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Abstract 
This research examines the formation of policy preferences under conditions 
approaching the ideal of deliberative democracy. These scenarios speeifically relate to 
complex and controversial environmental issues. The objective is to explore the 
possibilities for deliberative democracy and its implications for the policy process. 
The Far North Queensland Citizens' Jury (FNQCJ) was conducted over four days in 
January 2000, deliberating policy options for the Bloomfield Track, a controversial road 
within World Heritage listed rainforest. Policy preferences of participants were surveyed 
before and after deliberation using rank orderings of five policy options. 'Subjectivity' 
(beliefa and values) was also studied at three points using Q methodology. 
Analysis of the results reveals changes in subjectivity, which although 
comparatively small, has had a dramatic impact on policy preferences. The mechanism 
whereby policy preferences were transformed appears to involve the deactivation of 
symbolic assertions by interest groups and the activation of subjective states pertaining to 
common goods. Pre-deliberative policy preferences tended to reflect polarised (symbolic) 
discourses that dominated the issue publicly. 
Deliberation dissipated the distorting influence of symbolic politics and induced 
convergence toward a shared policy position appreciating the complexities of the issue for 
which deliberators sought integrated policy solutions, rather than juggling seemingly 
irreconcilable symbolic claims. Although this did not lead to absolute consensus, the 
differences in opinion among deliberators were readily accommodated in the formulation of 
policies. This appears to be a possible outcome of deliberation so long as outcomes are 
sensitive to the underlying reasons for particular positions. 
These fmdings suggest that policy preferences cannot be divorced from political 
context, including institutional arrangements. Under the status quo, citizens tend to be 
unduly influenced by the strategic arguments of interests, despite their capacity for better 
judgement. Without active citizen participation, policy discourses are shaped by dominant 
political actors, This results in a fuilure of policy preferences to reflect substantive 
dimensions of issues, perpetuating symbolic issues in public decision-making. By contrast, it 
appears that the deliberative process helps to reconstruct policy preferences according to 
theoretical ideals - peeling away the layers of confusion created by symbolic politics, 
which can result in poorly considered preferences. As such, it is concluded that deliberation 
serves to shape policy preferences to reflect community aspirations, which are consistent 
with the provision of common goods such as environmental protection, rather than 
individual concerns and prejudices. 
-v-
SYNOPTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PART I: BACKGROUND 
Chapter 1 Deliberation in the Wilderness! The Idea of 
Deliberative Democracy-.... ,,.uu••ou•Ho•••••••H•••••u• .. u•uu••••••••••••••• .......... ou•••·•··~•l 
Chapter 2 Deliberative Preference Transformation: Developing 
Exploratory models ......•....•......•••••.••......•...•..........••••....••...•••.....•••.•....•........... 19 
PART II: DELIBERATIVE PROCESS AND BACKGROUND 
Chapter 3 Simulating Deliberative Democracy: The Design of 
the FNQCJ ••••H•••••nHHHH•••~• .... •••••onuoHHHH••••H••n••••uuouH•uoo•u••••••••••••uuuouu65 
Chapter 4 Case Study: Policy Options for the Bloomfield 
T racLuou•ooooooooooooHU•OHUHO•••••••••• .. u••••••H••hoooooooooo•+••Huo•u~•••ou•••••••••nnuuuuoo85 
PART III: ANALYSIS OF DELIBERATIVE DYNAMICS 
Chapter 5 The Far North Queensland Citizens' Jury: 
Proceedings, Discourses and Outcomes ...................................................... 127 
Chapter 6 The Deliberative Dynamics of Subjectivity: 
Exploring The Discursive Sphere using Q Method ................................... 155 
Chapter 7 Deliberative Dynamics of Preferences: Analysis of 
Transformation Through Discourse ........................................................... W 
Chapter 8 Activating Norms Through Discourse: Deliberation 
and the Dynamics of Subjectivity and Preference ...................................... 233 
PART IV: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Chapter 9 Deliberation and Preference Transformation: 
Incorporating Findings into Theory .......................................................... 262 
Chapter 10 Conclusion: Deliberation out of the Wilderness! ...................................... 290 
References •u•u•ooouuo•••••••••oo••••ou•o•n•••••••••••uuuuo.•••o-*•••••••uuuu .. HHn••••••••••u•••Hn••u•309 
FIGURES 
Figure 2-1 Preference Construction Model... ...................................................................... 24 
Figure 2-2 Preference Model Including Motivational System ..................... .., .................... 37 
Figure 2-3 The Discursive Sphere ....................................................................................... 50 
Figure 2-4 Subjective States and Their Relationship to Policy Preferences ....................... 56 
Figure 4-1 Location of the Bloomfield Track ...................................................................... 89 
Figure 4-2 The Bloomfield Track ........................................................................................ 89 
Figure 4-3 Creek Crossing at Emmagen Creek .................................................................... 97 
Figure 4-4 Cowie Range ...................................................................................................... 97 
Figure 4-5 The Zig Zag ....................................................................................................... 97 
Figure 4-6 Protests During the Construction of the Bloomfield Track ............................ 113 
Figure 5-1 Map of the Cairns-Cooktown region showing roads aud Shires ..................... 132 
Figure 6-1 The Application of Q methodology to the FNQCJ.. ...................................... 161 
Figure 6-2 Diagrammatic representation of factors ........................................................... 173 
Figure 6-3 Factor loadings measured at three deliberative stages ...................................... 193 
Figure 8-1 Intersubjective construction of preferences using raw Q data ......................... 238 
Figure 8-2 Scatter plot ofloadings on Preservation aud Restrictive Access ..................... 248 
Figure 8-3 Calculation of Residual Shift on Restrictive Access ........................................ 250 
Figure 8-4 Scatter plot of Optimism & Propitiatism versus Residual Shift on 
RA ................................................................................................................... 252 
Figure 8-5 Scatter plot ofloadings on Pragmatism and Restrictive Access ...................... 256 
TABLES 
Table 2-1 Modalities of Preference Formation, French Assemblee 
Constituante ....................................................................................................... 24 
Table 2-2 Types of Consensus under the Preference Construction Model.. ..................... 26 
Table 3-1 Deliberators participating in the Fl\QCL ......................................................... 82 
Table 5-1 Timetable for the FNQCJ ................................................................................ 130 
Table 5-2 Technical Witnesses ......................................................................................... 133 
Table 5-3 Community Witnesses ..................................................................................... 134 
Table 5-4 Influence of Witnesses ..................................................................................... 141 
Table 6-1 Factor Scores .................................................................................................... 171 
Table 6-2 Statements experiencing greatest level of change in response 
across the deliberators ...................................................................................... 189 
Table 7-1 Five policy options used in the preference survey .......................................... 212 
Table 7-2 Pre and post-deliberative preference ranks ...................................................... 214 
Table 7-3 Pre and post-deliberative aggregate policy rank ............................................... 215 
Table 7-4 Correlation between individual pre and post-deliberative 
preference ......................................................................................................... 2 l 8 
Table 7-5 Distances between pre and post-deliberative preferences ............................... 219 
Table 7-6 Results oftest for trend ................................................................................... 221 
Table 7-7 Consensus test using distance from centre ....................................................... 222 
Table 7-8 Test for change in concordance ........................................................................ 223 
Table 7-9 Statistical versus Substantive Findings ............................................................ 226 
Table 8-1 Contribution of Subjective Factor to Aggregate Preference ............................. 243 
Table 8-2 Relative Contribution of Factors to Aggregate Preference ............................... 245 
Table 8-3 Pre-deliberative influences on Preference ......................................................... 257 
Table 8-4 Post-deliberative Influences on Preference ....................................................... 258 
ANALYTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Synoptic Table of Contents ................................................................................. vii 
Figures ................................................................................................................ viii 
Tables .................................................................................................................. ix 
PART I: BACKGROUND 
Chapter l Deliberation in the Wilderness? The Idea of Deliberative 
Democracy •••••••u•n••nunuo•••••••••u•• .. ou•ou•o•••n•uu•••••H••H••onu•nu••••u•••uuu•u•••l 
I.I Overview .................................................................................................... I 
1.2 The Ideal of Deliberative Democracy and its Detractors ........................... 3 
1.2.1 The Ideal of Deliberative Democracy...... ...................... . .......... 4 
1.2,2 Deliberation and Democr(]L.y: Can Citizens have the 'Right 
1.2.3 
1.2.4 
1.2.5 
Stuff"'..... ............. .. ...... . 
f)eliberation and Deliberative Outputs .... . 
Deliberation as Transformation of Politics in esse ... ,., 
Summary: Synopsis of Aims... . ....... ,.,, ..... , 
.... 5 
.9 
. 12 
.... 16 
1.3 The Task Ahead ....................................................................................... 17 
Chapter 2 Deliberative Preference Transformation: Developing 
ExploratOl)" models UH•uunuuHH<•HOOH<••o .. ununouuuuono••••oUOOhHOOOHHOO+•••••••oool9 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 19 
2.2 Preferences and Policy Choices ............................................................... 20 
2J l The Problem with Preferences as Reasons: A Critique of the Thin 
Model.............. ............ .................. .. ........... 20 
2.2.2 The Extended Model of Po&J' Preferences........................ 22 
2.2.3 The Preference Construction J,.fodel and l...todes of Deliberative 
Tran~fonnation,, ............ ,.." .,. .,,.17 
2.2.4 Summary .................. . .......... ..... .. ..... 28 
2.3 The Preference Construction Hypothesis: Deliberation and 
Changes in Beliets .................................................................................... 28 
2.3. l Cognition and Mechanisms for Deliberative Preference Shi{/... 29 
2.3.2 Preference Constroction and Issue Complexity: Bounded 
Rationality............... .... .. .. ..... . .. ..... .. .. .. .............. 29 
2. 3. 3 Deliberation as Pushing Back Cognitive limits.......... .. ............ 30 
2.3,4 Limitations of Deliberative Preference Transfortnation Due to 
Changing Beliefs.. . .. .. .. .. . . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. . 3 2 
2.4 Deliberation and Changing Values ............................................................ 33 
2.4. l The Case for Admitting Multiple Motivations to the Preference 
Model.... ................. . .... 33 
2.4.2 Multiple Motives: Including the Valuational Dimension in the 
Preference Model . . . .. . .. .. .. .. .. .... 3 6 
2.4.3 Deliberative Preference Shift due lo changing Values. .. ................. 40 
2.4.4 Activating Values Through Deliberation ...... ......... ".. .. 40 
2.4. 5 Summary.... .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . ..... .. .. .. ...... 45 
2.5 An Exploratory Model of Deliberative Preference 
Transformation ........................................................................................ 45 
Chlpterl 
2.5.l 
2.5.2 
2.5.3 
2.5.4 
2.5.5 
2.5.6 
2.6 
(Rejsimpiifying the Preference Model..... .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. . . .......... 4 6 
SubjectivityandDis:course .. ......... .,, ... , ,,,,,,, "., ... , .. ,.47 
Generalizeable Interest.-:,,. ............. .,.. ···"······· ....... 51 
Prt;ference Formation in the Discursive Sphere.... . .............. ..... 52 
Three T}pes qf Policy Pre,ference Sh~ft under the Discursive 
Model.. ................ .. ................................. .................. 54 
Summary .. "........... . ............. ., .. , .... .... " ...... 58 
Exploring Preference Shift Under the Discursive Model; 
Approaches and Methods ....................................................................... 58 
2.6.l The Nature of the Task............... .............. .............. .. ........ 58 
2. 6.2 Q methodology and the Analysis of Discourse................... . ......... 59 
2.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 61 
PART II: DELIBERATIVE PROCESS AND BACKGROUND 
Chapter 3 Simulating Deliberative Democracy: The Design of the 
FNQCJ ............................................................................................................. 65 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 65 
3 .2 Principles of Design ................................................................................. 65 
3.3 Case Studies in Deliberation and Deliberative Faihrre ............................. 67 
3.4 Discursive design: Leaming from Deliberative Failure ............................ 70 
3.4.l Conforming Behaviour..... .. ... d ... ., .... 71 
3.4,2 Deliberative Overload. . ....... .,,. .. ,, .. 73 
3.4.3 Strategic Talk... ..... ........ ... . ........... .. .. 75 
3.5 Recruitment of Deliberators .................................................................... 78 
3.5,1 Representativeness......... ............ . ..... " 78 
3.5.2 Geographic Area for Selection ...... ....... . ............ .. ............. 80 
3.5.3 Selection Process.. ............ ................ . ...... 81 
3.5.4 Compensation for Deliberators. .. .......... 81 
3.5.5 Final Deliberative Group...... ............. .. ...... 82 
3.6 Witnesses ................................................................................................. 83 
3.6.1 Expert Witnesses....... . .. ......... 83 
3.6.2 Community Witnesses ................ ,. .................................... ".'"· .... 83 
3.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................... 84 
Chapter 4 Case Study: Policy Options for the Bloomfield Track ................................ 85 
4 .1 Introduction ............................................................................................. 8 5 
4.2 Background to The Bloomfield Track Issue ............................................ 85 
4.2.l Overview of the Bloomfield Track. ................................ ............. ..... 86 
4.2.2 The Bloomfield Track in Ecological Context .............. ..93 
4.2.3 The Bloomfield Track in Social Context.......... 100 
4. 2.4 The Bloomfield Track in Political Context. . ... .. . . .... .. . . .. ... . . . ........ 102 
4.2.5 Summary.. ................. 106 
4.3 The Genesis of a Policy Fiasco ............................................................. 107 
4.3.J Events in Lead up to the Bloomfield Track Issue.... ....... ........ .. .... 107 
4.3.2 A Very Public Battle: The Construction of the Bloomfield Track .......... 112 
4.3.3 The Bloomfield Track Outcome. The Politics of Power .................... 120 
4.4 The Policy Problem ............................................................................... 121 
4,4,J After the Bloomfield Track,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, , ,,,,, 121 
4.5 Conclusion ............ , ............................ ,, .... ,,, ..................................... ,,, ... 123 
PART III: ANALYSIS OF DELIBERATIVE DYNAMICS 
Chapter 5 The Far North Queenslaod Citizens' Jury: Pro<:eedings, 
Discourses and Outcomes ~nuuo.o•HHnu••HHHuHno••o•••····•••uu••••UH••••UUU•••••127 
5, I Introduction ,,, .. ,,, .... ,, .. ,,,, ,,,, ......... ,, .. ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,,,, , ............ ,,,, ................. 12 7 
5.2 The Deliberative Process .................... ,, ................ ,,,,,,,, ,,,, , .................... 128 
5,2,/ Overview,,,, .. ,,,,,,. ,,,,,,,,,,,, , ,,,,,,,,,, .... ,,,,,,,,,,,, .. 128 
5.3 Discourses and Turning Points .......................... ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ....... ,,,,,,,,. 136 
5.3. I Sitelnspection .... ...... ,, ,, .. , .. .. .... ,, ,, .. , ,, , ,, ,, , 13 7 
5.3.2 fVUness Presentations,,.. .. ... ,,.,,."'"'"'' ........ ,,,, ...... 139 
5.3.3 Discourses on the Final Day of Deliberation, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,, l 50 
5.4 Policy Recommendations of the Far North Queensland 
Citizens' Jury .... , ........ ,, ....... ,, . ,, ,, ............. ,, .... ,, ,, ,, ........ ,,,,,,,,.,,,,, ............ 152 
5.4. l Position l: Staged Bloomfield Track Closure,, .............. ,, , I 53 
5.4.2 Position 2: Keep Bloomfield Track Open with Strict Management ........ 153 
5.4.3 llnanitnous Findings,,............ .. .... ".""" ..... , ....... 154 
5 .5 Summary ..... ,,,,,,, .... ,,,,,.,,,, .. ,, ............ ,, ........... ,,,,,,, ...... ,,,,, ....................... 154 
Chapter 6 The Deliberative Dynamks of Subjectivity: Exploring The 
Dis<:ursive Sphere using Q Method ............................................................. 155 
6. 1 Introduction ...... ,, .............. ,, .................... ,, ....................... , , .................... 155 
6.2 Q methodologyand the Analysis ofDiscourse ..... ,, ... ,, .......................... 156 
6.2. l Q methodology as the search for subjective species ,, ,, 156 
6'2. 2 Sampling and Q Methodology,, ,, , .. ,, ,, ,, ,, , , , ...... ,, ,, ,, , I 58 
6.2.3 Ana{vsis o/Q sorts and its Application to the f<iVQC! Data. .. ...... 160 
6.2.4 Step 1: QSorting,,,, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,......... .. .. ,,, ... ,, ..... 161 
6.2.5 Step 2: I'llctor Extractionfro111 the Subjectivity Data, ....... 162 
6.2.6 Step3·Judgmenta/Rotation .. ,,,,,,, .... , .......... 164 
6.2.7 Factor Description..,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,., .. ,,... .. ......... 165 
6.3 Q Factors: Four Subjective Types in the Discursive Sphere ................. 169 
6.3.J Overview of the Subjective Factors .. ,,,.. .. .... 169 
ti3.2 Factor Descriptions,, ......... ,,, ..... , 175 
6.4 Deliberative Dynamics of Subjectivity ... ,,, ............................................ 186 
6.4.1 Subjective Changes Across the Discursive landscape .. ........... 187 
6.4.2 Subjective Dynamics and Changes to Factors .. ·-· . .. 191 
6.4.3 Synopsis of Changes to the Discursive Landscape,, ,,,,,,,, .... ,,, ,,,,,,,., 196 
65 Explaining Changes to the Discursive Landscape .... ,, ... ,, ....................... 196 
6,5, 1 Explaining Changes to individual Factors,, ........... ,,,, ..... 197 
6.5.2 The Acquisition of Information in l)e/iberative Context ond the 
Role of Pre-existing Knowledge,,.,, ... . 203 
6.6 Summary and Conclusion .................. ,,, ....................... ,, .... ,, .................. 204 
-xiii-
Chapter 7 Deliberative Dynamics of Preferences: Analysis of 
Transformation Through Discourse ........................................................... 207 
7.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 207 
7.2 Measuring Policy Preferences for the Bloomfield Track. ...................... 208 
7.2.l Measuring Policy Preferences.......... .................... .. ................. 208 
7.2.2 Implementation of Pr~ference Survey .... ........................................ 210 
7.3 Policy Preference Results ...................................................................... 213 
7.3.1 Pre and Post-deliberative Policy Prejerences . ....... ,,,,. . .............. 213 
7.3.2 Aggregat£ Preferences,.. ............... . .......... .. .. 214 
7.3.3 Discusswn of Raw Results....................... .. ..................... 216 
7.4 Analysis of Preference Dynamics ......................................................... 216 
7.4.I Individual Preference Dynamics .... ,, ... _ ................. , ,, 217 
7.4.2 Group Preference Shifts..... .. ..... 220 
7.4.3 Empirical Consensus .... ., ....... ,., ........ 222 
7.4.4 l)iscussion of Statistical Analysis........ . ........ · ...... 223 
7 .5 Discussion: Deliberative Dynamics of Preferences ............................... 225 
7.5.1 Self-Assessment of Substantive Shifts.... ............ .. 225 
7.5.2 Substantive changes to aggregate outcome., ........ "'............. . ... 228 
7.5.3 Substantive Consensus .. ,,, ............ ,. .......... , ,,,............ .. 229 
7.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 230 
Chapter 8 Activating Norms Through Discourse: Deliberation and the 
Dynamics of Subjectivity and Preference ................................................... 233 
8.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 233 
8.2 Review of Findings ................................................................................ 234 
8.2. l Review qf Findings so far..... .. ............................ 234 
8.3 Explaining Deliberative Dynamics: Exploring Tbree possible 
explanations ........................................................................................... 236 
8.3. I Subjective Transformation...... . ...... 237 
8.3.2 Preference Construction. ............. . ... 237 
8.3.3 The Activation Hypothesis....... .. .... 239 
8.4 Assessing tbe Role of the Subjective Factors in the construction 
of preference .......................................................................................... 242 
8. 4, 1 The Contribution of the Subjective F'actars to Aggregate 
8.4.2 
Preference ..... 
Summary .. 
...242 
....... 245 
8.5 Refining Explanations of Deliberative Dynamics .................................. 246 
8.5. l The Activation of Preservation and Deactivation of Synibolic 
8.5.2 
8.5.3 
Politics ..... , .... , .. . .. .. ., "" ,. ... ,. ...... 246 
Pragmatisnt as the Counter-G'ase ........................ . 254 
Summary and Findings.. ............. ... ... .. .................. 257 
8.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 259 
PARTIV: FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Chapter 9 Deliberation and Preference Trans formation: Incorporating 
Findings into Theory .................................................................................... 262 
9.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 262 
9.2 Policy Preference Formation and the Implication of Multiple 
~orms .................................................................................................... 263 
9.2, l The Preference Construction ]Y!odel and Prediction o_f Policy 
Preferences.. .................... . ............ 263 
9.2.2 The Role of Multiple Subjective States in Explaining Preference 
f.,ormation and Transformation, ....... , ..... , ..... ,,.,, ........................... 264 
9.2.3 Multiple and Dominant l'{orms; Particular and Generalizable 
Interests... ............. .. ... 269 
9.3 Preference Distortion and Deliberative Remedies .................................. 271 
9.3.l Symbolic Politics: The Crowding-out of Dominant Norms and its 
Deliberative Dissipation... . " .. ,. ,,.. . .. . ,. . ,., .. . . .. . ".272 
9.3.2 Turning Desires into Preferences: The Activation of the 
Preservationist Norm, ...... ..... "... ... ......... ....... . ....... ,,., . . ,.,,,,.276 
9.4 Deliberative Dynamics: An Overview ................................................... 278 
9. 4.1 Two Processes of Dissipation and Activation: Same !Jeliberative 
Process., ..... ,, .... , ...... ",, . ., ......... , , ... . . . .... , , . "279 
9.4.2 The Importance of Deliberative Context: The Relative Role of 
Information and Deliberation in Dispelling Symbolic Myths? ...... . ...... 281 
9 .5 The Stability and Legitimacy of Deliberative Outcomes ....................... 284 
9.5.1 Stability of Deliberative Outputs Over Time............... .. ... 284 
9.5.2 Stability Dependence on the Content and Duration of the 
DeliberatilieProcess . ................. ............ ",, ... 285 
9.5.3 
9.5.4 
.4 venues jOr Process Afanipulation.. .. , .. ,, ,. .. , 
Summary: Legitimate Conclusions Jf'om the FlVQCJ, .. 
... 287 
... 288 
9.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 289 
Chapter IO Conclusion: Deliberation out of the Wilderness? ...................................... 290 
10.1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 290 
10.2 Politics in esse: The Disenfranchising Power of Preferences ................. 291 
10.2.l 'Dumb' Preferences........................................... .. ...... 29! 
10.2.2 The Revised Political Sequence.· Questioning Autonon1ous 
Preferences.. .. ............ ,, .. ,........ . . ... . 295 
10.2,3 Reverse Politics: Disenfranchising Citizens/Disenfranchising 
;Vature .... .. . .................. , , , ....... , ..... , , , ..... , ..... . . . . . . .... 297 
10.3 Deliberative Politics in posse: Enfranchising the Wilderness ................. 299 
JO,J.J Enfranchising Citizens Through Reason.. .. ........... 299 
111.3.2 Ecological Complexity: Do Deliberating Citizens Have the Right 
Stuff! .. ........ ............. .... ........... .301 
10.3.3 Deliberation and the Wilderness: Against Pre-emptive 
'Sustainable· Consensus. .., ..... 302 
l 0.4 Bringing Deliberation out of the Wilderness? ........................................ 305 
10.4. I A Citizens' Jury does not a Deliberative Democracy }.,fake .. ,, .... ,,, .... 306 
I 0. 4.2 .4 Citizens' Jury may a Non-Deliberative Democracy Transform.. , . , , , 308 
-xv-
References ......................................................................................................................... 309 
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 FNQCJ Surveys ............................................................................................. 327 
A.1.1. Pre-deliberative Survey ........................................................................... 328 
A.1.2. Post-Deliberative Survey ........................................................................ 330 
Appendix 2 Raw Survey Data ............................................................................................ 336 
A.2.1. Adventure .............................................................................................. 336 
A.2.1. l. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results........ .. .. .... .... .. .. ..... 336 
A.2.1.2. J>ost-Deliberative Swvey Results,, ..... ..... ,,, .. ,. .... ,,.,. ......... ," ..... ,, .. 336 
A.2.2. Aswad .................................................................................................... 337 
A.2.2. l. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results. .. .. .. .. .... . .. .. .. .... . ... . .... 33 7 
A.2.2. 2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results..... .. ............................. 337 
A.2.3. Boat ....................................................................................................... 338 
A.2.3.1. 11re-Deliberative Survey Results ... ,,,, .. 
A.2.3.2. [>ost-Deliberalive Survey Results,. .. 
. .... ............ 338 
. ""'"""'" ...... 338 
A.2.4. Janine ..................................................................................................... 340 
A.2.4. I. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results....... .. .. .. . .. .. . .. ......... 340 
A.2.4.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results.. ............ . .................. 340 
A.2.5. Julie ........................................................................................................ 341 
A.2.5.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results ...... ..... ................ ..341 
A.2.5.2. Post~DeliberativeSurveyResults.. .................... . .... "' .. ''" " ...... 341 
A.2.6. Keith ...................................................................................................... 342 
A.2.6. 1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results.. .. .............. 342 
A.2.6.2. Post-DeliberativeSurveyResults..... . ...................... .. 342 
A.2.7. Koda ...................................................................................................... 343 
A.2. 7. 1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results. .. .. .... .... .. . . ............ 343 
A.2. 7.2. Post.Deliberative Survey Results................ . ............................. 343 
A.2.8. Matilda .................................................................................................. 344 
A.2. 8. I. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results... . ................................... 344 
A.2.8.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results.................... .. .. .. ..... . . .. . . . .. 344 
A.2.9. Pearl ....................................................................................................... 346 
A.2.9.J. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results. .............. .. .. 346 
A.2.9.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results....... ........ .... ... .... ........ . .. 346 
A.2.1 O.Rastus .................................................................................................... 347 
A.2. JO. I. Pre-Deliberattve Survey Re.suits ... 
A.2. 10.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
..... '"' ..................... ..... 347 
" .................. .................... 347 
A.2.11.Snoopy .................................................................................................. 348 
A.2.11.l. Pre-DeliberativeSurveyResults. ... .... ................ .348 
A.2.1I.2. Post·De/iberative Survey Resullv ................................................. 348 
A.2. 12. Tamarra .................................................................................................. 349 
A.2.12.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results ............. ........... . ... , ............ 349 
A.2.12.2. Post-DeliberativeSurveyResults .... ...................... . '349 
Appendix 3 Technical Witness Handouts ......................................................................... 351 
A. 3. 1. Bob Baade ......................................................................................... , .... 3 52 
A.3 .2. Peter Hitchcock ...................................................................................... 3 5 6 
A.3.3. Steve Turton .......................................................................................... 363 
A.3 .4. David Haynes ........................................................................................ 366 
A.3.5. Julie Brown ............................................................................................ 370 
Appendix 4 FNQCJ Juror Findings ................................................................................. 373 
A.4. 1. Majority Position: Staged Closure of the Bloomfield Track ................. 373 
A.4.1.1. Mitigating Impact on Local Connnunities and C'apturing 
Opportunities.................... . .... 373 
A.4.1.2. Timelinefor Closure....... ............. .. ...... 374 
A.4.2. Minority Position: Leave the Bloomfield Track Open With 
Strict Management ................................................................................. 376 
A.4.3. Findings by All Jurors ........................................................................... 378 
A,4.3.J, Ranger Station/Visitor Centre .. ···"······'" ........... 378 
A. 4. 3. 2. Consultation................ .............. ...... .. .. .... ...... .. .. . . ... 3 79 
A.4.3.3. Sensitivity to Local Indigenous Issues...... . ..... 380 
Appendix 5 Q Method: Design and Analysis ................................................................... 381 
A.5. l. Selection of Q Statements ...................................................................... 3 81 
A.5 .2. Q-Sorting ........... , ........................ , ........................................................... 3 85 
A. 5 .3. Q Results ............................................................................................... 3 86 
A.5 .4. Changes to Statement Scores ................................................................. 389 
A. 5. 5. Changes to Sorts .................................................................................... 3 90 
Appendix 6 Analysis of Policy Preferences ....................................................................... 392 
A.6.1. Spatial 'Distances' Between Ranks ....................................................... 392 
A.6. 1. 1. Euclidean Distance....... . ...................... 392 
A .6. 1. 2. Spearman Distance... . . .... .. .. .. .. ... . . ..... ... 393 
A.6.1.3. Kendal/Disrance.. .... ......... . ............... 393 
A.6.2. Measures of Aggregation ....................................................................... 394 
A.6.2.1. Marginals and average rank..... .. ....... 394 
A.6.2.2. Borda Count...... .............. ..395 
A. 6,2, 3. Paired Comparisons and consensus rank , ..... 396 
A.6.2.4. Hare.................... ............ ............ .. .... 397 
A 6.2.5. Centre Rank. ................ ............. . .. 397 
A.6.3. Analysis of Paired Ranks ....................................................................... 398 
A.6.3.1. Critchlow and Verducci test for paired ranks.. ... . ........... ..... 398 
A.6.3. 2. Test for trend in rank data.. ... ..... .. ... .. .. .......... .. ........ 404 
A. 6.3.3. Correlation between paired ranks .. .. 404 
A.6.4. Test for Change in Preference Orderings Across the Group ................. 406 
A,6,4.1. T-testusingDistaneefrom Centre.,'"""""" ........... 406 
A. 6.4.2. Marden Test for di/]erence using Paired Rankings.... .. .. . 408 
A.6.5. Measures of Distribution, Concordance and Consensus ....................... 409 
A.6.5.1. Distributionjrom Centre........ ............ . ........... ....... .409 
-xvii-
Concordance , . , . . .... 410 A.6.5.2. 
A.6.5.3. Formal Measures of Consensus. . ........................................ 412 
Appendix 7 Structuration of Preferences ......................................................................... 417 
A.7.l. Preference Structuration and Single Peakedness .................................... 417 
A. 7.1.1. Case Study The Deliberative Poll on an Australian Republic .............. 419 
A.7.2. Analysis of Single Peakedness for the FNQCJ Data ............................. 420 
A.7.2.J. Results.... ............... ............ ..421 
A. 7.2.2. Symbolic Politics, Deliberation and Preference Structuration ..... " ... , 424 
Appendix 8 Combined Analysis of Subjectivity and Preference ................................... 427 
A.8.1. Preference Outputs from the Four Subjective Factors and Their 
Transformation ...................................................................................... 427 
A.8,1.1. Associating Preference.,'¥ with Subjective Factors: Calculation of 
Factor Preference Ranks,,. .. ........ ,,.,,,. ..... ". . ..... 428 
A.8. l.2. Factor Preference Ranks and Changes between Deliberative 
Stages............. . . . .. .. . .... . . .................. . 
A.8.1.3. Explaining Changes to Factor Preference Rank ................ . 
A. 8. 1. 4, Calculation of Factor Preference Construction,,,, 
..... 430 
. ... 432 
.... 433 
A.8.2. Preference Transformation: Detailed Analysis of Causes ..................... 434 
A.8.2.1. Assessing Preference Shift due to Subjective Transformation ............ ,,. 434 
A.8.2.2. Testing The Preference Construction Hypothesis ... ,,..... . ... 441 
A.8.3. Analysis of the Role of Pragmatism .. ,, ................... ,, ...... ,, ........... ,, ........ 442 
-xv111,..., 
PART I: BACKGROUND 
CHAPTER 1 DELIBERATION IN THE 
WILDERNESS? THE IDEA OF 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
Do citizens have the 'right stuff to make deliberative democracy work?1 Do the 
configurations of modern 'democratic' states lend themselves to political outcomes 
approaching democratic ideals? If the response to either question is negative, what are 
the major impediments in the way? What can be done to steer a path toward a 
'deliberative democracy'? Moreover, does a deliberative democracy lend itself to 
political decisions that are sensitive to the enviromnental circumstances of human 
societies? These questions set the broad parameters of this thesis, which aims to 
address them and in doing so contribute to the integration of deliberative theory and 
practice. 
A good deal of literature has been dedicated to the ideal of deliberative 
democracy and the potential barriers to it in practice. The deliberative literature to date 
bas covered a wide range of related topics - including not only the judgemental 
capacities of deliberating citizens, but also problems of legitimacy and 
representativeness, procedural versus epistemic merits, and achievability of theoretical 
ideals. Instances of 'deliberative' practice have emerged over the past thirty years 
independently of the theoretical literature. These have taken a number of forms such as 
deliberative polls, Citizens' Juries and consensus conferences. In some constituencies 
deliberative forums have become increasingly embraced as legitimate inputs into public 
decision making. 
1 A question posed by Tet1ock (1998). albeit in relation to democracy in a more general sense. 
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Thus, there is considerable activity associated with the 'deliberative tum' among 
both theoreticians and practitioners. However, there has been little communication 
between these two communities beyond tacit acknowledgment.2 Each has contributed 
much to the body of understanding. Through the efforts of theoreticians it possible to 
gauge how deliberative democracy works in the abstract. From practitioners we know 
that interesting results arise when deliberative forums are conducted and that they may 
at times fail spectacularly to either produce coherent results or influence public policy 
processes when confronted with realpolitik. Yet, there is currently a dearth of work 
linking these two sttands. 
More recently the need for empirical checks on theoretical possibilities through 
practical examples has become increasingly recognised (for example Bolrman, 1998). To 
integrate theory and practice properly, it is necessary to investigate the processes at 
play during deliberation in practice and the ways in which these relate to theory. It is 
also necessary to be sensitive to the political contexts of deliberative practice. 
Moreover, if we are to understand deliberative possibilities it is important to examine 
the extent to which both existing and theorised political institutions and examples of 
deliberative practice approach theoretical ideals. Where they do not, the gap between 
them needs explanation. It is this gap - between theory and practice - that I set out 
to bridge. In doing so, it is hoped that both possibilities for deliberative democracy and 
tangible steps that can be taken toward it can be identified. 
To achieve these aims I 'Will explore empirically the possibilities of deliberative 
democracy by probing the differences in the way that ordinary citizens respond to a 
complex environmental policy problem. The policy problem providing the focus for 
citizens' deliberations will be the Bloomfield Track, a controversial road located in a 
World Heritage listed rainforest wilderness area in the Far North of Queensland (FNQ), 
Australia. 
I will investigate citizen responses to the Bloomfield Track issue under two 
scenarios. The first concerns 'politics as usual' under the prevailing institutional and 
political settings for the issue. The second is conducted under conditions of 
'deliberative intervention', designed to simulate something approaching the 'deliberative 
'With perhaps the exception ofFisbkin (1995). 
Soction 12: Thi Ideal of Deliberative Democracy arr! its Detractors 
ideal'. The forum in which deliberations took place was the Far North Queensland 
Citizens' Jury (FNQCJ), which was conducted in Cairns in January 2000. The 
differences between the pre and post·deliberative scenarios and the process of 
transformation between them are analysed. By doing so, I hope to be able to infer 
something about the salient characteristics of the status quo that produce outcomes 
counter to deliberative ideals. I also hope to be able to formulate tentative mechanisms 
to address these gaps. 
In the following section (1.2) I will adumbrate the major features of deliberative 
democracy and consider some of the criticisms levelled at it. The discussion will serve 
to outline the broad areas of political practice and deliberative possibilities covered by 
this thesis. Section 1.3 outlines the structure of the thesis to achieve its aims. 
1.2 THE IDEAL OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND 
ITS DETRACTORS 
The term 'deliberative democracy', first coined by Bessette (1980), has become 
the idiom of choice for exponents of the deliberative tum in democratic theory. It is not 
a new phenomenon. The idea of deliberative democracy has its roots as far back as 
Rousseau, even Aristotle, with its modern precursors lying in the works of Dewey and 
Arendt. In its contemporary usage, deliberative democracy has both a classical (ideal) 
and critical flavour. The classical ideal is well encapsulated by Fay's (1975) description 
of politics as citizens' 'deliberate efforts to order, direct, and control their collective 
affairs and activities, to establish ends for their society, and to implement and evaluate 
these ends'.4 The critical component stems from the tendency for deliberative, or 
'discursive', democracy to be set up in contradistinction to an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs in politics as practised. 5 
1 
:\mong many others, too numerous to be considered here, For a discussion of the deHberative turn see 
Bohman (1998, p.400) 
4 Cited in Dryzek (1990, p.10) 
3 Bessctte's (1980) article is a good example, criticising elitist interpretations of the American 
constitution. Dryzek (2000, esp. pp.2~3) makes a point of stressing discursive democracy as a subset 
of deliberative democracy, specificaUy pertaining to this critical dimension, 
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Thus, on one hand we have deliberative democracy as prescription for achieving 
democratic ideals, or politics in posse; on the other it can be used as a counterfactual 
position from which to criticise the status quo, or politics in esse, In the following 
discussion I will sketch the ideal of deliberative democracy, before moving on to contrast 
it with practical considerations. 
1.2.1 The Ideal of Deliberative Democracy 
The classical ideal of deliberative democracy cited above resonates with Barber's 
(1984) 'strong democracy', which stresses broadscale participation in political decision 
making and the activation of 'citizenship' in determining outcomes, Following from this 
deliberative democracy in posse comprises two main elements: participatory and 
deliberative. 6 The first, participatory element concerns the legitimation of democratic 
decisions through the assent of the citizenry. The problem of legitimation for 
deliberative democracy is not trivial, not least because it may be interpreted to imply 
that everyone affected by a decision should have 'free and unconstrained' deliberative 
participation in the decision process (Benhabib, 1996, p.68). Such lofty ideals are 
clearly not possible. There have been a number of attempts to wrestle with the problem 
oflegitimacy, without full representation of all concerned with (or affected by) a policy 
problem.7 
Here I will side-step these issues and focus on the second feature of deliberation 
·~the transformation of preferences - considering the processes whereby this occurs, 
and how popular decisions might be affected by the application of deliberation to 
democratic processes. 8 To borrow from the classic conception of politics, I am 
interested in how citizens might choose particular policy means to satisfy desired ends. 
Importantly, I am also interested in how these ends are chosen. 
Preference transformation under deliberative democracy in posse tends to be 
contrasted with preferences under politics in esse in terms of the conditions under which 
they are formed. Dryzek ( 1990), for one, characterises the conditions of the deliberative 
'See for example Dryzek (2000, p.l), 
1 For example: (for example Goodin, 2000a; Dryzek, 200 l; O>!eill, 2001) 
3 [n using the term preferences, I am reaHy referring to a preferred policy option in relation to a policy 
problem - or expressed preference (see sec.tion 7.2). 
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ideal in terms of communicative rationality. Under communicative rationality, actors 
engage in 'intersubjective' discourse. This involves reflecting on the issue at hand from a 
shared perspective. This Habermasian concept, is also reflected in 'strong democracy': 
The participatory process of self-legislation that characterizes strong democracy attempts to 
balance adversary poiitics by nourishing the mutuaHstic art of listening. "I will listen'' means to 
the strong democrat not that I will scan my adversary's position for ··;veakne~'isess and potential 
trade-offs, nor even (as a minimalist might think) that I will tolerantly pennit him to say 
whatever he chooses. It means, rather, "I will put myself in his place, I will try to understand, I 
v,dli strain to hear what makes us aHke, I \Vill listen for a common rhetoric evocative of a 
couunon purpose or a couunon good". (Barber, 1984, p.175) 
This contrasts with preference formation under conditions where individuals 
engage in instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality is associated with strategic 
behaviour in order to bring about a desired outcome, usually associated with narrow self-
interest The deliberative ideal is corrupted once individual desires take over the process 
and arguments are used in order to elicit specific outcomes, a situation that will be 
characterised in the concluding chapter (10) as 'reverse politics'. 
Self-interest may be a manifest problem among individuals or groups with a 
particular stake in an issue. However, when it comes to much of the population a more 
pressing problem may not be self-interest, but misguided conceptions of the common 
good and/or poor judgemental capacities (for example Goodin and Roberts, 1975). I will 
consider some of these objections in the following discussion. 
1.2.2 Deliberation and Democracy: Can Citizens have the 'Right 
Stuff'? 
As alluded to at the outset of this chapter, a major challenge to the deliberative 
ideal concerns whether or not citizens have the 'right stuff to make deliberative 
democracy work. In short, the concern is that popular policy decisions often turn out 
to be collectively bad ones, giving rise to policy fiascos (Bovens and t'Hart, I 996, p.32-
34). Concern with failure of democracy due to the capacities of citizens has a long 
history, with Burke perhaps the best-known example in political theory.9 A more 
modem exponent of this scepticism is Schumpeter (1943 (1976), p.262), who presents a 
particularly grim view of the capacities of citizens, believing: 
9 See for example Sanders (1997, p.357) 
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[T]he typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the 
political field. He argues and analyses in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile 
within the sphere of his real interests. He becomes a primitive again. 
There is a wide array of literature challenging deliberative democracy and its 
direct democratic counterparts. 10 Most pressing for this thesis are those based on 
arguments about the capacity, or lack thereof, of individuals to engage the deliberative 
process in a manner described by the deliberative ideal. There are two main problems 
relating to the limitations of human capacities in achieving deliberative ideals. The first 
concerns communicative (or judgemental) competence. The second is the basis of 
motivations upon which individuals acting autonomously arrive at collective decisions. 
(a) Limits to Communicative Competence 
Deliberative ideals may be undermined to the extent that individuals are 
incapable of communicative competence, where deliberation proceeds on the basis of 
good argument and intersubjective understanding (see Dryzek, 1990). One stream of 
argument concerning competence comes from the legal literature. It argues that the 
average citizen is simply not capable of grappling with complex issues in any meaningful 
way (Green, 1967; Edmond and Mercer, 1997). Similar arguments of a more political 
flavour contend that preferences of citizens are inherently manipulable and essentially 
'empty', more a product of irrelevant causes, such as a desire to conform to the 
expectations of others. 11 Another well-versed objection is that without incentive to tell 
the truth, deliberators will engage in strategic uses of argument (Austen-Smith, 1992; 
Przeworski, 1998). 
The flip side of strategic talk could be the assertion that 'all deliberators are 
gullible'. While there is much focus in the deliberative literature of strategic uses of 
argument12, another question concerns just why individuals might be persuaded against 
their better judgement - assuming that if acting autonomously, their motivations would 
1° For a review of some of the major themes of criticism of deliberative democracy see Dryzek (2000). 
"For examples see (Janis, 1972; Wetzel and Walton, 1985; Kuran, 1997; Bliese and Halverson, 1998; 
Kuran, 1998; Verlhiac, 2000). Conformity is but one irrelevant cause of preferences; others include 
anti-conformity, adaptive and counter-adaptive preferences, the obsession with novelty and the 
resistance to novelty (Eisler, 1986a, p.110). 
12 Other examples include: (Pattanaik, 1978; Elster, 1995; Skillington, 1997; Johnston, 1998; Mackie, 
1998). 
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direct them otherwise. Rather than the propensity for strategic talk, it is the impact on 
'gullibility' that will be the focus of analysis here. 
Are deliberators gullible? It is an important question with respect to the 
prospect of deliberative democracy. Here I am interested in whether deliberation leads 
individuals to decide autonomously what they want, in terms of outcomes, as well as 
the best way this may be achieved through the implementation of policies. 
{b) Limits b,1Sed on Human Motivations 
Of course, I am also interested in how deliberation affects the motivations 
driving individual behaviour. An important consideration is whether basic human 
motivations can be compatible with deliberative ideals. The rational-self interest model 
is a particularly dominant, although much challenged, model for human behaviour. The 
model contrasts sharply with communicative rationality and, as I will now argue, is 
particularly relevant to environmental issues. 
In view of perceived limitations of human motivations, such as self-interest, 
dedicated environmentalists might baulk at principled commitments to grassroots 
democracy because there is no guarantee that their desire for green outcomes cao be 
reconciled with democratic principles (Goodin, 1992). Indeed, economists have 
produced evidence to support such concerns whereby 'sovereign' prefurences, based on 
self-interest, cannot ensure ecologically sustainable outcomes (Common aod Perrings, 
1992). 
That 'intrinsic' human self-interest might undermine the ability to achieve 
collectively desirable outcomes has led to the proposal of a series of remedies. 
Economists tend to focus on market based solutions, which supposedly harness self-
interest in order to achieve collective outcomes, such as the protection of the 
environrnent. 13 Another solution with a distinctly collective flavour is Goodin's (1986) 
'laundering' of preferences, whereby certain kinds of preferences are 'filtered' or 
'censored' from being expressed, for the sake of the common good. 
13 Baumol and Oates (1975) is perhaps the classic text. For a review of the development of these ideas 
see Spash (1999). 
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There is also an emerging theme similar to the laundering of preferences among 
ecological economists. As the proclaimed 'science of sustainability' (Costanza, 1991), 
ecological economics is concerned with the prospect for sustainable outcomes from 
collective choices. Apart from a lingering influence of neoclassical economics, many 
solutions developed tend to be fairly interventionist in flavour. One particular approach 
involves 'steering' individual preferences in 'sustainable' directions (Norton et al., 
1998).14 
(c) Human Capacities and Deliberative Ponibilities 
Findings such as those above citing limited human capacities tend to lead some 
theorists to advocate democratic processes that mediate the worst excesses of popular 
democratic processes through the exercise of intervention hy elites. Nevertheless, are 
the capacities of citizens so hopeless as to render the project of deliberative democracy 
futile? Can it be ecologically sustainable? 
In this thesis, I make a case that citizens do have the 'right stuff' to make 
deliberative democracy work and deternrine sustainable policies. Rather than limited 
capacities of citizens, the substantive problem may be structural, where existiog 
democratic process create impediments to deliberative democracy. Indeed, there is a link 
between the two. Individual capacities are limited because of structural factors. 
Consequently, those who criticise the capacities of citizens may simply be 
projecting the processes of politics in esse into the possibilities of deliberative 
democracy, without recogoising that individuals may act quite differently under 
deliberative ideals. One problem with such criticisms is an implicit assumption that 
deliberative democracy is constituted by anything that involves discussion. 15 Doing so 
lowers the deliberative benchmark considerably, making deliberative democracy an easy 
target. However, as I alluded above, deliberative democracy implies a particular set of 
14 However; these are not the only potential solutions, ecological economics too has experienced a fonu 
of deliberative tum, if albeit a partial one (for example Sagoff, 1998). This thesis is consistent witl1 
this deliberative tum in ecological economics so far as it seeks to understand the relationship between 
deliberation and jsustainable' preferences. 
15 This includes others who do not seek to criticise deliberative di:.mocracy per se. For example Schkade 
et al (2000) conduct a series of deliberative 'experiments' to examine how valuations based on legal 
compensation cases change during deliberation, For them, deliberation constih1tes 30 minutes of 
discussion! Less dra1natic examples of poor, or at least partial discursive design, are discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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conditions whereby individual preferences are formed and transformed. As will be 
argued in the remaining chapters of Part I, deliberative democracy involves far more than 
superimposing additional discussion onto politics in esse. 
I have considered above that conditions of communicative rationality arc 
qualitatively different to strategically motivated discussion under politics in esse. It 
follows that so too is the modus operandi of deliberation under theoretical ideals. In 
order to explore the deliberative possibilities, it is important to be mindful of these 
differences in discursive design. Thus, to explore the extent to which the judgemental 
capacities of 'ordinary' citizens might be enhanced under 'ideal' deliberative conditions, 
compared to those of politics as usual I will need to be sensitive to these differences. 
1.2.3 Deliberation and Deliberative Outputs 
I will also need to be sensitive to the role of preferences for public policies 
(referred to herein as policy preferences) as part of the deliberative process. In the 
following discussion I outline some of the considerations pertaining to deliberation and 
preferences as deliberative outputs. 
(a) Deliberation and Preference Aggregation 
There is an important tension between deliberative possibilities and politics in 
esse in relation to output In politics in esse, preferences have become the currency of 
democratic process. Deliberation, by contrast, tends to emphasise the process of 
reasoning. Thus, on one hand, the focus of democratic procedure is on aggregation of 
preferences, on the other the main concern is with reasons, 
Conceptualising the role of policy preferences in decision making is relatively 
straightforward, problems posed hy social choice notwithstanding.16 There are a 
number of potential avenues for transforming preferences into policy decisions. The 
most commonly recognised include the formal mechanisms such as voting for political 
candidates. A more 'participatory' approach includes referenda on policy options. 
"Including the challenges to social choice presented by Arrow (1963), and 'populism' by Riker (1982) 
pertaining to the stability (in transitivity) of aggregate preferences giving rise to indeterminate decision, 
Here I am not particularly concerned with these problems, although they will occasionally be alluded 
to. Rather, the focus is on the nature of preference inputs into social choice, which is considered a 
more substantive problem. If Individual policy preferences are prone to change tmder different 
conditions, then surely problems of aggregation are subsidiary, 
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Of course, it is not possible to hold a referendum on every policy issue, 
potentially breaking the nexus between policy decisions and participation. Even more 
problematic is that, at its foundations, the idea of deliberative democracy implies much 
more than reducing democratic decisions to votes. Under deliberative ideals the reasons 
for a preference are at least at important (for example Goodin, 2002). Yet, how do we 
turn reasons into decisions without recourse to preferences? 17 
(b) Deliberation as Consensus Building? 
One solution follows the argument that voting is unnecessary under conditions 
of 'complete rational consensus' (for example Cohen, 1989). Indeed, such outcomes 
tend to be interpreted as the ideal output of deliberative processes. Take for example 
the following interpretation by Eisler (l986a, p.103). 18 He states that: 
according to the theory of Jiirgen Habermas~ the goal of politics should be rational agreement 
rather than compromise; and the decisive political act is that of engaging in public debate with a 
view to the emergence of a consensus. 
He then goes on to argue that, in view of rational agreement: 
The input to the social choice mechanism would then not be the raw preferences that operate in 
the market. but informed and other-regarding preferences. Or rather, there would not be any need 
for an aggregating mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce 1.1nanimous 
preferences (Elster, l 986a, p. l 12, italics added). 
This may be contrasted with the more modest concerns of social choice with the 
potential for stable democratic outcomes. Indeed, it is this (perceived) reliance on 
consensus that exposes deliberative democracy criticisms based on charges of 
impossibility in achieving consensus (for example Femia, 1996; Van Mill, 1996). 
Another concern associated with the goal of consensus is that, if it is achieved, then it is 
done through the use of coercion or the exclusion of potential dissenters (Sanders, 1997). 
I intend to investigate the nature of consensus that might be realistically achieved 
under deliberative ideals to see if they echo the concerns of critics of deliberative theory. 
To do so, I will adopt a broader view of consensus than simply agreeing on a preferred 
11 Short of 'aggregating reasons'. An example of such an approach can be found in List and Petit (200!), 
although it is primarily concerned with the search for escape routes from Arrow's theorem. 
i:< For a rebuttal of these kinds of interpretations of consensus under discourse see \Vhite (1980). 
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policy outcome. Instead, I will break consensus dovm into to constituent parts based on 
the preference model developed in Chapter 2.19 
(c) Deliberation as Prelude to Voting? 
If complete consensus is not possible, then we fall back onto the problem of 
deliberation leading to a decision. This problem has led to a concession by deliberative 
theorists that some form of preference output is required to reconcile the ideal of 
deliberation with the need for a decision. Indeed, several practical examples of 
deliberative processes have been designed explicitly to result in voting, or preference 
aggregation procedures. Fishkin's (1991; 1995) 'deliberative opinion poll' provides 
perhaps the best known example - and a much criticised one.2° More recently, 
deliberative theory has also been incorporated into procedural accounts of public 
decision-ma.king from within the economics community, mostly in respect to 
environmental decision making (for a review see Niemeyer and Spash, 2001 ). 
This trend toward procedural accounts of deliberative democracy is criticised by 
Dryzek (200 l, p.657) as lending itself to the criticisms of popular conceptions of 
democracy levelled by social choice theorists such as Riker (1982). However, is there 
any reason for concern with the conflation of deliberation and policy preference 
aggregation, such as in the case of social choice?21 
If deliberation can be accurately described as the process of preference 
transformation (for example Przeworski, 1998) and social choice as preference 
aggregation, are the two not simply located at different ends of the same processes? As 
will become evident during this thesis, indeed they are. However, here I vehemently 
stress that they are at different ends. Certainly they should not be conflated. 
(d) Deliberation and Public Opinion 
Again, we fall back on the problem pertaining to the role of preferences in 
deliberative democracy. Habermas' (1994, p.8) provides one potential solution. His 
'two-track' model explicitly advocates a role for elections along liberal conceptions of 
19 Section 2.2.2(b) 
"For example Kuran (1998), Sanders (1999) and Merkle (1996). 
" Dryzek himself has identified avenues for reconciliation (Dryzek and List, 2001 ). 
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democracy. Under the model infomial public opinion, formation generates 'influence'; 
influence is transformed into 'communicative power' through the channels of political 
elections. Although not necessarily agreeing with this synopsis, it is this latter form of 
preference that I am implicitly concerned with in this research. 22 
There are a number of different conceptualisations of public opinion in the 
literature. These include highly specific 'scientized' public opinion polls, which 
Converse (1987) criticises as being unrelated to the nature of the political problem.23 
The also include looser conceptions of public opinion pertaining not just to personal 
preferences, but also the processes whereby they are formed and interact with decision 
making processes. Dryzek (2001, p.656) refers to these informal processes of public 
opinion influencing public policy as 'extra-constitutional agents of influence'. 
(e) Deliberaiion as Preference Transformation 
In analysing shifting preferences, I am not primarily concerned with procedures 
for aggregating preferences into a decision. Rather, I am interested in the process of their 
formation and transformation. This thesis will perform the task by iovestigating both 
the deliberative process and the preference output I will come to stress that the order of 
the process is important: preferences should follow reasons, not reasons from 
preferences.24 It will emerge by the end of the thesis that what we have is a dialectical 
tension between deliberation aud preferences. The qualitative difference between 
politics in esse and in posse concerns that end of the reasons-preferences relationship 
the political process is focussed. Wherever a democratic process emphasises 
preferences over reasons, it compromises the deliberative ideal. 
1.2.4 Deliberation as Transformation of Politics in esse 
Let me return to one of the core themes of this thesis, which seeks to contrast 
deliberative ideals and political practice. It is clear that the two are not the same. 
Indeed, the departure deliberative ideals from politics in esse that provides one of the 
n ,l\ithough I will make careful provisos in relation process of preference formation - lest deliberations 
become derailed by strategic rationality. 
13 See also Dryzek (l 990, ch.8) 
"For example, O'Neill (1995, p.202) argues that 'desires [ie. preferences] answer to goods, not goods to 
desires. I want objects because I believe they are good; I do not believe that are good because I want 
them' (citing Aristotle, !072, p.2). 
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most damning charges against deliberative theory. The argument goes that, while 
theoretically promising and intuitively appealing, deliberative ideals simply ignore 
politics in the real world (Shapiro, 1999}. Deliberative democracy is an ideal to be sure, 
but to what extent can attempts to make democratic processes more deliberative serve to 
transform politics as practiced? To explore the possibilities, in the following discussion 
I identify one particular facet of real world politics which deliberation may affect. 
Observations of political practice tend to reinforce the idea that politics is about 
power. In real world politics, power is used in manipulatory ways counter to the 
deliberative ideal. In other words, they are strategic, rather than communicatively 
rational. In earlier discussion, 25 I considered arguments that individuals tend to act 
stn1tegically in deliberative processes. I suggested that, rather than intrinsic self-interest, 
the problem with individual behaviour may finds its root~ in structural accounts of 
democratic processes. At the state level there are many structural reasons potentially 
accounting for the manipulation of citizens, particularly in respect to the environment,26 
but these are not of principal concern here. 
Of primary concern in this thesis are those mechanisms for manipulation of 
policy preferences and how this produces outcomes contrary to deliberative ideal. 
Finally, I am interested in how deliberation might provide a remedy to such processes. 
In short, I wish to investigate the extent to which deliberative processes may act as a 
practical antidote to politics in esse. 
(a) Symbolic Politics 
There are many possible avenues for manipulation under politics in esse. 
Goodin (1980) for one provides an account of these processes whereby outcomes are 
manipulated, ostensibly as part of the democratic process. One particularly pertinent 
"Section l.2.2(b). 
26 There a numerous candidates for accounting for the reasons why political actors might seek to 
manipulate citizens, ranging from accounts of rational political actors to more structural accounts of 
tensions within the role of modem states, such as those of neo-Marxists {for example ()ffe. 1984). 
Walker (1989) provides an account of the evolutionary trajectories of states that set them on collision 
course with ecological imperatives. A more specific account of the incompatibility of capitalist states 
with environmental imperatives can be found in Dryzek (1992). Elsewilere l have described how these 
t\\'o phenomena of political imperatives and deterioration ln environmental quaHty combine to produce 
an ever accelerating spiral where popular demands for environmental protection must he placated using 
manipulatory devices in vlew of the need for states to liquidate environmental resources (Niemeyer; 
1997). 
-13-
C!Epter 1 
example of manipulatory politics for the purposes here is that of 'symbolic politics'. 
Symbolic politics is described as follows: 
[M]ass public consists largely of spectators acquiescent to the abstract and remote passing parade 
of political symbols but who are anxious about a threatening, complex world. Ordinary 
citizens ... have only unstable and inconsistent polltical preferences, not firm ideological 
commitments that would resist ttie blandishments of elites. Political myth and ritual provide 
them with symbolic reassurance. Organized interest groups, on the other han~ do use politics 
instrumentally to directly and methodically maneuver for tangible benefits. Elites thus can 
easily manipulate mass publics by providing tension-reducing symbol'i (such as a political 
enemy, identification with a group, or attachment to a ]eader), which divert the public~s energies 
into fruitless mass violence or political quiescence, such actions facilitating the interests of the 
elites, Though politics is apparently centered on tangible outcomes: then, it 'reaUy' only 
provides symbolic reassurance to the ordinary mass publics, (Sears1 19931 p. 117)27 
To summarise Sears (1993), in general terms the construction of a symbolic 
preference is most likely to occur under the following conditions 
• 
• 
complexity: 
anxiety: 
where the issue is complex; 
where there is a high level of anxiety concerning the issue; and 
• politicisation: where there are active interests operative in the political sphere. 
Where the issue is complex, individuals will tend to develop broad 
predispositions towards it, rather than informed preferences with respect to policies.28 
Where there is aindety concerning the issue and symbolic attitudes relevant to it, 
individuals will tend to place 'attachment to reassuring abstract symbols rather than to 
one's own efforts' (Edelman, 1964, p.76).29 This tendency to seek reassurance 
provides scope for the manipulation of policy preferences where interests wishing to 
achieve a particular policy outcome "~11 invoke particular symbols in order to elicit a 
desired response. 
(b) Symbolic Politics and Political Socialisation 
This characterisation of symbolic politics tends to suggest that the public 
behaves in a less than consistent, or 'rational' manner, simply following the parade of 
passing symbols, hence the tendency to contrast symbolic politics with self-interest.30 
Following Edelman's (1964) initial idea, symbolic politics has been developed further to 
" Citing Edelman (1964). 
"As in the 'non-attitudes' as described by Converse (1970). 
"Cited in Sears (1993, p.117) 
'° See for example (Sears et al., 1979; Sears and Lau, 1983; Weatherford, 1983 ). 
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address this perception.31 Rather than simply following the whim of political actors, 
individuals may have very particularised attitudes; they may very much be a product of 
their political socialfaation. During this process, they develop stable and predictable 
responses to particular symbols (Sears et al., 1986), or symbolic attitudes.32 
(c} Symbolic Politics and Politics in posse 
As v.ill be seen in Chapter 4, symbolic politics characterises well the status quo 
in relation to the Bloomfield Track ease study, which is a complex and politicised 
environmental issue. Indeed, environmental issues appear particularly prone to 
symbolic politics, often in the form of polarised public debate along an environment-
economy continuum.33 One contributing factor concerns the complexity of ecosystems. 
This tends to favour symbolised conceptions of nature in politics. Consequently, 
complexity is more readily grasped, but the substance of the issue is lost. Although 
symbolic politics may prevail under politics in esse, it is yet to be seen whether it is a 
feature in posse. Thus, an important task involves gauging the extent to which symbolic 
preferences dissipate under deliberative conditions. 
This raises the question: can deliberation transform symbolic preferences if they 
are founded on processes of political socialisation? It will become increasing apparent 
during the thesis that it can. Although symbolic predispositions are strong, they do not 
constitute the only basis for forming policy preferences. The formation of preferences 
under conditions described by deliberative democracy may provide other possibilities. 
" See also Edelman (1988). 
"Krosnick (1991, p.548) refers to symbolic attitudes as those formed early in life by social conditioning 
and non-symbolic attitudes as those forme.d by the integration of information later in adult life. 
Symbolic attitudes in this study refer more specifically to those that are formed within the discursive 
context of the Bloomfield Track issue. That is attitudes developed as part of political socialisation in 
the FNQ region at the time of Bloomfield Track issue. 
33 Two elements of environmental issues give rise to the priming of individual attitudes along symbolic 
issue dimensions. The first is the tendency for interest groups to be mobilised along the poles of the 
envirorunent-economy divide, by virtue of the simple fact that these interests are those most motivated 
to act with respect to the issue at hand be it through strong emotional attachment to the 
environment (Kals et al., l 999), or direct interest~ su-ch as financial interest as developer and land-
holder, The second is the impact of the modem media on priming the attitudes of individuals (Iyengar 
et al., 1982; Iyengar, 1991; Doyle, 1992; Anderson, 1998; Kinder, 1998). The combination of the two 
invariably lead to the framing of environmental issues along the lines of discourse consistent with 
these polarised interests. 
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1.2.5 Summary: Synopsis of Aims 
In the preceding discussion I have briefly sketched the territory covered by this 
thesis. In short, I seek to explore the extent to which the policy choices of ordinary 
citizens are transfonned under conditions approaching the deliberative ideal. I do so 
with a view to examining those processes that take place under politics as usual, or in 
esse, which tend to preclude citizens from fanning policy preferences that they might 
under deliberative ideals. I have characterised this endeavour as comprising one part of 
the enterprise of deliberative democracy: that of preference transformation. 
The characterisation of the deliberative process in contrast to politics in esse 
requires that the analysis of deliberative dynamics is sensitive to the fonnation of policy 
preferences under particular political and institutional contexts. This is necessary in 
order to contrast them with preference fonnation under deliberative ideals in posse. 
Thus, in the following chapters I will not focus on the deliberative process alone, but 
also the policy issue of the Bloomfield Track in a more general sense. In doing so, I 
hope to be able to discuss the possibilities of deliberative ideals for transforming 
democratic processes and contrast them to political realities. 
The central theme throughout this thesis is fonnation of policy preferences 
under two scenarios. These correspond to the pre and post-deliberative points during 
the deliberative process. The processes preference formation will be important, not 
least because they will help to assess the extent to which deliberative ideals are achieved. 
However, although I do not seek to address it directly, the relationship between 
deliberation and preference fonnation may also affect another pressing question: that of 
legitimation and representation. Achieving deliberative ideals in relation to preference 
transformation may turn out to satisfy the requirements for legitimacy, to the extent 
that the most pressing problem entails the formation of policy preferences in the 
absence of straregic process. Rather than tackling the problem of presence during 
deliberative processes, deliberative legitimacy might be achieved by harnessing the 
advantages of small group deliberation to improve broader democratic processes, 
transfonning them toward deliberative ideals. 
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1.3 THE TASK AHEAD 
With the objectives of this thesis established, this section outlines the task 
ahead. The thesis will proceed in four parts: background; deliberative process and 
context; analysis; and findings and implications. The first part provides the background 
material for understanding the objectives of this thesis and the theoretical premises on 
which the approach for analysing the results is based. This present chapter comprised 
the first instalment of this process. In the following chapter (2), I continue the task by 
setting out the theoretical framework for understanding how policy preferences are 
formed and transformed under conditions of deliberation. 
The second part of the thesis involves setting the scene for the deliberative 
process by establishing the parameters of discursive design of politics in posse and 
describing the political process in esse. The first part of this process begins in Chapter 
3. It sets out to design the deliberative process of the FXQCJ. Specifically it develops 
mechanism for addressing identified examples of deliberative failure and follows as 
closely as possible the elements of ideal 'discursive design'. In Chapter 4, I set the 
scene for the deliberative process. I do so by outlining the major characteristics of the 
Bloomfield Track and describe how politics in esse has produced the present policy 
problem. 
Having laid the foundations, in the third part of the thesis attention is then 
turned to analysis of the deliberative process. Chapter 5 begins the analysis of 
deliberative democracy in posse by outlining the process of the FNQCJ and identifying 
the major 'turning points' in discourse. Chapter 6 begins the quantitative analysis of the 
deliberative process by analysing changes to the underlying subjectivity. Chapter 7 
follows with an analysis of the policy preferences. The analysis will focus on three 
aspects of deliberative dynamics. First is the extent to which individual preferences 
have changed. Second is the way in which aggregate outcomes have changed. Finally, 
the third concerns the exploration of whether these policy preferences have any meaning 
as a 'stand-alone' measure of deliberative output and preference transformation. In 
Chapter 8, I combine the analysis of subjectivity and preferences to establish the ways 
in which changes to subjectivity gave rise to those in policy preferences. Specifically, I 
examine how different subjective 'states' have been constructed into preferences at 
different deliberative stages. 
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The fourth, and final part of the thesis considers the overall findings of the 
analysis and their implications for deliberative theory and the possibilities for 
deliberative practice. Specifically, I consider the theoretical implications of the findings 
of the analysis in Chapter 9. In the final chapter (10), I conclude by outlining the major 
findings of the thesis. These are that democratic institutions based on contestation of 
outcomes and/or preferences tend to distort an underlying consensus. This gives rise to 
outcomes that are neither 'democratic' nor 'sustainable'. As such, political institutions 
in esse reverse the process that I will describe under deliberative ideals. That is politics 
under the status quo tends to transform policy preferences into reasons, rather than 
reasons into preferences. 
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TRANSFORMATION: 
DEVELOPING EXPLORATORY 
MODELS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The primary task of this chapter is to build a model for exploring policy 
preferences and their deliberative transformation. I will do so with the objective of 
gaining maximum insight into the possible mechanisms. Along the way, I will also 
establish the operational definitions and conceptual tools used measure and analyse 
these transformative processes. 
The chapter proceeds in section 2.2 with a brief discussion of the nature of 
policy preferences and the basic model for understanding their formation. Problems 
associated with measuring policy preferences without recourse to their underlying 
reasons are also considered. In view of these problems, the 'thin' preference model is 
expanded to include additional dimensions of values and beliefs. These two dimensions 
of preferences are then considered in tum in sections 2.3 and 2.4. Both sections explore 
respectively how deliberation might influence policy preferences in relation to beliefs 
and values. 
In section 2.5 I focus more directly to deliberative (or, more specifically 
discursive1) theory. A conception of deliberative preference transformation is 
developed using Habermas' idea of 'lifeworld'. The result is a 'discursive model' of 
preference shift, where there is a change in the constellation of values and beliefs that 
form the basis of policy preference. ln section 2.6 the requisites for the analysis of 
1 See footnote 5 on page 3. 
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deliberative transformation of preferences are outlined. I also consider the methods 
employed for exploring deliberative dynamics. This begins with a broad discussion of 
the nature of the task. The case is made for the use of Q methodology, in addition to 
other qualitative and quantitative methods under the rubric of analytical triangulation. 
2.2 PREFERENCES AND POLICY CHOICES 
As outlined in the introductory chapter, the primary aim of this research is to 
explore in detail the mechanisms whereby preferences change. Specifically, I am 
concerned with the reasons for any observed pre to post-deliberative transformation of 
policy preferences (which will be referred to herein as deliberative 'preference shift'). In 
order to understand any processes that may occur, I need to develop an appropriate 
model of preferences. This section begins the task. It does so by starting with the 
simplest possible conception of preference, then moving on to consider an extended 
model. 
2.2.1 The Problem with Preferences as Reasons: A Critique of the 
Thin Model 
(a) The Thin Model of Preferences 
The simplest, or 'thin', model is that most commonly ascribed to economics 
(and its political science counterparts), which is also the simplest. In short, the model 
equates rea.~ons with preferences. An example of this conception follows Bowles 
(1998, p.78), who states that 
preferences are reasons for behaviour, that is, attributes of individuals that (along with their 
beliefs and capacities) account for the actions they take in a given situation. 
The problem with using the term preference for both the reasons for behaviour 
and the behaviour itself seems to invite confusion. Take for example the following 
definition: '[A preference is] a statement that one good, event or project is preferred to 
one or more other goods etc' (Pearce, 1992, p.339). The problem is encapsulated by 
Elster's (1983) description of 'thin' rationality. The only requirement of thin 
rationality is the preferences are consistent with beliefs and desires. This gives little 
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room for exploring the mechanisms of transformation of preferences during the 
deliberative process. 
In other words, the problem is that preferences by themselves are 'dumb'. They 
cannot tell us anything about the underlying reasons.2 The use of thin preferences gives 
rise to an absurd circularity whereby (expressed) preferences are explained by 
(subjective) preferences, which in turn give rise to (expressed) preferences (Sen, 1977, 
p.325). 
(b) Thin Preferences and Deliberative Preference Shift 
An important question in relation to the thin model of preferences concerns 
whether or not it permits explanation of deliberative preference shift. That preferences 
change in ways not explained by the basic economic model is well established. 3 The 
problem lies in the fact that these models operate on the assumption that preferences are 
fixed- which is often interpreted to mean that they never change.4 
The important problem in relation to the thin model of preferences is not that 
they do not permit change. Rather, they do not provide any foundations for 
understanding why they change. The problem can be summarised as one of exogeneity 
-- the model has nothing to say about the reasons that underlie the expression of a 
preference. 
(c) Preference Structuration 
One possible remedy to tbe problem of the thin model of rationality and the 
analysis of 'dumb' preferences is the exploration of the structure of a given set of 
! This contention wiH become increasing apparent during the remainder of this thesis, particularly in 
Chapter 7. 
3 A \VCll-known example is that of preference reversal, whereby changes to ways in which decisions are 
framed give rise to changes to preferences, without changing any other choice parameters (for example 
Lichenstein and Slavic, 197!; Tversky et al., !98!). Another example may be included under the 
category of variable preferences is the endowment etTect, whereby preferences are affected depending on 
whether an individuals is the possessor or acquirer ofa good (Scitovsky, 1941; Kahneman et aL) 1990; 
Knetsch, 1990; O'Connor and Muir. 1995). A longer-term preference shift arc those admitted under the 
rubric of institutional economics~ particularly 'old' insitiutionalists (for a revie\V see Hodgson, 1993; 
O'Neill, l 995). 
4 The idea offLxed preferences is more an artefact of tbe application of formal models to the analysis of 
preferences than an a priori assumption that they never change. (Druckman and Lupiai 2000, p, l 7 
fn.4). 
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ordinal preferences.6 Using the idea of preference structuration7, it is possible to open 
the black box of preferences. This possible by observing the extent to which 
preferences are dominated by a perspective of the issue (or 'issue dimension') along 
which individuals organise their policy choices.8 
A number of deliberative theorists have already used analysis of preference 
structuration in relation to changes arising from deliberation. These have ranged :!Tom 
hypotheses about how deliberation may change preferences in terms of aggregate 
outcome (Miller, 1992; Dryzek and List, 2001) to empirical tests using actual 
deliberative forums (McLean et al., 2000). 
The latter example (McLean et al., 2000) demonstrates how deliberation may 
influence preferences to increase structuration within the deliberative group. However, 
analysis of structuration in Appendix 7 suggests that other interpretations can be drawn. 
As well as impact of deliberation, the results suggest that symbolic politics also tends to 
give rise to high levels of structuration. To arrive at this conclusion, a greater 
appreciation of the process of preference formation is needed. 
Consequently, although I will use preference structuration as part of a suite of 
tools in this thesis to probe preferences before and after deliberation, it does not escape 
the problem of dumb preferences. Analysis of preference structuration may tell us 
something about the dominant trends among preferences, but it still does not convey the 
reasons that underlie them. 9 As such, we cannot gain any real insight into the processes 
driving the deliberative preference transformation. We can infer structure, but still 
cannot say why the change occurred. To do so it is necessary to extend the preference 
model to admit dimensions of reasons for policy preferences into the analysis. 
2.2.2 The Extended Model of Policy Preferences 
So far, I have only considered preferences in relation to outputs in the form of 
policy choices. That these change will be interesting enough. However, that 
6 For a desc.ription of ordinal preferences see section 7.2.1 on page 208. 
7 Originally conceived by Black ( 1948). 
8 For an explanation of preference strncturation, see Appendix 7. 
9 Reflecting the use of preference slructuration within the subjective welfarist model of preferences is the 
tendency for its use to be restricted to the social choice problem of fmding an escape route from 
Arrow's (1963) paradox l'fvoting (beginning with Niemi, J 969). See also foomote 16 on page 9. 
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deliberation might transform preferences does not alone provide the foundations for 
understanding the practical implications of deliberative democracy, nor does it support 
its normative claims of democratic superiority. Of primary concern is how policy 
preferences might change in relation to inputs, or reasons, which is consistent with 
Elster's (1983) appeal to 'broad' rationality. 
A similar trend toward a broader conception of preference formation has emerged 
with the environmental economics literature under the rubric of 'preference 
construction' rn The conception of preference construction emerged following empirical 
investigation of the protocols whereby preferences are formed in relation to a particular 
decision - particularly during the process at aniving at a cardinal preference in a 
Contingent Valuation survey.u The findings challenge the thin model of preferences 
outlined above, which presupposes that preferences result from in situ 'rational 
calculation of utilities' (Slovic, 1995). By contrast, preference construction suggests, 
quite simply, that preferences are 'constructed' through a process ofreasoning.12 I am 
particularly interested in the exploration of these reasoning processes as they take place 
before, during and following deliberation. 
(a) Elements of Preference Constrttction 
To break the extended preference model down further into constituent parts: the 
reasons for a policy preference may include values and beliefs (Eisler, 1983, ch.l). 
More recently, Goodin (2002) has argued that values and beliefs are essential to 
democratic politics of a deliberative or 'reflective' kind, where reasons are at least as 
important as preferences. Under the extended, or 'preference construction model', 
which is illustrated in Figure 2· I, values constitute the motivational basis upon which 
choices are made. They give rise to a desire for particular goals or end states. When a 
particular choice is to be made, beliefs are brought into the construction of preferences 
t(l I v.ill tend to use 'preference construction' throughout this thesis to denote the process 'mental 
gymnastics' in evaluating policy 'means' to achieve desired 'ends' (after Slovic, 1995). 
n For example: (Payne et al., 1992; Gregory et al., 1993; Slovic, 1995). For a discussion of Contingent 
Valuation see page 209. 
12 The idea of constructed preferences fits comfortably with Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980, p.5) 'theory of 
reasoned action', which also challenges the view embodied in the thin model that human behaviour is 
'controlled by unconsc.ious motives or overpowering desires' but rather 'people consider the 
implications ofthelr actions before they decide to engage or not engage in a given behaviour'. In the 
manner that 'reason' is used by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), it and cognition can readily be 
interchanged. 
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as far as they relate to the probabilities that a particular (policy) means will give rise to 
desired end. 
Figure 2-1 Preference Construction Model 
~·-·· 
MOTIVATION 
values 
DESIRED 
END 
PREFERENCE 
CONSTRUCTION 
beliefs 
REASONING/ 
JUDGEMENT 
(matching means 
to ends) 
OBSERVED 
PREFERENCE 
behaviour 
EXPRESSED 
PREFERENCE 
To illustrate the role of desires and beliefs in the preference construction, I will 
borrow an example used by Elster (1998, p.100). It refers to an historical scenario of 
three groups within the French Assemblee Constituante ( 1789) voting on the choice of a 
unicameral or bicameral system of government The scenario is outlined in Table 2-1. 
The assembly is divided among three different groups who each want to achieve 
different ends from the design of the French constitution. There groups ··· the 
Reactionaries, Moderates and Radicals are represented in the first column, with each 
of their fundamental preferences, beliefs, and expressed preferences shown in the 
corresponding column of the same row. 
Table 2-1 Modalities of Preference Formation, French Assemblee 
Constituante 
Fundamental Preference 
(desire) Belief. &pressed Preference 
Reactionaries Destablise the regime Bicameralism will stabilise Unicameral ism 
the regime 
Moderates Stabilise the regime Bicameralism will stabilise Bicameralism 
the regime 
Radicals Stabilise the regime Bicameralism will Unirameralism 
destabilise the regime 
Source: Elstcr(l998, p.101) 
Secoon2.2: Prefuren::es ard Policy Cmices 
The first assembly group, the Reactionaries, is motivated by a desire to 
destabilise the existing form of government, so that the country may return to a 
monarchy. The remaining two groups -- the Moderates and the Radicals seek 
stability in the chosen form of government, but with different beliefs about how this 
would be achieved. The first two groups (Reactionaries and Moderates) believe that a 
bicameral system would tend to stabilise the regime, the Radicals that it would lead to 
destabilisation. Consequently, the Reactionaries and Radicals both vote for 
unicameralism despite opposing fundamental preferences because of their different 
beliefs about matching of means to ends. The Moderates are alone in voting for 
bicamernlism. 
The French Assemblee Constituante example demonstrates how preferences 
might be fonned under the preference construction model. The thin model that began 
the discussion in this chapter does not properly account for the reasons underlying 
preferences, effectively linking underlying preferences (ends or desires) with expressed 
preferences. It can be seen from Table 2-1 that it is quite possible for individuals to 
agree on ends, but not on means because of the differing premises (beliefs) upon which 
preferences are constructed. The example suggests that there are a number of ways 
individuals might agree with one another - quite apart from the similarity between their 
policy preferences. I will explore some of these types of consensus below. 
(b) Preference Construction and Consensus 
In Chapter 113, I discussed the implication that deliberative processes may or 
may not lead to greater consensus. Consensus is a term commonly used in relation to 
political decision-making, but is rarely conceptualised. Here I will briefly outline types 
of consensus that may exist in relation to policy preferences. 
The preference construction model provides a conceptual tool for understanding 
the different types of consensus that may exist among a group. Three types of 
consensus emerge from the preference construction model, which correspond with the 
three components of values (desires for ends), belief (judgement) and e.xpressed 
preference. Each type of consensus is described in Table 2-2. 
13 Section l.2.3(b ). 
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Table 2-2 Types of Consensus under the Preference Construction Model 
Description of 
agreement 
Type of 
consensus 
Element 
De; ire 
Agreemenr on 
the desired 
outcome to be 
acltleved 
]\formative 
cqnsenms 
of Preference Construction 
Expressed 
Belief P1'eference 
Agreement in Agreement in 
belief of the expressed 
impact ofa preference for 
po Hey a policy 
Epistemic Empirical 
consensus consernu; 
The first type, normative consensus, refers to an agreement among individuals 
with respect to the ends to be achieved in relation to a given policy problem.14 In the 
above example of the French Assemblee Constituante, this concerned the level of 
stability of the resulting form of government from a process of constitution building. 15 
The second type of consensus, epistemic consensus, concerns agreement in the way in 
which ends are matched to means, or the consequences of, particular policies.16 The 
final type of consensus, empirical consensus, is consistent with the more familiar ways 
in which the term is used in relation to preferences.17 
Another type of consensus also emerges from the French Assemblee 
Constituante example by virtue of the fact its relatively simple nature, compared to 
many policy problems. Indeed, as conceived, the example only concerns a single issue-
dimension. Although there is disagreement among actors at a number of levels, there is 
unanimous agreement regarding the important issue - the stability of the regime and the 
14 There are parallels between the use ofnonnative consensus here and that used by Rawls (1971, p.263) 
in his theory of justice, whereby 'everyone has a similar sense of justice', Another parallel is that of 
Cohen's (1993) 'moral consensus" 
15 A more relevant example for this research might be a desired level of environmental conservation. 
16 A good example of this in relation to Australian environmental policy concerns the debate over the 
type of fire regime to be used in native scrub1and forests, There are some that believe that; because 
many Australian forests have evolved in association with regular fires, which have shaped much of the 
pre~European landscape; that conservation is best served by a regular fire regime. Others believe that 
because fires destroy at least some existing vegetation and kill animals) that a concerted fire regime is 
anathema to the goal of conservation. In broad terms> both groups desire the same out1.'-Dme, but have 
very different ideas about how this should be achieved. The example also serves to demonstrate how 
the lines between fundamental preferences and beliefs are blurred. If we adopt of more fine-grained 
perspective of the issue it is possib]e to resolve the difference in beliefs into a difference in values -
the two groups are essentially talking about a different kind of conservation. 1'hc inseparability of 
beliefs and values is something I will consider in section 2.5. t. 
t7 The use of rational and empirical consensus is roughly consistent with that used by White (1989) in 
relation to the idea of consensus as conform! by Habermas (particularly 197lb). 
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impact of the choice of parliamentary system. This agreement on the important issue 
dimensions constitutes another form of consensus, which Dryzek and List (200 l) refer 
to as 'meta-consensus'.18 
2.2.3 The Preference Construction Model and Modes of Deliberative 
Transformation 
With the introduction of the extended preference model there is renewed scope 
for deliberative preference shift. Indeed the terms I have used in relation to the 
preference construction model - cognition, the process of knowing; and judgement, the 
process of reasoning have similar meaning to that of deliberation. From Hobbes, to 
deliberate is 'to consider carefulty with a view to decision' where actions done 
deliberately are 'done of set purpose'.19 
A deliberative preference shift might then involve either a change in decision 
about an appropriate course of action to give effect to a desired end following 'careful 
consideration' or a change in the chosen end, or 'set purpose' (policy end). The first 
type of shift relates to changes in beliefs that pertain to the matching of policy means to 
desired ends. This dimension may be characterised by 'cognitive rationality', which 
presupposes some ideal against which the level preference construction might be 
compared.20 The idea is similar to Elster's (1983, p.19) description of 'judgement', 
which concerns the capacity to 'synthesise vast and diffuse infonnation that more or 
less clearly bears on the problem at hand, in such a way that no element or set of 
elements is given undue importance'. 
Of course, this process of reasoning m order to improve preferences only 
captures the epistemic dimension of policy preferences outlined in Table 2-2. The 
second, normative dimension, may also contribute to preference shifts due to a 'change' 
in the value system itself. I will more fully explore the normative dimension of policy 
18 The implication of meta-consensus for Dryzek and List (2001) concerns the extent to which it tends to 
promote the structuration of preferences along a common issue dimension, whereby it is possible to 
elicit stable and meaningful preference aggregations. See discussion in section 2.2.l(c) and in 
Appendix 7. 
19 Cited in Goodin (Goodin, 2000b). 
20 For example, see Dryzek's (1990, pp.190-191). 
-27-
Chapter2 
preferences and their transformation in section 2.4, following discussion of the epistemic 
dimension in 2.3. 
2.2.4 Summary 
In this section, I have developed a basic model for understanding the reasons 
whereby a policy preference might be transformed during deliberation in terms of desires 
and beliefs. However, simply recognising an extended dimension of preference 
construction says nothing about where these desires and beliefs come from. Nor have I 
yet explored ways in which policy preference might be transformed by the process of 
deliberation. 
An important consideration, however, is that in practice the constellation of 
beliefs and means-ends in relation to policy preferences will be far more complex than in 
the example of the French Assemblee Constituante. This will hold for environmental 
issues, which often involve a multitude of considerations. A preference cons1ruction 
model must account for this kind of complexity. This not least involves whether or not 
there are limitations in judgemental capacities. In short, the model developed so far has 
only begun the task of conceptualising deliberative preference shift. I will continue the 
task below by considering the two major components of the preference model pertaining 
to beliefs and values in sections 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. 
2.3 THE PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION 
HYPOTHESIS: DELIBERATION AND CHANGES IN 
BELIEFS 
The previous section identified two possible mechanisms for deliberative 
preference shift. The first involves the process of preference construction ···- or 
matching of policy means to desired ends. The second pertains to changes in values 
such that different ends are sought. In this section I will consider the first type of 
deliberative shift, which I will refer to in the remainder of this thesis as the 'preference 
cons1ruction hypothesis'. 
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Two main elements might contribute to deliberative preference shift under the 
preference construction model, The first is through increased information. The second 
results from an increase or improvement in the judgement process. The role of 
information in the formation of preferences is well recognised in both politics and 
economic approaches to public decision making.21 
Let me use the French Assemblee Constituante example in Table 2-1 to 
demonstrate. New information - for example. based on an updated study of existing 
democratic systems might suggest that there may be ways in which bicameral 
systems can be manipulated to produce instability that are not possible through 
unicameralism.22 This new information might lead to a change in belief in relation to 
parliamentary systems such that the reactionaries, who previously believed that 
bicameralism would achieve their desired end of instability, come to prefer bicameralism. 
2.3.2 Preference Construction and Issue Complexity: Bounded 
Rationality 
I have already suggested that the French Assemblee Constituante a simplified 
one. By contrast, many policy problems may be considered by deliberative forums will 
tend to be far more complex and uncertain. In other words, there may be limits to 
cognitive rationality. The problem is encapsulated by Herbert Simon's 'bounded 
rationality' (1957; 1985; et al. 1992), which holds that: 
The capacity of the human mind for fonnulating and solving complex problems is very small 
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational 
behavior in the real world - or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality 
(Simon, 1957, p.198). 
As discussed in Chapter l, that individuals might be limited by judgemental 
capacity has long been recognised in political science. In response to this, I suggested 
21 In the case of politics, see for example Ferejohn (1990); in economics, see Spash & Hanley (1995) 
and Munro and Hanley (1999). 
22 For example, if the reactionaries are an electorally small group, then two houses will increase the 
potential for a hung parliament in which they hold the balance of power, thereby increasing the 
prospect of instability. The type of preference shift I have just described is not unlike that of Holland 
et al. (1986) where preferences shift through a process of refinement and differentiation. Under their 
model, object A, becomes to distinct entities A1 and A1 (Druckman and Lupi a, 2000, pp.6· 7). In terms 
of policy choices, individuals may come to differentiate policy options that beforehand were considered 
similar enough to one another such that there is indifferene-e between them. 
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that the problem might in fact reflect a structural dimension whereby the nature of 
politics in esse impedes judgement of individuals. Accepting such a possibility opens 
the prospect that deliberation might remedy these structural dynamics. The following 
discussion considers just this scenario. 
2.3.3 Deliberation as Pushing Back Cognitive Limits 
(a) Incremental Preference Construction 
Even in the face of complexity and limits to cognitive rationality there may be 
substantial preference shifts resulting from an increase in information due to an inductive 
process of reasoning. This inductive element is not unlike Axelrod's (1973) 'schema 
theory' whereby individuals can make increasing sense of a complex world by absorbing 
and processing information. 
It works roughly along the lines of individuals having a map of how they 
perceive the world to work. New pieces of information are acquired and, depending on 
whether or not they fit into the existing scheme, the subjective map is either reinforced, 
or amended to reduce the dissonance created by an improperly fitting piece of the 
cognitive jigsaw. In view of additional information gained, if there is sufficient change in 
the beliefs with respect to the efficacy of policies, there may be a change in preferred 
policy option, or ordering of multiple options. 
(b) Pooling information and Reason 
The process of group deliberation may also potentially increase the amount of 
information at hand by pooling the knowledge among deliberators (for example Aldred, 
2000).23 According to Fearon (1998) group deliberation may serve to reduce, or 
overcome bounded rationality through the combining of cognitive powers in much the 
same way as multiple processors working in series increases the power of computers. 
23 Although there may be potential for this to occur in the FNQCJ, the model of deliberation I will 
develop in the next chapter does not assume any particular knowledge of the issue beyond that of the 
average citizen. The main process of information acquisition will be through the injection of new 
information via witnesses' presentations. Indeed, as the recruitment of deliberators does not assume 
any particular knowledge of the issue, the prospect of preference shift through a process of information 
acquisition increases. 
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(c) Symbolic Prejfrences: Deliberation as Lifting Preference Construction from a 
Low Base 
A further possibility for deliberative transformation of preferences emerges if we 
consider that, before deliberation, individuals really had not given the issue much 
thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of preference construction. In 
such cases we might apply the term 'cognitive miser' (Taylor, 1981). The cognitive 
miser adopts a minimalist approach to preference construction. This involves taking 
cognitive shortcuts by engaging in 'top of the head' or 'peripheral' processing of 
informational cues (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), or simply following the lead of others 
who they believe hold similar attitudes (for example Lupia, 1994). 
\\'here shortcuts are taken there may be inconsistencies in preferences based on 
partial information, or incomplete information processing.24 These modes of preference 
construction are consistent with tbe political processes described in Chapter l under the 
rubric of symbolic politics (see Sears, 1993). In symbolic politics, the use of symbolic 
arguments invokes strongly held predispositions; individuals may follow intuitively 
appealing cues in order to reduce any anxiety they may hold concerning an issue. It is a 
simple and cognitively cheap solution to the problem of constructing preferences in 
relation to complex policy problems. 
If, before deliberation, individuals have been cognitive misers and/or they hold 
symbolic preferences, it is plausible that participation in the deliberative process may 
lead to deliberative preference shift. 'Ibis occurs simply by motivating participants to 
engage the issue and process the information at hand.25 It is also plausible that, through 
similar processes, deliberation may serve to dispel symbolic myths that form the basis 
for symbolic preferences. Thus, the cognitive dimension may serve to explain much of 
any observed deliberative preference shift. However, as will be outlined below, 
focussing on preference construction alone also has strong limitations. 
24 A good exampie of this is provided by Thomas (1997) who cites an environmental example where 
there is inconsistency between attitudes to\varrls lead in petrol and in gunshot or lead sinkers. 
"As has been observed by Pelletier et aL (1999, p.120). However, this is at best a partial explanation. 
As will be revealed in Chapter 5, the issue deliberated by the FNQCJ has been salient in the public 
domain for over 15 years. Most of the public appears to have fonned an opinion on the issue one way 
or another. The difference between the pre and post-deliberative scenarios, however, He in the nature of 
the inforn1ation pruv:ided to the detiOerators and their sensitivity to strategic talk. 
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2.3.4 Limitations of Deliberative Preference Transformation Due to 
Changing Beliefs 
The preference construction model and associated preference shift represents a 
minimal extension of the thin preference model presented in section 2.2.1. Indeed, such 
a model may be acceptable as a means of inserting the rational element into rational 
choice. The model has similarities to the 'preference constrained' approach in rational 
choice, where the underlying desires of individuals must be specified (Dowding and 
King, 1995, p.2). The standard approach used in rational choice is that of narrow self-
interest. This is not to say that rational choice is fixed on a single, 'one fits all' 
motivation.26 Although rational choice theorists may admit the presence of a multitude 
of motivations in the construction of preferences, there remains a fundamental problem 
associated with exogeneity. Perhaps for this reason some economists have come to 
embrace deliberation as a mechanism of 'refining' preferences.27 
One example of this concession of preference shift, without posing any major 
challenge to the assumptions of economics is that of Stigler and Becker (1977). 28 
Although refusing to concede anything approaching variations in the underlying 
motivations for preferences - or 'tastes' to use the economic term - they devise 
mechanisms for preference shifts that are not dissimilar to the processes I have outlined 
in this section. 
Without getting bogged down in technicalities, the argument goes that 
'preferences change, but tastes do not'. The assertion leads Goodin (1990) to ask 'how 
did these tastes form in the first place?' One response could be that they are fixed by 
genetics (Hansson and Stuart, 1990, esp. pp. 529, 542)29• The other possibility is 
political socialisation of they sort described by symbolic politics. Either approach 
presupposes that the suite of values that comes into play during preference construction 
26 Indeed, there has been a steady expansion of the domain of motivations to include variations of the 
utilitarian theme such as the utility associated with expressing a position (Brennan and Lomask:y, 
1993) or the desire to participate (Wickham-Jones, l 995). 
27 See discussion pertaining incorporation of deliberation into economic approaches to decision making 
in section 1.2.3( c) of Chapter 1 (page l l ). 
28 Using an assumption of fixed tastes, Stigler and Becker (1977) demonstrate the preference shift using a 
formal model based on maximising utility whereby the utility attached to the consumption of a good 
may be appreciated by a kind of multiplier of underlying tastes. 
29 Cited in (Sunstein, !997a, p.7) 
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is fixed. Consequently, the role of deliberation is simply to inform the processes of 
preference formation, improving the dexterity of the mental gymnastics in maU:hing 
means to ends. 
However, there is at least the possibility that choices in relation to particular 
ends may be transformed during the deliberative process. Not least of the possibilities 
is that there may be a sharp contrast between what constitutes what is good for the self 
and good for the community. 'Tastes' (as the motivations driving choices) may not 
change, but there may be more than one source of motivation potentially coming to bear 
in the construction of a preference. If we are to account for such distinctions, then it is 
necessary to introduce a value dimension into the preference model. This value 
dimension is the subject of the following section. 
2.4 DELIBERATION AND CHANGING VALUES 
The previous section considered cognitive dimension to the preference 
construction model. This cognitive dimension may have levered open the black box of 
preferences, but its contents are still empty. The model still has nothing to say about 
where the underlying subjective states, or desire for particular ends, come from. This is 
not problematic if there is one all-purpose normative dimension capable of explaining 
the motivational basis of preferences. However, as I ·will argue below, there is a good 
case for including the possibility of multiple motivational states in the preference model. 
2.4.I The Case for Admitting Multiple Motivations to the Preference 
Model 
Preference constrained models -- those that involve a single, fixed motivational 
basis of preferences - pose two problems for an attempt to account for shifts during 
deliberation. The first relates to explanatory power, or the external validity of such 
models. The second concerns the inability of imposing particular motivations to satisfy 
an important dimension of autonomy. The third concerns potential escape routes from 
the rational behaviour-provision of common goods problem, specifically relating to 
environmental quality, or sustainability. These concerns are addressed in tum below. 
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(a) Explanatory Power 
Models of rational behaviour, usually based on motivational foundations of self-
interest, have proved highly versatile as a theoretical model. The model can be revised 
to account for all manner of behaviour, with elements added to address challenges that 
emerge.30 However, despite their elegance, the explanatory power of self-interest 
models remains weak (Udehn, 1996). On this basis, Etzioni (1986) criticises attempts 
within economics to theorise all possible motivations under a single utility function -
or 'grand X' arguing that a satisfactory account of the way in which preferences are 
formed must admit multiple utility states. 
(b) Autonomy 
I have argued above that economics, and its political science corollaries, tend to 
fix upon models of self-interest, or variations of that basic theme. Another strong theme 
is consumer, or more properly in relation to public decisions, citizen sovereignty 
whereby individuals act autonomously where choosing their desired policy means. 
While economists are concerned with the freedom to choose means to suit particular 
ends, there is an additional dimension of autonomy when different motivations are 
admitted as possible. Indeed, as far as they exist, not to admit them risks a greater loss 
of autonomy than simply concerning the freedom to choose ends. Individuals should 
also be free to choose those ends that should be satisfied by means (Watson, 1975). 
Thus, a truly deliberative conception of politics should be open to the 
possibility that, when given the opportunity to do so under deliberative conditions, 
individuals may choose to act according to some (intersubjectively shared) common 
good. In relation to the environment, they may well choose to act in manners that 
consistent with a shared notion of sustainability, which leads me to the third problem. 
"' Etzioni (1986) argues !hat the mirror of economic theory, based <>n the assumption of self-interest, has 
'three faces'. Without at least accounting for differing motivations in the construction of preference, 
and devising some form ofmeasuretnent, there is a risk collapsing back into the 'anything goes• model 
of preference where all possible motivations can be subsumed under some all-encompassing 'great X' 
utility state. This includes the explanation of putatively altruistic choices under the rationality 
assumption of self-interest (Margolis, 1982). 
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(c) The Ecological Dimension 
As just stated, the third problem of fixed motivational states relates to the 
problem of human motivations and their potential to be consistent with the provision of 
common goods, such as environmental ones. Not accounting for the motivational 
dimension of preferences (usually by simply assuming self· interest) invokes classic a 
tension identified by Goodin (1992) between environmentalism and democracy. This 
occurs where desirable environmental outcomes cannot be assured, but rely on a 
fortuitous concordance between the 'interests' of humans with that of nature.31 
Without admitting other motivations, the tension remains unresolved. There is no way 
of suggesting mechanisms whereby preferences and collective environmental objectives, 
such as 'sustainability' can be ensured (Common and Perrings, 1992; Norton et al., 
1998). Dryzek (1996, p.28) for one, is explicit about the nature of the problem: 
The problem with instrumental rationality is that its orientation is a manipulative one in the 
interests of human ends, and this translates ail too easily into human arrogance in dealing with 
naturai systems and subordinating them to these ends. 
How do we reconcile the apparent contradiction between human capacity for 
self-interested behaviour and the need for collective action to achieve environmental 
protection? Several types of solution have been presented. The first type tends to 
follow economic models that espouse the compatibility of self~ interest and 
environmental protection through an optimistic assessment of technological 
possibilities.32 At the other end are extremely pessimistic and heavy handed solutions 
in the tradition of Hobbes (for example Orr and Hill, 1978). There are also 'midway' 
solutions that are aimed at steering society in a so-called sustainable direction (Norton et 
al., 1998). 
The latter solution is most consistent with the deliberative approach explored in 
this thesis. However, it still falls short of deliberative ideals because it pre-supposes 
some particular 'sustainable end' that may not be widely shared, even after the 
deliberative process. I will explore this problem of imposing particular ends on citizens 
in later discussion. What is important in the context of this research is the possibility 
that individuals may be motivated to act in a number of possible ways. These include 
31 See section l.2.2(b) in Chapter l (page 7). 
32 For example, O'Riordin's (l 981) Technocentrist. 
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not just those that are inconsistent v.ith a collective goal of environmental protection, 
but also in ways that do lead to such outcomes. Thus, I am interested in examining the 
extent to which deliberation may contribute to the transformation not just of 
preferences, but the valuational basis upon which they are constructed. 
2.4.2 Multiple Motives: Including the Valuational Dimension in the 
Preference Model 
That humans may be motivated to act because of different valuationa\ 
foundations is far from new (see Eisler, 1986b).33 Sen (1977) considers the possibility 
that there may exist preferences beneath the surface of those that are expressed (or 
'preferences for preferences'). O'Xeil\ (1993, pp.64-5) stresses that it is possible (if 
not desirable34) to have a preference for cultivating particular types of wants. 
The possibility that humans display multiple motivational states finds more 
resonance in political philosophy, particularly in relation to Platonic conceptions of 
politics as the 'art whose business it is to care for souls'.35 The classic definition of 
politics alluded to in the introductory chapter concerns the collective determination of 
the common good. A 'common good' is a quality that is independent of individua~ or 
aggregate preferences, embodied in a shared understanding.36 More pertinent is that 
such conceptions are not concerned just with what individuals want, hut why they want 
it. To use the framework I have adopted so far, the challenge for deliberative democracy 
concerns not only choices in relation to means, but motivations or desires for ends are 
driving a particular decision. 
{a) The Multiple Ends Preference Model 
Within the environmental literature that there may be multiple motives coming to 
play on preferences has been most famously observed by Sagoffs (1988) 
'citizen-consumer' schism. Io Figure 2-2 I use the citizen-consumer dichotomy to 
"See also Han;anyi {1955, esp. p.315), Juster (1985), Lindenberg (1983) and Hirschman (1984) 
34 Based on the premise that 'well being is realised not by satisfying given wants, but by educating our 
capacities of judgement and our desires, that that we come to prefer what is good' (citing O'Neill, 
1993, pp.65-82; O'Neill, 1995, p.202). 
"Plato, The Laws 650b, cited in Sunstein (1997b, p.196) 
"For example Cohen (1986). 
' 
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illustrate the role of multiple motivations in the extended preforeuce model. However, I 
hasten to add that I do so without meaning to imply that these exhaust the possibilities 
for motivational states in relation to an environmental preference.37 
Figure 2-2 Preference Model Including Motivational System 
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In simple terms, the main feature of the model is that, instead of a single 
motivating value, a number of possible motives may come into play upon which to 
construct a preference for a particular policy means. The two possibilities of self-
regarding citizen and other-regarding consumer may or may not both be consistent Vii.th 
one another - although evidence cited above suggests that in relation to environmental 
issues they tend not to be.3' Thus, in relation to an environmental preference, the two 
motives are not complements, but substitutes and the individual is faced with an 
'either/or' choice between motives. In the example represented by Figure 2-2, the social 
37 Within some of the environmental literature, particularly ecologicai economics, Sagoff's (1988) 
'citizen-consumer' dichotomy has become de riguer, despite limited empirical foundations. Examples 
of exceptions include Blarney (1995), in the case of envirorunental economics and willingness-to-pay 
on contingent valuation questionnaires. However, even in this example the citizen~conswner is 
established a priori, rather than exploring other possibilities. Rohrscbneider (1988) has undertaken a 
comparative study examining the drivers of environmental attitudes that includes a citizen..conswner 
dimension, with the addition of synlbolic attitudes. 
"As also may be illustrated by the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin, 1968). 
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values associated with the citizen have prevailed and been constructed into policy 
preferences over and above the personal values of the consumer. 
Of course, it is entirely possible for an individual's personal values to be 
consistent with social ones - a point not least recognised by Sen (1977). Nor do the 
two scenarios of citizen and consumer exhaust all ontological possibilities, particularly 
in respect to the environment - although they tend to be the most widely considered. 39 
Indeed, even if we consider only a small number of value dimensions that may vary in 
respect to the construction of preference, there may exist permutations "ith high orders 
of magnitude (Rokeach, 1973, p.23). The problem of imposing valuational systems and 
the complex web of potential types will be explored further in section 2.5. 
(b) Avoiding the Imposition of 'Psychologisms' 
Given the multitude of potential valuational types, one particular problem 
concerns the criteria whereby particular types, if any, should be chosen to form the 
basis from which to explore deliberative preference transformation. The answer is that I 
should not choose any, but rather seek to ex.Jllore what motivations may manifest 
through careful observation. In the fullowing discussion, I will consider the reasons 
why. 
I have argued above that to permit a genuine freedom to choose into a 
deliberative model of preferences, one cannot pre-specify what motivational system is 
consistent with a common good, or 'sustainable', in relation to environmental issues. It 
does not follow that I should detennine a priori categories from which to evaluate the 
formation of how do, or should behave. Yet there has been no shortage of attempts to 
do just that, not least in respect to the environment. 
Dryzek (1995, p.18) argues that 'just about every human political ideology ... has 
at one time or another been justified as consistent with nature'. Yet, there is no 
objective measure for presupposing that any is more superior to the other. Some 
conceptions, though intuitively appealing, may be recipes for disaster. To take a 
particularly salient example, Goodin and Roberts (1975, p.928) muse that 'one cannot 
3
1> As will be seen in Chapter 9, although a useful tool for describing multiple motivational states, the 
citizen-consumer dichotomy may not necessarily describe the actual motivational processes in relation 
to environmental policy preferences, 
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help wishing that Hitler had forsaken ethical ideals and pursued narrow material gain 
instead'. In other words, imposing a particular 'ideal' rationality is not only contrary to 
the condition of autonomy, it is also potentially disastrous to the very goal of a 
'common good'. 
With the emergence of 'sustainability' as an environmental discourse, this too 
has begun to attract candidates - one recent example is that of Siebenhl.iner's (2000) 
Homo sustinens. As appealing as these conceptions may seem, they may not be 
consistent with the condition of autonomy in terms of freedom to choose ends. Indeed, 
if we are deliberative democrats, who are we lo impose our notion of desirable ends onto 
others by engaging in what Myerson and Rydin (1996) refer to as 'pre-emptive 
consensus '?40 It may be entirely possible that individuals, even after deliberation, will 
reasonably reject some notion of sustainability imposed by a so-called 'expert'. Not 
least for this reason, I wish to steer well away from imposing any particular ontological 
framework (or 'psychologism') when examining motivations underlying preferences. 
Additionally, imposing psychologisms may simply misstate the nature of the 
problem of human-nature relationships as expressed through preferences. Simply 
conferring some ideal model of human motivations in relation to nature will not ensure 
these goals are achieved. In relation to sustainability, there is an emerging perspective 
that the role of deliberation is not to give rise to some pre-determined conception of 
sustainability. Rather, an ideally 'deliberative' approach involves defining its 
parameters through discourse. Doing so is 'ecologically rational' so far as it is 
responsive to a constellation of changing environmental and social circumstances (Barry, 
1996; Rydin, 1999).4 ' 
Imposing rationalities is also a bad strategy for exploring deliberative 
possibilities. To borrow an ecological analogy, it is not unlike attempts to classify all 
species of animals a priori according to number of legs. The classification will work, 
producing neat categories. However, it will do nothing to develop understanding 
biological evolution or the way that ecosystems operate. 
40 Or more specifically, pre-emptive 'normative consensus' to use the sche1ne of consensus types outlined 
in Table 2-2. 
41 And thus satisfying an important criteria for an 'ecologically rational' sociai choice 1nechanism, that of 
'negative feedback' between eoologiea! and human systems (see Dryzek, 1987a). 
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The design of instruments based on pre-determined psychological conceptions 
gives rise to Dryzek's (1990) 'mismeasure of political woman/man', resulting in 'garbage 
in-garbage out' accounts of deliberative dynamics. I may wish lo investigate whether 
deliberation gives rise to the emergence of 'sustainable woman/man', and make 
observations consistent with my hypothesis. However, the idea remains an artefact of a 
pre-imposed ideal, which may tell us nothing about the substantive benefits of 
deliberation in relation to environmental problems. 
In section 2.5 I will develop a model of preference construction that takes into 
account changing ideas about the ecological, political and social contexts in which 
preferences are fanned, and how these might be related to multiple motivational states. 
I wish first to consider processes whereby individuals might be motivated to adopt 
some notionally 'sustainable' perspective when constructing preferences. I will do so 
under two models. The first is based on transformation of values during deliberation. 
The second is based on the social psychology model of 'norm activation'. 
2.4.3 Deliberative Preference Shift due to changing Values 
The possibility that humans may express different types of values in relation to 
a given policy issue introduces two new possible mechanisms for deliberative preference 
shift. The first mechanism follows a conventional model. This model, which I will label 
the 'value transformation hypothesis', simply involves changes preferences dues to a 
transformation in values. In other words, this suggests that there have been a 
fundamental change in the values of the individual. As recognised by Nanon et al. 
(1998), such transformation is unlikely to occur over short time frames, particularly 
over four days. 
2.4.4 Activating Values Through Deliberation 
A more promising model for accounting for the transformation of desired ends 
during the deliberative process is the idea of norm activation (Schwartz, 1977; Schwartz 
and Howard, 1981). For Schwartz, a norm pertains to a set of values that motivate 
behaviours. The most common usage of the term concerns what Schwartz refers to as 
social norms, which consist of 'expectations, obligations, and sanctions currently 
anchored in social groups' (Schwartz, 1977, p.223). By contrast, personal norms are 
anchored in the self, although they are formed through a process of social interaction. 
Soction24: Dellberationarrl C~ V a1ues 
Although not specific to any particular type of norm, the model is most commonly 
applied to the activation of 'other-regarding' or altruistic behaviour. In other words, it is 
used to account for mechanisms that lead to the transition from the self-regarding 
consumer to the other-regarding citizen (for eJ<ample Blarney, l 998a). 
Although 'norm' is central to Schwartz's model, it may cause confusion in 
relation to political theory, where norms tend to be restricted to the social dimension.42 
To avoid this confusion, I will restrict my use of terminology to 'values', which provide 
the basis for motivations in the sense that Schwartz uses personal norms. 
To paraphrase Blarney (1998a, p.49), the conditions under which the activation 
of particular (other-regarding) values is most likely to occur is where actors are aware of 
a need, there are known positive consequences 43 and a sense of responsibility to act. 
These can be stated more concisely as: 
• 
• 
• 
awareness of need; 
awareness of consequences; and 
awareness of responsibility . 
Awareness of need is not unlike the notion of attitude salience. We may value 
something merely by the fact that we are aware of it (Zajonc, 1968). The problem of 
awareness of consequences can be summarised as 'how can I value something (and 
construct my preferences accordingly) if I do not understand it'? Finally, even when 
aware of the need and consequences, an individual may still seek to abrogate personal 
responsibility for a need through denial (Schwartz and Howard, 1981). Such a denial 
may not be as pernicious as it sounds. It may simply result from perceived problems 
such as ambiguity of the information available lemling an individual to defer action (for 
eJ<ample Blarney, 1998a, p.51; Hobson, 2001). I will eJ<plore these mechanisms, and the 
role of deliberation in facilitatiog activation in the following discussion. 
(a) Awareness of Need: Increasing Salience though Discourse 
Deliberative democrats often ascribe to deliberation an increase in the propensity 
for individuals to consider an issue from the perspective of the common good (for 
42 Thanks to Bob Goodin for pointing this out, along with other vagaries associated with using of 
definitions from different disciplines in a single body of work. 
43 Or negative consequences in the case of inaction. 
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example Miller, 1992, p.61). Consistent with activation through awareness of need, 
deliberation may seIYe to expand the domain of consideration of affected others through 
a process referred to by Eckersley (2000) as 'enlarged thinking'. This follows from 
Arendt's (1961) 'representative thinking', which Eckersley which extends beyond 
humans to the environment Along a similar vein, Goodin ( 1996) explores mechanisms 
whereby deliberation may give voice to environmental concerns, albeit through the 
mouthpiece ofhumans.44 
Using the language of social psychology, the process of awareness involves an 
increase in salience, which deliberation seIYes to increase by actively considering a wider 
array of interests than if individuals were left to their own devices. Salience may simply 
increase because a particular aspect of an issue is brought to the attention of deliberators 
(for example Zajonc, 1968; Clarke et al., 1999). It may also be made salient via more 
force of argument, where purely self-interested positions cannot be sustained (for 
example Goodin, 1986, p.87). 
(b) Awareness of Consequences: Cognition as Mechanism for Overcoming Barriers 
to Activation 
Even where there is recognition of the need to act in the common good, there are 
still barriers to this occurring. There are good arguments to suggest that, even without 
extensive deliberation, individuals may at least attempt to be other-regarding when 
making policy choices (Goodin and Roberts, 1975), which is also backed by empirical 
evidence (Rohrschneider, 1988; Blarney et al., 1995). 
It is generally accepted that very few individuals would explicitly desire an end 
that is manifestly 'anti-environment' or 'anti-ecological sustainability' (Macnaghten and 
Jacobs, 1997). Similarly, Hajer (1995, p.14) recalls the propensity of politicians to 
declare that 'we are all Greens now'. However, as his work deftly shows (in his case at 
the national level), simply expressing a desire is not directly related to giving it effect. 
Thus, simply knowing there is a need is not sufficient. 
•.:Importantly, Goodin (1996) does not proffer a mechanism whereby the irnp1.,"fative to consider the 
'interests~ of nature is imposed upon the deliberators; rather. it occurs by virtue of the deliberative 
process. That such ecological enlightenment should take place through the free and uncoecorced 
exchange of ideas satisfies not only the conditions of ideal deliberation, but also those of free agency 
according to Watson (1975). 
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Lack of awareness of consequences poses a particularly significant problem to 
changing behaviour in relation to the provision of common goods. Individuals may be 
seeking to activate a particular value, but still fail to give effect to it. More is needed 
than good intentions. Expressing a preference (or voting in elections) may indeed, lower 
'the cost of acting on one's perceived moral duties' (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993, 
p.173). However, individuals can only construct preferences to suit these ends as far as 
they are anned with information to construct the appropriate connections between 
means and ends. To borrow from economic conceptions of voting, there may be no 
incentive to do so (Downs, 1957); or, in the case of extra-constitutional process45, 
participate in politics at all (Olson, 1965). The cost of creating an informed preference 
far outweighs that of simply expressing a preference (Hardin, 2000). 
The barrier of awareness of consequences is not unlike that of bounded 
rationality. However, more is at stake than arriving at 'sub-optimal' preferences. 
Without the ability to understand the consequences of ones' actions, rather than engage 
in statisficing behaviour, there is a danger that preferences 'Will be constructed on some 
other value altogether. Consequently, the embodied interests of others (nature, future 
generations) are effectively ignored. Following from Goodin and Roberts (1975), the 
'rationally-ignorant' voter may not be so problematic if voting according to self-interest, 
compared to a rationally ignorant ethical voter. 
This problem of awareness can be readily demonstrated in respect to 
environmental issues. There is generally a low level of environmental literacy, with 
misunderstanding of even basic ecological concepts, such as biological diversity (Spash 
and Hanley, 1995). The problem is particularly acute for constructing preferences 
sensitive to the needs of future generations. Wbcre present consequences are better 
understood, benefits to future generations are discounted in the cognition process 
(Wade-Benzoni, 1996; Wade-Benzoni, 1999), even if there is a commitment to them in 
principle. More generally, if constructing a normative claim into preference is impeded 
by infonnational constraints, then those values will either be poorly constructed into 
preferences, or remain inactivated during the construction process. This will occur 
45 See discussion on page 12. 
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irrespective of matter how vvidely certain values might be held to constitute a common 
good - or 'generalizable' to use the language of Hahermas. 
The potential for enhanced capacities to act m the common good (or 
'sustainably' in the case of the environment) may be increased with improved 
knowledge in the deliberative context. An example of this may be a 'love of complexity' 
in relation to environmental issues and a desire to construct preferences accordingly.46 
Indeed, it is precisely this appreciation for the complexity and emergent properties of 
ecosystems that is embodied in Leopold's (1933) 'ecological aesthetic'. 
(c) Denial of Need 
Even in the face of awareness of needs and consequences, there may still be 
barriers to activation of other-regarding values. There still remains the problem 
individuals may still choose to act in a manner contrary to the common interest, 
effectively denying the need. This may be particularly problematic when the needs 
attached to different motivations are in conflict, as exemplified by the citizen·consumer 
dichotomy - such as in the extreme case of a developer involved in an environmental 
issue. 
Even where conflicting motivations are not strong, institutional dimensions may 
come into play if one does not trust institutions to implement popular decisions. A 
good example of this type of denial is to assert that political institutions are unlikely to 
deliver the public good irrespective of individual preferences, therefore the individual 
will not support requisite policies. That is, expression of other-regarding preferences is 
contingent on trust in institutions (see for example Brouwer et al., 1999). Thus, there is 
a tendency for individuals to allocate preferences according to what they think is 
possible - or at least not excessively difficult. 47 
46 A mechanism for this has been identified by Scitovsky who argues (albeit via experiments conducted 
on rats) that the process of learning about a phenomenon stimulates an appreciation for ever more 
complexity (Scitovsky, !976, p.39). 
47The same mechanism may also ¥tork for ignorance. A good example of this can be found among 
Australian voters where the vote for the major parties is kept artificially high because of a sentiment a 
vote for a minor party is wasted because there in Httle chance of them getting into power, even though 
preferences are redistributed. See description of the Hare system of aggregation in section A,6.2.4 in 
Appendix 6. 
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2.4.5 Summary 
I will now take stock of achievements so far in this chapter. I began the process 
of building a model of preferences with the basic (thin) model, which was inadequate for 
accounting for preference shift. The first of these modifications was the introduction of 
the preference construction model, which concerned the process of matching means to 
ends. I then considered the valuational component to the extended preference model, 
considering the possibility of competing motivations that may come into play in the 
formulation of policy preferences. I then explored mechanisms whereby particular 
values may become activated and constructed into policy choices, as well as barriers 
thereto because of particular circumstances that are counter to the deliberative ideal. 
Each of these additions to the preference model has increased the scope for 
preference shifts during deliberation. However, there remain many loose ends. Not 
least of these concerns methods for observing processes that I have described. The 
remaining task of this chapter is to develop a systematic approach to the 
conceptualising the task deliberative dynamics and developing research methods by 
which the goals of this thesis can be achieved. 
2.5 AN EXPLORATORY MODEL OF DELIBERATIVE 
PREFERENCE TRANSFORMATION 
As concluded in the previous section, empirically exploring the complex 
processes underlying preferences is a potentially forbidding task. Yet there is potential 
for simplification, which I will seek to demonstrate here. In this section I will develop a 
conceptually simple model of 'discursive' preference transformation. I do so by 
drawing on the discursive theory, which is strongly related to particular theories of 
deliberative democracy, as epitomised by Dryzek (1990). 
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2.5.1 (Re)simplifying the Preference Model 
One of the most important developments to emerge from the mechanisms for 
activating particular values48 is that it is impossible to separate the valuational position 
from which possible policy options are evaluated from the evaluation process itself. 
The 'activation' model accounted for ways in which increased knowledge might assist 
with the activation motives, thereby changing preferences. However, the perspective 
that the individual adopts will also impact on the way in which they will interact with 
the information at hand - a point well recognised by Bister (1983, p.19). The same 
also works in reverse. Individuals who possess greater levels of information, or at least 
have greater confidence in their beliefs, also tend to hold more strongly held value 
positions (for example Palfrey and Poole, 1987). In short, values and beliefs are 
interdependent. 
In view of this interdependence, the preference model developed so far is no 
longer adequate, as far as it treats them as separate stages during preference 
construction. Rather than try to measure them as distinct entities, I need to deal with 
them as more complete value-belief systems. In the remainder of this chapter, and those 
tbat follow, I will refer to the combination of values and beliefs under the rubric of 
subjectivity. Thus, instead of considering multiple motives, I am concerned with how 
particular groupings of beliefs and values translate into coherent 'subjective systems' 
that give rise to preferences. The basic idea is something similar to Rockeach's (1973, 
p.11) 'value system'. However, it has a more 'transient' quality; in as far as I treat it 
not as a stable subjective state, but as a constellation of beliefs and values that 
crystallise together in relation to a policy issue. 
In recognising the interdependence of values and beliefs, it toms out that there is 
scope to simplify the deliberative model of preference transformation by turning to the 
theoretical literature of deliberative democracy. The basic idea of activation can be 
incorporated into discursive model of preference transformation using the language of 
discourse and subjectivity. In the following discussion, I begin to explore the 
possibilities. 
48 See section 2.4.3. 
Section25: An Exploratory Model of Deliillative Prerererm T ranfmnatkln 
2.5.2 Subjectivity and Discourse 
I will now briefly sketch the ways in which the deliberative preference model can 
be integrated with discursive models of the sort discussed by Habermas and Dryzek. I 
do so in a rudimentary fashion, by way of exploring connections between theory and the 
conception of preferences developed so far rather than attempting to achieve a 
theoretical contribution to the literature. 
(a) Subjectivity and the Lifeworld 
One potentially useful concept for exploring the domain within Vihich 
preferences are constructed along the lines of subjectivity, embodying both cognitive and 
valuational components, is Habermas' idea of 'lifeworld' which Dryzek (1990) adopts 
in his conception of discursive democracy. In short, the lifeworld comprises the locus 
'where culture, social relation, and individual personalities are maintained an 
constructed'. In his interpretation of Habermas, Dryzek tends to nse lifeworld to 
contrast the modem propensity for interaction to occur based on instrumental (the 
matching of [selfish] means to ends) rather than communicative rationality. 
Communicative rationality is based on the deliberative ideal, or the 'degree to which 
these processes are uncoerced, undistorted, and engaged by (communicatively) 
competent individuals'. It is achieved to the ext~'llt that there is 'understanding across 
subjects [and] the coordination of their actions through discussion, and socialisation' 
(Dryzek, 1995, pp.19-20). 
The 'lifeworld' is the theoretical space in which communicative rationality 1s 
created, comprising the 'symbolic network in which subjects interact' (White, 1988, 
p.102). It is something that shapes individuals and societies, but it is more than 
humans; it is discursively constructed, but it is more than just talk. Despite its firmly 
anthropocentric roots, Dryzek (1995, p.20) attempts to rescue communicative 
rationality from potentially anti-ecological perspectives. He does so on the basis that, 
although is not capable of agency, nature is nonetheless a subjective entity that is 'truly 
alive and pervaded with meanings'. He refers to the possibilities for communication 
with nature that are non-verbal. In this way, his arguments are similar to those of 
Goodin's (1996) exploration of how deliberation might enfranchise the earth, but with 
the additional dimension of communicative rationality. 
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(b) The Lifoworld in Relation to Environmental Policy: Tentative Schematics 
Taking any particular environmental issue as an example, the lifeworld may be 
described in terms of the complete network of communications among all entities. In 
order to make the idea of lifeworld more tractable for our present purposes I will 
consider that portion of the lifoworld that may potentially come to bear on a particular 
issue. This subset of the lifewor!d - which I will label the 'discursive sphere' -
embodies all possible beliefs and values (or discourses) that exist in relation to an issue. 
The issue of concern in this thesis is that of the Bloomfield Track. Thus, the discursive 
sphere comprises discourses specifically in relation to that policy issue. 
In order to render tractable the idea of the discursive sphere, I will differentiate 
the major elements within it. Each element reflects a major component of the discursive 
system. They are systems in which discourses are generated. They are also in tum 
transformed by discourses from other parts of the sphere. Of course, any such 
differentiation will be artificial, in this case aimed primarily at conceptualising the 
problem posed by the Bloomfield Track policy issue. 
A particularly useful (subset) of the lifeworld in relation to the Bloomfield Track 
issue is illustrated in Figure 2-3. In the figure, I have identified four major discursive 
components. These include the sphere specifically involving environmental issues, or 
the 'ecological sphere'. This is the locus of not only nature itself, but also human 
interpretations of nature. The sphere with which such interpretations interact is that 
comprising human systems (or the 'social sphere'). Another important (if not critical) 
discursive system in relation to environmental issues concerns political discourses, 
which are attributed to the political sphere. The final discursive system involves 
discourses related to the production and exchange of goods and services. This 'economic 
sphere' interacts discursively with human systems via mechanisms that are more 
conventionally described by economics.49 Of course, the economic sphere interacts 
with the ecological sphere as far as the latter acts as both a source of resources and 
49 In this sense~ flows ofrnoney between human and economic systems can be called a 'discourse' .so far 
as it embodies 'meaning' if albeit a very dominant one in certain contemporary societies, Indeed, such 
a perspective might serve to by monetary values in their proper place with respect to broader human 
and environmental systems. 
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repository of waste.50 The discursive interaction between political and econorruc 
systems might best be incorporated under the rubric of political economy. 
The list could go on. Indeed, the number of possible interactions between these 
systems is large. For each, there will probably exist a relevant discipline, but identifying 
these is not the important task here. The most important feature of representing the 
discursive sphere as I do here is to stress the need to be as inclusive of all possible 
interactions as far as they might dominate public discourse. I do this rather than begin 
with a particular disciplinary perspective, which will tend to foreclose particular 
avenues of investigation. 
Each of the subsystems I have just described is, in turn, a discursive system. 
For illustration, some of the elements of these systems are labelled. For example, the 
ecological sphere consists of individual organisms, which are, in turn, linked by 
ecological processes; again in turn linked by biospheric processes. 
The 'ripples' in Figure 2-3 represent discourses within the discursive sphere 
emanating from each of the four major discursive subsystems. I use discourses in the 
same sense as Dryzek (1990) as something that 'embodies a shared set of capabilities 
which enable the assemblage of words, phrases, and sentences into meaningful "texts" 
intelligible to readers or listeners.'51 Alternative definitions of discourse abound, but 
what is important for the purpose of this analysis is that a discourse embodies shared 
meanings that can be (potentially) understood and communicated. Importantly, these 
meanings may embody both values and beliefs; that is, they are manifestations of 
subjectivity. These discourses are intersubjective to the extent that they are shared 
among groups of individuals. Yet, in the sense that they are used here, discourses 
transcend individual actors. Rather, the emphasis is on the meanings that they 
embody.52 
'
0 As described by environmental economics. See for example, Baumol and Oates (1975). 
51 Citing van Dijk (1985, p.710). 
52 See also discussion in Chapter 6, section 6.2.1 on page 157, 
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Figure 2-3 The Discursive Sphere 
Political 
Economic 
One potential objection to the way in which I have set out the discursive sphere 
goes that it contains elements that do not 'speak' per se. This is true enough, but it 
should be stressed that the discursive sphere represents the constellation of discourses 
that may potentially be understood by communicatively competent actors.53 It does not 
so much require agents to speak, rather that they listen. Goodin (1996) considers 
something very similar in respect to his discussion of deliberation as a process of 
enfranchising nature. In earlier discussion I have considered how Leopold's (1933) 
ecological aesthetic reflects an appreciation of nature in an individual's value system 
5~ See discussion in section 1.2.1 of Chapter 1. 
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through an understanding of the interrelations and complexity of ecological systems 
or understand the 'book of nature'. 
2.5.3 Generalizeable Interests 
The extent to which individuals are willing to read 'nature's text' determines 
wether or not such discourses are important components of a common good - or, to 
use the language of discursive democracy, a 'generalizable interest' (for example 
Habermas, 197la). Dryzek (I 987b, p.675) summarises the idea as follows: 
A generalizable interest exists beneath the swface misconceptions of actors. In offering an 
argument on behalf of a candidate for generalizable status, an individual ls in eftbct claiming it 
should be a moral law, to which all rational, uncoerced, and knowledgeable individuals would 
subscribe in the situation at hand. 
The parallels between generalizeable interests and the activation of 
environmental values should be readily clear. Iudeed, Dryzek (1990, p.54-5) argues that 
the 'continuing integrity of the ecological systems on which human life depends could 
perhaps be a generalizable interest par excellence'. 
As discussed earlier54, it is difficult to conceive broadscale disagreement with the 
preservation of nature (or ecological sustainability in its broadest sense) as a 
fundamental goal. Indeed, some argue it is a goal intrinsic to human uature.55 However, 
for similar reasons to those used to argue against imposing 'psychologisms' as that basis 
for the construction of preferences.56 Follovviug Dryzek (1990), I do not wish to 
predetermine the contours of a geueralizeable interest.57 Rather than pre-empt the 
subjective foundations of preferences, what is needed is a method for mapping 
subjective states as they are constructed into preferences. One possibility that I will 
explore in section 2.6.2 is that of Q methodology, which I develop more fully in 
chapters 6 and 8. 
54 Section 2.4.4(b). 
55 There has even been at least one theoretical attempt under the 'biophilia hypothesis' to describe love of 
nature in terms ofDanvinist evolution (for example Kellert and \VilsonJ 1993). 
56 Section 2.4.2(b ). 
57 ~foreover, it may not be necessary to do so. Nor is there any reason to believe that a stylised 
dichotomy may be enough to account for the potential range of conceptions about what constitutes of 
generalised interest. Exemplary of the problem \Vith attempting to pre~empt observations, Rokeach 
( 19731 p.23) demonstrates hov.· s1nall variations in value orientations give rise to a n1ultitude of 
possible normative outcomes, 
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2.5.4 Preference Formation in the Discursive Sphere 
I will now consider the way in which the discursive sphere can be used to 
characterise modes of preference construction and deliberative transformation. In the 
tradition of critical theory, I will begin with the 'counterfactual ideal' before considering 
how policy preferences are actually formed, and then how they might be transformed. 
(a) Ideal versus Actual Preference Formation 
The discursive sphere depicted in Figure 2-3 is an abstract representation of the 
complexity inherent to the environmental policy problem. Any attempt to formulate 
coherent policies requires that these discourses be understood, as far as is possible. An 
ideally discursive system, characterised by open and unconstrained communication, is 
one that is sensitive to the entire suite of relevant discourses. 
However, it is clearly impossible for preferences to be constructed on the basis 
of all discourses in the discursive sphere, posing a problem of bounded rationality par 
excellence. Thus, in order to make sense of the issue, individuals need to be able to make 
sense of the world around them. A more plausible modus operandi of preference 
construction involves the integration of 'packages' of discourses into a coherent 
perspective through which choices about appropriate policy means are made - which 
are not dissimilar to the 'subjective maps' discussed above.58 These are located in 
various positions in the discursive sphere in Figure 2-3. For example, a strictly 
anthropocentric value is located in the extreme right of the discursive sphere. Tbe 
aforementioned consumer, or Homo economicus, lies somewhere between the social and 
economic spheres. By contrast, the citizen is located between the social and political 
spheres.59 
(b) Politics in me and the Distortion of Preferences 
The processes determining the actual location of subjectivity upon which 
individuals construct preferences are, of course, not entirely autonomous. Apart from 
the limitations of bounded rationality, achieving discursive ideals is also constrained by 
"See section 2.3.3 (page 30) 
5~ In the way that the discursive sphere is constructed, these two archetypes occ.upy only a smaU subspace 
of the possible types that may be found. 
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the kind of structural and (manipulatory) political processes I described in Chapter l. 
These represent distortions in the communicative process that may act as barriers to the 
activation of certain discourses in preference construction. 
A major distortion that Dryzek (1990, p.12) alludes to in respect to the modern 
lifeworld is the propensity to derive actions based on instrumental rationality and 
human self-interest. There are also distortions that have a more particular or localised 
political dimension. These include the examples considered in Chapter 1 under the 
rubric of symbolic politics. 60 In respect to the environment, the enfranchisement of 
nature may already be hindered in view of its lack of direct voice (Goodin, 1996). 
Although nature may be gaining increasing recognition in modern political 
discourse, there still remain fundamental distortions that act against its elevation in 
policy processes of the sort that Dryzek (1990, p.12) refers to.61 The question is, does 
deliberation improve this situation? More fundamentally, usmg the discursive 
preference model, what constitutes an improvement to the status quo? 
(c) Conceptiom of 1mproved' Preferences 
Although it is not possible to construct an ideally discursive account of policy 
preferences in full knowledge of all discourses within the discursive sphere, it is possible 
to say something about what might constitute an improvement. Using the deliberative 
processes of preference transformation described in the previous sections, preference 
transformation involves the construction of preferences based on particular discourses in 
certain quarters of the discursive sphere. 
From the point of view of environmental political ecology, an improvement in 
the deliberative construction of preferences occurs where there is a shift in the locus of 
discourses62 toward the centre of the sphere. The centre represents an area where there 
is increased complexity as an increasing number of discourses are heard and weighed up 
in the process of formulating policy preferences. In essence, a deliberative shift toward 
fill Section 1.2.4(a). As will become increasingly clear in discussion of the case study in Chapter 4; there 
are many ]ocalised distortions in discourse. 
4
' I have argued elsewhere that part of this problem lies in ignorance pertaining to the consequences of 
indifferent, or destructive attitude.s to nature, which increased knowledge has historically served to 
remedy to some extent (Niemeyer, 2000). 
" Or subjectivity, which I will use to denote the subjective equivalent. 
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this 'murky' discursive territory characterises the deliberative potential that I have 
labelled politics in posse. 
In relation to preference construction, improved knowledge and comprehension 
in a communicative setting increases the scope for an increasing number of discourses to 
be considered in relation to the issue. Further, in relation to changing values, a decrease 
in distortion in the commuuication of these discourses lends itself to the construction of 
preference along the lines of an intersubjectively shared generalizable interest. This 
contrasts with some other conception of the issue that is imposed on the individual. The 
processes whereby policy preferences are discursively transformed resonate with the 
mechanisms discussed previously in the chapter in relation to preference c-0nstruction 
and value transformation. In the following discussion, I will describe more explicitly the 
way in which these hypotheses related to the discursive preference model. 
2.5.5 Three Types of Policy Preference Shift under the Discursive 
Model 
Earlier in the chapter, I developed three different hypotheses to explain 
deliberative preference shift. The first involved preference construction, where, through 
a process of cogoition, preferences were constructed to better-reflect values, or desires 
for particular ends. The second hypothesis of value transformation concerned a 
fundamental transformation of values whereby the individual comes to desire an entirely 
different end. The third hypothesis concerns a variation of the value transformation 
hypothesis. It involves the activation of different values that have otherwise been 
dormant during the process of preference construction. 
To some extent, by combining values and beliefs as part of discourses the 
discursive model of policy preferences blurs the distinction between these hypotheses. 
Yet, they are still useful for conceptualising potential preference shifts. In the following 
discussion I will review these hypotheses in view of the new preference model. 
(a) Comtructing lntersubjective Preferences 
Adopting the discursive model of policy preferences, the preference construction 
hypothesis remains much the same as in section 2.3, but takes on a more intersubjective 
dimension. It is posited that individuals who subscribe to the same discourses, 
suggesting shared subjectivity, should also prefer the same policies, particularly where 
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deliberation is characterised by communicative rationality. Before deliberation, this may 
not be the case, for much the same reasons outlined in section 2.3.3. \\'here they do not, 
then we would expect that deliberation would tend to increase the intersubjective 
construction of preference. 
This intersubjective component brings the preference construction model into 
line with the discursive approach. Beforehand, a major problem with the preference 
construction hypothesis is that, epistemically speaking, there are no absolutes with 
respect to the relationship between means and ends save for perhaps the most 
obvious oflogical connections. The benchmark against which we can say that there has 
been an improvement in construction falls to the level of epistemic consensus, formed 
under conditions of communicative rationality. 
(b) Transforming Subjectivity 
Under the discursive model, the value transfonnation hypothesis translates from 
a shift in values into a shift in the type of discourses to which an individual subscribes. 
Assuming a correlation betwem discourse and subjectivity, there is a resulting change in 
subjectivity that underlies preferences. The transformation can be represented by a 
movement of subjectivity 'Within the discursive sphere in Figure 2-3, say from citizen to 
consumer; even toward the ecological dimension where deliberation serves to enfranchise 
nature (Goodin, 1996). 
Although subjective transformation permits the possibility of preference shift, at 
its core it is fairly inflexible, particularly as it does not account for multiple states as 
outlined in section 2.4.2(a). For much the same reasons discussed in relation to the 
argument that values tend not to change over short periods, it follows that subjectivity 
- or at least the values component - will also be fairly static. Consequently, the 
transformation model may still not pennit a particularly large change in pref<,-rence. 
One variation of the basic transformation hypothesis might be that subjectivity 
transforms at the margins, perhaps in the fonning of changing beliefs, giving rise to a 
new awareness of consequences. This awareness may then give rise to the activation of 
preference construction based on entirely different subjective foundations, which I will 
now consider. 
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(c) Activating Subjectivity 
Consistent with the 'multiple self model discussed in section 2.4, there may be 
more than one discursive bundle, or subjective position, potentially coming to bear on a 
particular issue. It accepts that, when prompted, an individual might respond in 
seemingly inconsistent ways depending on a given context.63 
Given that individuals may subscribe to different discourses depending on 
context, then so should their policy preferences. The role of multiple subjective states, 
based on packages of discourses, in the construction of policy preferences is represented 
in Figure 2-4. Four states are circumscribed within the discursive sphere and each has 
some bearing on preference (either individually, or collectively). 
Figure 2-4 Subjective States and Their Relationship to Policy Preferences 
DISCURSIVE 
SYSTEM 
values and beliefs 
(lnter)subjective states 
that may potentially . 
play a rnle in. the 
construction of 
preferences 
Relative role in the 
construction of 
policy preference 
Note that Figure 2-4 depicts more than one subjective state coming into play 
during preference construction, the level of influence being depicted by the thickness of 
the arrow connecting it to policy preferences. To what degree a particular subjective 
"A point not leas! recognised by Stephenson (1983), who describes the phenomenon using (increasingly 
popular) analogies from physics, particularly quantum physics. One of these contexts concerns the 
construction of the survey instrument itself, which may be easily manipulated to invoke a desired 
response (Dryzek, 1990, ch.8). 
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state dominates will depend on the nature of these discourses. It also depends on its 
relationship with other discourses. This relationship will affect how each is constructed 
into policy preferences. 
Earlier I have discussed how distortions in the discursive sphere tend to privilege 
certain discourses over others. These distortions also influence the extent to which 
different discourses are expressed as preferences. The processes are not unlike those of 
choice framing64 and attitude priming65 which may give rise to large changes in 
preference while subjectivity remains relatively stable. A more systematic process of 
distortion is again that of symbolic politics, which may serve to increase the salience of 
certain, more accessible discourses during preference construction. 
(d) Two Types of Activation 
Under the activation model, a preference shift involves a change in relative 
weighting of a particular discourse during preference construction. There are a number 
of possible relationships between different discourses as far as they are constructed into 
preferences. 
Where there is no dissonance between different subjective states, they may 
readily coexist during preference construction. The changes to level of activation in 
preferences may follow a smooth path where the level of impact on policy preferences 
is proportional to the level to which an individual reoognises that discourse. In this 
sense, the relationship is linear. 
Alternatively, certain discourses may be incompatible to such an extent that they 
do not easily coexist during preference construction. This is not to say that they do not 
coexist in subjectivity the citizen-consumer dichotomy is a good example of a widely 
accepted case in point Where there is a high level of dissonance - say between ones' 
feelings regarding abortion concerning the rights of the mother or the child - then there 
may be a discontinuous relationship between the two states. This may take the form of 
'Gestalt switch', whereby preferences may switch between one state and the other. 
"For example: (Tversky et al., 1981; Iyengar et al., 1982; Davis, 1995; Hoffman and Ventresca, 1999) 
"For example: (Fazio, 1989; Iyengar, 199 l; Clarke et al., 1999} 
2.5.6 Summary 
In this section I have sought to develop a tentative model of deliberative 
preference shift based on a discursive conception of policy problems. The model has 
integrated elements of the preference construction and value activation models of the 
previous sections to arrive at a preference model based on the activation of varying 
subjective states into policy preferences. I have married discursive preference shifts 
with the structural dimension of political issues by considering distortions within the 
discursive sphere, pertaining to a particular issue, whereby individuals become more 
attuned to certain discourses than others. 
The task now is to devise a method for discerning the major discourses as they 
might translate into policy preference so that we might see how they are transformed 
during the deliberative process. In the following section, I will sketch the broad 
approach that will be adopted throughout the thesis. 
2.6 EXPLORING PREFERENCE SHIFT UNDER THE 
DISCURSIVE MODEL: APPROACHES AND 
METHODS 
So far in this chapter I have developed the conceptual tools for exploring the 
deliberative transformation of policy preferences. I have yet to say much about the 
methods to be used. I will begin the task in this section by briefly outlining the broader 
requirements involved in such an undertaking. This will be followed by a discussion of 
approaches that will be adopted. 
2.6.1 The Nature of the Task 
(a) Intensive Research and Analysis 
The nature of the task of exploring deliberative preference shift as laid out in this 
chapter requires an intensive analysis of deliberation among a small number of 
individuals, rather than extensive analysis involving large numbers. Whereas research 
under the thin model involves the examination of large nun1ber of cases to test specific 
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hypothesis, the deliberative preference model requires the intensive examination of 
smaller numbers of individuals to divine the reasons giving rise to the observed changes 
(for example Brown, 1985; Simon, 1985, p.300).66 
(b) The Use of Analytical Triangulation 
As part of tbis intensive approach to researching deliberative preference 
transformation, it will be necessary to employ a variety of complementary analytical 
methods. This will be done in the thesis under the broad approach of analytical 
triangulation (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
This triangulation will include a qualitative analysis of the deliberative process, 
such as analysis of discourse using deliberative 'turning points' in Chapter 5.67 It will 
also involve both quantitative and qualitative analysis of policy preference shifts in 
Chapter 7. The most important component of the analysis that v.111 be used to identify 
the subjective states associated with policy preferences will be that of Q method, which 
I will now discuss. 68 
2.6.2 Q methodology and the Analysis of Discourse 
Q methodology is a particularly promising approach for the exploration of 
subjectivity in relation to a particular phenomenon. It is well suited to the broad. 
intensive and exploratory approach of this research, not least because it involves in an 
intensive analysis potentially incorporating complementary methods. A detailed 
description ofQ methodology will not be provided until Chapter 6. Here l will simply 
introduce it in broad terms. 
Q methodology was devised by William Stephenson and first introduced in a 
letter to Nature in 1935. Brown (1993, pp.34) describes the approach as follows: 
Q methodology provides a foundation fur the systematic study of subjectivity .... Most typically 
in Q, a person is presented with a set of statements about some topic, and is asked to rank-order 
them (usually for 1agree' to 'disagree'); an operation referred to as Q sorting. lbe staternents are 
00 As \Vill be discussed in the following chapter~ attempts to induce preference transformation under 
deliberative ideals also requlre-s the use of small numbers. 
67 Section 5.3. 
fS Discourse analysis is: also be used to a lesser extent to attempt to fill gaps in analysis left by the Q-sort 
by tracking changes to the 'story line' during debate over the issues at hand. The simultaneous use of 
these approaches is consistent with grounded theory methodology and the use of triangulation to 
crosscheck and confer results, 
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a matter ofopinion only (not fact), and the fact that the Q sorter is ranking the statements from 
his or her own point of view is what brings subjectivity into the picture. 
What is of interest in Q methodology is the subjectively assigned relative 
importance of statements relevant to the Bloomfield Track case study. In short, I will 
use the Q methodology as a form of discourse analysis to identify the predominant 
subjective groupings discussed above as far as they are constructed into policy 
preferences. The relationship between these discourses and preferences is depicted in 
Figure 2-4. 
As used in this thesis, a factor can be said to relate to a particular discourse, 
which is the manifestation of underlying subjectivity.69 Despite debate about the 
relationship between Q-melhodology and discourse analysis (for example Dryzek, 1993; 
Brown, 2001 ), there is strong agreement that the two can be related to one another.70 
The only contentious element of !he debate concerns whether Q methodology is a subset 
of discourse analysis, or whether it is one means for elucidating discourse. I have used 
Q methodology in the latter sense. 
Thus, although applied more widely than as a tool for the analysis of discourse, 
Q methodology is well suited to the task here.71 The identification of the discourse to 
be analysed is dependent on the phenomenon under study. From the discourse, a series 
of statements, or 'concourse' to use the term applied by Q-methodologists, associated 
with a particular issue are selected. The parallels between the use of the terms 
'discourse' and 'concourse' can be evidenced by the following quote: 
Concourse is the very stuff of like, from playful banter of lovers or chums to the heady 
discussions of philosophers and scientists to the private thoughts found in dreams and diaries. 
From concourse, new meanings arise, bright ideas are hatched, and discoveries are made: it is 
the wellspring of creativity and identity formation in individuals, groups, organizations, and 
nations. (Brown, 1993, p.5) 
As used in this research, Q methodology will provide a mechanism for the 
'codification of discourses' pertaining to the various policy positions adopted by 
deliberators. Using the concourse as the basic tool, Q methodology will assist with the 
69 As discussed in Chapter 5 on page 49, 
m Another example of the use of Q methodology as discourne aoalysis is Barry and Proops (1999), who 
use it to analyse environmental discourses in relation to involvement in a Local Employment "frading 
Scheme (LETS) in the UK. 
71 Brown (2001) stresses that Q methodology can be applied to much more than discourse, so this use of 
Q for discourse analysis consists of one type of application of the broader approach. 
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identification of coherent structures amidst the entangled 'mess' of discourses that may 
come into play over the environmental policy issue adopted as the case study. As 
Brov.n (2001) states: 
Q methodology provides the means, via Q technique and method, for finding the global 
structure (as manifested in a factor) or set of factors) that is inherent in a discussion. 
In summary, Q sort is used to 'reveal the inherent structure of a concourse' and 
the 'vectors of thought' associated with it (Brown, 1993, p.5), which take the form of 
factors. When extracted from the Q data in Chapter 6, these factors will represent 
intersubjectivety shared discourses that tend to be constructed into policy prefr'fences in 
the manner depicted in Figure 2-4. 
2. 7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has traversed a wide nmge of literature in order to explore 
mechanisms whereby deliberation might give rise to the transformation of policy 
preferences. It has also laid the foundations for methods of measuring both policy 
preferences and the reasons underlying them. I began the discussion by considering the 
inadequacy of using policy preferences as the sole measure of deliberative 
transformation. I then considered an extended model. This included the motivational 
dimension - a system of values that might give rise to differing ends. It also comprised 
an evaluative system of cognition whereby desired ends are matched to policy means. 
A promising framework for understanding the process of deliberative 
transformation was that of (norm) activation. The approach recognises the inter-
relatedness of the cognitive and motivational dimensions. This realisation was 
incorporated into a discursive model of preference transformation. Under the model, 
pre-deliberative preferences are impacted by distortions within the discursive sphere. 
By contrast, it is hypothesised the deliberation serves to remove these distortions and 
increase that comprehensiveness in the synthesis of discourses in preference 
construction. 
I then briefly considered the manner in which the contours of discourses, or 
subjectivity, might be identified. Q methodology was identified as a potentially useful 
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tool for explaining preforence transformation between conditions of politics in esse and 
in posse. 
Having laid the conceptual foundations for the thesis in this chapter, in the 
chapter that follows I will focus on the design of the deliberative process. This will be 
done to achieve, as far as possible, a deliberative process that follows theoretical ideals, 
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PART II: DELIBERATIVE 
PROCESS AND 
BACKGROUND 
CHAPTER 3 SIMULATING DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: THE DESIGN OF 
THE FNQCJ 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter establishes the parameters of design for the FNQCJ. It does with a 
view to facilitating the emergence of a deliberative process that is as close as possible to 
deliberative ideals outlined in Chapter 1. The approach involves examining a small 
sample of past deliberative processes to identify examples of deliberative fu.ilure. These 
are then addressed by way of modifications to deliberative design. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 briefly revisits the principles of 
deliberative design. I then compare these deliberative ideals to the implementation of 
previous deliberative processes to gain insight into particular featutes of design that 
might give rise to non-deliberative outcomes. In section 3.4 I consider those pitfalls 
identified, which I then attempt to by specifying features of the discursive design that 
should constitute a remedy or at least minimise deliberative failure. Then, in sections 
3.5 and 3.6 I outline the approach taken to the recruitment of deliberators and witnesses 
participating in the deliberative process. 
3.2 PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN 
As stated in Chapter l, the design of the FNQCJ is intended to achieve as far as 
possible the ideals of deliberative democracy. By doing so, the aim is to observe 
preference transformation between the status quo and something approaching 
deliberative democracy. So far in this thesis, I have contrasted the deliberative ideal in 
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terms of communicative rationality and the emergence of generalizable interests. I have 
also stressed increased levels of cognition where individuals juggle increasing levels of 
complexity in arriving at policy choices. These deliberative ideals are used in this 
chapter to guide design. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, criticisms of deliberative democracy tend to be based 
on simplistic interpretations of what constitutes 'deliberation'. t Based on these 
interpretations, the parameters of deliberative design may simply involve bringing a 
number of individuals together (often stakeholders with fixed views), giving them plenty 
of information and letting them talk for a period. Thus, at first blush there seems 
nothing particularly special about deliberation. Needless to say, things are never as easy 
as they seem. 
There have been a large number of forums claimed to fall under the deliberative 
banner. These have ranged from small, short meetings to grander events involving 
hundreds ofindividuals.2 Rather than take a particular model 'off the shelf, the design 
of the FNQCJ involved much attention to achieve deliberative ideals as far as is 
possible. However, it was loosely modelled on the citizens' jury format - one of the 
smaller, more intensive of the deliberative models.3 
Part of the process of design has involved refining the citizens' jury model. It 
has also involved looking at past deliberative processes for instances where it appears 
that deliberative ideals have not been met. By examining the causes of 'deliberative 
failure', it was hoped to build an understanding of deliberative processes in practice to 
fine-tune the principles of deliberative design. In the following discussion I will consider 
a small number of examples that have been used for this purpose. 
1 Section l.2.2(c) (page 8). 
'Examples ofthe smaller type of forum are those conducted by Schkade et al. (2000). Examples of the 
larger include search conferences (for example Emery and Purser, 1996; Pelletier et al., 1999), 
consensus conferences (Joss, 1998; Australian Museum, 1999; Boy et al., 2000). The largest of the all 
of the deliberative forum are deliberative polls (Fish kin, 1991; Fishkin, 1995; Merkle, 1996). 
3 For examples see: (for examples, see Crosby et a!., 1986; Tonn and Peterson, 1993; Stewart et al., 
1994; Armour, 1995; Crosby, 1995; Aldred, 1997; Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; Smith and Wales, 
1999a; Smith and Wales, 2000). 
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3.3 CASE STUDIES IN DELIBERATION AND 
DELIBERATIVE FAILURE 
Let me begin the discussion of case studies in deliberative failure by first alluding 
to a significant problem of attributed to deliberative design. The result of the 
deliberative process may simply be a function of the elements of design that have been 
built into it. Indeed, a number of commentators have criticised deliberative forums as 
tending to produce a particular type of outcome. 
However, there is no consensus on which direction such biases tend to favour. 
There are argumentq suggesting different sorts of outcomes. For example, Kuran ( 1998) 
argues that deliberative processes tend to mask more radical (usually right-wing) 
conceptions of issues because of participants' fear of how they will appear to others. 
Another contention is that participants will end up acting in the same way as politicians 
(Kuran, 1998), therefore bypassing the need to engage in deliberative processes since 
they yield the same sort of outcomes as existing political processes. 
Another type of deliberative failure is said to occur because individuals simply 
do not wish to change their positions. It has also been contended that deliberative 
processes may tend to arrive at anti-ecological outcomes. 4 .4.nother contention is the 
deliberation tends to overwhelm individuals. Consequently, they may adopt coping 
strategies, such as grasping for simple solutions. In the following discussion I will refer 
to two examples where these sorts of deliberative outcomes have occurred. These will 
include Pelletier et al (1999) and Skillington ( 1997). Both authors argue that deliberative 
approaches may tend to favour the status quo, though from radically different 
perspectives. By contrast I will argue that these sorts of 'deliberative failure can be 
avoided and mechanisms built into deliberative design to avoid the types of deliberative 
'paralysis' that they describe. 
Pelletier et al (1999) found that among participants m a series of search 
conferences on food security that there was a tendency of participants to shift their 
views on agricultural issues away from social-environmental to more parochial and 
conservative perspectives. Their observations run counter to the hypothesis outlined in 
'See also Kuklinski (1991) 
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Chapter 25, which argued that deliberation should appreciate complexity, not diminish it 
in the discursive landscape. 
Pelletier et al. (1999, p.120) conclude that their results may have been due 
deeper reflection of the issue of the sort I have outlined during discussion of deliberative 
ideals. More likely is that participants sought to resolve perceived conflicts (or reduce 
dissonance) within an existing and well understood perspective ---· with conservatism 
tending to have more easily reconcilable tenets than more outward and social 
perspectives.6 Jn other words, rather than increase in complexity detected in post-
deliberative subjectivity, there was a propensity to favour simplistic conceptions of the 
issue. It is difficult to determine from the study of Pelletier et al. (1999) precisely what 
occurred. The analysis did not include any triangulation of results - such as qualitative 
assessment of the deliberative process. Their analysis relied entirely on two Q-sorts 
conducted three weeks before and three weeks after the search conference. 
Despite these weaknesses, there are clues that may help to inform deliberative 
design. To begin, the remit --- or 'terms of reference' - of the conference was very 
broad, covering a wide range of issues to do with agriculture without a specific aim. 
This may have contributed to the complexity of issues presented to the conference and 
restricted proper reflection. Compounding this was the time allocated to the conference 
- two and a half days. This appears to have been insufficient time for deliberators to 
get across all the issues. 
Also, there appears not to have been any concerted input to improve the 
information available to participants. There were no 'expert' witnesses or additional 
information source beyond the participants themselves. This appears to have led to the 
self-generation and replication of existing perceptions, and therefore biases, within the 
group - reinforcing existing opinions rather than transforming them. The self~selection 
process used to recruit panel members may have further compounded this, where 
individuals with strong opinions are more likely to agree to participate. Finally, there 
was a large deliberative group. Each of the conferences consisted of 30-50 individuals. 
Although there was some scope for small-group deliberation -the forum broke up into 
'Section 2.5.4(c). 
6 However, these conclusions were tentative and are the subject of ongoing analysis, 
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self-selected groups of 4-6 at various stages of the conference 
many participauts to engage in meaningful deliberation.1 
there were far too 
Taken together, these factors may have contributed to a fonn of 'deliberative 
paralysis'. Supporting this conclusion is Pelletier et al's (1999) second hypothesis 
mentioned above, which suggested a role of difficulties in reconciling a complex array of 
elements, thus tending to favour simplistic solutions. Need this have been the outcome? 
It certainly contrasts with conclusions from other deliberative forums, particularly 
involve small groups with simpler remits (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997, p.v). Comparison 
of the outcomes based on aspects such as size and remit suggests that there appears to 
be a 'threshold effect' in deliberative design. Beyond a threshold, the increasing 
complexity of the process yields a sv•1itch in deliberative dynamics. Depending on how 
they are configured, a deliberative process may either effectively deliberate the issue on 
the basis of merit or fall prey to rhetorical posturing of simplistic (symbolic) ideas or 
participants (Green, 1967). 
As well as concerns with remit, number of participants and duration of 
deliberation, another important consideration is just who engages in deliberation. This 
brings me to the second example of deliberative failure, a conference on recycling 
observed by Skillington (1997). The deliberative process appears to have resulted from 
similar dynamics to those observed by Pelletier et al (1999). In this case, deliberative 
failure appears to have been extreme. 
The forum described by Skillington (1997) brought together representatives from 
particular interests, each holding a pre-defined and intractable position. Speakers at the 
conference had pre-prepared statements replete with rhetorical tools aimed at eliciting 
pre-determined outcomes. The forum was clearly not communicatively rational. 
Rather, it was characterised by strategic behaviour, with participants jockeying to 
elevate their particular views. 
The case study is a good example of 'you get what you design for'. After 
observing the deliberative process, Skillington (1997) concluded that deliberative forums 
tend to act as a 'modality for the transmission of productivist culture and for the 
7 Some of the problems associated with deliberation among large numbers are considered by Goodin 
(2000a, pp.82-3) 
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reassertion of corporatist tendencies'. The frame of reference for the discourse analysis 
the researcher carried out was neo-Marxist structuralist. The researcher looked for and, 
nol surprisingly, found structural tension in which the relative power of economic 
concerns meant that environmental concerns could not prevail. However, as for the first 
case study, need these be the sort of outcomes resulting from deliberative process -~ 
despite the emphatic findings of the author? I argue that they are not. The solution 
entails careful attention to deliberative design. 
To avoid the type of outcomes observed by Pelletier et al (1999) and Skillington 
(1997) it is necessary to ensure that the deliberative process is designed so that the 
ideals of communicative rationality is fostered to the greatest extent possible. Another 
important point concern the ongoing arguments I have made against testing specific 
hypothesis in relation to deliberative processes. A better approach, and one adopted in 
this thesis is to explore and learn. In the following discussion I will seek to learn from 
these examples of deliberative failure, learn from them and improve deliberative design. 
3.4 DISCURSIVE DESIGN: LEARNING FROM 
DELIBERATIVE FAILURE 
Despite the examples in the previous section, most deliberative forums on 
environmental issues have tended to produce strong shifts in favour of 'ecological' 
outcomes. These forums have tended to be designed on the principles of practical 
reason and emphasised the orderly and factual presentation of evidence. 8 These 
outcomes highlight the need to pay careful attention to the design of deliberative forums 
and the need for experimental research to refine the deliberative process. 
The previous section has served an important purpose. It has highlighted a 
number of potential pitfalls which design of the deliberative process of the FNQCJ 
should be guarded against. These include problems of conforming behaviour, 
deliberative overload and 'strategic talk'. Of course, no matter how good the design, 
8 Evidence in favour of this contention includes Crosby (c!998) Aldred (1997), Kenyon (1998), 
UKCEED (1999), and Ward (1999). 
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these pitfalls may still emerge. To this end, part of the strategy is to design against 
them, while attempting to confer with deliberative ideals. The other is one of 'wait and 
see', where analysis of the deliberative process examines the extent to which scenarios 
counter to the deliberative ideal have occurred. Based on observations of the deliberative 
process I will attempt to explain why certain outcomes occurred, that might be used to 
refine the principles of deliberative design. 
As will be seen in the chapters that follow, most of these pitfall were 
successfully avoided, although I will discuss a number of potential 'wildcards' which 
may have given rise to slightly different results. In short, the attention paid to 
discursive design has paid-off, resulting in outcomes approaching deliberative ideals. In 
the following discussion I will outline some of the fearures of deliberative design for the 
FNQCJ that served most effectively to result in 'deliberative' outcomes. I will do so 
under the headings of different types of deliberative pitfalls that have been discussed 
above. 
3.4.l Conforming Behaviour 
One of the pitfalls associated with deliberative failure discussed so far in this 
chapter is that of 'conforming behaviour'. This may include a range of related 
phenomena. For example, Aldred (2000) argues that the evidence for deliberation in 
overcoming bounded rationality is not particularly promising, in view of observed 
phenomenon such as 'group think', which may serve to mutually reinforce pre-existing 
biases (Janis, 1972).9 A related problem is the desire to conform on the part of 
individuals, rather than analyse the strength of argument 10 A similar concern is that 
more powerful or articulate actors dominate the process. 11 
Conforming behaviour of deliberators occurs where the deliberative process is 
driven by a majority or certain dominant members of the deliberative group. Where 
outcomes result from the influence of such individuals or groups, they constitute 
9 One potential example of this problem may be observed in the results of deliberation reported by 
Schkade et al. (2000) where deliberators pondering the extent of damage to be awarded to litigants 
appear to engage in a bidding war, inflating heavily the outcome compared to where individual 
valuations are aggregated, 
10See: (Asch, 1956; Kiesler and Kiesler, 1970; Bister, 1983, p.40). The problem referred to as 'yea 
saying' in the context of contingent valuation (Blarney, 1999). 
"For example: (Dryzek and Torgerson, 1993; Sanders, 1997). See also Pelletier et al. (1999, p.105). 
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deliberative failure, except where such an outcome is a product of communicative 
rationality and the exercise of judgement (cognitive rationality). There are a number of 
components of deliberative design aimed at combating this problem. I will briefly 
enumerate them below. 
(a) Briefing of Roles to Reinforce Independence 
One part of the solution to this potential problem was to ensure that all 
participants were fully aware of the need to critical reflection of what was being said~ 
not to simply believe something because it was being stated. To this end, the 
deliberators participating in the FNQCJ were carefully briefed about their roles and 
expectations in terms of behaviour. The role of the facilitator was particularly 
important in this regard. 
(b) Facilitation 
Facilitation is critical to the deliberative process. The moderating role of the 
facilitator serves to reinforce the capacity of deliberators to manage and reflect on the 
information at hand (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997, p.v). The facilitator is the guardian of 
the deliberative process and serves to focus the panel on the task at hand. A good 
relationship between the facilitator and the deliberative group is ~ntical. The facilitator 
should be neutral at all times such that the deliberative group is unaware of hisiher own 
personal views (Palmer, 1999). The role of the facilitator is particularly important in 
ensuring that each deliberator is able to contribute to the process in equal measure and is 
comfortable in expressing a particular opinionu 
During the FNQCJ, the facilitator acted as the gatekeeper of the process, 
ensuring fairness and managing group dynamics. The facilitator helped the deliberators 
formulate questions and ensured that all participants understood exactly what was 
happening during the process. He also helped to maintain group cohesion by ensuring 
that the dialogue among the deliberators was understood by all. 
;i The facilitator for the FNQCJ 1 Peter ~1cCarthy, was selected on the basis of experience, but also on 
familiarisation with the research tradition of deliberative democracy. He was actively engaged in the 
late design stage of the deliberative process and contributed to the fine-tuning of the discursive design. 
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3.4.2 Deliberative Overload 
The example of the search conference conducted by Pelletier (1999) has been 
cited in section 3.3 as an example of 'deliberative overload' whereby the deliberative 
process gets bogged down in trying to achieve too much in too short a time. V.'here 
deliberative overload occurs, far from encouraging communicative rationality, the 
deliberative process may actually increase symbolic processing of information 
(Kuklinski et al., 1991 ). 
A related issue is that that of deliberative competence. As discussed in Chapter 
l, issues of competence are not new or unique to deliberative forums - it has been the 
subject of debate within the legal literature for sometime.13 Particularly salient is the 
ability of the lay person to digest complex scientific infonnation and arrive at a 
competent decision. This presupposes that in deliberating complex ecological 
phenomena, in order to be 'communicatively competent' panel members must also be 
'scientifically competent'. 
However, despite good reasons for scepticism, the weight of the literature 
pertaining to legal juries affirms the view that juries can indeed demonstrate competence 
in dealing with complexity (Edmond and Mercer, 1999). This also appears to be the 
case of non-legal deliberative forums (for example Coote and Lenaghan, 1997). 
However, this does not preclude the possibility of participants misunderstanding 
information they are given, or being overloaded by the demand placed on them given the 
time and resources made available. These problems appear to be related to the design of 
a deliberative forum rather than representing a flaw in theory. 
Part of the solution also involves careful facilitation, so that deliberation is kept 
focussed on the task at hand. Of course, this implies that the task set for the 
deliberative process is well defined. In the following discussion I will consider the 
design principles for the task, or remit, set to the FNQCJ. 
(a) Design of Remit tlJ Remedy to Deliberative Overload 
Smith and Wales (l999b, p.1) stress the need to carefully choose the remit, or 
question, presented to the deliberators which will influence the information to be 
13 See for example: (ABA, 1989; Edmond and Mercer, 1997; Tetlock, 1998; Edmond and Mercer, 1999). 
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presented. Although they are concerned primarily with fairness, the choice of remit is 
also important to ensure that the scope of the question is not too great, allowing 
insufficient time for deliberation. 
The question with which the deliberators were charged was carefully framed in 
order to focus the deliberative process. If not done with care, the framing of the remit 
will restrict certain avenues of deliberation and will have a negative impact on both 
deliberators and witnesses (Smith and Wales, 1999a, p.301; Smith and Wales, 1999b, 
p.14). 
There are two ways in which deliberators can be asked to consider policy issues 
(Smith and Wales, l 999a). One is an open-ended approach to deliberations, where 
participants are free to explore issues they feel are relevant and come up with wide 
ranging recommendations. Another is to constrain deliberations of the group to a 
number of predefined options. In the case of the FNQCJ, the remit provided an 
important common denominator for deliberations in the face of disparate views and it 
will be relied on heavily in the process to maintain focus (Palmer, 1999). As such, there 
is a tradeoff in the design of the remit between a narrower remit with more restricted 
deliberation and a broad remit, giving rise to increased scope for conflict. 
While the above assessment tends to support a narrower remit, too restricted a 
remit can render the deliberative process a fail accompli. While communicative 
rationality should tend to restrict certain outcomes that cannot be sustained based on 
rational argument, this should not be done ex ante by virtue of discursive design. Such 
an approach would tend to support the charge of Kuran (1998) that deliberative 
democracy is overtly oppressive to certain points of view. Alternatively, an excessively 
broad remit would be one that simply asks the deliberators to come up with some 
decision. A middle-ground approach will entails the deliberators deliberating the 
environmental impacts in terms of specified options. 
Evidence suggests that deliberators' responses to decisions tend to be more 
biased under complicated decisions that simpler ones (Green, 1967)14• This fmding 
tends to support the need for a simple remit. Another consideration is the finding that 
extreme choices presented to juries tend to result in bias in favour of more lenient or 
14 Quoted in Gerbasi (l 977, pp.339-340). 
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risk-averse outcomes (Vidmar, 1972)15• Risk aversion with respect to the environmental 
impacts of particular choices is likely to become a factor in the deliberations in a manner 
described by Wynne (1989). 16 
(b) Remit of the FNQCJ 
From the above discussion it was decided that remit be framed in such a way to 
strike a balance between simplicity and complexity. Based on these considerations the 
following remit was formulated: 
• ·what recommendations does the jury make regarding the .future management 
of the Cape Tribulation to Bloon1field Track? 
In considering the question, the jury is asked to take into account: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Community access and consultation 
Impact on local Aboriginal people and their cultural values 
The integrity of the World Heritage/environmental values of the area 
Economic impacts 
Feasible alternatives 
Long-term impacts 
These factors were built into the remit following assessment of the case study 
and consultation with stakeholder and decision-makers involved in the issue. In short, 
they were intended to cover the major discourses pertaining to the Bloomfield Track 
issue, consistent with its representation in the ·discursive sphere' in Chapter 2. 
3.4.3 Strategic Talk 
Another potential for deliberative failure that is well recognised in the 
deliberative literature occurs where individuals act strategically to influence the direction 
of deliberation using 'strategic talk' (Austen-Smith, 1992; Przeworski, 1998). Strategic 
talk, such as was observed in the example of Skillington (1997) (section 3.3) effectively 
prohibits preference shift~. All deliberators have a strong position in which they 
attempt to coerce others to follow --·-c everyone bas a fixed position, therefore no one 
15 Quoted in Gerbasi (1977, p.336). 
"Cited in Ward (1999, p.20). 
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changes their mind. This may, and probably would occur over long periods of 
protracted deliberation, but not within the timeframe petmitted by the FNQCJ. 17 
Other possible outcomes from strategic behaviour during deliberation include 
the use of strategic language by a smaller subset of strong individuals to persuade fellow 
deliberators of arguments that elevate their own particular interests (Johnston, 1998; 
Aldred, 2000). In such cases deliberation may lead to transformed preferences, but they 
will be premised on 'false beliefs', rather than improved preference construction through 
the acquisition of information and improved (cognitively rational) judgement. 
In the context of deliberative polls, Kuran (1998, p535) argues that the 
expectation that all panel mmnbers will automatically participate 'thoughtfully and 
honestly' in the deliberative setting is 'overly optimistic'. In response to such 
assertions, I do not assume that it is possible for all participants to dispense with pre-
existing interests. It is a hypothetical ideal to be tested; it is not treated as a fail 
accompli. Indeed it is plausible that certain categories of individual with particular 
conceptions of interest do not shift in the perspective of the issue, shift less easily, or 
shift for different reasons - despite an appeal for dispassionate analysis of the issue on 
merits. This tension between the theoretical ideal of reasoned contemplation and reality 
of passion and interest has a long history in legal juries (Abramson, 1993). 
However, it is accepted as a possible feature of deliberative dynamics. Yet, the 
design of the process has he en done to minimise the possibility of strategic behaviour on 
the part of participants, as far as they \\~II autonomously choose to dispense with their 
own pre-defined perspective. Part of the solution to avoiding strategic talk has already 
been discussed in terms of careful facilitation and process design where the expectations 
and responsibilities of deliberators have been carefully laid out. A major component of 
this design has been to recruit 'citizens' as deliberators; rather than representatives from 
stakeholder groups, or 'interests'. I will discuss this, and other features of deliberative 
design below. 
11 One example of this sort of process is described in Dryzek and List (Dryiek and List, 2001), which 
involved discussion among two individuals from opposing perspectives over a long period of time, 
Sectbn3.4: D~design: l..eamiq;; from D~ Fallure 
(a) Deliberation Among Citizens; Representations by Interests 
Dryzek (1990, p.43) argues that a discursive design is one in which 'individuals 
should participate as citizens, not as representatives of the state or any other corporate 
and hierarchical body'. It follows that citizens who are not members of any such body 
are more likely to confer with deliberative ideals. That ordinary citizens are willing to 
engage in communicative behaviour and reconsider their preferences and views than 
representatives of interest groups has been well observed (Rippe and Schaber, 1999, 
p. 79). In short, citizens - as opposed to interests -- are more likely to engage in 
communicative, rather than strategically rational behaviour. Thus, recruiting 'ordinary' 
citizens is an important strategy for avoiding problems of strategic talk. 
This is not only pertinent to the attempt to replicate politics in posse; it also 
facilitates the comparison with politics in esse. After all, these citizens comprise the 
body of public opinion of the sort referred to in Chapter 1. They are also the citizens 
whose policy preferences are most likely to be transformed by the deliberative process. 
This contrasts with 'political interests' that may seek to influence opinions in order to 
mobilise support in ways described by symbolic politics (Sears, 1993).18 
This is not to say that interests do not play a critical role in the deliberative 
process. Indeed, the activities of political interests are an important mechanism for 
introducing important discourses into political deliberation (Dryzek, 200 l ), as 
acknowledged by the inclusion of the 'political sphere' in the discursive model m 
Chapter 2. The important feature of the discursive design of the FNQCJ was to restrict 
the role of political interests to the role of witnesses presenting to deliberators in order 
to bring their arguments into the deliberative domain. I will return to the issue of the 
selection of witnesses in section 3.6 below. 
(b) Publicity 
Another consideration in reducing the scope for behaviour counter to deliberative 
ideals regarded the question of whether or not to publicise the FNQCJ and/or allow the 
media to observe the process. It was a particularly pressing question. Because of the 
contentious nature of the Bloomfield Track issue19 and the novelty of the FNQCJ 
"See section !.2.4(a) in Chapter l. 
19 As will be seen in Chapter 4. 
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process, there were a number of unsolicited approaches by the media to e-0ver the event. 
It was decided that media spotlight would affect the dynamics of the deliberators and 
steer it away from the deliberative ideal. For example Kuran (1998, p.535) argues that: 
To make a statement before television cameras is to risk being showcased as a paragon of 
political correctness before a vast audience, This danger \vill ordinarily make participants think 
tv.rice before uttering potentially controversial thoughts. 
As I have already outlined, perhaps more problematic than the e-0ncems of 
Kuran (which may really pertain to deliberation silencing indefensible claims in a 
communicative environment) is the potential for media attention and publicity generally 
to foster strategic behaviour. The problem has been observed in very public deliberative 
polls (Gibson and Miskin, forthcoming). 
Because the public (and media) impact of the deliberative process in this research 
was of lower priority to research objectives it was decided to avoid publicity as fur as 
possible. Deliberators were also given every opportunity to remain anonymous, so that 
they could express their opinions freely. To this end, they were given the option of 
providing a pseudonym to be used in reporting the results of the deliberative process. 
They were also asked to agree to a e-0mmitment not to discuss the deliberative process 
with representatives from the media In addition to the briefing of deliberators in 
relation to their roles, these measures served to impress upon them the importance of 
the integrity of the deliberative process. 
3.5 RECRUITMENT OF DELIBERATORS 
In addition to the considerations outlined in the previous section, an important 
element of the discursive design was the recruitment of deliberators to participate in the 
FNQCJ. In the following discussion, I will outline reasons for and the approach taken 
to selection of deliberators. 
3.5.1 Representativeness 
According to Dryzek (1990, p.43) an ideal discursive design is one in which 'no 
concerned individuals should be excluded'. Clearly incorporating all e-0ncerned citizens' 
is not possible in the context of a citizens' jury, which is limited to 16-20 individuals. 
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Furthermore, as I have outlined in the previous sections, large numbers greatly decrease 
the chances of achieving deliberative idealsw 
However, small numbers does not mean that no level of representativeness is 
possible. One approach is to stratify the selection process for the recruitment of 
individuals from major demographic groups. These are based on demographic 
characterised identified as important to the dynamics of environmental issues, like the 
Bloomfield Track. However, an approach that attempts to include representatives in 
such as way suffers from what Smith and Wales (1999a) refer to as 'false essentialism'. 
This occurs where individuals are expected to represent the views of all within their 
designated demographic (Annour, 1995, p. 180). No selection can claim to be truly 
representative of all interests in society (Pitkin, 1967, p.80), 21 particularly in citizens' 
juries given their small size (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997, p.91). 
In the end, the impact of attempting representativeness may have a negligible 
effect on the outcome. Smith and Wales' (1999a) argument is correct to the extent that 
no deliberative group can deliver the definitive and enduring answer to complex social 
question (Rippe and Schaber, 1999). There is also evidence that representativeness does 
not necessarily influence outcome. Some of the older literature on juries contests that 
random and other methods for the selection panel of deliberators do not yield 
significantly different results (Diamond and Zeise!, 1974; Kahn, 1974; Gerbasi et al., 
1977). 
However, these findings do not entirely negate the need for representativeness. 
Evidence from legal juries suggests that the constitution of a deliberative group does 
have bearing on the outcome (Abramson, 1993). If this is the case, then the onus is on 
the selection process to achieve some level of representativeness. If complete 
representativeness is not possible, then, arguably, some representation is good. More is 
better still. 
Accepting the need for representativeness of sorts, the question then becomes 
one of 'where' the deliberators should be selected from, or the relevant demographic 
boundaries. Typically in social research, demographic boundaries are drawn along lines 
20 See for example Goodin(, 2000a). 
21 Cited in Smith (1999a) 
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of gender, socioeconomic status and education. However, these types of boundaries 
may not be as appropriate for environmental research dealing with preferences and 
deliberation. Some variables are more important than others are. For example, in the 
Australian context Eckersley ( 1989) has found that environmental views are 
predominantly a function of education. In view of these considerations, the deliberative 
panel was randomly selected, but stratified to reflect major demogrnphic groupings, 
particularly with respect to education. 
3.5.2 Geographic Area for Selection 
The question of what determines an appropriate geographic boundary for the 
administration of and consultation for environmental issues is important (Fishkin, 1991, 
p.78), yet largely unanswered issue (Smith and Wales, 1999a, p.12). There is little in 
the literature addressing this question. Rippe and Schaher (1999) argue that, given the 
nature of environmental issues, strictly local approaches to decision-making do not 
suffice. In many cases, discursive designs need to expand beyond local administrative 
boundaries (Benhabib, 1996, p70). This is true for the Bloomfield Track, where 
'interest' goes beyond the local area; particularly given its World Heritage status, which 
implies no less than an international dimension. For the purposes of the FNQCJ, it was 
not practicable to expand the area for recruitment to such an extent. This was on a 
number of grounds, including the cost and the diminished possibilities for achieving a 
'critical mass' of discourses considered, to draw the pool of deliberators from a wide 
area. Instead of a 'global' perspective, a regional approach was taken. 
The region from which deliberators were recruited included the area from Cairns, 
northwards to Cape York. In choosing this geographic area, the deliberators recruited 
were likely to have some knowledge and opinion about the issue. That is, they have 
been exposed to politics in esse. 
The organiser came under strong criticism from residents in the Bloomfield area 
for not selecting in favour of people from the local area, being the demographic most 
affected by the road. However, as I have outlined above22, such an approach 
contravenes the objectives of the project as well as the design ideal of communicative 
"See section 3.4.3(a). 
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rationality. Instead, it was decided that representation of those interests was better 
achieved by their participation in the deliberative process in the capacity of witnesses. 
3.5.3 Selection Process 
The general approach to recruitment was to select a random-stratified sample 
from Far North Queensland. To get the initial pool of potential deliberators we engaged 
a market research company23 to send out 2000 letters. The addresses were selected 
randomly from !he phone book using postcodes for all areas in the FNQ region from 
Cairos north to Cape York 
The 2000 initial letters sent out each included a card which recipients were aske<l 
to complete and return. The card included a questionnaire regarding demographic details 
such as age, gender, working status, education level and length of residency. 
Approximately 600 responses were logged, of which 180 indicated a willingness to 
participate. An assessment of the response letters suggested that there was a lower 
response-rate the greater the distance from Cairos. Thus, there appeared to be an 
element of self-selection in the responses, which potentially biased the selection 
process. 
To attempt to address the problem of self-selection, the demographic 
information obtained from the responses was used to draw a stratified sample using an 
algorithm to achieve a composition of demographic characteristics consistent with the 
region. To achieve this census data was used to set quotas for each category - gender, 
age group, education and length of residency. 
3.5.4 Compensation for Deliberators 
As is sometimes practised for citizens' juries, the deliberators were offered 
compensation for their time and expenses. This was done to ensure fairness, but also to 
provide an incentive for individuals to participate - thus improving representativeness 
on the deliberative panel - and to provide fair compensation to those who would 
otherwise be disadvantaged by participating. 
23 NCS Australasia. 
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Deliberators for participating in the FNQCJ were paid (AU)S300 for their time, 
as well as additional funds for expenses. Evidence from participants suggested that, 
while not a major factor in their decision to respond to the recruitment process, 
compensation permitted some to participate where it may not have othernise been 
possible. 
3,5,5 Final Deliberative Group 
Table 3-1 lists the deliberators selected to participate in the FNQCJ. The table 
shows the pseudonyms, or codenames, used by deliberators, their gender, age, 
occupations, education, length of residency and the local council area in which they 
reside.24 Deliberators selected but not able to attend are also shown. 
Table 3-1 Deliberators participating in the FNQCJ 
Codename 
Adventure 
Aswad 
Boat 
Janine 
Julie 
Keith 
Koda 
lviatilda 
Pearl 
Rastus 
Snoopy 
Tamarra. 
t 
t 
t 
t 
MIF 
F 
F 
M 
F 
F 
M 
F 
F 
F 
M 
M 
M 
F 
M 
M 
41 
57 
40 
43 
56 
64 
34 
39 
29 
34 
54 
49 
41 
48 
26 
Occupation 
Bookkeeper 
Inspector 
Engineer 
Program coordinator 
(community services) 
Retired 
Retired 
Marine scientist 
Mother I part~time study 
'fourism 
Professional musician 
Real estate agent 
Orcliardisr 
Gardener & contractor 
Wdder 
M SOs Cane farmer & land 
develo er 
t recruited, but unable to participate 
Education 
tertiary 
yrlO 
tertiary 
yrlO+ter 
yrl2 
yrl2 
tertiary 
yr12 
yr JO 
yrlO+rer 
yrl2 
yrl2 
yr!O 
yr JO 
yr12 
yrlO+ter 
Rmdency 
Cvean) 
>20 
>l 
>lO 
>10 
>10 
>10 
>5 
>20 
>20 
>20 
44 The location of these local council areas can be seen in Figure 5-1 on page l32, 
Shire 
Douglas 
Cairns 
Douglas 
Cai ms 
Cairns 
Douglas 
Cairns 
Cairns 
Cairns 
Cairns 
Mareeba 
Cook 
Cairns 
Douglas 
Dougfa.s 
Section3.6:Witresres 
3.6 WITNESSES 
In the following discussion, I will outline the broad rationale for the recruitment 
of witnesses to present to the FNQCJ. The details of individual witnesses, and their 
presentations, are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 25 
3.6.1 Expert Witnesses 
The witnesses to present to the FNQCJ were selected to reflect the broad 
categories of issues pertinent to the remit presented to the deliberative group and the 
case study more generally. Advisers to the FNQCJ were consulted to assist with the 
identification and recruitment of witnesses and list of potential witnesses was compiled. 
To aid the process of selection, witnesses were divided into two broad categories of 
expert and community representatives. 
Expert witnesses were to give evidence pertaining to technical aspects under the 
remit. Areas from which these witnesses were recruited included: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Tourism 
Environmental Impact 
Engineering 
Economics/Regional Planning 
Transport 
In addition to these main witnesses, a pool of individuals with expertise about 
the case study not central to the remit was collated. These individuals were contacted in 
advance to the FNQCJ and asked to act as a supplementary witness who would be 
contacted by the organisers during the deliberative process seeking follow-up 
information requested by deliberators. The witnesses were also asked to be available for 
follow-up questions. 
3.6.2 Community Witnesses 
Recruitment of community witnesses turned out to be problematic. The 
intention was to give voice to the needs and aspirations of the community and give 
25 Section 5.2. l. 
Crnpted 
deliberations a social context. Three major categories of community witnesses were 
identified: 
• 
• 
• 
Representative (local councillors) 
Residents 
Indigenous 
Community representatives recruited included the mayors of the Douglas and 
Cook Shire Councils. The local councillor from the Bloomfield area was also recruited to 
give a more localised perspective. We also contacted local resident's group(s) in the 
Bloomfield area and the Wujal Wujal Community Council but because of the politically 
contentious nature of the issue, as will be seen in the following chapter, failed to succeed 
in attracting witnesses from these groups.26 
We contacted a number of indigenous organisations that, although amenable to 
the idea of the deliberative process of the FNQCJ, were not willing to cause friction 
with the Wujal community by participating. The organisers managed to locate an 
academic at James Cook University. Although not intimately familiar with the specific 
issue, he was able to give an informative talk about the dynamics of indigenous issues. 
3. 7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the broad parameters for the conduct of the 
deliberative process. The principles of discursive design have proceeded in a manner to 
ma'Cimise the prospect of the FNQCJ approaching the deliberative ideal, or politics in 
posse. In the following chapter, I will re-enter the domain of politics in esse where I will 
describe the major features of the case study of the Bloomfield Track. 
u For an insight into some the problems associated with recruiting Vl-'itnesses from the indigenous 
community, see foomote 3 on page l l 5. l will return to the controversy regarding the conducting of 
the FNQCJ a nwnber of times during the remainder of the thesis, not least because it reflects the 
political dynamics of the Bloomfield Track issue more generally. 
CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDY: POLICY OPTIONS 
FOR THE BLOOMFIELD TRACK 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As '"ill become evident during the remainder of this thesis, to understand fully 
the policy preferences of deliberators ~- both before and after deliberation - it is 
important to have some understanding of the context in which they were formed. To 
this end, this chapter outlines the nature of the Bloomfield Track issue in the briefest of 
terms - its history, its politics, and the nature of the present policy problem. 
The discussion begins in section 4.2 with a backgrmmd of the Bloomfield Track 
and itq regional, ecological and political context. Attention is then turned in section 4.3 
to the genesis of the policy issue of the Bloomfield Track, including the circumstances 
giving rise to the controversy. This is done primarily in order to provide a background 
understanding of the nature of the current policy problem, which is discussed in section 
4.4. 
4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE BLOOMFIELD TRACK 
ISSUE 
In this section, I will set the scene of the Bloomfield Track issue. l will do so by 
first providing a brief description of the Bloomfield Track, including its geographical 
location and major features. I will then provide some context for the Bloomfield Track 
controversy by describing the ecological, sociological and political dimensions of the 
Bloomfield Track 
Chapter4 
It is impossible, given the space here, to provide a full account of the Bloomfield 
Track issue. It is truly complex, worthy of a thesis of itself However, rather than get 
bogged down in this complexity, I will instead a very brief account of its major 
dimensions, particularly those that will be found to have some bearing on policy 
preferences. 
I will proceed by setting the scene of the Bloomfield Track issue, boginning with 
a brief description of the Bloomfield Track itself. I will then discuss the Bloomfield 
Track in ecological context, outlining the nature and significance of the ecology of the 
region. This is followed by a discussion of the sociological dimensions of the 
Bloomfield Track, including the different communities affected by the issue. Finally, the 
political dimension of the Bloomfield Track issue is discussed. This will include a 
description of the constitutional stmcture of the Australian federation and its 
contribution to the dynamics of the issue. In the section that follows, I will draw on 
this material to describe more specifically the genesis of the Bloomfield Track issue. I 
conclude the chapter with an account of the current state of play. 
4.2.1 Overview of the Bloomfield Track 
The Bloomfield Track is located in the Daintree Region in the far north of the 
state of Queensland (FNQ), Australia. The stippled line in Figure 4-1 (on page 89 
below) shows the location of the Bloomfield Track. It is approximately 30km in length, 
stretching from Cape Tribulation, northwards to the Bloomfield River. 
The Bloomfield Track is a very rudimentary road. It is passable only by four-
wheel-drive (4WD) and has become popular with off-road enthusiasts. Although works 
have recently been undertaken to upgrade certain sections of its surface, the condition of 
the Bloomfield Track is a reminder of its method of constmction. This consisted of a 
series of bulldozers blazing a trail through the rainforest over a period of 20 years ··-
most famously on the last occasion when the road 'proper' was completed in 1984. 
Over this period it has transformed from a very crude (temporary) road to a walking 
track of international standing and back to the 'track' as it is currently configured. 
(a) The Region 
The Daintree region surrounding the Bloomfield Track is sparsely populated and 
is almost entirely covered by tropical rainforests, comprising both high and lowland 
Section4.2: Bockgrourrl to Thi Blcomfleld Track ISst.a 
varieties. It is internationally renowned for its conservation value and is a major 
international tourist attraction. Indeed, by far greatest commercial activity in the region 
is tourism (WTJ\.fA, 1992). The rainforest through which the Bloomfield Track travels 
is now listed as being of World Heritage Significance - and since listing has been named 
the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area, the northern end of which comprises the Daintree 
Region. The yellow line in Figure 4"1 shows the boundary of the Wet Tropics. 
At the southern end of the Bloomfield Track lies Cape Tribulation. Cape 
Tribulation is the principal destination for tourists visiting the 'Daintree Region' -
between the Daintree River and Bloomfield Rivers. The region includes a number of 
tourist facilities, including backpackers (hostels) and hotels, with a nearby residential 
subdivision. 
Subdivisions within the Daintree portion of the Wet Tropics are a particularly 
problematic and controversial feature of the region. As well as the few plots near Cape 
Tribulation there is a major subdivision of land near the main road to the north of the 
Daintree River. Overall, there are approximately 1500 plots that have been subdivided 
within the region (Rainforest CRC, 2000, p.16). At the time of construction of the 
Bloomfield Track there were approximately 500-600 residents between the Daintree 
River and Cape Tribulation, living on 400 of the available plots. If there is no major 
change in policy or planning in the area, the population of the region is expected to 
grow. The current estimates are between 1200 and 2400 people over the next 30 years 
(Rainforest CRC, 2000, p.5), considerably increasing the ecological pressure on the 
region. 
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The closest major urban centre within a day's reach of the Bloomfield Track is 
Cairns, which acts as the tourism and commercial hub for the region. The majority of 
tourists travelling from Cairns to Cape Tribulation do so by road, although there is a 
small airstrip to the south of Cape Tribulation. The road north of Cairns (the Cook 
Highway) follows the coast to Port Douglas, another tourist destination famous for its 
luxury resorts and proximity to the Great Barrier Reef. 
Approximately 20km north of Port Douglas lies the sugar-farming town of 
Mossman of approximately 1800 residents. 1 The town is the administrative centre of 
the Douglas Shire - which extends north to the Bloomfield River and is responsible for 
managing the Bloomfield Track.2 
Some 30km north of Mossman the main road ends abruptly at the small 
township of Daintree. The route to Cape Tribulation (and the Bloomfield Track) turns-
off the main road just before the Daintree township. Getting to Cape Tribulation 
necessitates crossing the Daintree River by a ferry operated by the Douglas Shire 
Council. From there the road passes through a series of ranges and lowland areas. 
Until recently (1995) the road north of the Daintree River to Cape Tribulation 
was itself also a dirt track, until the volun1e of traffic led to a decision to upgrade it to 
bitumen. Even since the construction of the Bloomfield Track, most tourists do not 
venture beyond Cape Tribulation. However, their numbers have been increasing -
through both 'self-drive' tourists in rented 4WDs or organised tours on coaches 
specially designed with 4WD capability. 
The major centre to the north of the Bloomfield Track is Cooktown, a remote 
former gold mining port. Once a major centre, rivalling Cairns, its population now 
consists of only a few thousand residents. Cooktown is the administrative centre of the 
Cook Shire. The boundary of the Cook shire abuts the Bloomfield River at the northern 
end of the Bloomfield Track. Importantly, the Shire includes residents of Bloomfield 
Region, some of whom are very vocal in their support of the Bloomfield Track.3 
1 According to the 1996 census, the total population of the Douglas Shire, in which the Bloomfield 
Track is located and includes Port Douglas and Mossman (see Figure 5-1 on page 132) is 14,594 
(ABS, 2000). 
2 See Figure 5-1 on page 132. 
3 See Figure 5-1 on page 13 2. 
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This Bloomfield Region, which is home to approximately 1000 residents, 
comprises the catchment area of the Bloomfield River and includes the communities of 
Ayton and Wujal Wujal (shown in Figure 4-2). Ayton is a small 'township' which was 
originally settled around the turn of the last century by ' tin scratchers' (alluvial miners). 
A more recent wave of settlement occurred in the 1960s by 'alternate lifestylers' looking 
to get away from mainstream (Europeanised) Australian society (Anderson, 1989). 
Nearby is the Wujal Wujal Township, a predominantly indigenous community 
abutting the northern bank of the Bloomfield River. Now administered by the 
Wujal Wujal Community Council, it was initially formed by the migration of displaced 
clans around the Cooktown area in the 1950s, which the Queensland Lutheran Mission 
Board established as a 'mission' in 1956 (Anderson, 1983). The members of 
community, which are mostly from the Kuku-Nyungkul society, are part of a broader 
indigenous dialect known as Kuku-Yalanji - which I will use to refer to the indigenous 
residents of the Bloomfield and Daintree Regions. They have maintained a continuous 
presence and attachment with the land in the region and have made a claim for rights of 
access under native title. 
This isolation of the communities in the Bloomfield Region is marked, even 
following the construction of the Bloomfield Track. · The road to north from the 
Bloomfield River to the junction with the Cape York Peninsula Developmental Road, 
near Cooktown, is rudimentary.4 An even cruder track, known as the CREB Track5, 
connects Wujal Wujal to the Daintree Township via China Camp and an area known as 
'The Roaring Meg' after its large waterfalls. 6 
(b) Travelling the Bloomfield Track 
The Bloomfield Track provides a link, albeit a rudimentary one, between the 
remote Bloomfield region and major southern centres such as Mossman and Cairns. 
Prior its construction, local residents were restricted to northern access via a rough track 
4 The condition of the road, and its impact of vehicles, was bought home when the organising team of 
the FNQCJ was travelling from Cooktown to Ayton whereupon we came across a local woman next to 
a broken down vehicle. The road was so rough that the rods holding one of the front wheels in place 
had completely snapped such that it lay flat on the ground under the weight of the vehicle. 
5 CREB: Cairns Region Electricity Board, which constructed the track for maintenance of electricity 
supply. 
6 See Figure 4-2on page 89. 
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to the larger township of Cooktown approximately 60km away. From there it is a 3 
hour-plus inland drive south to reach Cairns, although as will be seen in Chapter 5 there 
is some contention as to its utility as a mode of access for Bloomfield residents.7 
For much of its length, the Bloomfield Track passes through lowland rainforest 
along the coastal fringe. Obstacles faced by those traversing the Bloomfield Track 
include a series of creeks, beginning with Emmagen Creek just north of Cape Tribulation. 
The Bloomfield Track also passes over a number of ranges. Most prominent of these is 
the Cowie range (see Figure 4-4), where the Bloomfield Track becomes particularly 
steep, with a slope of over 30%.8 It is often impassable, though less so following recent 
resurfacing of the southern slope with concrete, although the northern slope remains 
gravel. Although it is over 15 years since construction, there remain a number of areas 
where the crude the construction of the Bloomfield Track is still evident. Among these 
is a section of the Bloomfield Track known locally as the Zig Zag, which is subject to 
erosion and slippage of the cuttings into steep hillslopes (see Figure 4-5). 
These attributes of the Bloomfield Track contribute to its controversy because 
of the implications for levels of access for the local community and the potential for 
environmental damage. They also contribute to an ongoing debate concerning the need 
to upgrade and maintain the Bloomfield Track. I will discuss the debate surrounding the 
Bloomfield Track controversy more fully in the next section (4.3) after describing briefly 
the ecological, social and political context in which it is situated. 
4.2.2 The Bloomfield Track in Ecological Context 
(a) A Biological Paradise? The Ecology of the Daintree Region 
The Daintree Rainforest is exemplary of the difficulty in separating so-called 
scientific facts from human values. Indeed, it is not possible to emphasise the ecological 
importance of the region without invoking some measure of subjectivity. Descriptions 
of the region tend to be couched in emotive phrases such as a 'Garden of Eden' (for 
7 There is also a four wheel drive track passing west and south from Bloomfield to the Daintree 
originally built by the Cairns Region Electricity Board access track (CREB), but is restricted access 
and considered too hazardous for regular use. 
8 Or approximately I :3 such that every three metres of forward motion give rise to a one metre climb. 
Less conservative estimates of the slope have been put at I :2.75 (Wilderness Action Group, I 983, 
p.58). 
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example Billington, 1984). Much of the literature describes the area in defensive terms, 
emphasising what is at risk, rather than what is there to be enjoyed.9 
The Daintree rainforest is a remnant of an extensive rainforest complex that 
covered most of the Australian continent. As the climate dried following the break up of 
the Gondwana supercontinent, the forest has gradually retreated to its current vestiges, 
of which the Daintree is the most significant representative (Russell, 1985; White, 
1994). Perhaps because of this, the ecosystems of the Daintree have been considered to 
represent ancient assemblages, particularly of flora. Thus, there has been a tendency to 
couch the region in terms of an 'ancient' ecosystem. However, there is increasing 
evidence that it has been a constantly evolving system, with shifting assemblages 
between rainforest and drier woodland types (Trott, 1997). 
This tension between common perception and emerging scientific evidence 
illustrates an important point. Very little is actually known about the Daintree 
rainforest; at least compared to what remains to be discovered (for example Mcintyre 
and Kitching, 1994). However, despite the lack of detailed scientific knowledge of the 
ecology of the region, there has been a longstanding consensus that it is of incredible 
scientific and conservation importance. As will become evident during the remainder of 
this thesis, this combination of ecological importance, yet poor levels of knowledge have 
important implications for political discourse and policy making. It will also have 
implications for the findings of the FNQCJ. 
The region has a tropical climate, with associated high rainfall during seasonal 
monsoons. The Daintree region is particularly wet. Average annual rainfall is 
approximately 4000mm; reaching 6000mm in particularly wet years. Moreover, much 
of this rainfall falls as a deluge during a relatively brief monsoon period from January to 
April (Ayling and Ayling, 1991), thus increasing the scope for erosion considerably, 
particularly exposed soils in cleared areas.10 
The Daintree Region consists primarily of steep, mountainous terrain. The 
satellite image in the background for Figure 4-1 provides some indication of the 
9 For example: (Wilderness Action Group, 1983; Borschmann, 1984; Russell, 1985; Aiken, 1987; 
Mcintyre et al., 1989; Kennedy, 1993; Bliss, 2000). 
'
0 A problem that is also exacerbated by the highly weathered metamorphic soils of the region, as 
highlighted by the presentation of Steve Turton during the FNQCJ (See Appendix 3). 
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ruggedness of the area, most of which is covered by dense tropical rainforests. Despite 
the spectacular nature of the mountainous rainforest, the lowland rainforest fringing the 
coast that is of greatest conservation significance - and is the section along which the 
Bloomfield Track has been constructed. This is not just because of the assemblage of 
fauna and flora to be found there. What is particularly critical is that there is very little 
of it left. Extensive clearing of lowland rainforest in other areas of FNQ for sugar cane 
farming has dramatically reduced its range. The Daintree contains the last significant 
example of continuous mountain to coastal rainforest in Australia (Webb, 1984). 
(b) An International Icon: Where the Rainforest Meets the Reef 
Another significant feature of the Daintree Region is the proximity of the 
rainforest to the Great Barrier Reef. Smaller inshore reefs abut the coast along the region 
creating a unique situation where tropical rainforest adjoins coral reef - known locally 
as 'where the rainforest meets the reef' (Russell, 1985). These inshore reefs are shown 
in Figure 4-2 as lighter shaded areas abutting the coast. This combination of proximity 
between mountainous and coastal rainforest and fringing reef is widely considered as 
unique to the Daintree Region (Borschmann, 1984; Bliss, 2000). 
The biological significance of the region is underscored not just by its proximity 
to coral reefs or the diversity of its known flora and fauna, but also by the frequency 
with which new species are discovered. These discoveries are not limited to fauna or 
smaller invertebrates, but also include macrofauna (Russell, 1985; Rolls, 1994). The 
potential of the region to yield new species with potential commercial and 
pharmaceutical uses is well recognised (for example Brook, 2000). 
Figure 4-3 Creek Crossing at Emmagen Creek 
Figure 4-5 Cowie Range 
Figure 4-6 The Zig Zag 
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{c) Ecological Threats to the Daintree 
It is widely recognised that the Daintree is a region under threat. As new species 
are discovered, others are being lost. Most significant of these has been the dramatic 
decline of four species of frog that are endemic to the mountainous regions of the 
Daintree (van Tiggelen, 1995). That these losses are occurring away from areas of 
human activity has been puzzling, although there remains a suspicion that it is somehow 
connected to human activities, backed to some extent by scientific studies. 1 More 
directly attributable to human activity are threats to species due to clearing of private 
landholdings in the Daintree as well as roadkill due to increased tourist traffic. 
Most vulnerable to the impact of human activities is the cassowary, a large 
brightly coloured rainforest bird, which is closely related to the emu. The cassowary 
was once common throughout the rainforests of FNQ, but is becoming increasingly rare. 
It has been effectively eliminated from rainforest areas close to the largest urban 
settlements. Its decline in the Daintree is attributed to a combination of dog attacks and 
road kills. 
The cassowary is emblematic of the threats to the ecological integrity of the 
Daintree Region, where its abundance is greater than most other rainforest areas in the 
FNQ region. This is not only due to is symbolic importance - although it is one of the 
more spectacular examples of the local fauna. It also serves to illustrate the 
interconnected nature of such threats due to the complex properties of ecosystems - as 
exemplified by Commoner's (1972) first law of ecology which states the 'everything is 
connected to everything else'. The relationship between the cassowary and the 
rainforest is best characterised by commensalism. Not only is it dependent on the 
rainforest, but the rainforest is, in tum, dependent on it. Up to 100 species of tree rely 
on the cassowary to propagate its seeds, by passing through its gut, as well as 
dispersing them (Nielsen, 1997, p.45). Should one disappear from the region, so will the 
other. 
1 As reported in Nielsen ( 1997). 
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4.2.3 The Bloomfield Track in Social Context 
In many ways the sociological configuration of Queensland, particularly the far 
north region, or FNQ, is quite different from the remaining (eastern) Australian States. 2 
This difference is important for understanding the dynamics of the Bloomfield Track 
issue and the formation of policy preferences under the status quo. In recent Australian 
political history it has maintained a reputation for having a culture that is aggressively 
pro-development, with the government often taking an anti-environmental stance of 
many issues. 
Studies that have investigated the environmental politics of Queensland have 
likened it to any resource-intensive political economy. Its economic foundations 
comprise mostly primary industries such as farming and mining (for example Head, 
1986) and, more recently, tourism. While this accounts to some extent for its political 
dynamics, Queensland's politics is in no small part tied to its sociological landscape 
(Niemeyer, 1997; Ke11ow and Niemeyer, 1999). One feature of its sociology is its 
recent history of settlement and regional development: 
Queensland is very much a frontier society where the people take on many of the characteristics 
of traditional frontier societies .. .independence, aggressiveness, distaste for status or position. 
They only respect what you say or what you do. They thus have a Jack of respect for centralism 
and people in high positions. Being cut off from others, they develop a characteristic 
conservatism. (Fitzgerald, 1984, p.250) 
This is particularly the case in FNQ, which is one of the last areas of the state to 
be settled, with the region around the Bloomfield Track being first settled around the 
turn of the nineteenth century. Another major contributing factor to the sociology of 
Queensland - and again, particularly FNQ - is the level of regionalisation. 
Queensland has a higher level of dispersion of its population than any other Australian 
state, with most of its population spread among small regional townships (Niemeyer, 
1997). The combination of recent settlement and small communities has contributed to 
the entrenchment of conservative political attitudes through what Jaensch (1989) refers 
to as the ' neighbourhood effect'. 
2 It also commonly argued that many features ascribed to Queensland are shared with Western Australia, 
although there are slightly different reasons for their major political and sociological characteristics 
(Niemeyer, 1997). 
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Until very recently there has been a pervading diffidence toward rainforests in 
general, and the Daintree Rainforest in particular, within the FNQ region. Part of this 
reflects its recent pioneering past and the attitude that nature, particularly impassable 
rainforest, poses something of a barrier to development and a belief that the abundance 
of rainforest provides an assurance against its loss. This is often attributed to an anti-
ecologicism within the frontier culture of the region. However, despite the validity of 
such claims on the surface, the deeper truth is not so clear. The assertions need to be 
taken as part of a wider cultural context. An important part of this context concerns the 
attitudes developed in the case of the barrier that the wilderness posed to early 
settlement: 
The first European settlers saw the rainforest as a severe obstacle to development. They were the 
pioneers and their economic base can1e from farming, timber and minerals. Lowland sugar 
farming, upland grazing and agriculture and urban expansion have cleared over forty per cent of 
the original rainforest and most remaining areas have been logged. Only the most remote and 
least accessible stands are left. (Kendell and Buivids, 1987, p.120) 
The extensive clearing of the rainforest in the region has been legitimised not by 
an inherent anti-ecological justification, but a perception that it is an abundant and 
resilient resource. This is perhaps best reflected in a statement by the Premier of 
Queensland at the time that the Bloomfield Track was constructed. His belief that' 
there is so much [rainforest in the Daintree Region] that in thousands of years our 
rainforest will never be traversed by human beings' (Aiken, 1987). 
shared attitude among the community. 
His was widely 
Since the construction of the Broomfield Track, there has been a steady change in 
the culture of FNQ. This is partly due to the influx of migrants from the southern 
Australian states, but most significantly due to the emergence of tourism as the most 
important industry of the region. However, although this 'frontier' culture of FNQ has 
since been diluted, it remains a part of the political discourse of the region. 
The tension between these frontier perceptions of nature still bubble beneath the 
surface of considerable demographic and economic changes in the region. Discourses 
along the lines the nature is there for be used as a resource for commercial development 
through traditional industries of logging and agriculture are still part of the cultural ethos 
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in some quarters. These developmentalist arguments regularly emerge as part of the 
political discourse.3 
As will become evident during the analysis of the FNQCJ, particularly using Q 
methodology, these discourses were still manifest in the pre-deliberative subjectivity 
driving policy preferences. To understand this particular dynamic, it is also necessary 
to explore briefly the political context of the Bloomfield Track issue. 
4.2.4 The Bloomfield Track in Political Context 
The Bloomfield Track was constructed under the patronage of both the 
Queensland state government and the Douglas Shire Council (a local government body). 
It took place under the expressed opposition of the federal Australian government -
which, beyond strong rhetoric was unwilling to act in a decisive manner. The 
relationships between these tiers of government and related constitutional dimensions 
have significant impact on Australian environmental issues. The Bloomfield Track was 
certainly no exception. I will briefly cover these political dimensions in the following 
discussion. 
(a) Queensland in Australian Political and Constitutional Context 
Australia has a federal system of government, similar to that of Canada, with 
three tiers of government - local, state and federal. It is actually an agglomeration of 
otherwise independent states under a federal govemment4 where most powers, including 
responsibility for environmental management, have been largely retained by the states. 
Local councils are small regional bodies that also come under the jurisdiction of the 
states. 
Federal-State Roles in Environmental Decision-Making 
The federal (or commonwealth) tier of government retains only notionally 
limited powers under the Australian constitution, exclusively covering matters of 
'national significance'. However, it is not powerless to act against the wishes of states 
3 One example is a recent call by the current federal member for the electorate of Leichaardt, which covers 
the Daintree Region, for the reinstatement of logging rights against the conservationist claims of 
'southern greenies ' (Roberts, 2001 ). 
4 Under the Australian Constitution, enacted in 190 I. 
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in order to protect the environment. A number of important issues in the lead up to the 
Bloomfield Track issue are particularly salient examples of this. The first concerns 
federal intervention to halt sand mining on Fraser Island in Queensland in 1978 under its 
power to refuse export licences (FIEI, 1976; Fisher, 1980). This had a profound impact 
on environmental politics in the state, pitching the Queensland government even further 
against environmentalists. The second, and most famous case of federal intervention, 
did not directly involve Queensland, but had an impact on the Bloomfield Track issue. 
The 'damns controversy' took place in the early 1980s, just before the 
construction of Bloomfield Track. It occurred shortly after the recently elected Hawke 
Labor government reversed a decision by the Tasmanian state government to build a 
large dam in the Franklin River wilderness to supplement its hydroelectric industry 
(Tighe, 1992). The case is widely recognised as a turning point in federal-state relations 
in respect to environmental issues, where the federal government displayed both the 
willingness and capacity to override 'sovereign' states in the name of the enviromnent. 
Local Government 
While state government operates relatively independently from its federal 
counterpart, local government in Australia is entirely a creature of the states. One 
interpretation of local government is that of an agent of state government, administering 
responsibilities that cannot be properly conducted at the state level (for example Davis, 
1984). 
It has a reputation (unfairly in many cases) as being particularly unsophisticated 
with respect to the discharge of its responsibilities, at least in the case of rural Councils. 
However, it is also arguably the most important in terms of administering environmental 
resources through its responsibilities for town planning, inter alia, which is certainly the 
case with respect to the Dain tree Region. 
(b) The Socio-political context 
At the time of the construction of the Bloomfield Track, Queensland had been 
governed by the National Party for a period approaching 15 years under the leadership 
of Joh Bjelke-Peterson. His disdain for environmentalists and environmentalism has 
been well documented (for example Hundloe, 1985). The Queensland National Party is 
a rural Conservative Party, which until it lost an election in 1989 had maintained power 
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via the judicious use of a system of gerrymander.5 The National Party epitomised the 
attitudes characterised above under the rubric of frontierism. It was strongly 'states 
rights ' focussed and was firmly opposed any outside intervention. It was highly 
conservative in orientation, advocating free enterprise and small government (Aiken, 
1987). 
The Queensland government's approach to environmental management at the 
time the Bloomfield Track was constructed was fundamentally an instnunental, thinly 
veiled exercise in promoting development (Niemeyer, 1997; Kellow and Niemeyer, 
1999). Scant as they were, the environmental reforms that had been put in place were 
quickly wound back in 1978. This occurred when the government, responded 
petulantly to the intervention by the federal government in the above-mentioned Fraser 
Island controversy (Hundloe, 1985, pp.88-90). As will be seen below, this event also 
had bearing on the Bloomfield Track issue. 
The early 1980s, during which the Bloomfield Track was constructed was one in 
Australian politics where environmental issues were beginning to peak, in electoral terms 
- at least at the federal level of government (Papadakis, 1993, p.142). In Queensland, 
however, state politics remained dominated by 'developmentalism' .6 There was also 
strong sense of parochialism in Queensland politics, with much sentiment against the 
intervention from the federal level. This was particularly so following the election of the 
federal Labor party, which hailed from the opposite side of politics to the Queensland 
government. Following the 'damns case' tension between the federal government and 
the Queensland state government was reaching a particularly strong climax (Davis, 1989; 
Kellow and Niemeyer, 1999, p.210). 
Queensland Politics Post-Bloomfield Track 
In December 1989, following 20 years m power (and construction of the 
Bloomfield Track), the National Party was toppled from government in Queensland 
after a judicial inquiry reported widespread corruption (Coaldrake, 1992; Neal, 1994). 
5 It is notable that support for the Queensland government at the time of construction of the Bloomfield 
Track was particularly strong in the FNQ region in general and the Douglas Shire in particular. 
6 Developmentalism simply refers to a tendency to privilege economic growth as a policy goal, particular 
in contrast to environmental protection. In the Australian context, this propensity for government to 
actively foster growth has been referred to as 'colonial socialism' (Butlin et al. , 1982). 
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The incoming Labor Party was elected on a platform of electoral and administrative 
reform. Partly resulting from these reforms, as well as increased urbanisation in the 
southeast corner of the state, the political culture of Queensland is much changed. 
In particular, Queensland's approach to environmental issues changed almost 
immediately following the fall of the National Party in 1989 (Roberts, 1989). However, 
real change has been slow. The structural dimensions that give rise to political dynamics 
described above remain at least partly in tact. 
Politics in ENO and the Dou~las Shire 
An important facet of politics in Queensland that remains intact since the 
construction of the Bloomfield Track has been the cultural and political landscape of 
FNQ. Electoral refonn has redistributed electoral power from rural areas, such as FNQ, 
to the more densely populated southeast of the state. If anything, this has contributed 
to the 'them versus us' dynamic in the politics of the region. 
Yet, the socio-political landscape of the FNQ region has transformed to some 
extent. Indicative of this change in the Douglas Shire was the election of a well-known 
environmentalist as Shire Mayor in 1992 - who was involved in the original protest 
against the Bloomfield Track. However, the adage 'the more things change, the more 
they stay the same' is befitting of the region. The new Mayor must still contend with a 
hostile Council, who often override him on important decisions, particularly those in 
respect to environmental issues. 
The politics of the region still reflects the dynamics of the period during which 
the Bloomfield Track was constructed. If anything, the changes to the region have added 
yet another dimension, rather than transformed the political landscape. This was 
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certainly evident during the organisation of the FNQCJ7, and to some extent during the 
proceedings of the citizen jury itself. 8 
A historically important feature of the Douglas Shire Council, particularly in the 
context of the Bloomfield Track issue, is its affinity with rural development and the 
construction of roads. As Anderson (1989) reports, roads have always represented 
progress in Far North Queensland. Those responsible for them are often described in 
terms of heroic figures braving adversity and conquering untamed wilderness (for 
example Pike, 1977). 
This penchant for carving roads through wilderness is not simply a product of 
the above-mentioned frontier culture of the region. There are also structural reasons, 
where the limited revenue raising capacity of local governments increase a reliance on 
residential development, which is in turn facilitated by the construction of roads (Davis, 
1984). This historical favouring of road construction and (largely unregulated) 
development is evidenced by the relative importance of engineering positions within 
councils in contrast to those involved with town planning (Davis, 1984). Indeed, at the 
time that the Bloomfield Track was constructed, the Douglas Shire Council did not have 
a town planner, but it certainly had a shire engineer (Borschmann, 1984, p.40). As will 
be seen in the following section, the role of the engineer was instrumental to the way in 
which the Bloomfield Track issue was played out. 
4.2.5 Summary 
In the preceding section, I have provided a brief description of the Bloomfield 
Track; the region surrounding it; and the ecological, social and political contexts in which 
1 The political dynamics of the FNQ region led to the abandonment of two case studies prior to the 
FNQCJ. In the first case, concerning the potential upgrade of a transport corridor up the ranges near 
Cairns, there was resistance by local bureaucrats in FNQ to the use of a case study because of a 
perceived clash with the established decision-making procedure. The second case study, concerning a 
privately constructed road through a World Heritage listed area between Cairns and Port Douglas was 
abandoned due to the objection by the developer - who was also responsible for the subdivision of 
land in the Daintree Region and is well known for strong political connections (see Seccombe, 1988) 
- who mobilised political support at the federal level of conservative politics, through the local 
Queensland Branch. The FNQCJ itself was also threatened by local interests in the Bloomfield 
Region, who argued against 'outside' interference in what they saw as a local issue. For further 
discussion see also Chapter 3 on page 80. See also footnote 3 on page 115 in relation to politics 
surrounding the indigenous community. 
8 As will become evident during the analysis of the FNQCJ proceedings in Chapter 5 and analysis of 
discourse using Q methodology in Chapter 6. 
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the issue has evolved. I have characterised the Bloomfield Track as a 4WD road which 
ostensibly services the remote Bloomfield Region, but which is more commonly used for 
tourism. The ecological context of the Bloomfield Track has been described in terms of 
the perceived ecological importance of the Dain tree Region, as well as the level of threat 
to the area and the comparative scientific ignorance despite these perceptions. The 
sociological context has been set by describing the region as one in rapid transformation 
from a frontier society to an international tourist destination. The political context is 
one where there is tension between competing levels of government, with the different 
constitutional roles contributing to structural constraints on environmental management. 
This background provides not only a backdrop for discussion pertaining to the 
Bloomfield Track controversy; it is essential for understanding the issue. This, in turn, 
is instrumental for understanding the subjectivity and preferences of deliberators. It will 
also help to understand the way in which it is possible to manipulate preferences to 
induce a policy fiasco and the role of deliberation as an 'antidote' to these processes. 
The following section continues to set the scene for the FNQCJ by outlining the major 
events contributing to the Bloomfield Track, considered by many to be a policy fiasco. 
4.3 THE GENESIS OF A POLICY FIASCO 
A policy fiasco is a negative event that is perceived by a social and politically significant group 
of people in the community to be at least partially caused by avoidable and blameworthy fai lures 
of public policy makers. (Bovens and t'Hart, 1996, p.15) 
4.3.1 Events in Lead up to the Bloomfield Track Issue 
From the beginning of construction in 1982, the Bloomfield Track has been 
highly controversial. Despite stated objectives to increase community access, many 
attribute its construction to the political dynamics of the time. In the following 
discussion, I will outline the events leading up to the Bloomfield Track controversy. 
(a) Early Attempts to Build The Bloomfield Track 
The idea of a road from Cape Tribulation to the Bloomfield River has been 
around since the mid-1930s (Wintour, 1984). A bulldozer first pushed it through in 
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1968. This was done at the behest of a consortiwn of local business people with the 
approval of the Douglas Shire Council.9 However, the 'road' was barely useable and 
quickly fell into disrepair (Borschmann, 1984, p.32). 
A second attempt to construct the road was made in 1976, this time by the same 
real estate interests responsible for the subdivision of parts of the Daintree mentioned in 
section 4.2.l(a) above (Borschmann, 1984, p.32). This time the construction was 
without formal approval and was even less effective in producing a viable road than the 
first. However, significantly, it did result in the gazetting (inclusion in Council plans 
and official maps) of a road corridor through which it passed by the Douglas Shire 
Council in 1978 (Keto, 1984b, p.11). In 1979, the route was again cleared, this time by 
the Council under the auspices of a 'pilot track' (Borschmann, 1984, p.32). 
(b) Green Pragmatism and the Tourist Dollar: A Very Brief Hiatus 
By 1980, the Queensland Government had discovered the benefits of developing 
a green tinge and began to talk of conservation, albeit with potential tourist markets in 
mind. It recognised the tourism potential of the Daintree Region, and its capacity to 
raise revenue, and set aside a portion land through which the Bloomfield Track travels as 
the Cape Tribulation National Park. 10 However, always seeking to find ways in which 
to facilitate commercial growth in the regions, the Douglas Shire Council also sought to 
secure its option to develop the Bloomfield Track. It did so by applying for an 
extension to the width of the road reserve, which was approved at the state level 
without public involvement (Keto, 1984a). 
By this time, although a manifest failure as a viable road, the route now followed 
by the Bloomfield Track had become an internationally renowned walking track, acting 
as a drawcard to the region. For four years there were no further efforts to regrade the 
track to render it useable by vehicles. However, it was to be an unstable situation, 
which was tipped by a series of events well beyond the reach of the Douglas Shire. 
9 It is often claimed that this was done illegally (for example Borschmann, 1984). However, according 
to one of the individuals involved, Shane Mason, who operates the Cape Tribulation Store, the 
consortium had approval from the Douglas Shire Council to construct the road (Mason, 2002). 
10 See Figure 4-2. When the decision was announced, the then Premier, Bjelke-Peterson, declared that 
the 'area provides a living museum of plant and animal species in what is one of the few remaining 
examples of undisturbed coastal rainforest in the world' (Aiken, 1987, p.136). 
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(c) The Bloom.field Track Decision: Thinking Globally, Acting Locally 
The decision to construct the Bloomfield Track was made by the Queensland 
Premier at a July 1983 at a public meeting in the Douglas Shire (Keto, I 984a). There is 
little documentation about the events leading to the decision. However, the 
circumstances of the decision to construct, and the means by which it was implemented, 
have important implications for the Bloomfield Track policy issue. 
As mentioned above, the federal Labor party, in opposition to the National 
Party in power in Queensland, had recently won the federal election in 1983 after 
promising to intervene in the Franklin River dams issue in Tasmania. Despite efforts by 
that state, the newly formed federal government succeeded in overcoming constitutional 
barriers to intervention in the high court by nominating the area for World Heritage 
listing thereby triggering its right under the federal constitution to intervene. This 
intervention incensed the Queensland Premier, still smarting from his 1978 Fraser Island 
experience. 11 
Not surprisingly, the decision by the Premier of Queensland to support the 
construction of the Bloomfield Track is widely recognised as a move designed to invite a 
similar showdown with the federal government (Papadakis, 1990, p.347). Yet, the 
decision was not entirely due to petulance. Neither was it entirely his own. 
It is clear that there was local support with the Douglas Shire Council for the 
Bloomfield Track. Its construction had been a long-standing objective of the Shire 
Chairman and a number the Councillors, but for sufficient funds. At least one 
Councillor had lobbied the Premier to help fund the construction of the Bloomfield 
Track, using the presence of protesters at the July meeting to entice him into a 
showdown with the federal government, and the environmental lobby.12 
At appears that the trigger for the decision to build the Bloomfield Track was 
not to serve as an access for the Bloomfield Community, but due to concern on a wider 
political stage. Having won the case for World Heritage Listing in Tasmania there was a 
fear among the conservative political ranks in Queensland that the environmental lobby 
was now moving north to achieve the same for the Daintree Rainforest. It was not a 
11 See section 4.2.4(b). 
12 As was relayed to me personally by the (now) former councillor (having Jost his place on the Douglas 
Shire Council in a recent election). 
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baseless fear. Calls for the listing of the area under World Heritage were widespread, 
particularly in the more heavily populated 'southern' Australian states.13 The presence 
of protesters at the meeting reminded the Premier of the potential for the Federal 
government to interfere in the affairs of Queensland at the behest of these 'southern' 
greenies. He was not about to let them tell him how to run his state. 
In the Bloomfield Track issue, the Premier had the perfect issue by which to 
send a loud message. Without a determined effort to stop him by the federal 
government, the Queensland Premier also had the legal and administrative means to 
impose his will. The administrative arrangements in Queensland at the time were such 
that no public input was necessary to legitimise the decision to construct the Bloomfield 
Track. There were no formal processes established for public input, let alone provision 
for deliberative and/or participatory forums. There was a statutory obligation under 
state law that an environmental impact assessment (EIA) be prepared for major public 
works, often treated as no more than a symbolic requirement in an administrative 
environment geared for development (Kellow and Niemeyer, 1999, p.208). 
To satisfy this requirement, the shire engineer who oversaw the construction of 
the road prepared a short EIA, which found no reason why the road should not proceed. 
The EIA that was submitted has been widely criticised as woefully inadequate. There is 
not the space to go into a formal assessment of the document here, but the tone of the 
findings by the Shire Engineer may be encapsulated by the following quote: 
.. . there is nothing unique about the rainforest on each side of the walking track. The rainforest 
is certainly not as dense or as attractive as that which exists in the Noah Range area [to the south 
of the Bloomfield Track]. I have seen many rainforests in New South Wales, Queensland and 
overseas and I would consider that this area is less attractive than many other rainforests in 
North Queensland.14 
The Douglas Shire Council engineer - who still works for the Council, and 
participated as a witness in the FNQCJ - has been much vilified in the pro-
environmental literature for his role in the construction of the Bloomfield Track. 
13 Such as New South Wales and Victoria. 
14 Cited in Keto (1984b, p.10) 
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However, in a very real sense, he was simply 'doing his job', in an era where his role 
went well beyond giving technical advice and organising public works. 15 
If the Bloomfield Track is indeed a policy fiasco, then culpability lies m the 
hands of decision-makers, the Douglas Shire Councillors and the Queensland 
Government. Their determination to proceed with the Bloomfield Track is the stuff of 
legend. Exemplary of the attitude of policy makers is the following excerpt from an 
interview the Douglas Shire Council Chairman: 16 
Interviewer: Will a survey of the road be performed before construction? 
Chairman: No, that's not necessary ... 
Interviewer: Will the Council perform and Environmental Impact Assessment on the road? 
Chairman: Yes, we've already done it. 
Interviewer: Who did it? 
Chairman: The Shire Engineer. 
Interviewer: Has he qualifications in ecology? 
Chairman: Everybody's an expert. 
Such language might seem alarmingly trite m its apparent disregard for due 
process, but it is moderate compared to that coming from the Queensland Government. 
Following the blockade of the initial attempt to construct the Bloomfield Track in late 
1983, the Queensland Minister for the Environment at the time was positively 
confrontational: 
'Course there'll be another confrontation because they've got the Socialists [the Federal Labor 
Party] backing these people! We will bring 'dozers in there if needs be, to clean this road up. 
And it will be needed! We will cut the tops of the ranges down if it's needed, and no hippy, no 
greenie, no environmentalist will stop that from happening. They can do their hardest. The can 
do what they like! They won' t win! 17 
And they did not win. Having been halted by protests and the impending wet 
season in late 1983, the construction of the Bloomfield Track proceeded apace in the 
following year. 
15 Shire engineers at the time were one of the few university-educated employees on the Council payroll, 
who were seen as of similar importance to the town clerk (Jones, 1977). 
16 Interview by Rosemary Hill of Douglas Shire Chairman, Cr. Tony Mijo, at the Cairns Environment 
Centre 9 November 1983, cited in Keto ( 1984a). 
17 Interview by Graham Lever of Queensland Minister for the Environment, Hon. Martin Tenni, 
conducted on ABC radio in late 1983. See: (Lever, 1985). 
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4.3.2 A Very Public Battle: The Construction of the Bloomfield 
Track 
The Bloomfield Track was constructed in haste; a single bulldozer cleared a trail, 
sometimes swerving around protesters buried along its path to prevent construction (see 
Figure 4-6).1.8 Even during construction, the green movement intensely lobbied the 
federal government to nominate the area for World Heritage listing and intervene in the 
road issue, as it had recently done in the state of Tasmania. But it did not succeed. The 
federal government refused to act decisively for reasons I have already outlined. 
18 There are many, sometimes lurid accounts of the events that took place during the protest over the 
construction of the Bloomfield Track. For examples see: (Wilderness Action Group, 1983; Kendell 
and Buivids, 1987; Seccornbe, 1988) 
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Figure 4-6 Protests During the Construction of the Bloomfield Track 
Source: (Kendell and Buivids, 1987) 
Soctbn 4.3: Tu GerESis of a Policy Fia.<m 
The Bloomfield Track issue was not determined entirely at the whim of a few 
political representatives with axes to grind; it was played out very much in the public 
view. Public opinion mattered.1 The government, although wielding power not since 
seen in the state, needed public support. Dismissing detractors with colourful rhetoric, 
although part and parcel of the politics of the day and electorally popular, was not 
sufficient to neutralise their impact. It was also necessary to proffer legitimate reasons 
for the decision to construct. Some of the arguments for and against the Bloomfield 
Track that entered public discourse from the political sphere are as follows. 
(a) Arguments far the Bloomfield Track and Level of Community Support 
Most significant of the reasons proffered in favour of the Bloomfield Track was 
to alleviate isolation of the community in the Bloomfield Region. Other reasons 
included the enhancement of law and order enforcement: by flushing out drug traders, 
orchard thieves and illegal migrants and assisting the defence of Australia from attack by 
sea. One of the most creative of the arguments in favour of the Bloomfield Track was 
the reduction in greenhouse gases due to reduced distances travelling to and from the 
Bloomfield Region to major centres in the south.2 
It is difficult to ascertain just how much support existed in the FNQ region for 
the Bloomfield Track. A number of local residents came out in favour of it (Aiken, 
1987), as did significant members of the Wujal Wujal community (Anderson, 1989), 
which was a surprise to many, given indigenous claims of sacred sites near the 
construction site. It remains difficult to gauge the true level of indigenous support, even 
to this day.3 
1 Or 'extra-constitutional agents of influence', as discussed in section 1.2.3(d) of Chapter l (page 12) 
2 As argued by the Queensland Minister for the Environment in Parliament (QLA, 1983, p.748). 
3 Anderson (1989) illuminates the issue of indigenous support for the Bloomfield Track by alluding to 
the important fact that not only is there a strong cultural dimension to indigenous communities, such 
as in Wujal Wujal, there is also a strong political dimension. It is the combination of both that gave 
rise to the way in which the community was presented in the public debate. He points out that certain 
key individuals supported the track. By virtue of their position, the rest of the community was 
necessarily seen to follow. He does not allude to the reasons why this individual supported by 
Bloomfield Track. A similar situation was experienced during the organisation of the FNQCJ where 
initial inquiries with the Chairwoman of the Wujal Wujal community raised no objection to the project 
and tacitly agreed to participation. However, the decision was overturned when another (male) senior 
member of the community attended a meeting with the FNQCJ organisers and threatened a boycott of 
the process. The community subsequently withdrew its participation. This senior member is widely 
known in the region for his pro-development position, who also happens to hold a contract to maintain 
the northern end of the Bloomfield Track for the Douglas Shire Council. 
-115-
Craixe-4 
Whatever the level of local support, it is clear that the Bloomfield Track issue 
deeply divided the FNQ community - even if there appeared to have been a post-
. Franklin Dam malaise at the Federal level. From the rhetoric of the Queensland 
Government it is clear that it sought to use the Bloomfield Track issue to assert its 
sovereignty over the region against the dictates of the Federal Government. It was a 
strategy that specifically appealed to its constituency of rural conservatives. 
The claim of the pro-Bloomfield Track alliance that it was acting in the best 
interests of the Bloomfield Community had a strong air of legitimacy, which finds 
resonance in the culture of the FNQ region and its frontier recent past. It was difficult 
to publicly deny the right the community to enjoy the same levels access to that 
enjoyed by others in the region, particularly close to Cairns. However, it is often 
neglected by advocates Bloomfield Track that many of the Europeans in the Bloomfield 
Region had moved there to get away from society in the first place. 
It was a successful tactic, but it should be remembered that it was a political 
tactic. The use of the political language of the pro-Bloomfield Track alliance is 
reminiscent of symbolic politics in the sense described by Edelman (1964). An anxious 
public seeks reassurance from its leaders, who respond by invoking symbols rather than 
acting on the substantive complexity of an issue. 
The demonising of 'hippies' and 'greenies', who were seen as a threat to the 
prevailing culture of developmentalism, was one fonn of reassurance. Assuring the 
public that it was indeed possible to construct the Bloomfield Track and protect the 
environment was also a factor. However, this reassurance was often based on an 
assumption that there was so much 'nature' that it could not possibly all be destroyed. 
The assertion that private landholders should be safe to enjoy the benefits of ownership, 
without being dictated to by either a 'socialist' Federal Government, or their hippy 
footsoldiers, was yet another case of symbolic reassurance. Testament to the resilience 
of these symbolic concerns is that, to some extent, these discourses still prevail. 
However, as is often the case, the substance of the Bloomfield Track issue is quite 
different. 
Following the initial controversy during the construction of the Bloomfield 
Track, many of the claims have disappeared from political discourse. Most enduring is 
that the road serves as a means of local community access for Bloomfield residents. 
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This theme will emerge during the analysis of the FNQCJ. It is also a view that is 
strongly advocated by some members of the Bloomfield Community when threatened 
with 'outside' interference. 
(b) Arguments Against the Bloomfield Track 
Try as they did, the green lobby did not succeed in mobilising enough support 
within the community to convince the Federal Government to act to halt the 
construction of the Bloomfield Track. Green groups attempted to keep the issue on the 
national agenda in the lead up to the 1984 election by withdrawing their support for the 
federal Labor government. However, following the Franklin Dam issue, the public 
attention of environmental issues had declined {Aileen, 1987, p.138). In any case, the 
government was in its post election cycle and hesitant to risk a high profile 
confrontation with Queensland where there was little electoral advantage for them 
(Papadakis, 1990). 
The thrust of the anti-Bloomfield Track public discourse focussed on highly 
emotive and symbolic issues such as the intrusion into a significant wilderness 
(Wilderness Action Group, 1983). Pictures of pristine rainforest 'ruined' by bulldozers 
dominated the campaign. There was also an attempt by the green lobby to invoke 
opposition to the Bloomfield Track within the Wujal Wujal community, claiming sacred 
sites near the road. This was based on a naive assumption that the traditional owners of 
the land would automatically oppose intrusive development. However, as I have stated 
above, the issue of support from the indigenous community is a complex one, itself tied 
up in community political dynamics.4 
With some justification, the green lobby also challenged the legality of the 
construction of the Bloomfield Track. Because of its haphazard construction, it crossed 
the boundaries of the road reserve into the surrounding National Park (Lipman, 1985). 
However, the most potent weapon of environmentalists was also symbolic. 
Environmentalists cited damage caused to the onshore reefs by sediment run-off from 
the Bloomfield Track. The Great Barrier Reef had already been listed as a World 
Heritage Area and was an important issue for mobilisation of the anti-Bloomfield Track 
4 See footnote 3. 
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movement. In many senses, the reef issue was to the anti-Bloomfield Track alliance 
what the community access issue was to those in favour. The issue struck a chord with 
much of the community, who were keen to see their symbol of 'rainforest meets reef 
preserved. As for the community access issue, this too strikes a chord even 15 years 
following the construction of the Bloomfield Track. 
This is not to say that the anti-Bloomfield Track lobby actively sought to 
simplify the issue, reducing it to politically potent symbols. Elements within the 
environmental lobby were particularly attuned to the potential for incremental impacts 
associated with the Bloomfield Track - by adding yet another layer to the web of 
threats to the Daintree Region. They were also aware of the need for public education, 
mounting a public education campaign to increase public awareness of the significance of 
the region (Aiken, 1987, pp.137-8). 
In respect to the Daintree Region, it seems that knowledge of the importance and 
vulnerability of the rainforest community in face of development such as the Bloomfield 
Track invokes ever-increasing levels of passion. Much of the literature published on the 
subject in academic journals, or other literature produced by academics is of a highly 
emotive nature. 5 There are strong incentives for protagonists on all sides of 
environmental issues to construct symbolic claims, in the manner described in Chapter 
1, to maximise their ability to communicate the implications to a wider community. 
This is particularly true for the need to simplify political message for public 
consumption through the mass media. As I will point out below, the media has played 
its own role in transforming the political discourse concerning the Bloomfield Track. 
(c) The Role of the Media 
To fully understand the public discourse concerning the Bloomfield Track issue 
- both then and now - it is important to distinguish between the way in which the 
protagonists have conducted their campaign and the way in which the political discourse 
has been transmitted to the public through the media. One analysis of the local media 
coverage of the Bloomfield Track issue reports an overt pro-Bloomfield Track bias 
within local media in the FNQ region. It found that 64% of articles produced during the 
height of the issue being labelled as pro-Bloomfield Track, 25% anti-Bloomfield Track 
5 For example: (Billington, 1984; Aiken, 1987; Mcintyre et al., 1989). 
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and 11 % showing no apparent bias (Doyle, 1992). More important is the way in which 
these biases tended to be represented. Pro-track articles tended to focus on the 'them 
versus us' dimension of the Bloomfield Track by parodying green activists as being from 
'down south' and used a series of symbols to invoke negative images of protesters. 
These images have largely since abated, although the negative 'greenie' 
stereotype still lingers. Indeed, as will be seen in the following chapter, the symbol of 
the ' ratbag' greenie still resonated with deliberators before deliberation in respect to the 
new Mayor of the Douglas Shire Council (the position having been renamed from 
Chairman). He was well known as a protester at the original blockade and a consistent 
opponent of the Bloomfield Track. In other words, even 15 years after the main event, 
the symbol still resonates in political discourse. 
However, the negative stereotype of greenies is not self-sustaining. Rather, it 
exists primarily as dialectic in relation to the other symbolic dimension of the 
Bloomfield Track issue of progress and the rights of humans versus the rights of nature 
- which is also perpetuated by media. Since the construction of the Bloomfield Track, 
the content and intensity of the rhetoric has changed but not its substance. With the 
listing of the Daintree Region as part of the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area, the 
human versus nature dimension of political discourse as perpetuated by media has 
transformed into rights of community access versus conservation imperative. 
The proportion of local media reporting that was sympathetic to the anti-
Bloomfield Track lobby was equally simplistic, tending to focus on specular events 
during the blockade whereby protesters were injured or arrested (for example Wilderness 
Action Group, 1983; Doyle, 1992). Billington (1984, plO) portrays a frustration on the 
part of green activists with journalists covering the Bloomfield Track controversy. The 
latter tended to demonstrate an inability, or unwillingness to engage with the complexity 
of conservation issues, instead focussing on the political dimension and interviewing 
lobby groups associated with the issue in order to file se~sational headline grabbing 
reports. Occasionally, reporters did attempt to look at the issue itself, but even these 
tended to emphasise the more spectacular 'symbolic' dimensions, such as the intrusion 
into so-called 'virgin rainforest' or damage to the onshore reef. 
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4.3.3 The Bloomfield Track Outcome: The Politics of Power 
The Bloomfield Track provides a clear example of politics as the exercise of 
power. The pro-Bloomfield Track coalition prevailed because they had the power to do 
so. They had the resources of law to enforce their desired ends and send the bulldozers 
through the rainforest.6 Green groups lost because they simply did not have the power 
to stop them. 
The lack of power of green groups included adverse public opinion. Political 
accounts of the Bloomfield Track tend to portray the loss of the Bloomfield Track issue 
by greens as a result of failure to properly organise and mobilise support (for example 
Edebone, 1985). A related explanation for this is that, unlike its Franklin River 
predecessor, the anti-Bloomfield Track did not have a charismatic leader to provide an 
instrument winning over public opinion (Aiken, 1987, p.140).7 However, this type of 
analysis fails to recognise the immense structural barriers to a green victory. This 
pertains to the dynamics leading up to the decision and the dogged determination by 
decision-makers in Queensland to push ahead. The timing of the election cycle was also 
an important factor that kept the federal government out of the fray. 
These analyses fall squarely into the 'politics is about power' basket. The main 
point is that irrespective of who won, it would be a shallow victory. Either way, the 
result is a long way from deliberative ideals. Under such circumstances, a victory for the 
greens would not automatically have been a victory for a deliberative conception of 
democracy. As I will argue at a later point, without the force of good reason, neither 
would it have necessarily been a victory for the environment. 
Whatever the case, it is too late - the Bloomfield Track has been constructed. 
However, it does remain a significant policy problem. The politics in esse that 
characterise the issue also remain largely intact and provide the benchmark against which 
deliberative possibilities can be compared. In the following section I will briefly outline 
the nature of the present policy problem. 
6 Including the police, who were instrumental to ensuring that the bulldozers got through. The pictures 
in Figure 4-6 on page 113 give some indication of the numbers of police allocated to the Bloomfield 
Track blockade. 
7 It could be argued that they did. As I have mentioned above, the current Mayor of the Douglas Shire 
Council was a prominent protester against the construction of the Bloomfield Track and is well known 
as a charismatic spokesman on environmental issues. 
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4.4 THE POLICY PROBLEM 
4.4.1 After the Bloomfield Track 
As I have already mentioned, in 1989, seven years following the construction of 
the Bloomfield Track, a state election in Queensland replaced the National Party 
government. This resulted in politically aligned governments at both state and federal 
levels and provided the opportunity to declare the Daintree region a World Heritage 
Area.8 The World Heritage Area was named The Wet Tropics and a joint federal-state 
body, the Wet Tropics Management Authority (WTMA), was commissioned to manage 
the Area. 
The Bloomfield Track has remained a thorny issue. It is a product of a different 
political era. Also, it has yet to be properly resolved. A combination of factors, not 
least of which remains the simmering tension between two intractably opposing sides, 
has meant that the Bloomfield Track has effectively been in policy paralysis since 
construction. This was partially broken in 1998. Due to prohibitive cost of 
maintenance of a dirt track following steep contours in a heavy rainfall region, the 
Douglas Shire Council applied to the WTMA to upgrade the steepest section and lay 
gravel along major sections. The Wet Tropics Management Authority granted an 
approval for the works on the condition that the local council prepare a comprehensive 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) with recommendations for providing for long-
term management. To date the EIA has yet to be commissioned. 
As I have outlined in this chapter, there are strong and opposing interests and 
interconnected pressures within the region that make the formulation of policy in the 
region extremely difficult. There is intense competition among competing interests over 
the issue. These include the needs of the small local community, tourist operators and 
an ever-pressing conservation imperative. The narrow policy space is reflected in the 
intractable nature of the politics concerning the Daintree region as a whole. Factors 
contributing to this are the area's importance as a World Heritage site; increasing 
pressure from visitors; and construction of housing in the rainforest on private blocks 
within a large controversial subdivision in the late 1970s. 
8 This was done under the United Nations Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage (World Heritage Convention) 1972. 
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Currently, the number of visitors to the area is limited by the absence of a bridge 
across the Dain tree River, with only a ferry providing access. Construction of housing 
in the region, which would lead to large-scale clearing of rainforest, is currently limited 
by the absence of an electricity grid. There is strong pressure within the from local 
residents south of Cape Tribulation to provide both bridge and electricity, the prospect 
of which would dramatically increase pressure on the region - giving rise to a 
potentially catastrophic series of 'knock-on' impacts. 
There remains support for the Bloomfield Track from within the local 
community groups. These express resentment at what they view as ' outside' 
interference in their own affairs by those who call for its closure.9 The Bloomfield 
Track has also become an important, if symbolic link between the indigenous 
Wujal Wujal community and their southern kinship groups, historically separated by 
forced resettlement. There is consequently intense pressure from some local residential 
groups to keep the Bloomfield Track open and upgraded - although some residents 
also resent the increasing intrusion by tourists. The combined forces of geographic 
isolation and a sense of disenfranchisement have enhanced suspicion of outside 
interference in local affairs. 
Environmental groups have consistently maintained their calls that the 
Bloomfield Track be closed, preferably reverted to a walking trail. Polarisation of 
interest groups is, in part, an artefact of the political history of the area and the absence 
of mechanisms for consultation and mediation. The continued policy stagnation of the 
Bloomfield Track issue is a constant reminder of its bitter political history. 
9 Which was very strongly felt at a meeting with stakeholders within the Bloomfield Community in the 
lead up to the FNQCJ. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided background information pertaining to the Bloomfield 
Track in order to provide an appreciation of the political, social and ecological context of 
the policy issue. The rationale for doing so has also been to set the scene of politics as 
usual, or in esse, against which I wish to compare the deliberative ideal. 
Politics in esse as characterised by this chapter has thus far produced a policy 
outcome that is regarded by some commentators as a fiasco - albeit in often 
emotionally charged terms. Such is the nature of the political environment that 
characterises the Bloomfield Track issue. 10 If it is not a 'fiasco', at the very least it 
remains highly contentious due to the process whereby the original decision to construct 
the Bloomfield Track was made. The alternative conditions of policy formation include 
those I have described in chapters 1 and 3 under the rubric of politics in posse. In the 
following chapter, I begin the analysis of the outcome of the deliberative ideal by 
outlining the proceedings of the FNQCJ process. 
1
° For example Keto ( l 984b) 
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DELIBERATIVE 
DYNAMICS 
CHAPTER 5 THE FAR NORTH QUEENSLAND 
CITIZENS' JURY: PROCEEDINGS, 
DISCOURSES AND OUTCOMES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a brief account of the procedure and outcomes of the 
FNQCJ. The objective of the chapter is to provide the reader with a broad appreciation 
of the deliberative process in anticipation of more intensive analysis in the following 
chapters. The chapter is organised into three thematic areas of: 1) deliberative 
process/timetable; 2) discourses and turning points; and 3) deliberative outcomes. 
The first theme - providing a description of the deliberative process - is a 
very brief overview of events that took place during the FNQCJ. Much of the relevant 
material pertaining to the deliberative process, including the rationale for the design of 
the FNQCJ deliberative process was provided in Chapter 3. Rather than duplicate that 
material, the description of the deliberative process is limited to a simple outline of the 
timetable, including a description of some of the specific procedures therein, as well as a 
list of witnesses that presented evidence. The description of the timetable is followed 
by a concise account of the deliberative process in terms of significant events that took 
place. 
The second component of the chapter - or ' analysis of discourse' - is 
conducted with the aim of reducing the complexity of the total deliberative output 
arising from the FNQCJ. This is not an attempt to understand the communicative 
process in its entirety. Rather, the analysis is conducted with a view to assisting with 
task of this thesis: to account for changes to preferences because of deliberation. Thus, 
rather than a 'blow by blow' account of discussions that took place, important 'turning 
points' during the deliberative process that were instrumental in the formation of 
Chapter5 
subjectivity (and, therefore, preferences) are identified. To this end, an overview of 
important events is presented via the judicious use of quotations and descriptions of 
deliberative events. This analysis forms the basis for the following chapters, which 
explicitly concerns analysis of subjective and preference transformation during the 
deliberative process. 
Following discussion of the deliberative process and deliberative turning points, 
the outcomes of the deliberative process are reported. These outcomes take the form of 
a synopsis of the deliberator's report, which was formulated on the final day of 
deliberations. 1 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The following section (5.2) provides a brief 
outline of the deliberative process, in terms of timetable and procedural practices used 
for the FNQCJ. Section 5.3 then discusses the major developments or turning points 
during the deliberative process that proved most influential in shaping the outcomes of 
the process. These outcomes are briefly reported in section 5.4. The final section (5.5) 
summarises the major findings from the chapter. 
5.2 THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS 
5.2.1 Overview 
The deliberative process of the FNQCJ took four days. This included one day 
of preparation and site inspection; t~o days of information gathering, during which 
witness presentations were given; and a final day of deliberation and report writing. The 
first three and final days were respectively intended to comprise the two major 
deliberative phases. The first is notionally labelled the 'information phase' , during 
which deliberators acquired knowledge about the Bloomfield Track issue through field 
inspection and witness presentations. The second 'deliberative phase' of the process 
was intended to be one where the deliberators would consider the various merits of the 
arguments and the information acquired with a view to formulating findings. 
' The 'Jurors' Report', which cites the major findings of the FNQCJ and the reasons that underlie them, 
is reproduced in part in section 5.4, with the remainder of the report reproduced in Appendix 4. 
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However, as will become clear from this chapter and those that follow, much of 
the deliberation - and changes to subjectivity - actually took place during the 
information phase of the process. The deliberative phase served to increase the level of 
coherence among the array of opinions, rather than the formation thereof, these opinions 
having more or less already been (trans) formed during the infonnation phase of the 
deliberative process. These deliberative phases (or, rather, the boundaries between 
them) nonetheless serve as useful markers for tracking developments during the 
deliberative process. The relation of these phases to the various components of the 
FNQCJ can be seen in Table 5-1. 
Having outlined the framework of the FNQCJ process, the following section 
provides a brief account of the events of each day. 
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Table 5~1 
Deliberative 
Stage/Phase 
Stag• 1 
(Pte-Jelib1r•t1'011) 
"' :; ·! 
i ~ 
<>; '@.. 
~ 
s ... ,. 2 
(Mili-li•/ib.,ctiu) 
....,_ 
~ 
0 
~ ·~ 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
~~ 
::! 
Stage 3 
Po11 .. Jdib1rotio1t) 
Timetable for the FNQCJ 
Dar Time 
9.00-9 : 30 
9.30-1 o.oo 
10.00 I l.00 
Day I 
WEDNESDAY 12.00 13.00 
13.00 17.00 
17:00 21.00 
21.00 
9.30 - 10.30 
10.45 I 1.45 
12.00 13.00 
13 00 13.45 
Day 2 
THURSDAY IJ.45 14.45 
15.00 16.00 
16.l5 - 17. 15 
17.30 -18.00 
9.30 - 10.30 
10.45 - 12.30 
12.30 - l3 l 5 
Day 3 13. 15 - l4. l 5 
FRIDAY 
14.30 l5.30 
16.00 17:30 
17:30-1800 
9.30 - 12.30 
12 30 - 13.15 
Day 4 
SATURDAY 
13.15 - 18.00 
18. 00 
Process 
Survey 
Introduction 
T ran.sic 
Process Briefing 
Site ln.spccrion 
Dinner 
Transit 
Jury Senion I 
W itncs.J Session l 
Witneu Si:s.sion 2 
Lunch 
Witness Se.uion 3 
Wicne.u Senion 4 
Witness Session 5 
Jury Swion 2 
Jury Session 3 
Witnc.ss Session 7 
Lunch 
Witn(U Sn:lion 8 
Wimess Session 9 
Jury Session 4 
Sur•ey 
Morning Se.ssions 
Lunch 
A(ccrnoon Sessio ns 
Survey/Close of 
Jury 
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Description 
Pre deliberative survey {policy preferences and Q sort) 
Morning tea and introductions. Brief prescntalion ourlining the Ciriunt' 
Jury pruccss and rhc timctablc for chc day 
T nn1pon to Ca.pc Tribulation 
Initial btiefing ou1lining the process and wha.t will be happening over 
che next four cb.yJ wi1h lunch 2 t Fern Tree Roon , C ape Tribulation 
Guided site in.spection on Bloomfield Track 
Tran,port co Porr Dougla.s for din ner 
TnnJport back to the James Cook Univcuity 
Identifying and exploring 1hc iuues 
Enginccring/Cou impact 
Planning/Rcgjonal impact 
E nvironmental impact (tcrrcsuial} 
Environmental impact ( rec{) 
Tomism 
Review of the day and identification of any further informa1ion 
requi red 
Review o ( p re ... ious day/Disausion/Funhcr information 
Local Shire Mayon 
Local Community Impact 
Indigenous Community impae1 witness 
Points to consider/overview 
Adminisrration of Q. sott 
Review of p revious day 
J ury Session Report writing 
Jury Scs.sion Rcporc writing 
Review of proccis 
Q sort/Prefucncc/ Pos t deli bccati,,e 'urvey 
Section 5.2: Tu Delire~ Pn:x:ess 
(a} Day I: Briefing and Site !mpection 
The first task undertaken by the FNQCJ deliberators was to complete the pre-
deliberative surveys. Following this, deliberators were introduced to the organisational 
team and the process facilitator.2 They were then familiarised with the process in which 
they would participate over the coming days. Part of this included a briefing about their 
remit3 and expectations about how they were to approach the task at hand. The 
objective of this session was to ensure that deliberators were fully versed in the process, 
and to ensure familiarity with what was expected of them. 
The introductory session stressed that they were expected to approach the issue 
with a view to formulating the best possible outcome for the benefit of the community.4 
Deliberators were also encouraged to treat any information provided to them with 
scepticism, to check its veracity, and to ask for clarification where any questions arose. 
It was also explained to deliberators that information could be gathered outside the 
witness presentations upon request. To this end, two of the organisers acted as 
'researchers' for the deliberative group. These researchers sought answers to specific 
queries posed by deliberators, which were then delivered to deliberators by the 
beginning of the following day. 
After the initial briefing, deliberators then embarked by bus to Mossman, where 
they transferred to a four-wheel drive bus that took them to Cape Tribulation and on to 
the Bloomfield Track. 5 The deliberators disembarked at Cape Tribulation for lunch, 
where they were further briefed about the process over the coming days. Once back on 
the bus, two witnesses joined the deliberators for the site inspection. The first was an 
engineer from the Douglas Shire Council, who was on hand to answer questions 
regarding technical aspects of the Bloomfield Track as they arose during the site 
inspection. The second witness was a well-known Cape Tribulation resident and tour 
2 For a description of the role of the facilitator, see section 3.4. l(b)of Chapter 3. 
3 The remit of the jury provided the guiding principles whereby they should consider the issue of the 
Bloomfield Track and formulate policy decisions. The remit of the FNQCJ is discussed and outlined 
in section 3.4.2(a) of Chapter 3. 
4 However, the geographical boundaries of the community under consideration were not explicitly 
formulated, but left for deliberators to determine for themselves. For a discussion regarding the 
appropriate choice of community boundaries, or 'communities of fate' (Eckersley, 2000), see section 
3.5 of Chapter 3. 
5 See Figure 5-1; see also map in Figure 4-1 on page 89. 
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operator, Lawrence Mason, who provided a commentary as deliberators travelled along 
the Bloomfield Track. 
Figure 5-1 Map of the Cairns-Cooktown region showing roads and Shires 
· ....... _ World Heritage Listed Area 
COOK Sealed Road 
............... Unsealed Road 
SHIRE - - - - Road (Sealing in progress) 
Bloomfield Track 
MA REEBA 
SHIRE 
Schematic map compiled using information obtained from the Wet Tropics 
Management Authority and the Australian Bureau of Statistics.Cairns 
0 
N 
25 SO km 
, 
At the conclusion of the site inspection, deliberators were transported to Port 
Douglas for dinner with the organising team.6 Following dinner, they were transported 
back to their hotel. 7 
6 Although interaction between the FNQCJ organising team and deliberators was encouraged, this was 
done under the strict proviso that members of the team did not discuss their opinions concerning the 
Bloomfield Track issue. 
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(b) Day 2: Technical Witnesses 
Day two of the deliberative process marked the beginning of witness 
presentations. These began with technical witness presentations, covering the issues of 
engineering and maintenance and construction cost; planning and regional impact; 
environmental impacts; and economic impacts of tourism. The list of witnesses who 
presented within these thematic areas and their backgrounds are provided in Table 5-2.8 
Table 5-2 Technical Witnesses 
Witness Category 
Engineering 
Regional Impact/Planning 
Environmental Impact 
(Terresrrial) 
Environmental Impact 
(Marine) 
Tourism 
Name 
Bob Baade 
Peter Hitchcock 
Steve Turton 
David Haynes 
Julie Brown 
Organisation 
Shire Engineer, Douglas Shire Council 
Old Cassowary Consulting 
Cooperative Research Centre for Rainforest 
Ecology & Management, James Cook University 
Water Quality Research and Monitoring, Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 
FNQ Tour Operators Association 
As discussed in Chapter 3, witnesses were required to present evidence about 
their specific topic area within the remit. Following these presentations, witnesses left 
the room for up to 20 minutes. Deliberators discussed the evidence and possible 
questions or points of clarification for the witness to address. Witnesses were then 
brought back into the room whereupon deliberators posed their questions. 
Following each of the two days of witness presentations, deliberators assembled 
to discuss what they had learnt and impressions from the proceedings thus far. Any 
major gaps in information that emerged during the day were communicated to the 
organisers, who endeavoured to find material to address these questions by the following 
monung. 
7 Most deliberators were accommodated in hotel accommodation across the road from the venue for the 
FNQCJ, the Smithfield Campus of James Cook University. However, five deliberators, who lived in 
close proximity, chose to return borne in the evenings. There was concern tbat this would prove 
problematic, in terms of deliberators who stayed in the hotel gathering together to deliberate with the 
remainder absent. However, this was mitigated by gathering the jury for a meal at a local restaurant 
following the conclusion of the formal process each day. 
8 A synopsis of each of their presentations can be found in Appendix 3. 
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(c) Day 3: Community Witnesses 
On day three, community representatives gave presentations on the social and 
community dimensions of Bloomfield Track issue. A list of these witnesses is provided 
in Table 5-3. 
Table 5-3 Community Witnesses 
Witness Category 
Community Representative 
Community Representative 
Commtmity Representative 
Indigenous Perspective 
Review of the day, Points to 
consider 
Name 
Graheme Elmes 
Mike Berwick 
Colin Burns 
John Scott 
]ill Jake! 
Organisation 
Mayor, Cook Shire Council 
Mayor, Douglas Shire Council 
Bloomfield Area Local Councillor, Cook Shire 
Lecturer, Aboriginal Studies, James Cook 
University 
Queensland Department of Families, Youth and 
Community Care 
The first two community witnesses, Graheme Elmes and Mike Berwick, who 
were Shire Mayors of the Cook and Douglas Shires respectively, gave their 
presentations in much the same format as described for technical witnesses -
presentation followed by 15-20 minutes sequestration. However, rather than field 
questions separately, both Mayors were present for a joint session during which each 
were given the opportunity to address the questions from the deliberators. 
This joint session was followed by the presentation of Colin Bums. As the local 
Councillor for the Bloomfield ward of the Cook Shire, Burns was recruited to provide a 
more direct representation of the local community perspective with respect to the 
Bloomfield Track. As already discussed in Chapter 3, invitations to other community 
representatives, particularly from the Bloomfield River Community Catchment 
Committee, were refused.9 The Wujal Wujal Community Council also refused to send a 
9 This refusal was accompanied by legal threats to halt the FNQCJ. See section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4 for a 
discussion of the social context, especially how mistrust occurs in respect to any perceived threat to 
local autonomy. 
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representative to speak about indigenous interests. 10 Difficulties associated with finding 
a substitute for direct indigenous community representation were prohibitive. The 
witness eventually recruited to give evidence pertaining to indigenous issues, Dr John 
Scott, was an academic from James Cook University. 
Jill Jakel, a regional employee of the Queensland Government department who is 
responsible for social impact assessment, led the final session of the second day of 
presentations. Her task was to assist the deliberators with the process of weighing up 
the various elements of the evidence given that day. This included discussion of criteria 
for evaluating social impact: community aspirations, community benefit, potential losers 
(and opportunities for minimising loss), long-term impacts (future generations) and, 
importantly, the level of risk attached to various options. Following this session, the 
second, mid-deliberative survey was administered. 
(d) Day 4: Deliberation and Report Writing 
The final day of the deliberative process comprised what has been notionally 
described as the second 'deliberative phase'. Deliberators began the day by discussing 
the evidence and formulating possible recommendations. Through a process of 
elimination an initially large list of policy options was reduced to a few, which were 
more intensively deliberated. Once the final positions of deliberators were established, 
they were broken up into small groups to begin the process of preparing the Jurors' 
report, which is summarised at the end of this chapter. 
10 A similarly strongly worded letter was received from the indigenous Wujal Wujal community in 
response to a similar invitation. As discussed in the previous chapter, the reasons for this are complex. 
Following an initially positive response from the Chairwoman of the Wujal Wujal community, the 
eventual response to the formal invitation to participate in the process appears to stem from a combined 
product of the history of the issue, a genuine sense of disempowerment and the harnessing of resulting 
frustration by certain elements within the community who felt threatened by potential outcomes from 
the FNQCJ that were contrary to particular interests. For a discussion of the dynamics in the 
indigenous community north of the Bloomfield Track in relation to the issue see footnote 3 on page 
11 5. 
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5.3 DISCOURSES AND TURNING POINTS 
The following discussion begins the analysis of deliberative dynamics of the 
FNQCJ, which will be conducted over the following three chapters. Where much of the 
analysis in the following two chapters is quantitative, here I am concerned solely with 
qualitative approaches. Indeed, consistent with the approach of analytical 
triangulation 11 , the qualitative data from this chapter will be drawn on to assist with the 
interpretation of the results of quantitative analysis in those that follow. 
The qualitative analysis that follows is not exhaustive. It is not possible to 
provide a detailed account of the deliberative process in detail. This is not least for 
reasons of space. Neither is it desirable to do so, as the objective of this research is not 
to detail the minutiae of the deliberative process, but to identify those discourses that 
contributed to the deliberative transfonnation of policy preferences. 
Thus, the main task involves the identification of major discourses that emerged 
during the deliberative process. To this end, the focus of the analysis is not on major 
discourses per se, but specific changes on the margins of subjectivity, or 'turning points' 
(Abbott, 1997). These turning points are not identified simply in terms of changes in 
the language of deliberators. Language may remain constant, while the meaning attached 
to words changes. 12 By tracking changes in discourse, the adoption of turning points is 
grounded in an attempt to understand the major processes observed during the FNQCJ. 
Further, the approach to analysis of discourse is sensitive to a broader communicative 
context (for example, political and institutional) within which deliberators had formed 
understandings of the issue (see for example Forester, 1992) and changed these 
understandings during deliberation. These are identified as turning points. 
The account of the deliberative process that follows is constructed not simply 
by leafing through transcripts, but by full immersion in the issue of the Bloomfield 
Track, through conversations with deliberators and direct observation of the deliberative 
11 See section 2.6 in Chapter 2 (page 58). 
12 A good example of this will emerge in the following chapter in relation to the tenn 'development'. 
During the early stages of the FNQCJ, deliberators had a shared understanding of the term in a negative 
sense in relation to the Daintree Region, as associated with the construction of physical infrastructure 
for the purposes of commercial gain. They subsequently came to associate the tenn with a much wider 
array of developmental possibilities, such as construction of a non-commercial ranger station for the 
purposes of environmental education. 
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process. This process was also supplemented by listening to recordings of the FNQCJ 
and the use of notes taken by a scribe employed for that purpose.13 
The following discussion of discourses and turning points that emerged during 
the deliberative process is broken into three components. The first two cover the 
information phase, divided into the field trip and witness presentation components. 
The final discussion covers the deliberative phase on the final day of the FNQCJ. 
5.3.1 Site Inspection 
The first day of the deliberative process appears to have proved an important 
turning point, influencing the subjectivity (and ultimately preferences) of the 
deliberators. Although comparatively little 'evidence' was presented, the process 
familiarised deliberators with the issue in the broadest terms and prepared them for the 
task ahead. Importantly, the trip to the Bloomfield Track appeared to have a significant 
effect on how deliberators viewed the issue, affecting the processes through which they 
subsequently processed information presented to them. I attempt to identify the 
implications of this process in the following discussion by considering turning points as 
they took place. 
There were a number of important turning points during the site inspection, 
which featured during subsequent deliberations. The first of these occurred shortly after 
leaving Cape Tribulation along the Bloomfield Track, at the first crossing at Emmagen 
Creek. 14 The vehicle in front of the bus - a 'self-drive' four wheel drive that had been 
hired by tourists to drive the Bloomfield Track - became stuck in the middle of the 
creek. This occurred primarily because the driver, unfamiliar with both the vehicle and 
the driving conditions, failed to engage properly the vehicle in four-wheel drive. 
A number of deliberators later recounted it as a poignant moment as they 
watched rear wheels of the vehicle wildly spinning and throwing up water as the driver 
attempted to gain traction while the river surrounded the vehicle. The situation was 
resolved only after the local guide on the bus for the site inspection, Lawrence Mason, 
instructed the driver how to make the river crossing. 
13 The task of the scribe was to record significant deliberative 'events' to use as a reference when 
revisiting the recordings of the deliberative process. 
14 See Figure 4-3 on page 97. 
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For a number of deliberators, the event highlighted features of the status quo of 
the Bloomfield Track that proved influential to their findings on the final day. For one, 
tourists predominantly use the Bloomfield Track. This includes those travelling 
individually in private vehicles, known as 'self-drive'. These self-drive tourists are in 
large part unfamiliar with the conditions of the road, therefore contribute to enhanced 
risks to themselves and others, and further damage to the condition of the Bloomfield 
Track. 
The second significant turning point occurred further along the trip. Due to 
slippage of the schedule (in part because of the incident just mentioned), the bus was 
forced to tum around at Cowie Range. 15 This waslOkm short of the objective, which 
was to reach Bloomfield River and visit the local communities to its north. The Cowie 
Range comprises the steepest section of the Bloomfield Track. Deliberators 
disembarked the bus on the slope, which had recently been surfaced with concrete. The 
engineer from the Douglas Shire Council took the initiative and briefed them on the 
engineering of the site. 
This event was another turning point because once outside the bus, deliberators 
were able to situate themselves more properly in the ecological context of the 
Bloomfield Track issue. One deliberator (Matilda) when asked what was influential in 
changing her perceptions of the Bloomfield Track issue, stated: 
Being in the rainforest itself (especially when the bus driver turned off the engine).16 
It appears that the experience served to invoke an appreciation of the rainforest 
setting. This affected the way in which deliberators viewed the Bloomfield Track issue. 
As one deliberator (Koda) put it: 
I didn't really learn much new but the site visit was good in terms of seeing the current state of 
the road, thinking about the big picture issues - international significance etc - and that local 
access issues and 4wd road aren't really good reasons to compromise the area's intrinsic 
values.17 
Thus, it seems that the site inspection had a priming effect for at least some 
deliberators. It made them cognisant of the juxtaposition of forest and road. This may 
15 See Figure 4-4 on page 97. 
16 See survey results in section A.2.8 of Appendix 2. 
17 See survey results in section A.2. 7 of Appendix 2. 
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have served to 'enfranchise nature' (in the sense of Goodin, 1996) and to focus them on 
the task of deliberative process, providing a heightened appreciation of the 
environmental imperative. 
Although the event at Cowie Range enhanced the environmental awareness of a 
number of deliberators, it had a rather different effect on at least one other deliberator. 
Keith, who had travelled the Bloomfield Track a number of times some years 
previously, was struck by the extent of revegetation that had occurred during the 
intervening period. As will be seen in the following chapters, this appears to have 
contributed to a perception by him, along with a small number of other deliberators, that 
there was good level of resilience in the ecosystems abutting the Bloomfield Track. As 
will be seen, when combined with the absence of direct scientific evidence of major 
impacts attributable to the Bloomfield Track, this led to a perception that perhaps it did 
not significantly contribute to environmental damage. 
Whatever the interpretation of the rainforest experience, the event at Cowie 
Range certainly appeared to stimulate deliberators to participate actively in the process. 
Before this, deliberators tended to be detached, preferring to listen rather than 
participate. Within minutes of disembarking, deliberators were asking questions of the 
two guides and discussing the issue amongst themselves. In many respects, it is as this 
point that the deliberative process 'proper' began. 
It is also important to point out that at there was at least one potential turning 
point that did not take place on the first day, but which could have also had a 
considerable impact. Because the bus was forced to turn around before reaching the 
Bloomfield River, the deliberators did not get the chance to witness first-hand the local 
community.18 
5.3.2 Witness Presentations 
The following discussion concerns the discourses and turning points during the 
two days of witness presentations. The discussion is organised into two parts. The 
first provides an overview the perceptions of deliberators about the relative impact of 
18 This, combined with what will be seen as relatively poor community representation, may have 
contributed to decline in the belief of the importance of the Bloomfield Track for local community 
access. However, this is not automatically the case. This issue will be revisited in more detail in 
Chapter 8, following the analysis of the quantitative data. 
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the various witnesses, as stated in their post-deliberative surveys.19 The second part of 
the discussion covers the various deliberative themes that emerged from these influential 
presentations and the role of witnesses in contributing to these themes. 
(a) Relative Influence of Witnesses 
The survey given to deliberators at the conclusion of the deliberative process 
sought to elicit responses to help gauge what parts of the process impacted most 
strongly on their values, beliefs and preferences regarding the Bloomfield Track. In 
particular, it asked which of the witnesses they thought most influential. The responses 
are summarised in Table 5-4. The table lists witnesses in the first column by 
approximate order of influence. The rows corresponding with each witness deliberators 
nominated that witness as influential, as well as the reason stated for this influence. 
19 See the post-deliberative survey in section A.1.2 in appendix J. The results of the surveys are 
provided in appendix 2. 
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Witness 
Hitchcock 
Haynes 
Turmn 
Scott 
Baade 
Jakel 
Influence ofWitne~es 
Adventure 
Diversely informed 
Boat 
Almost imPo1liblc to maintain the 
status quo - Always creep. Tropical 
rainforest only covers 0. 1% of 
Australia 
Adventure 
Lack of research on environmental 
im pact 
f11.11ine 
Environmennl Impacts information 
AJvasture 
A refreshing insight inco indigenous 
values 
Koda 
loc.als use coast road because it's 
'relaxing' • not a grear reason in my 
mind to keep the ro;;id o~n given 
chc ahcrnativc.s 
Boat 
Maintenance cosu arc 3x higher 
than for other roads. The road was 
builr in hasre without proper survey 
or consultation 
Janiu 
Poincs co consider 
Pearl 
His "'Bulldoz.ing" approach made me 
realize that we have to act now 
Jani11r 
Gcncraf informadon on the 
en.ck and uea.' 
fani11r 
Uniqueness of forest info 
Koda 
•science wi11 never have all the 
answers" 
SnVDpy 
Knowledgeabk 
Matilda 
the incergeneradonal aspects 
and priorities impresK'<i me 
Pttrrl 
W2.nts: co push dcve1opmcnt 
wirh liule consideration of 
future conservation values 
M11.tilda 
Sucassfully balanced 
Environment and 
Economy 
Matilda 
Passiona.tc, about 
cnvironm\:ntal aspects 
Pttrrl 
Some fringing rufs 
already dead 
Prar/ 
The closure wont affect 
the area commcrdatly or 
roucist~wi.se greatly 
p.,,,.[ 
Unique/pristine pa.rt of the 
world 
S11oopy 
Results of research 
!Wtw 
Well presented ideas, 
winners/ losers/ 
compcn.sadon 
R4sJw 
Showed why the arc.a. is so 
original [important) 
S11oopy 
AJchough he is a. grccnic 
he is unbiued 
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Table 5-4 shows that two witnesses in particular stand out as most influential -
Mike Berwick (Douglas Shire Mayor) and Peter Hitchcock (Cassowary Consulting). 
These witnesses were recruited to provide evidence to the FNQCJ for very different 
reasons. Hitchcock was recruited as a technical witness through being a former executive 
officer of the Wet Tropics Management Authority1 and current planning consultant on 
World Heritage issues. He presented evidence on the second day about the regional 
impacts of the Bloomfield Track.2 Berwick, the Mayor of the Douglas Shire, spoke on 
the third day as part of a joint session with the Mayor of the Cook Shire, ostensibly 
representing the community perspective of their respective constituents. Both 
witnesses were clearly in favour of closure of the Bloomfield Track. As will be 
evidenced in the following discussion, both witnesses adopted a broad, integrated, 
perspective on the Bloomfield Track issue that strongly impressed most deliberators. 
Slightly less influential were those presentations dealing with specific types of 
impact, such as Haynes' presentation on impacts to the Great Barrier Reef and Turton's 
on terrestrial environmental impacts. The fonner presentation contributed most 
significantly to deliberations. This not in terms of what it contributed to knowledge. 
Rather it main impact was to dispel symbolic myths, particularly that the Bloomfield 
Track would kill inshore reefs. Both the latter two presentations also contributed to an 
emerging alarm among some deliberators at the poor level of knowledge regarding 
specific impacts associated with the Bloomfield Track. 
Also influential was John Scott, an academic researcher in indigenous issues. 
Scott was recruited very late to give evidence, following the refusal from the 
Wujal Wujal community to send a representative. He did not claim to speak with 
1 The joint State-Federal body established to manage the Wet Tropics World Heritage area. See 
discussion in Chapter 4 for more details. 
2 As for all witnesses, a synopsis of his presentation can be found in Appendix 3. 
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authority about the Bloomfield Track issue directly.3 Rather, his presentation covered a 
broad range of indigenous perspectives and challenges to be considered in respect to the 
issue. Despite the non-specific nature of this presentation, he was influential in the 
opinions of at least two of the deliberators.4 
The three overtly 'pro-Bloomfield Track' witnesses - Burns, Baade and Elmes 
were evidently less influential than most other witnesses, although their views 
played an important role during deliberations. Rather than convey an urgent need for 
the Bloomfield Track for local community access, Burns' presentation highlighted 
divisions among Bloomfield residents. Bob Baade, the Douglas Shire Engineer who 
prepared the original environmental impact statement5 and oversaw its construction, 
was very well infonned regarding the arguments for the track. Many of these arguments 
resonated with those made in the era during its construction, rather than reflecting the 
contemporary situation, which did not impress many deliberators.6 Infonnation 
provided by Baade regarding maintenance costs proved somewhat influential. 
As will be seen in the following discussion, as for Burns, Councillor Graherne 
Elmes, Mayor of the Cook Shire, also failed to impress. These witnesses stressed the 
importance of the Bloomfield Track for community access. The sole witness missing 
from Table 5-4, Julie Brown of the Far North Queensland Tourist Operators 
3 As was the case for the site inspection on the first day, there is another potentially important discourse 
that was not fully represented by the witnesses' presentations. It concerns the Bloomfield Track as a 
symbolic link between Kuku Yalanji kin located in the communities of Wujal Wujal and Mossman 
(see Chapter 4 on page 122). Unlike their non-indigenous counterparts in the region, these residents 
were not part of their communities due to personal lifestyle choices. Thus there was an important 
argument to be made on their behalf which was unheard by deliberators. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, this was due to inherent tensions within the issue, combined with powerplays within the 
Wujal Wujal community itself. However, there was fortuitous local and indigenous insight into the 
issue from within the ranks of the jury, through the recruitment of Janine (see Table 3-1). Although 
Janine did not pretend to ' represent' the local indigenous community, by virtue of both her 
membership of the kin group and professional experience in the Bloomfield Area, she was able to give 
voice to various discourses emanating from that community (in the sense of Dryzek, 2001 ). 
4 Although satisfied with the reasons for lack of direct representation by the Wujal Wujal community, at 
least one deliberator (Adventure) stated that she would have preferred to hear more direct evidence 
regarding the indigenous perspective. See deliberators ' survey results in Appendix 2. 
5 See section 4.3 of Chapter 4. 
6 One of the more extraordinary claims made during his presentation was that the Bloomfield Track was 
supported by the Queensland Police for law enforcement. (See synopsis of witness presentations in 
Appendix 3). These claims clearly resonate with the symbolic claims made by political actors at the 
height of the Bloomfield Track issue during its construction (see the previous chapter), which did not 
impress many among the jury. 
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Association, served to highlight that the most significant usage of the Bloomfield Track 
is not for local community access, but rather for Tourism. 
The remaining witness was Jill Jakel, a Social Impact Officer from the 
Queensland Department of Family and Community Services. She assisted deliberators 
to frame the broad range of implications resulting from the array of evidence presented 
to them in terms of community needs and aspirations. One deliberator, Janine, 
nominated this is a particularly influential session. 
(b) Eme,.gent Discourses During Witness Presentations Influential in Deliberator 
Findings 
The following discussion provides a very brief overview of those discourses that 
took place during the witness presentations that appear to have influenced during the 
deliberative process. The discussion focuses particularly on the second day of 
presentations (Day 3) concerning community issues. This is because, apart from 
Hitchcock's presentation on Day 2, this was when the most prominent discourses 
influencing the outcome of the FNQCJ emerged. 
Common elements to both the presentations of Berwick and Hitchcock were the 
emphasis on the long-term, integrated and incremental impacts in their presentations. 
Both carefully laid out the various options and associated cost and benefits, not only in 
monetary, but also 'social' terms. Hitchcock in particular advocated a 'win-win' 
position whereby conversion of the Bloomfield Track to a walking track, combined with 
the upgrade of the inland route, could lead to currently unavailable opportunities for 
'node' development. 
Perhaps more importantly, Hitchcock effectively communicated the uniqueness 
of the Daintree region in terms of biodiversity. As can be seen from Table 5-4, this 
struck a chord with many deliberators. He also raised an issue that was not previously 
considered by deliberators related to 'incremental attrition' (Walker, 1994, p.297). This 
is where small decisions inexorably lead to upgrade of the Bloomfield Track and 
associated facilities. Each impact alone is not significant. However, together they serve 
to damage irreversibly the region and its environmental values.7 Berwick reinforced the 
7 For a critique of incrementalism in public decision making see Goodin (I 982). 
-145~ 
Ch:q:terS 
arguments of Hitchcock, adding legitimacy to them by grounding them in the decisions 
that currently faced the Douglas Shire Council. 
An important turning point during Berwick's presentation can only be 
understood in the context of his long-standing involvement in the Bloomfield Track 
issue. As discussed in the previous chapter, Berwick played a dominant role in the 
environmental activism seeking to stop construction against the Douglas Shire Council 
and Queensland State Government. He was subsequently elected as Mayor in 1991 on 
an openly pro-environmental platform, and has remained in that position ever since. 
All deliberators were aware of Berwick's activist past. Many were preparing to 
adopt a sceptical position in relation to his presentation. This was in no small part due 
to earlier evidence presented by David Haynes (the third most influential presentation, 
see Table 5-4) that could not emphatically support claims regarding the impact of the 
Bloomfield Track to the Great Barrier Reef. As discussed in the previous chapter, this 
alleged damage had provided an important symbolic argument used by environmental 
activists seeking to stop the construction of Bloomfield Track and, subsequently, its 
closure. Consequently, there was scepticism among deliberators regarding such 
symbolic claims. Before his presentation, Berwick was symbolically associated with 
these claims, which tainted him in the eyes of many deliberators. 
However, with his display of communicative competence8, Berwick dispelled 
completely the perceptions among some deliberators that he was another 'greenie 
ratbag'. He surprised most deliberators with his frank agreement regarding the veracity 
of symbolic claims such as reef damage. The focus of his presentation was not such 
claims, but an integrated perspective of the issue over the long-term in which a wide 
range of impacts were considered. In many respects, his presentation reflected that of 
8 For a description of communicative competence see section 1.2.1 in Chapter I. 
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Hitchcock. However, there was added imprimatur. He was a political decision-maker 
who, by virtue of his position, was required to balance competing issues.9 
By contrast, very few deliberators were impressed with community 
representation advocating the 'pro-Bloomfield Track' position. In much the same way 
as the pre-deliberative concerns regarding the symbolic issue of reef damage, these 
presentations suggested that such positions another symbolic claim by interest groups, 
which did not necessarily reflect the interests of the broader community. This was not 
their intention, which was rather to convince deliberators about the need to maintain the 
Bloomfield Track as an access route. Worse in the minds of some deliberators, elements 
of local representation arguing in favour of the Bloomfield Track for community access 
invoked the very fears of incremental damage that were raised by Peter Hitchcock. 
Instead of elevating consideration of community concerns of access, the pro-Bloomfield 
Track witnesses actually served to dissuade many deliberators. 
As for the symbolic claims pertaining to environmental damage, the decline in 
belief that the Bloomfield Track was important for community access played a major 
role in subsequent discourse. Moreover, the manner in which the evidence was 
presented in favour of access contrasted it with the above-mentioned problems 
associated with incrementalism that struck a chord amongst the deliberators. Elmes' 
presentation contributed to these concerns. When queried about which environmental 
issues were most pressing in the region he cited sediment runoff: 
the biggest environmental problem that we have is our roads ... they are not sealed roads ... the 
amount of sediment that flows away every year. .. ends up in our creeks and flows out to the sea. 
Elmes then continued to press the case for surfacing - bituminising or 
concreting- of roads (including the Bloomfield Track) to address his professed concern 
for sediment runoff. However, instead of persuading deliberators regarding the 
importance of sediment run-off, his arguments reinforced the aforementioned issue of 
However, this was possible only once pre-deliberative scepticism about his assoc1at100 with 
environmentalism was assuaged. During the discussion among deliberators immediately following 
Berwick's presentation there were questions raised regarding whether or not he was representing his 
constituency or his own views. The deliberators discussed this issue at some length. They concluded 
that, because his views were an explicit part of his campaign platform - the nature of which very few 
electors could be in doubt - and he was elected by a majority vote within the Douglas Shire, he could 
thus legitimately proffer them as a community representative. Moreover, deliberators were impressed 
by the communicative competency of his presentation; that is, the authority of the quality of his 
arguments (Dryzek, 1990, p. I 5) 
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incremental attrition. Many deliberators felt that, as a community leader and decision-
maker, he was insensitive to these issues led some deliberators to adopt a stronger, more 
risk-averse position, to help avoid impact on the region through incremental impacts. 
For example, one deliberator (Pearl) responded to Elmes' presentation by stating: 
His 'bulldozing' attitude made me realise that we have to act now (to protect the Daintree 
region]. '0 
Moreover, in the opinion of most deliberators, there was no convincing case for 
the Bloomfield Track for community access. For example, Koda responded to the Colin 
Burns's presentation thus: 
locals use coast road because it's 'relaxing' - not a great reason in my mind to keep the 
[Bloomfield Track] open, given the alternatives. 
The alternative Koda refers to are those proffered by Peter Hitchcock, in 
particular the ongoing upgrade of the inland route. 
That the inland route from Cairns to Cooktown was in the process of being 
upgraded to a bitumen road (due to be completed in 2005) featured prominently during 
the deliberative process. Hitchcock initially raised the issue during his presentation. He 
argued that as well as improving community access, closure of the Bloomfield Track also 
increased opportunities for tourism under a ' nodal' approach development. Part of this 
plan included the access to the Wujal Wujal/Ayton end of the node via the soon to be 
bituminised inland highway from Cairns to Cooktown. 11 
In a manner similar to Elmes, Burns' presentation served to reinforce the claims 
made by Hitchcock. Burns echoed the concern expressed by Hitchcock that tourism 
was bypassing the Bloomfield Community. However, he went further. He portrayed 
resentment within the local community toward tourists visiting what they viewed as 
'their' area, 12 often using the disparaging phrase that they wanted to 'have their cake [of 
access] and eat it too' (ie. keep the area to themselves). Rather than persuade 
deliberators about the need for community access, his presentation highlighted divisions 
within the community, as alluded to in the previous chapter, regarding the main use of 
'° See section A.2.9 in Appendix 2. 
11 See the Cape York Penninsula Developmental Road in Figure 5-1, which is currently in the process of 
being upgraded (see discussion on page 148). 
12 This sentiment was strongly vocalised during meetings with representatives from local community 
groups in Ayton, as reported in the previous chapter. 
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the Bloomfield Track. Further, having moved to an isolated area, many residents now 
wanted to enjoy services afforded to those in more densely populated areas. 
This theme emerged during Berwick's presentation. He discussed poorly 
serviced rural developments, such as that north of Daintree River. 13 To use his words, 
these are proving a 'planning disaster'. Residents who were once happy to purchase 
unserviced blocks (no water, electricity etc.) were subsequently demanding services that 
could only be subsidised at the cost of the rest of the Shire. Berwick cited the example 
of rates from residents just to the south of the Bloomfield River, which yielded an 
annual return of approximately $6000 in rates. This compared unfavourably to an 
approximate $50,000 in annual maintenance costs for the Bloomfield Track, which 
residents claimed were essential for access. 
A case presented by Elmes supporting the need to maintain the Bloomfield 
Track for local community access proved more influential to deliberators, but it did not 
prevail. Elmes argued that the community often used the Bloomfield Track during the 
'dry' season (approximately March to October) for transit down to Mossman and 
Cairns for shopping, where the cost of provisions are considerably cheaper. Elmes was 
pressed on this issue during questioning. One deliberator (Boat) suggested that it might 
indeed be cheaper to travel to Cooktown for provisions, rather than Mossman or Cairns 
once all the costs were taken into account.14 
During discussions, a number of deliberators found it remarkable that the Mayor 
of the Cook Shire would argue in favour of enhanced access such that its residence could 
travel to a nearby shire (Douglas) to spend their money. 15 Rastus, for example, 
pondered the possibility whether better provisions for shopping in Cooktown would 
address the cost issue. Rastus also suggested that the upgrade of the inland route would 
decrease transport costs of goods to Cooktown. This detracted from the argument for 
the Bloomfield Track for access to the south because the north to Cooktown would 
become an increasingly viable option. Adventure supported this point by suggesting 
that, rather than focus on access from the Bloomfield Area to the south, the road to the 
13 See section 4.2. l(a) in Chapter 4 (page 87). 
14 Including transport (fuel, vehicle maintenance), road maintenance and external costs (particularly in 
relation to environmental damage). 
15 See Figure 5-1 on page 132. 
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north could be upgraded to enhance access to Cooktown and the inland road to Cairns.16 
During questioning, Berwick reinforced this line of argument. He suggested that the 
small number of residences in the Douglas Shire just south of the Bloomfield River 
would be better serviced if the shire boundaries were redrawn so they were part of the 
Cook Shire. Yet, Elmes persisted with the argument that residents would prefer to be 
serviced from Mossman. 
That Elmes' and Bums' positions regarding community access did not serve to 
convince deliberators was an important turning point during deliberations. Their 
arguments tended to reinforce concerns among deliberators regarding difficulties in 
containing incremental attrition in the area, wherein increased access to the area leads to 
pressure for increased services and results in the positive feedback of increasing 
environmental pressure. Consequently, many deliberators came to seek closure of the 
Bloomfield Track as the only acceptable option. Those who did not prefer closure were 
still concerned enough to stress that strict regulation of both the level of usage of the 
Bloomfield Track, and vehicles using it, would be an absolute necessity. 
5.3.3 Discourses on the Final Day of Deliberation 
Very few new discourses emerged on the final day of the deliberative process. 
The so-called 'deliberative phase' appears mainly to have served to explicate individual 
positions concerning the Bloomfield Track issue. Changes that did occur appear to have 
been mainly associated with the clarification of positions formed over the previous three 
days. 
However, at the end of the process there emerged a number of discourses 
highlighting the major differences between two positions. These are best encapsulated 
by the synopsis of the deliberator's report in the following section. These discourses 
are also subjected to further analysis in the following chapter. Thus, the following 
discussion is limited to the process whereby deliberators arrived at these positions. 
These positions will be referred to as the 'Closure' and 'Status Quo'. 
The first of these positions, that of Closure, was accompanied by the emergence 
of an environmental risk-averse argument, which maintained that the area is critically 
16 See map in Figure 5-1 on page 132 
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important and management of it should be conservative to maximise environmental 
values. Proponents of this position emphasised the importance of the Daintree region, 
in terms of its unique biological heritage. They were also cognisant of the difficulties of 
maintaining the area as it stands, given the interconnected pressures within the region 
and the ineffectiveness of imposing regulations to minimise damage. In view of these 
considerations, these deliberators tended to favour closure of the Bloomfield Track. 
However, they did not propose to 'drop the curtain' 17 on the local community 
by closing the road. Rather, they saw the best way of proceeding with closure as part 
of an integrated package of road works to improve local access from the Bloomfield 
River north to Cooktown to join the upgraded inland highway. As will become evident 
over the remaining three chapters, this position is most strongly associated with the 
subjective position of 'Preservation', identified in the following chapter. 
The dissenting view that emerged on the final day of deliberation is best 
expressed by the question put by its proponents on a number of occasions: 'in view of 
the evidence presented, why should the Bloomfield Track be closed?' These 
deliberators pointed to the lack of definitive scientific evidence proving beyond doubt 
that the Bloomfield Track is directly harming the environment. 
A notable advocate of this position, Keith, cited direct observation from his past 
use of the Bloomfield Track that the aesthetic quality has improved since construction, 
with trees growing back and revegetation of roadside verges. This was reflected by a 
number of other deliberators who maintained there was insufficient evidence to suggest a 
serious threat to Daintree region from the Bloomfield Track. However, they also 
stressed that if such evidence materialised they would change their position. 
Accompanying this discourse (most prominently expressed by Adventure) was an 
emerging alann among some deliberators about the paucity of evidence about to the 
environmental impact of the Bloomfield Track, which they wanted to see rectified with 
an ongoing research effort. 
Another discourse, which was proffered by a smaller number of dissenters to the 
dominant position, concerned a form of technological optimism. They argued that novel 
technologies could be implemented to address some of the more pressing tensions 
17 To use the language of one of the deliberators. 
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between environmental concern, community access, and the economic benefits 
associated with tourism. One particular possibility was posited by Keith, who 
suggested that a monorail or similar low-impact transport technology could be used to 
provide access. Although sceptical about the cost-effectiveness of such an approach, 
several others concurred with the general point that technology could address many of 
the issues. As one deliberator (Snoopy) put it: 'we don't even know if we are going to 
need cars in 100 years'. 
These deliberators tended to contrast with those in favour of closing the 
Bloomfield Track and turn it into a walking track. They felt that to do so would exclude 
all but the most fit and young from experiencing the area. Thus, it is not surprising that 
these deliberators tended to fall outside these categories. Those deliberators in favour of 
closure attempted to counter this view by arguing that these recreational opportunities 
already existed in the region, to no avail. By this time the process was drawing to close 
and it was time for deliberators to compile their findings into the Juror's Report, which 
is summarised in the following section. 
5.4 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FAR 
NORTH QUEENSLAND CITIZENS' JURY 
The following discussion provides a synopsis of the findings of deliberators 
participating in the FNQCJ. The findings are drawn from the FNQCJ Deliberator's 
report. The final section of the report, in which deliberator's own accounts of their 
findings are explicated, can be found in Appendix 4. 
At the conclusion of proceedings, the deliberators of the FNQCJ were divided 
between two positions concerning the future management of the Bloomfield Track. 
Seven deliberators supported the majority position in favour of staged closure of the 
Bloomfield Track and five supported the dissenting view of carefully managing the 
status quo. These positions can be summarised as follows: 
-152-
Section 5.4: Policy Recommendarions of th: Far North Queenslarx:I. Citizens' Jury 
0 Closure position: 
0 Status quo position: 
Staged Closure of the Bloomfield Track over a 10-15 
year period (7of12 deliberators in favour). 
Keeping the Bloomfield Track open with no further 
upgrade and regulation of vehicular access (5 of 12 
deliberators in favour). 
The main findings concerning each of these positions are briefly described below. 
5.4.I Position I: Staged Bloomfield Track Closure 
Those deliberators who preferred to see the Bloomfield Track closed made their 
recommendation because of their beliefs regarding: 
O the importance of the area in ecological and cultural terms; 
0 the ability of an orderly and staged closure accompanied by appropriate 
measures to benefit both community and environment; 
0 the multitude of pressures and impacts in the region to which the Bloomfield 
Track contributes; 
0 the strong likelihood that the status quo will lead to incremental upgrading of 
the Bloomfield Track; 
O the relatively poor return of benefits to the local community compared to 
maintenance costs; and 
0 the existence of alternatives for tourism and community access that do not 
require that the Bloomfield Track remain open. 
It was specified that closure be conducted in an orderly and predetermined 
manner to be announced publicly well in advance of implementation. 
5.4.2 Position 2: Keep Bloomfield Track Open with Strict 
Management 
The remaining deliberators, those who felt that the Bloomfield Track should 
remain open, did so on the grounds that access to the area should be available to all those 
who wished to visit. Based on the evidence presented to them, they felt that there was 
not a strong case for the finding that the Bloomfield Track has a detrimental effect on the 
ecology of the area. However, they also agreed that if the track proved to have a 
negative impact on either the rainforest or the fringing reefs, then closure was the best 
option to preserve the integrity of the area into the future. 
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5.4.3 Unanimous Findings 
The deliberators as a whole agreed on a number of important issues. Notably, 
there was concern among all deliberators- sometimes expressed as alarm- at the lack of 
scientific evidence specifically relevant to the Bloomfield Track. There was also 
agreement that no facilities should be constructed along the length of the Bloomfield 
Track. Nor should any works done to upgrade the Bloomfield Track surface or stream 
crossings. The Deliberators considered the construction of Ranger Stations at each end 
of the Bloomfield Track, and developed a provisional guide for future consultation. It 
was stipulated that future management of the Bloomfield Track should be conducted 
with sensitivity to local indigenous issues and the land claim in the area currently being 
made by the Kuku Yalanji people. 
5.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has served to illuminate the major elements of the FNQCJ process. 
It has also alluded to the developments that took place during the process, which appear 
to have influenced most the subjectivity and preferences of deliberators. These include: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the appreciation of the ecological context of the Bloomfield Track during the site 
inspection; 
the dissipation of pre-deliberative held symbolic beliefs (based on perception rather 
than evidence) concerning reef damage and community access; 
the development of a long-term perspective over which the issue is viewed, including 
an appreciation for the integration of a range of impacts to the region of which the 
Bloomfield Track is a part; and 
identification of the paucity of information that exists to inform important decisions 
concerning the Bloomfield Track. 
All deliberators agreed that the Bloomfield Track should not be upgraded beyond 
its present condition. However, the deliberators were divided between closure of the 
Bloomfield Track and the maintenance of the status quo, pending a greatly improved 
research effort to gauge its environmental impact. 
lt can be seen from the above assessment of the deliberative process that the 
participants in the FNQCJ did indeed change their minds in relations to the Bloomfield 
Track policy issue. The following two chapter analyses the extent of these changes, 
first in respect to subjectivity, followed by analysis of changes to policy preferences. 
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OF SUBJECTIVITY: EXPLORING 
THE DISCURSIVE SPHERE USING 
Q METHOD 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the impact of the deliberative process of the FNQCJ on 
the subjectivity (values and beliefs) of deliberators pertaining to the Bloomfield Track 
issue, which was surveyed using Q method. There are two components to the analysis. 
The first involves the reduction of a complexity of subjective information from the Q 
data using a form of factor analysis. The resulting factors represent predominant 
subjective 'archetypes' against which the subjectivity of deliberators can be compared. 
Attention is turned to examining subjective dynamics through the changes in 
subjectivity. 1 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section (6.2) briefly describes the 
rationale of Q methodology and the process of subjective factor extraction. The factors 
resulting from the analysis are described in section 6.3. In section 6.4, the subjective 
dynamics during the deliberative process are then described. Possible reasons for these 
changes to each of the four subjective factors are discussed in section 6.5. Finally, 
section 6.6 summarises the findings of the chapter. 
1 These shifts will be compared to changes in policy preferences in Chapter 8. 
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6.2 Q METHODOLOGYAND THE ANALYSIS OF 
DISCOURSE 
This section briefly describes Q methodology and its role in exploring 
subjectivity. This is followed by a description of the process used to obtain and 
analyse the Q data from the FNQCJ. The aim is to provide sufficient information to 
comprehend the analysis both in the remainder of this chapter and those that follow.2 
6 .2.1 Q methodology as the search for subjective species 
The discursive preference model outlined in Chapter 23 considered the role of 
subjectivity in the formation of policy preferences. These manifest as discourses within 
the discursive sphere, which in tum reflect particular subjective groupings that can be 
observed among a population sample.4 Although I am interested in these groupings, I 
have argued strongly against predefining them. Rather, the approach here is to 
'discover' them by exploration of the data. To this end, in Chapter 2 I considered the 
potential use of Q methodology. 5 
An important strength of Q analysis for the purposes here is that it is driven by 
operant subjectivity, which the observer must seek to understand. This contrasts with 
the observer imposing a priori associations between variables and then seeking to 
explore strength of these using statistical methods, which is the domain of so-called 'R' 
methodology.6 To use an analogy I briefly employed in Chapter 27 I am in a sense 
surveying the discursive sphere to discover subjective factors (or 'species') that embody 
the various discourses8 that give rise to different kinds of policy preferences. 
2 For a more thoroughgoing description of Q methodology, see Brown (1993). Dryzek (1990, ch.9) 
gives a concise argument for using Q methodology in political science. The definitive modem volume 
is Brown (1980), which is the major source informing the use of Q methodology herein. One of the 
original sources on Q methodology is Stephenson (1953). 
3 Section 2.5.4. 
4 See section 2.5.2(a) in Chapter 2. 
5 Section 2.6.2. 
6 In describing a particular species, the observer does not measure correlates between characteristics of 
randomly selected plants that may or may not belong to the same species, but groupings of individuals 
that appear similar. She then explores and describes those characteristics that are common to that 
species. 
7See discussion on page 39. 
8 Or 'concourse', to employ the language of Q (Stephenson, 1953). 
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(a) The Application of Q Methodology in this Research: Objectives and Points of 
Clarification 
Before proceeding with a description of Q methodology, I should first clear up 
some points relating to the way it is used in this research. Firstly, although I have 
stressed that I do not wish to pre-define any subjective types, there is an important 
assumption driving the analysis of subjectivity. This follows the discursive preference 
model outlined in Chapter 2, which posits that there is a relationship between 
subjectivity and policy preferences such that similar preference types will cluster 
together with similar subjective types. This does not mean that I assume that 
preference-subjectivity is the only relationship to be discovered. The factors that result 
from the analysis will be but one type of codification, for which many variations exist.9 
There is another point I should clear up. Contrary to what the ecology analogue 
discussed in Chapter 2 might suggest, 10 individuals do not represent subjective factors 
(or discourses) per se. Rather, they are loci of discursive interaction within a broader 
communicative 'landscape '.11 The subjective factors discussed in this chapter represent 
ideals or 'archetypes' that have been elucidated from the Q sorts of deliberators. Thus, 
when I refer individuals as corresponding to a subjective factor I do not wish to imply 
that their subjectivity is defined by that factor. Individual subjectivity is surely far more 
complex than could possibly be represented by a small number of factors. Rather, I am 
simply referring to the extent to which they agree with the discourse associated with 
that factor. 
The final point pertains to the way in which Q method is applied here. That is, 
for a dynamic analysis of subjectivity. Consequently, I will not merely be surveying the 
extent to which individuals concur with subjective factors (and their relationship with 
preferences). Of primary focus is the transformation of subjectivity, or specifically: 
9 Brown (1980, p.34) draws a comparison between Q methodology and Weber's ideal type (1947) as 'an 
abstraction, a new understanding of social reality reached by the observer and based on a raw data base 
(the ordering ofQ statements] composed of the conceptions of persons being observed'. 
'
0 That exploring the discursive terrain is not unlike exploring ecological terrain to discover the resident 
species. See section 2.5, particularly page 49. 
11 Perhaps in this sense individuals might be better thought of as local 'ecosystems' in which subjective 
species interact. 
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1) the change in the discursive landscape due to deliberation; 
2) the change in policy preferences; and 
3) the change in the relationships between subjectivity and preferences. 
The latter two objectives will be achieved in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 
respectively. In this chapter I am exclusively concerned with the first task, to observe 
and analyse the transformation of subjectivity during the deliberative process. In the 
following discussion, I will outline the process whereby this will be achieved. 
6.2.2 Sampling and Q Methodology 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a feature of this study, shared with all those under 
the Q banner, is that the intensive nature of the research. 12 In short, this requires small 
nun1bers of individuals, which as discussed in Chapter 313 is also necessary to achieve 
ideal deliberative conditions. Most ' conventional' methodologists - often referred to 
as 'R methodologist' in Q because of the tendency to correlate traits rather than 
individuals - would consider this a major weakness. 
Although small sample sizes are often anathema to R studies, Q methodology is 
able to use them produce meaningful, externally valid and resilient fmdings. 14 This is 
because the discovery of 'subjective species' in the discursive terrain can be done more 
effectively among a small group. Once the sample size reaches a particular threshold the 
'marginal benefit', or probability of finding a new subjective type decreases 
dramatically. Additional subjects produce little new information. The 
'representativeness' of Q studies using small numbers of individuals can be explained by 
again invoking the ecology analogue. When ecologists survey a particular area to 
identify resident species, rather than investigate the entire area only a small number of 
select sites are selected. The reason for this is that the probability of finding a new 
12 See section 2.6.1 in Chapter 2 (page 58) 
13 Section 3.5. 
14 Where the discursive landscape has not changed, the same Q sort, using similar processes of 
judgmental rotation but applied to different samples very often reveal similar results (for example 
Lipgar et al., 2000). 
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species decreases exponentially with each subsequent sample. This is known in ecology 
as the ' area-species curve' (Ricklefs, 1990, pp.721-726). 15 
(a) The Development of Q Statements 
The most important consideration for sampling using Q methodology concerns 
not numbers of individuals, but the selection of statements to be used in the Q sort. In 
the following, I will briefly discuss the nature of the task. More detailed accounts of the 
process can be found in Appendix 5. 
To use the words of Brown (1980, p.186) the process selecting statements for a 
Q sort is more an 'art' than a science - although this probably understates the 
systematic nature of the task. Nonetheless, it does involve negotiating the potentially 
immense complexity of the concourse under study, but there are useful principles that 
guide the process. The main guiding principle for statement selection concerns the 
systematic selection of a representative sample of statements based on Fishers' (1960, 
p.17-21) principle of randomisation.16 To this end, Q methodologists tend to use block 
or ' factorial' designs (see Brown, 1970). In short, the approach involves establishing 
the major categories relevant to the phenomenon being surveyed and allocating 
statements among them. The statements can be devised a number of ways. What is 
most important is that they grounded in the actual discourse pertaining to the subject at 
hand (for example Brown, 1993, p.95). 
The block design used to develop the Q sort used here is discussed in detail in 
Table A5-2 in Appendix 5. In short, nine 'discursive' categories were used. These were 
intended to cover as far as possible the major types of discourses pertaining to the 
Bloomfield Track issue. The statements themselves were developed from the analysis 
of the Bloomfield Track case study in Chapter 4. However, the theoretical dimension of 
this research has also meant that the selection of statements was also driven by 
15 The analogy may to some degree serve to reconcile, rather than highlight differences between Q and R 
methodologists. Indeed, the approach to ecological surveying described above is in fact a type of R 
study with a particular sampling regime that involves intensive sampling within a given transect, rather 
than a less detailed sampling of a larger area. As is the case for transect sampling for species, Q 
methodology intensively samples small numbers of individuals with a comparatively large number of 
statements (Brown, 1993). The most important condition is that each sample is intensively explored 
so that nothing is missed. Thus, sample size is secondary to the choice of statements to ensure a good 
representation of all aspects of subjectivity from which factors are extracted. 
16 Cited in Brown (1 980, p.61). 
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theoretical criteria. Specifically, the criterion is the discursive preference construction 
hypothesis of relationships between subjective types into policy preferences. Again, a 
detailed account of the approach can be found in Appendix 5.17 From the process, 42 
statements were selected covering an array of thematic areas concerning the Bloomfield 
Track issue. 18 
6.2.3 Analysis of Q sorts and its Application to the FNQCJ Data 
Turning attention from design to analysis, the basic process of obtaining and 
analysing the Q data for the FNQCJ can be described as four separate steps. These are: 
Step l: 
Step 2: 
Step 3: 
Step 4: 
obtaining Q sorts from each deliberator at three stages of the 
deliberative process; 
extracting factors from the raw data; 
applying judgmental rotation to the initial factors; and 
interpreting and describing the resulting factors. 
Each of these steps is depicted in Figure 6-1. Step 1 resulted in three 'sorts' 
provided by each of 12 deliberators at different stages of the deliberative process. The 
resulting Q sorts are represented as the inverted pyramids in Figure 6-1. The top row of 
a 'Q sort' represents the score that is allocated to a statement under that category. 
Step 2, the extraction of subjective factors, is depicted in Figure 6-1 as clusters 
of deliberators with similar Q sorts. Step 3 Uudgmental rotation) involves plotting 
deliberators according to their affinities with the factors and rotating the axes to 
maximise substantive differences. The final step of factor interpretation (Step 4) 
involves translating the results into factor scores. These comprise and array of scores 
for the Q statements typical for that factor. 
17 Section A.5.1. These statements are listed in Table AS-3 on page 383. 
18 These are listed in on page 24. 
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Figure 6-1 The Application of Q methodology to the FNQCJ 
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Each of these above four steps is described in turn in the following discussion. 
6.2.4 Step 1: Q Sorting 
The actual process of Q sorting entailed deliberators sorting 42 cards, each 
containing a single statement. A description of how the Q statements are 'sorted' can be 
found in A.5.2 of Appendix 5. In short, the statements were sorted by deliberators into 
nine categories from '-4' (most disagree) to '4 ' (most agree). Each category was 
subjected to a quota, which was set across all categories to approximate a normal 
distribution; 19 an approach referred to in Q methodology as a ' forced' distribution.20 
The shape of the resulting Q sorts from FNQCJ deliberators approximates the 
shape of those shown in the first step of Figure 6-1 , though deliberators were given 
freedom to depart from the distribution where necessary. The resulting Q sorts for all 
deliberators are reproduced in Appendix 5.21 
19 The quotas were {3, 4, 5, 6, 6, 6, 5, 4, 3} for the scores {-4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4} respectively. 
20 See A.5.2 of Appendix 5. 
21 See Table A5-4 on page 388. 
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Deliberators were asked to perform Q sorts at the three different stages of the 
FNQCJ outlined in Chapter 522, using the same set of statements each time. To restate, 
these stages correspond with the three deliberative stages. They are: 
• Stage 1: Pre-deliberation: 
• Stage 2: Mid-deliberation: 
•Stage 3: Post-deliberation: 
immediately before the start of the FNQCJ; 
at the end of day three, immediately following the 
conclusion of all witness presentations; and 
immediately after the conclusion of the FNQCJ 
on day four. 
In short, by taking these three subjective snapshots it is hoped to account for the 
subjective dynamics of deliberators, through the transformation of the results into 
factors, as far as they relate to changes to preferences. 
6.2.5 Step 2: Factor Extraction from the Subjectivity Data 
The next step in Q analysis, represented in Step 2 of Figure 6-1, involves the 
extraction of the initial factors. In the following discussion I will outline this process, 
beginning with a brief description of what constitutes a subjective factor. This is 
followed by an account of the process of factor extraction, including a justification of the 
particular approach adopted. 
(a} What is a factor? 
In Chapter 223 subjective factors were conceptually described as 'the 
codification of discourses' running through the Bloomfield Track issue. The idea of 
using Q methodology here is to extract various discourses to maximise the ability to 
account for changes in policy preference. 
In Q methodology the technical definition of a factor is simply the clustering of 
individuals who have ranked the statements in a similar fashion (Brown, 1980, p.6). 
These clusters are conceptually represented in Step 2 of Figure 6-1 as groupings of 
closely related Q sorts. In very rough terms, the factor is determined by choosing some 
point within these clusters using a specific algorithm - although as will be discussed 
below, the approaches used vary. 
22 Section 5.2. 
23 Section 2.6. 
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(b) The rationale for extracti.ng factors ftom the Q sorts ftom all three deliberative 
stages as a group 
Before discussing method of factor-extraction, another element to the analysis 
that needs to be addressed. This concerns that way in which the data sets for each 
deliberative stage are treated as part of a longitudinal analysis. Because there is not one, 
but three sets of data there are a number of possible ways in which factors could have 
been extracted. One approach is that adopted by Pelletier et al. (1999), who analysed 
the sets of data obtained at different deliberative phases as separate groups. A second 
approach analyses of all three groups of data together (for example Lipgar et al., 2000). 
Both of the above approaches were trialed, with the latter approach of grouping 
all three sets of data adopted. This is not least because separately analysing the three 
sets of Q sorts provided little additional insight - a finding that is consistent with the 
discussion in section 6.2.2 above. 
(c) The Process of Factor Extraction 
The second consideration for the extraction of subjective factors concerns the 
method of factor extraction. As is the case for most Q studies, I have adopted the 
centroid method. Because of its indeterminate results, this approach is no longer used in 
mainstream factor analysis (Brown, 1980, p.33). However, the analysis of subjective 
data does not require detenninacy, but explanatory power. 
In this case, the explanatory power sought is the ability to account for changes 
to policy preferences. This is achieved is via a process of judgmental rotation, which 
will be described shortly. The centroid method is adopted, not because it provides the 
determinate results, but because it lends itself best to judgmental rotation, which 
increases scope for explaining the subjectivity underlying particular policy preferences. 
The process of extracting the initial factors for the grouped Q sorts using the 
centroid method was performed using the statistical package MQ Method (2.06). The 
first stage of factor extraction entailed correlating all 12 sorts at three deliberative stages 
(12x3 = 36 sorts in total) with one another to produce a 36x36-correlation matrix. In 
essence, the process involved plotting all the 36 sorts in 42 dimensional space (the 
number of statements in the Q sort) and examining groups of closely correlated sorts 
using a statistical algorithm specific to the centroid method. 
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Step 2 in Figure 6-1 illustrates this process, though only in two dimensions. The 
resulting factors represent modal points within each cluster. Individuals are ' loaded' on 
that factor depending on how near or far they are from that centre point, reflecting the 
extent to which they 'agree or disagree' with the archetypal position. These factors 
now provide the raw ingredients needed to extract the final factors that can be used to 
account for changes to preferences using a process of judgmental rotation. 
6.2.6 Step 3: Judgmental Rotation 
In Q method, analysis does not usually end with the extraction of the initial 
factors. Rather, these simply provide the raw materials from which the researcher 
extracts new factors that help to understand subjectivity from a particular perspective. 
The process is referred to as judgmental rotation. I will now briefly describe the 
rationale of judgmental rotation and its use in analysing the subjective data. A 
description of judgmental rotation can also be found in Brown (1993). 
Judgmental rotation is grounded in the use of theoretical, rather than statistical 
criteria, to gain insights into relationships based on the perspective that the researcher 
adopts to examine the data (Brown, 1980, pp.33, 226-31 ). This is not to suggest that 
the process involves 'making up' results to suit a particular hypothesis, as results 
cannot be extracted that do not already exist in the data (Brown, 1980). Rather, the 
process effectively entails the observer moving around the data to observe it from the 
best position for the task at hand, which in this case concerned the ability to account for 
differences in preferences. The approach concurs with a fact well known in physics 
that results are contingent upon the observers' vantagepoint.24 
Judgmental rotation of the FNQCJ subjective data involved identifying patterns 
among deliberator's preferences. These were then compared to the initially extracted 
factors (from Step 2). Where possible these factors were manipulated (rotated) so that 
they reflected, as far as possible, the various types of preference outputs. To this end, 
24 See for example Stephenson ( 1983). To use the example of Brown (1980, p.226), different theoretical 
perspectives applied to the same electoral results (Marxist, psychoanalytic, etc.) will yield different, but 
no less valid results. These results are no less valid than those that claim to hail from positive accounts 
of social or natural phenomena. However, their validity is intrinsically tied to parameters of 
experimental observation, and assertions must be sensitive to this. In the case of the analysis of the 
FNQCJ subjective data, these parameters are set to maximise the power of the resulting subjective 
factors in explaining differences among and changes to preferences. 
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those groups of deliberators with similar preference rankings were manipulated in 2-
dimensional space defined by the factor axes of pre-existing subjective factors. The axes 
were rotated to place preference types along the factor axes. 
To illustrate, the graph in Step 3 of Figure 6-1 depicts an idealised scenano 
involving two groups with similar preference positions. These groups cluster together 
within the plane defined by the two factors initially extracted in Step 2. Although these 
preference types are neatly grouped within this plane, the factors as they stand do not 
maximise the ability to describe the subjective positions that distinguish these 
preference types. This can be better achieved by rotating the axes so that the axes of the 
new factors bisect these groups. The dashed axes in the figure represent these new 
factors. 
The representation of judgmental rotation in Step 3 of Figure 6-1 has been 
idealised to assist with the explanation of the process. In reality, deliberators did not 
fall so neatly into tightly formed groups according to preferences. However, definite 
trends could be detected, particularly with respect to differences between pre and post-
deliberative preferences and particular groups of deliberators. These differences were 
most clearly elucidated in respect to post-deliberative preferences, which is to be 
expected. 
Rotation of the data was performed a number of times using different pairs of 
subjective factors until the major differences among preferences were reflected in the 
resulting factors. Four subjective factors resulted. The factors should provide a better 
account (compared to unrotated factors) of the subjectivity of those deliberators with 
particular types of preference ranking for policy options for the Bloomfield Track. 
However, they are meaningless unless properly interpreted and described using a 
process of factor interpretation and description. I will now tum to the description of 
this task. 
6.2.7 Factor Description 
The raw outcomes from the process of judgmental rotation just discussed are 
factor scores and factor loadings. Factor scores consist of an array of typical scores for 
- 165-
each statement for a factor, which must be evaluated and described to make sense of it.25 
Factor loadings reflect individual affiliation with these factors - or in the aggregate 
sense, the abundance of that discourse within the discursive sphere. 
These outputs provide the basic tools for factor descriptions, but more 
information is used to perform properly the task. Indeed, to appreciate fully the factors 
and the subjective dynamics a more rounded picture of what each subjective factor 
represents in required. To this end, factor descriptions will be supported by qualitative 
observations, particularly those in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
In the following discussion, the main elements of factor description are briefly 
described. This begins with a more descriptive account of factor scores and factor 
loadings. The process whereby factor descriptions have been developed is then 
discussed. 
(a) Factor Scores 
As outlined above, the basic output of factor analysis and judgemental rotation is 
an assemblage of scores for each of the 42 individual statements that comprise the Q 
sort. These are known as factor scores, which are depicted in step 4 in Figure 6-1. 26 
By definition, these scores reflect the archetypal response to a statement for a factor. 
The factor scores used for factor description can be found in Table 6-1 (page 
169). For example, factor 4, Propitiatism, yielded a very low score for statement 32. 
This implies that individuals loaded on this factor (Propitiatists) believe that the 
Bloomfield Track does not affect inshore coral reefs. Thus, in turn it can be expected 
that individuals significantly loaded on Propitiatism will tend to concur with the view, 
reflected by their responses to statement 32. 
25 The array of factor scores for the four factors can be found in Figure 6-2 on page 169. These will be 
discussed in the next section. 
26 The process for deriving factor scores involves the use of a composite of individual factor loadings and 
the rank for that statement of those individuals significantly loaded on the factor. See Brown (1980) 
for a description of the process of deriving factor scores. The factor scores for the four Q factors 
extracted from the FNQCJ data were calculated by MQ Analysis. 
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(b) Factor Loadings 
Individual concordance with a particular factor is measured by factor loadings 
(see Step 4 in Figure 6-1). These are essentially measures of correlation between an 
individual's Q sort and the archetype for that factor. 
Put another way, factor loadings (with values between -1 and 1) indicate the 
level to which the subjectivity of individuals resemble a particular subjective archetype. 
This is much the same way as members of an animal or plant species tend to resemble to 
a phenotype. A factor loading of 'l' denotes perfect concordance with a factor, the 
individual having exactly the same Q sort as the archetypal representative of that factor. 
A negative loading indicates disagreement with that factor, with factor loading '-1' 
denoting perfect disagreement. Values close to zero indicate that there is no significant 
relationship, or that the factor does not help to describe that individual's subjectivity. 
In other words, the subjectivity of the individual cannot be said to correspond with that 
of that particular factor. 
(c) Interpretation and Description 
Factor interpretation involves building a coherent description capturing the 
salient features of a factor. For example, a factor may be summarised with a few words, 
or title, such as 'Preservation'. However, although descriptive these terms are loaded 
with particular meanings in different contexts. Therefore, it is important to focus not 
just on the factor labels, but on the factor description as a whole to which these labels 
should then come to be associated. 
The above discussion about the relationship between Propitiatism and beliefs 
about damage to coral reefs constitutes part of the task of factor interpretation. The 
primary aim of interpretation is to provide a reasonable insight into subjectivity 
associated with that factor. A guiding principle provided by Brown (1993, p.33) is as 
follows: 
Just as each Q sort portrays a version of the world 'as I see it,' so does each factor represent a 
version of the world that is commonly held and which speaks to us through the unison of the 
factor scores, and factor interpretations cannot stray far from the factors of which they are 
interpretations if they aspire to descriptive accuracy. 
In Q studies, factor interpretation and description tend not to follow strict 
algorithms. Rather, the details vary according to what the investigator is trying to 
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accomplish (Brown, 1980, p.347). However, all share general features. These are the 
interpretation of raw factor scores into a dialogue describing operant subjectivity.27 
The process primarily draws on factor scores as the raw materials, but often 
incorporates a wider array of information, such as follow-up in-depth interviews 
(Brown, 1980, pp.23-4). This is also the case here, where additional information 
included observations of actual discourses reported in the previous chapter in addition 
to responses to open-ended surveys filled out by deliberators at the end of the 
deliberative process.28 Follow-up interviews were conducted with individual jurors 
where the results of the Q analysis raised questions that needed clarification. 29 In 
addition, background material pertaining to the Bloomfield Track issue is incorporated 
into the descriptions to help ground the factor in the issue and its context (political, 
historical, economic, cultural etc.). 
An important consideration in interpretation of factors is the selection of the 
statements that will form the basis of the factor description. Often, statements are 
preferentially selected based on factor scores that are significantly different from other 
factors - that is, are distinguishing statements (Brown, 1993, p.31).30 However, 
simply using distinguishing statements may miss a good part of the story. For example, 
two factors may share a similar factor score for a statement, which are significantly 
different from the remaining two factors. Thus, while the statement may not be useful 
for distinguishing one factor from the rest, by differentiating between groups of factors 
it can still play an important role in exploring the contours of subjectivity. 
In a different approach to factor description, Pelletier et al (l 999, p.108) 
included the ten statements with the highest scores as well as the ten lowest. However, 
as for the fust approach discussed above, this approach may also be excessively 
arbitrary, leading to exclusion of otherwise important descriptive elements. For 
27 Q methodologists often describe factors that result from the approach as operant subjectivity because 
they result from observation of subjectivity rather than intrinsic to the method of measurement. See 
for example Stephenson (1977) 
28 The results of which are reported in Appendix 2. 
29 These interviews were conducted over the phone in the period following the FNQCJ. Of the twelve 
deliberators only a small number of jurors were interviewed. Other information relevant to the 
interpretation of factors was gathered during discussions with deliberators who participated in a 
meeting six months following the FNQCJ, as described in section 9.5. l(b) of Chapter 9 (page 285). 
30 A statement distinguishes a factor if that factor's score is significantly different to those of the other 
factors. 
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example, one factor may yield a score of zero for a statement where the others score 
highly. Such cases may be significant and worthy of exploration. 
The approach adopted for describing the four subjective factors extracted from 
the FNQCJ subjective data did not follow a strict algorithm. Rather, heuristic strategy 
was adopted. It began with distinguishing statements for each factor. The resulting 
factor descriptions were then crosschecked with the qualitative data to check 
consistency. Where necessary, other statements were selected that help to identify 
similarities and differences between factors. The process was repeated a number of 
times and the results checked at each stage. The result of this process of factor 
interpretation is the set of factor descriptions reported in the following section. 
6.3 Q FACTORS: FOUR SUBJECTIVE TYPES IN THE 
DISCURSIVE SPHERE 
This section describes the four factors that were extracted from the Q analysis 
described in the preceding section. It begins with an overview of the factors, describing 
each in broad terms, followed by a more detailed description of each factor. 
6.3.l Overview of the Subjective Factors 
The four factors extracted using Q analysis are labelled Preservation, 
Pragmatism, Optimism and Propitiatism. The factor scores, the raw materials from 
which factor descriptions are built according to the process outlined in the previous 
section and shown in Table 6-1. Statements that are said to distinguish a factor are 
those for which the factor score is significantly different from all the factor scores for 
the others. These distinguishing statements highlighted using shading. 
Figure 6-2 summarises the major features of the four factors. The figure consists 
of a Venn diagram depicting the factors within four overlapping spheres. The size of 
each sphere reflects the average size of the factor throughout the deliberative process -
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expressed as the percentage of variation among Q sorts it explains (%var).31 The factor 
size at each deliberative stage is provided in the brackets below the factor heading. 
It can be seen from Figure 6-2 that the four subjective factors are not distinct; 
there is some overlap between them. 32 The level of overlap varies. Preservation and 
Propitiatism, are strongly related (64% overlap). The smallest level of overlap is that 
between Pragmatism and Optimism (38%). 
Also provided in Figure 6-2 is a brief description summarising the most 
important features of a factor. Statements (with numbers shown in brackets) that are 
relevant to each factor are shown. Where statements reflect two or more factors, they 
are located within the overlap between factor spheres. The statements in the centre of 
the diagram are common to all factors. To simplify the diagram, thematically similar 
statements that form a common theme are grouped together and paraphrased. 
31 The actual size of the factor is represented by an eigenvalue, which are shown in the bottom row of. 
Table 6-1. Eigenvalues are equivalent to the sum of the squares of individual's loading on that factor. 
The eigenvalue is related to the amount of variance among the Q sorts of deliberators that a particular 
factor accounts for. (Brown, 1980, p.40f). However, for descriptive purposes, a better measure of 
factor size/abundance is the level of variation explained by a factor in percentage terms. The level of 
variance explained by a factor is simply found by dividing the eigenvalue by the number of sorts 
(deliberators). 
32 The technical term for distinct or uncorrelated factors is orthogonality, as opposed to oblique or related 
factors. See Burt (1940, pp.265-6), Brown (1980, p.163). There are similarities between the factors 
does not mean that they are not useful in describing differences in subjectivity. It is useful to 
highlight these similarities, not least because it is possible to use the description of one to contrast 
with another, thereby leading to a better understanding of both. 
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Table 1-1 Factor Scores 
Factor Score 
No. Statement PRES PRAG OPT PROP 
l Laying bitumen on the Bloomfield Track would be beneficial for the environment. It may even -2 -3 1 1 
help reduce fuel usage and the greenhouse effect. 
• 
2 I don't know tf Improving the Bloomfield Track would lead to a rapid acceleration of 0 2 0 
development In the area to the detriment of the environment. 
3 In deciding on what to do with the Bloomfield Track I don't know whether lt"s more -2 -2 2 0 
Important to meet the needs of the community or the environmen t. 
4 Whilst impacts on locals in the Bloomfield area are a concern, it ls the broader community that 2 3 3 
should carry m ore weight when deciding what to do with the Bloomfield Track. 
• 
5 I don"t know what the people of Bloomfield think about the Bloomfield Track. 2 2 
6 T he road ls just the 'thin edge of the wedge'. Further improvement of the road will lead to 3 3 -2 2 
more development in the area resulting in environmental damage. This may not happen for a 
long tim e, but it will happen. 
7 Erosion from the Bloomfield Track is permanently damaging the coral reefs that fringe the -2 -2 3 
beaches below. 
8 When it comes to the Bloomfield track, people living in Cairns are in no position to judge -1 0 2 -1 
what the interests of the local residents of Bloomfield are. 
9 If the Bloomfield Track is sealed (bitumenized) there will not be a rapid increase in -4 -1 -1 -1 
environmentally damaging development in the Oaintree area In the future. It may even benefit 
the environment there. 
-
10 No development should be permitted In World Heritage areas such as the Oalntree. 3 4 
11 I would be worse off if more of the O aintree rainforest is protected. -3 -2 -1 -1 
12 The Bloomfield Track issue is important for Queensland. 2 2 0 -1 
13 I'm not sure if the future of the Bloomfleld Track should be determined by locals, outsiders or -1 -1 1 -1 
both. 
14 The fate of the Bloomfield Track ls of no concern to me. -3 -4 -2 -3 
15 Economic development associated with the Bloomfield Track wlll provide more opportunities 
for future generations in North Queensland. 
-1 -1 0 
16 The future of the Bloomfield Track should be determined by everyone and not just by those 
who live in the Bloomfield area. 
3 3 2 
17 I don't know how, but I think that there must be some way in which everybody benefits from 2 0 4 
protecting the rainforest near the Bloomfield Track. 
18 The Bloomfield Track is important because it allows quick access to remote areas of the N orth. 0 0 2 2 
19 Conservation in the Dalntree area is worthwhile at whatever cost. 4 -3 2 4 
20 Using cars on the Bloomfield Track is bad for the rainforest. 2 -1 0 -1 
21 Any decision about the Bloomfield Track will greatly affect people like me. -2 0 2 
22 I have no idea what the people in the Bloomfield area think about the Bloomfield Track. -1 
Continued over 
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Table 1-1 Factor Scores(continued) 
No. Statement PRES PRAG O PT PROP 
23 Erosion from the Bloomfield Track does not cause siltation or damage to the fringing inshore 
reefs between Cape Tribulation and Cooktown 
-1 0 -1 -2 
24 If we don 't take steps to protect the Daintree Rainforest future generations will miss out on the 4 3 4 4 
opportunity to experience the area as we do now. 
25 We don 't need to worry too much about environmental damage in the Daintree region because 
-3 -4 -4 -4 
future generations will be better able to deal with these problems than we are. 
26 There is no reason to believe that the the Daintree Rainforest is under threat. 
-4 0 -3 -4 
27 If future generations could have their say about the Bloomfield track, they would be less 
-2 -1 -3 -3 
concerned about the environmental impacts than many people make out. 
28 The protection of plants and animals in the D alntree is OK so long as it doesn't affect me. 
-2 -4 -3 -3 
29 Let's fix the problems in the Daintree just for now. The future will take care of itself. 
-4 -3 -4 -2 
30 The more that it is possible for the average North Q ueensland resident can access the 
-2 -2 -2 -1 
Bloomfield Track the better 
31 I don't like how development Is creeping further and further N orth into the D aintree and 2 0 0 
beyond because of its effect on the environment. 
• 
32 The coral reefs along the foreshore below the Bloomfield Track are not badly affected by the 0 2 
road. 
33 N ative animals in the Daintree need protection because they have a right to life which cannot 3 2 3 
be traded against economic considerations. 
34 The Wujal Wuj al Community is better off now that the Bloomfield Track has been built. 4 0 2 
35 The most Important use of the Bloomfield Track Is for tourism. -3 -1 
36 I'm concerned that I will be made worse off by any decision about the Bloomfield Track. 0 -1 -1 -2 
37 I think that both short and long term perspectives are needed In deciding what should be done 
• 
3 3 3 
with the Bloomfield T rack, but I don't know which one is m ore important. 
38 The Bloomfield Track may not have been the best idea, but I guess there is probably little point -1 4 -2 2 
in closing it now that it has been built. 
• 
39 I don't really know who benefits most from the protection of Rainforest in the Daintree. 0 
40 A long term perspective on the Bloomfield Track is essential. 4 4 
41 When it comes to the Bloomfield Track, it 's not important to worry about what the future will -1 2 -4 
hold. We need to worry about now. 
42 Everyone in Q ueensland is better off for having a road like the Bloomfield Track. 0 -3 -2 
Ei~envalues 14.12 4.63 2.62 
• = p < 0.05 
-
= p < 0.05 
Significant difference between factor scores for a statement is calculated using the standard error of 
difference (SED) where SED,_, • ~se; + sE: , where x and y are the respective factor scores for a statement 
for the two factors being compared. The standard error for is calculated by SEO • s ~, where r zx is I• A~1 - ,p. 
the reliability coefficient for a factor and s, is the standard deviation of the forced distribution of the Q 
sort. For details, see Brown (1980). 
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Figure 6-2 Diagrammatic representation of factors 
Preservation~~~~~~"'~~~ 50% &».,~ ~~~~'%~~"W Pragmatism 
The BT contributes to development and long-term Decisions about the BT need to be based on firm 
environmental damage. evidence. Although the environment is important, 
so is the right decision. 
%var= 39 (pre, mid, post= 38, 39, 41) %var= 13 (pre, mid, post= 11, 12, 15) 
Upgrading the BT will lead to 
increased levels of development 
which will damage the area (2,9) 
Car use on the BT is 
damaging to the 
ranforest (20) 
Need to worry about the 
longer term 
consequences (37) 
The BT is the 'thin end of the 
wedge' and will lead to more 
environmentally damaging 
development (6) 
Bitumenising the BT 
will damage the 
environment ( 1) 
Development should not 
be permitted in the 
Daintree (10, 31) 
Would be better (or not 
worse) off if the Daintree is 
protected (11 , 14) 
BT is an important issue (12) 
There is little point in 
closing the BT now it is 
there (38) 
A long-term perspective is not 
necessarily essential, present 
consequences are more important 
than future ones (40, 41) 
The BT may not have been a 
good idea, but now that it's 
there it my as well stay.(38) 
The BT does not necessarily 
damage the reef (32) 
The Track is mainly used for 
tourism (35) 
The BT issue 
should be 
determined by 
everyone and not 
just locals (16) 
Conservation of the Daintree 
Id be sensitive to cost (19) 
currently 
damaged 
BT (7,3 
The is no rong evidence that 
who the winners 
and losers of 
protection of the 
Daintree (3,39) 
We must protect the Daintree of 
future generations will not be able 
to experience it as we do. (24) 
the Dain is under threat 
6) 
TheWujal 
Wujal 
community seems 
ere is little point 
n closing the BT 
ow it is there (38) 
Conservation is 
worthwhile at 
any cost ( 19) 
Long-term perspective and 
concern for future consequences 
of decisions (29, 40, 41) 
better off with the BT 
(34) 
The Daintree is under threat (26) 
The BT issue requires broader 
community decision than just 
Concerned 
about local 
benefits(5) 
Coral reefs are n 
being damaged by 
the BT (7) 
directly affected parties ( 4) 
The BT is important 
for community 
access, not tourism 
(1 8, 2, 30, 35) 
Not sure if community or 
environment is more 
important in deciding the 
future of the BT (3) 
Some development in e 
Daintree ma e 
acceptable ( ) 
The BT does not have t 
inevitably prove detrimental 
Outsiders cannot judge 
local interests (8, 13) 
There must be some way in which everybody 
benefits from protection of the 
Daintree (17) 
P ropitiatism ~~~~~~~~~~"$~ 56% ~~~~~~~~,~~~~optimism 
The issue is fraught with tensions between local needs Environment and development Oncluding the Bn can 
and environmental protection with serious consequences prove a 'win-win', given the right decisions that 
that must be resolved at all costs. respect local needs and environmental protection. 
%var= 5 (pre, mid, post= 10, 2, 2) %var= 7 (pre, mid, post= 10, 8, 4) 
Crapt.er6 Secfun 6.3: Q F actois: Four Subjec!M Tyre; in tre DID.lrsi\e Spm-e 
It can be seen from both Table 6-1 and Figure 6-2 that all factors share (at least a 
nominal) concern for future generations. All, except Pragmatism also share a belief that 
the Daintree region is under threat and that finding a solution requires broad community 
participation. Beyond these core values and beliefs, the differences between the factors 
become more pronounced, but there still remain important similarities. It is possible to 
characterise the four factors as groupings in both horizontal and vertical directions in 
Figure 6-2. 
The clearest distinction can be found when moving from the left of the figure 
(Preservation/Propitiatism) to right (Pragmatism/Optimism). This represents a 
transition from ecocentrism, or a high degree of environmental concern, to a more 
anthropocentric, or utilitarian disposition. A less clear, yet still discernible transition 
can be seen moving from the top to bottom of Figure 6-2. The upper two factors 
(Preservation/Pragmatism) tend to be associated with emphasis on low levels of access, 
and concern about increased levels of development in the Daintree region. They are also 
less focussed on issues associated with the local Bloomfield community. By contrast, 
the lower factors (Propitiatism/Optimism) are fairly parochial, emphasising community 
and the benefits thereto of local development. For this reason, and others that will 
become apparent during the factor descriptions, these last two factors are referred to as 
the 'localised factors'. 
Figure 6-2 also depicts a good deal of variation among the four subjective factors 
in terms of size (or abundance). By far the biggest factor overall is Preservation (38%). 
This is followed by Pragmatism (13%), Optimism (7%) and Propitiatism (5%). 
However, between during the deliberative process abundance varies substantially, 
particularly in the case of Propitiatism, which has declined from 10% to 2%. These 
changes to the subjective factors will be discussed in detail in section 6.4. An immediate 
task is that of factor description. 
6 .3.2 Factor Descriptions 
The following four sections describe each factor in detail, beginning with 
Preservation and followed by Pragmatism, Optimism and Propitiatism. As is usual for 
factor description in Q methodology, Q statements and factor scores drive much of the 
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discussion. Rather than restate individual statements in the text they are simply referred 
to by statement number (often in brackets), which the reader can use to refer to Table 
6-1. 
(a) Factor 1: Preservation 
In brief, Preservationists are anti-development, pro-preservation and feel they 
have a strong personal (if indirect) interest in protection of the area. 1 The Preservation 
factor is dominated by responses to the Q statements indicating a high level of sentiment 
against development in the Daintree Region. Preservationists share a perception that the 
Bloomfield Track is, and will continue to be a contributing factor to this development. 
This perception is part of a long-term perspective of the issue, that treats the problem 
in terms of a broad, interconnected suite of regional issues of which the Bloomfield is 
but one, although a very important component. 
One of the strongest themes of the factor is that Preservationists feel a strong 
personal commitment to protection of the Daintree area. They tend to feel that they 
would be personally better off (or at least no worse off) with the protection of the area, 
as indicated by responses to statement 11. 
Statements with high scores for the Preservation factor also tended to reflect an 
anti-development sentiment within the Daintree region (such as responses to statement 
numbers 10 and 32). There is also a perception that the Bloomfield Track is a 
contributing factor to future development (statement 2), thereby contributing to further 
environmental damage. Related to this is the concern that the use of vehicles on the 
Bloomfield Track is detrimental to both rainforest (statement 21) and, to a lesser extent, 
the reef (statement 7). The rationale for this attitude among deliberators loaded on this 
factor can be explained in three parts. First, although there is little direct scientific 
evidence concerning the impact of vehicle use along the Bloomfield Track, they felt that 
evidence from other case studies was sufficiently strong and transferable to the 
Bloomfield Track case.2 
1 I use the term ' they' in the abstract. That is, in relation to the archetype of a factor (see discussion on 
page 157), which only explains some part of any individuals' subjectivity, albeit often substantial, in 
relation to the formation of policy preferences. 
2 See Chapter 5. 
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Second, there appears to be a high level of environmental risk aversion among 
Preservationists - consistent with the 'precautionary principle' .3 During the 
deliberative process, those individuals who came to be strongly loaded on Preservation 
tended to emphasise the ecological importance of the area. In view of this, even if 
damage to reef and/or rainforest cannot be 'proved' by available scientific evidence, that 
such damage is even possible rendered any potential risk significant. Such risks were 
seen as significant enough to preclude the Bloomfield Track. This was most strongly 
reflected in discussions on the final day of the FNQCJ by Preservationists among the 
deliberators. 4 
A third, related, point concerned an increasing tendency during the process for 
Preservationists to emphasise the longer-term and indirect impacts associated with the 
Bloomfield Track.5 Preservationists stressed the importance of insidious risks, such as 
the accumulative impact of activities in the region progressively degrading its ecological 
values (also reflected in responses to statement 24).6 More spectacular risks, such as 
the immediate and complete destruction of reef and rainforest, were seen as evidently 
less likely and as such less important. 
The tendency of Preservationists to emphasise environmental risks has 
implications for their views on environmental management. Individuals loading highly 
on Preservation were sensitive to the political and institutional environment in which the 
Bloomfield Track is managed. They do not believe it would be possible to contain these 
issues, or even the development of the Bloomfield Track itself (reflected in responses to 
statement 38). 
Another facet of the issue stressed by Preservationists was the fair distribution 
of resources among and between generations. Their outlook tends to be longer-term and 
'bigger picture' . This is reflected in the tendency of Preservationists to de-emphasise 
3 The precautionary principle arising from the 'Rio Declaration' states that 'where there are threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation' (principle 15). 
4 As reported in section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5. 
5 For example, in the final survey Janine emphasised the prospect that the Bloomfield Track was 
interconnected with the issue of provision of mains power (see Appendix 2) 
6 This is reflected in the tendency of Preservationists to nominate the witness presentation of Peter 
Hitchcock, concerning World Heritage Values and regional impacts, as most influential. 
the impact of the Bloomfield Track on the Bloomfield community, instead preferring to 
view impacts in terms of the broader community (statements 4 and 13). 
(b) Factor 2: Pragmatism 
Pragmatists tend to focus mostly on present and, perhaps more importantly, 
known consequences when assessing the Bloomfield Track issue. They are least 
optimistic among the deliberators that a 'win-win' solution to competing claims about 
the issue can be found. Pragmatists are also less environmentally oriented than 
Preservationists are. However, they are not against preservation per se. They believe 
that development in the World Heritage Areas should be curtailed to protect the 
environment. 
In short, Pragmatists appear to be conservative, tending toward the status quo. 
This is not due to any particular ideological predisposition, such as a penchant for 
keeping things as they are, but a perception that changes should be supported by 
reasons. It is a kind of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it' rationale. 
Pragmatists were not fully convinced the Bloomfield Track was 'broke'. They 
felt there that there was no firm evidence supporting the contention that the Bloomfield 
Track contributes to environmental damage, both to the rainforest (statement 20), or 
inshore reefs (statements 32, 7 and 23). In view of this lack of evidence, Pragmatists 
tended to feel that there is not a strong enough case for the Bloomfield Track to be 
closed, given that it is already there and serves at least some purpose (statement 38). At 
its extreme, the logic of the Pragmatist is simply 'no evidence, therefore no damage'. 
There is a tendency for Pragmatists to want to 'have it both ways'. They did 
not see closure as justified, but neither did they want to see incremental attrition. To 
this end, they sought to preclude the upgrading of the Bloomfield Track (statement 9). 
However, they did not entirely subscribe to the 'thin edge of the wedge' argument, that 
creeping development associated with the Bloomfield Track would lead to 
environmental impact (statement 6). 
It would be unfair to attribute the conservatism of Pragmatists to lack of interest 
in environmental impacts - or that they are cognitive misers7, simply displacing the 
7 See section 2.3.3(c) of Chapter 2 (page 31). 
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burden of proof onto those whom might press for change. Pragmatists were very 
engaged with the Bloomfield Track issue and generally concerned about conservation of 
the region - loading highly on statements reflecting personal concern for the Daintree 
area (statements 14 and 28). They simply adopted a different perspective to the 
precautionary principle that guided Preservationists. Where there is evidence of 
environmental damage, Pragmatists tended to agree that action should be taken to 
address it - although any measure would still need to be balanced against its cost to the 
community (statement 19). 
There appears to be a genuine desire among Pragmatists to ensure that the 'right' 
decision is made - not the easy one. This caution contrasts with the desire of 
Preservationists to act immediately because of concern that the status quo cannot be 
maintained.8 There appears to be a belief that there is indeed a ' right' decision that can 
be found if there is only enough information at hand. That is, if new and decisive 
evidence of environmental damage emerged, Pragmatists would indeed favour a change in 
policy to protect the environment. For example, one deliberator, Aswad, was a strongly 
Pragmatist throughout the deliberative process and stated in the survey following 
deliberation that 
My opinion hasn't changed much as there were no specific damage that has been recorded. If, 
however, there was recorded damage I'm sure my opinion would be different. 
This ' rational' approach to policy making of Pragmatists appears in no small 
part related to attitudes to science, upon which they placed considerable weight. 
Indeed, Pragmatists expressed alarm at the paucity of scientific research conducted on 
the road. For example, one deliberator (Adventure) increased loading on the Pragmatism 
factor by virtue of ' lack of 'concrete' research to back up many of the claims made'.9 
To acquire more information, Pragmatists tended to turn to 'science', or more 
specifically, scientific method, as they understood it. 
Pragmatists tended to place much emphasis on the ability of scientific inquiry to 
produce answers with certainty on issues of environmental damage. This reflects a 
particular view of scientific method, rather than the reality of scientific outputs, which 
8 See description of Preservation above. A commonly used analogy is the 'boiling frog' . Frogs are 
insensitive to small changes in temperature such that it is possible for it to be boiled alive without 
realising. Preservationists might accuse Pragmatists of being just such a frog. 
9 See final survey, appendix 2, and particularly the responses of Adventure. 
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can raise more questions than answers (see Chalmers, 1982; Wynne, 1996). Among 
Pragmatists, science was considered as the definitive input into decisions, rather than a 
conservative and heuristic process that yields probabilistic outcomes.10 
Pragmatists appear anthropocentric in their views. If a trade-off between 
humans and nature must be made, then it should benefit the former. However, they are 
not convinced the issue has reached this point. Because damage to the Daintree area 
does not appear to be significant (statement 27), potential environmental impacts should 
be weighed against benefits that development (statement 20). 
However, they are not developmentalists per se, 11 in the sense of favouring 
commercial development. Neither are they 'anti-development' in the broader sense, 
favouring low scale developments such as an interpretive centre. 12 They are primarily 
pragmatic. They wish to know the 'facts' pertaining to the Bloomfield Track issue 
before any potentially regrettable decisions (in terms of human impact) is made. 
(c) Factor 3: Optimism 
First of the 'localised' factors is that of Optimism. Two major themes define 
Optimism. These include concern for the local community near the Bloomfield Track 
and a belief that, over the long-term, a solution can be found to resolve conflicts between 
human and environmental interests. 
In a real (and not necessarily pejorative) sense, Optimists were parochial in 
outlook. Of all four factors, Optimists tend to focus most on the needs of the local 
community (reflected in responses to statements 8 and 13). Of particular focus is the 
ability or validity of outsiders judging the interests of the Bloomfield community. They 
displayed considerable uncertainty about the appropriate level of local community 
input. However, tend to feel that the final decision should be based on inclusive 
processes (statement 4). Thus, Optimists' sensitivity to community issues was high 
compared to the other factors. When asked how the process could have been improved 
10 Based on discourse among the jury on the final day of deliberations during which perceptions of 
science where explicitly debated. For discussion of the method of collecting and analysing qualitative 
data pertaining to the deliberative process see section 5.3 in Chapter 5 (particularly page 136). 
11 For a description of developmentalism, see Chapter 4 (page I 04). 
12 See Chapter 4. 
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rn the frnal survey, they tended to nominate better local (Bloomfield community) 
representation. 13 
Indeed this fixation of Optimists with the rights of Bloomfield locals appears to 
reflect a strong 'liberal' property rights ethic. This ethic pervades the local cultural 
landscape of the region, particularly at the time of Bloomfield Track construction. It is 
an ethic based on a belief that property ownership brings with it exclusive rights and 
freedoms to the exclusion of others (Grey, 1980; Bonyhandy, 1992). By improving 
access to landowners, the Bloomfield Track enhances these property rights. Moreover, 
even if it does not, it is not for others to decide what is best for them, even with respect 
to environmental issues - doing so will interfere with their rights. 
This concern for property rights reflects an important (symbolic) facet of the 
public discourse associated with the Bloomfield Track Issue. As discussed in Chapter 
4, this 'rights of local access' argument was a politically powerful tool at the height of 
the Bloomfield Track issue. It remains potent to this day.14 
Optimists also tended to be less concerned than the other factors about adverse 
environmental consequences arising from development, strongly disagreeing with a 'no-
development' position (statement 10). Like Pragmatists, they are also less ecologically 
risk averse than Preservation, being are uncertain whether improving the Bloomfield 
Track will contribute to environmentally degrading development (statement 2). 
Whatever the case, their inclination is that it will not be a major contributor to any 
potential future environmental collapse (statement 6). 
However, this is not to say that Optimists do not care about the environment. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, most individuals, when prompted, would express at least a 
putative concern for the environment.15 Despite appearances, in this regard Optimists 
are no different. One example of this is the high factor score for statement 33, which 
emphasises the rights of native animals in juxtaposition to economic considerations. 
13 This included Rastus who was unfamiliar with the area, but nonetheless believed at the outset of 
discourse that the Bloomfield Track is important for community access (statement 18). See appendix 
2. 
14 Similar problems with the prevailing culture of property rights plague current attempts to curtail land 
clearing in Queensland, the rates of which are higher than any other state in Australia (see Rolfe, 2000; 
Sherwin, 2000). 
15 See section 2.4.4(b) on page 42. 
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The response reflects a similarly strong commitment to preservation to that of 
Preservationists, but there is an important difference. Optimists are more 
anthropocentric, being less willing to undertake to preserve to the cost of humans; and 
more willing make tradeoffs where necessary to human benefit (statement 19). 
Optimism appears also to adopt a long-term perspective. Their commitment to 
seeking long-term solutions for the problem at hand (statement 29) is similar to 
Preservationists. Although concern for future generations is a feature among all 
deliberators (and hence, all factors), it appears particularly strong for Optimists 
(statement 41). 
Thus, on the surface there appears to be a strong dissonance between Optimists' 
desire for development, and the placing of a high degree of emphasis on environmental 
protection and future generations. However, they do not seek development because 
they do not care for future generations. They are pro-development in part precisely 
because of this concern. This perspective can best be described by placing Optimism 
properly in its FNQ context. 
I have included Optimism under the 'localised factor' umbrella for a number of 
reasons. Not least is because it very strongly reflects the local culture of the regions, as 
outlined in Chapter 4. There is much about the Optimist that is consistent with the 
'pioneer' ethic ascribed to people in remote areas of Northern Australia, who overcame 
large obstacles to achieve what they believed was an improvement in lifestyle.16 It is on 
this basis that we might better understand the tension between environmental and 
development objectives. Many authors portray these early pioneers as rapacious 
developers with little concern for the environment and future consequences. However, 
in light of the palpable concern by Optimists for environmental consequences, a more 
nuanced interpretation may be appropriate. 
Passmore (1974, p89) illuminates the pioneering phenomenon from a different 
perspective. He argues that actions of pioneers were driven by this very concern for 
future generations. To use the language of value (or norm) activation in Chapter 2 they 
were very aware of the need to cater for the future, but unconditioned by awareness or 
belief that there would be negative environmental consequences from their actions. In 
16 See Passmore (1974, p.77) and Fitzgerald (1984, pp.412-413). See also section 4.2.3 in Chapter 4. 
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short, activation of future-regarding behaviour was blocked by a lack of awareness of 
consequences.17 
Optimists may be concerned for future generations, but what about the 
environment. If aware of at least the potential for environmental harm, their attitudes to 
nature may cause some dissonance. In an attempt to resolve this dissonance, Optimists 
seek solutions whereby everybody wins (statement 18) - both humans and nature. To 
achieve these outcomes creative solutions need to be found. Optimists believe that the 
Daintree is under threat. They also believe that it should be protected. However, this 
may not require the actual closure of the Bloomfield Track (statement 19, 26), 
particularly if there is not evidence of direct damage. There must exist other solutions. 
One solution to these tensions within the Bloomfield Track policy issue for 
Optimists is technology. Although not explicitly identified in the Q statements, an 
underlying theme observed in the discourse of Optimists is the possibility of technical 
solutions to policy problems. It is a straightfoiward belief that concerted effort will 
yield solutions to pressing problems. In this sense Optimism is similar to 
Technocentrism, as identified by O'Riordin (1981), which is characterised by faith in 
the ability of humans to find novel solutions to environmental problems.18 
However, despite overtures to environmental concern, an overriding principle of 
the Optimist is anthropocentricism. Although concerned about environmental damage, 
they feel that actions should benefit people. In the context of the Bloomfield track, 
closure should only be countenanced when the costs outweigh the benefits, and these 
benefits should be given proper account (statement 18), particularly because there may 
be novel solutions to seemingly intractable problems. 
( d) Factor 4: Propitiatism 
The final factor is Propitiatism. It is perhaps most important for understanding 
deliberative dynamics. The factor is labelled Propitiatism because it strongly reflects a 
somewhat anxious attachment to both sides of political argument over the Bloomfield 
17 See section 2.4.4(a). Of course, if such activation were to take place, then individuals are no longer 
'Optimists' as such, the subjective basis of their behaviour having migrated to some other subjective 
factor. 
18 One deliberator in particular, Keith, increasingly emphasised technological possibilities such as a 
monorail to satisfy competing demands. 
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Track and their associated symbolic claims. This concern for both poles of issue often 
lead Propitiatists to seek mechanisms for appeasing both sides, but satisfying neither. 19 
As will be seen following further analysis in Chapter 8, adherence to Propitiatism causes 
a dissonance problem in relation to choosing policy means that is more pressing than 
even for Optimists. 
Like Optimism, Propitiatism is also a localised factor, but for slightly different 
reasons. It does not so much reflect the culture of the region, but the politics particular 
to the Bloomfield Track issue. More specifically, it reflects the symbolic nature of 
politics were arguments are tailored to invoke a highly emotional response, rather than 
to inform beliefs.20 These symbolic assertions refer to those made by the respective 
anti and pro Bloomfield Track positions in the politically charged environment in which 
the Bloomfield Track was constructed, as outlined in Chapter 4. Anxious to appease 
both claims, Propitiatists seek integrative solutions. However, if they are devised to 
address symbolic claims, then it follows that they are not substantive solutions to 
complex problems. 
The symbolic claims associated with Propitiatism concern most specifically 
damage to the inshore coral reefs attributed to the Bloomfield Track and its importance 
for community access, which I have outlined in Chapter 4. In particular, Propitiatists 
are very concerned (and confident) that the Bloomfield Track causes significant damage 
to these inshore reefs (statements 32, 7 and 23). As in the case of Preservationists, 
there is also concern that the Daintree rainforest is under threat (statement 26). There is 
also belief that action should be taken to preserve the area for future generations 
(statements 24 and 25). 
In much the same way as for Optimism, Propitiatists are also fixated with 
community issues, particularly that of role of the Bloomfield Track in providing access 
for the Bloomfield community. The factor yielded a score of - 3 for statement 39, 
suggesting a high level of confidence regarding parties affected by preservation of the 
19 Indeed, the term propitiate refers to an action ' to render propitious or favourably inclined; to appease, 
conciliate (one offended)' (Oxford University Press., 1989). 
20 This does not preclude the possibility that such claims are true. Rather, the term Propitiatism is 
descriptive of their impact on subjectivity- which will be discussed in Chapter 8. It turns out that 
none of the symbolic claims referred to in this research were supported by the deliberative process. 
However, later in this thesis, the possibility that there was indeed a case to be made, and the potential 
impact of such arguments on the deliberative process, are considered. 
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Daintree. This confidence is also reflected in a similar statement (statement 5) which 
concerns the knowledge of the respondent about the feelings of Bloomfield Residents 
towards the Bloomfield Track. Propitiatists tend to feel they are well placed to judge 
the benefits of these residents and their judgement is that the Bloomfield Track is indeed 
a net benefit to the community (statement 18). 
As I have already suggested, Propitiatism tends to reflect not one, but both sides 
of the Bloomfield Track debate in the political sphere. This juggling of polarised 
discourses appears to manifest in some interesting 'contradictions' in the discursive 
landscape. For example, Propitiatists' concern for local community access helps to 
explain why there is not a great deal of concern regarding the actual usage of vehicles on 
the road and damage to the rainforest (statement 20). However, they are also very 
anxious about damage caused by the Bloomfield Track. 
Another curious result is very strong concern for the future of the Daintree 
rainforest (statement 26) and belief that no cost is too great to achieve its protection 
(statement 18). Yet, there is relatively low concern over development in the Dain tree 
region (statement 10). This position with respect to development appears to define a 
major distinction between Propitiatism and Preservation. On this issue, it is similar to 
Optimism. 
The similarity to Optimism extends to desire for 'win-win' solutions. However, 
whereas Optimism appears to reflect a strident belief that environment and economy 
can be reconciled, Propitiatists appear to grasp at possibilities, particularly those that 
come from within the political discourse from which it appears to be heavily influenced. 
A very good example of this is encapsulated by Statement 1, which stresses benefits of 
the Bloomfield Track to the local community and its potential for reducing the 
greenhouse effect.21 This symbolic type of argument was given extensive coverage in 
the media at the time of the Bloomfield Track's construction (for example Kendell and 
Buivids, 1987, p.135). With a factor score of 1, the level of agreement of Propitiatists 
with statement 1 is not high. However, it contrasts strongly with Preservationists and 
Pragmatists, who are unimpressed by such rhetorical claims.22 
2 1 The statement was paraphrased from a statement by the Minister for the Environment in support of the 
Bloomfield Track at the height of controversy (QLA, 1983, p.748). 
22 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of symbolic politics. 
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Further evidence that Propitiatism reflects the broader political discourse 
surrounding the Bloomfield Track issue can be seen in the confidence with which they 
hold their beliefs, even in the absence of concrete data.23 This reflects actors in the 
political sphere, who state their cases with confidence under conditions of symbolic 
politics (for to do otherwise will only undermine one's claims). Similarly, Propitiatists 
tend to be confident in their beliefs, despite the contradictions and the absence of 
substantiating evidence. 
Thus, it appears that Propitiatism is the discursive progeny of two opposmg 
poles of symbolic discourse. In Chapter 4 I suggested that the opposing views 
contesting the Bloomfield Track issue gave rise not only to a high degree of symbolic 
politics, but also policy paralysis.24 Propitiatism reflects this paralysis. As will be seen 
in Chapter 8, it is associated with a high level of cognitive dissonance in respect to the 
best policy decision (or preference). As will be seen in the following section, although 
associated with paralysis, in a deliberative context Propitiatism is inherently unstable. 
It is easily dispelled in the face of engagement in the issue and awareness of lack of 
substantiating evidence. 
6.4 DELIBERATIVE DYNAMICS OF SUBJECTIVITY 
The Q factors, or subjective types described in the previous section provide a 
tool for understanding the contours of the discursive landscape. This section uses these 
findings to describe changes within the landscape due to movement of deliberators to or 
from particular factors. Part of the investigation also involves a look across the 
discursive landscape as a whole to identify major trends. Assessment of subjective 
dynamics begins in the following discussion with a description of changes to 
subjectivity across the discursive sphere. This is followed by a more detailed 
examination of deliberative dynamics through the Jens of the four subjective factors. 
23 As discussed in Appendix 5, the Q sort was designed to measure values, beliefs and confidence with 
which these are held. 
24 See particularly page 121. 
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6.4.1 Subjective Changes Across the Discursive landscape 
There was a definite change to the discursive landscape during the deliberative 
process. Evidence of this has already been alluded to in the previous chapter. Changes 
in discourse were observed following particular turning points. Some of the most 
significant turning points followed presentations concerning the symbolic issues of reef 
damage and community access. That significant changes occurred is also supported by 
the fact that most deliberators stated they felt that they had changed their minds with 
respect to the Bloomfield Track issue when surveyed at the conclusion of the FNQCJ.25 
The following discussion reports the findings of quantitative analysis of these 
subjective dynamics. In other words, it will provide a broad sweep across the discursive 
sphere. This is done by investigating response to Q statements at the various stages of 
the process. 
(a) Change to the Subjectivity of Individuals During the Deliberative Process 
The hypothesis that the discursive landscape changed during the deliberative 
process was tested using a number of statistical techniques - which are reported in 
Appendix 5. The results show that there are both significant similarities as well as 
differences between the Q sorts of individual deliberators at the three deliberative stages. 
In other words, deliberators' initial subjectivity is a significant predictor (at the 95% 
level of confidence) of their subjectivity later in the deliberative process. However, the 
changes are also significant (remembering that it has not yet been differentiated using the 
subjective factors). 
This supports the hypothesis that there is indeed a significant change in the 
discursive landscape because of the FNQCJ. The extent and nature of these changes will 
become clearer once the subjective factors are introduced into the analysis. 
Although subjectivity has changed during deliberation, it has not involved a 
continuous transformation throughout the deliberative process. Rather the subjective 
transformation appears somewhat erratic, involving an initial jump followed by a small 
level of consolidation. The magnitude of changes measured during the first deliberative 
phase (between pre and mid-deliberation) is far greater than those arising form the 
25 See survey data in Appendix 2. 
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second (mid-post).26 In other words, it appears that the greatest impact on the 
discursive landscape appeared during the first phase of the deliberative process, during 
which witnesses made presentations to deliberators. 
(b) Nature of Changes to the Discursive Landscape 
Most of the changes within the discursive landscape will be discussed in section 
6.4.2. However, there were several changes across the discursive landscape not captured 
by any particular subjective factor. Others are so pervasive that they are worthy of 
special mention. 
Table 6-2 shows ten Q statements for which changes in response were greatest 
among the deliberators. The level of change to the average response for that statement is 
provided in the last column of the table. It can be seen from the table that certain types 
of statement experienced large changes in terms of response. The greatest of these 
concern the issue of damage to the inshore reefs associated with the Bloomfield Track 
(statements 7, 23, 32). These changes will be captured in the discussion of the 
Propitiatism factor below, in addition to changes to statements 18 and 34, concerning 
the issue of community access. 
26 See section A.S.4 in Appendix 5. 
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Table 6~ St a tements experiencing greatest level of change in response 
across the deliberators 
Avenge Score 
{Stage} 
N o. S t4t•ment P re MiJ Post Cha"(' 
7 
Erosion from the Bloomfield Track is permanently damaging the coral 
1.42 - 0.25 - 0 .75 2 . 17 
reefs that fringe the beaches below. 
23 Erosion from the Bloomfield Track docs nor cause siltation or damage to - 2.42 0.00 - 0.25 2 .17 
che fringing inshore reefs becween Cape Tribulation and Cooktown 
32 T he coral reefs along the foreshore below the Bloomfield T rack arc not -1. 17 0.83 0.83 2.00 badly affected by the road. 
36 [' m concerned char I will be made worse off by any decision about the -1. 17 - 1.0 8 0.50 1.67 Bloomfield Track. 
If the Bloomfield Track is scaled (bitumcnizcd) there will not be a rapid 
9 increase in environmentally damaging development in the Daintrce area - 1.25 - 2.08 -2.92 ! .67 
in the future. It may even benefit the environment there. 
38 
The Bloomfield T rack may not have been chc best idea, bur I guess chcre 
0.75 - 0.67 - 0.8 3 1.58 is probably liulc point in dosing ic now chat it h as been built. 
18 
The Bloomfield Track is impouanc because it allows quick access to 
1.00 -0.25 - 0.50 I. 5 0 
remote areas of the North. 
Laying bitumen on the Bloomfield Track would be beneficial for the 
environment. It may even help reduce fuel usage and the greenhouse -0. 75 -1. 17 - 2 . 08 l. 3 3 
effect. 
31 
I don' t like how devclopmenr is creeping further and further North into 
1. 17 1.92 2.25 1.08 
the Daintrce and beyond because of ics effect on the environment. 
I think that both short and long term perspectives are needed in deciding 
37 what should be done with the Bloomfield Track, but I don't know which 0 .92 0.4 2 - 0.17 J .08 
one is more importanc. 
10 No development should be permitted in World Heritage areas such as the 
Daincrce. 
0.92 1.58 I.92 1.00 
I don't know if improving the Bloomfield T rack would lead co a rapid 
2 acceleration of development in the area to the detriment of the -0.08 - 1. 83 - 1.08 1.00 
environmenc. 
28 
The protection of planes and animals in the Daintree is OK so long as it 
- 2.67 - 1. 75 - 1.75 0.92 doesn't affect me. 
26 There is no reason to believe that the the Daintrcc Rainforest is under 
ch re at. 
- 2 .58 -2.00 - J. 75 0 .83 
34 
The Wujal Wujal Community is better off now char rhc Bloomfield T rack 
J .2 5 0.75 0 .50 0.75 has been built. 
39 I don'< really know who benefits most from the protection of Rainforesc - 0.67 -0. 42 0. 0 8 0.75 in the Daintree. 
20 Using cars on the Bloomfield Track is bad for the rainforest. 0.33 1.58 J.00 0.67 
In deciding on what to do with the Bloomfield Track I don't know whether 
3 it's more important to meet the needs of the community or the - 0.6 7 - 0. 83 - 1.25 0. 5 8 
env iron ment. 
Personal concern about the future of Daintree region also increased (statement 35 
and 28). The result is not surprising and resonates with findings for other deliberative 
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processes that participation in deliberative process tends to increase the subsequent 
interest in the issue.27 There was also an increased sensitivity to the longer-term 
impacts of the Bloomfield Track (statement 37). Further, perception that it was 
environmentally damaging increased. This was both in terms direct impact (statement 
20) as well as part of an interconnected suite of impacts (statement 9, 31, 2). 
There was also an increase in resolve regarding the negative environmental 
consequences of (commercial) development and that such development should be 
curtailed (statement 10). Also associated with this is a decline in acquiescence about the 
future of the track. As a whole, the deliberative group tended to reject the argument that 
'because the Bloomfield Track is has already been built, it should stay (statement 38). 
In other words, if there is good reason for it to be closed, then there are no hesitations to 
reverse a policy fiasco. 
Another trend concerned an increased level of confidence with which deliberators 
held their values and beliefs. Of the statements in Table 6-2, these include increased 
confidence in the belief that development associated with the Bloomfield Track will be 
environmentally detrimental (statement 2). Similar increases were also observed for 
other thematic areas, such as concern for future generations (statement 37) their position 
with respect to human-nature tradeoffs (statement 3) and who beneficiaries of 
protection of the Daintree Region are (statement 39). 
However, this increased confidence did not extend to all facets of the Bloomfield 
Track issue. The exception concerns the importance of the Bloomfield Track for the 
local community access. Although there was a decrease in belief in its importance for 
access, this was not a particularly confident view, based on the quality of evidence 
presented (statement 22 in particular, as well as 13, and 39).28 This accompanied a 
perception among deliberators that local views were not well represented in the 
27 For example: (for example Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; Kenyon, 1998 ; UKCEED, 1999). In the 
example of one deliberator from the FNQCJ (Matilda), participation motivated her to become involved 
in local elections that followed soon after the deliberative process, where she campaigned for an 
environmental group. 
28 However this is not to say that they had no confidence. None of the statements pertaining to 
confidence in assessment of community impact drew particularly strong responses. There was an 
increased agreement that all, not just locals (statement 16) should determine the future of the road. 
There is also strong agreement that the interests of the broader community should predominate albeit 
with sensitivity to local impacts (statement 4). This is probably related to increased concern for the 
environmental integrity of the area and personal stake in the outcome. 
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FNQCJ,29 which resulted in reticence to attach a high level of confidence in their 
assessment of local benefit. 
6.4.2 Subjective Dynamics and Changes to Facto rs 
Having briefly surveyed changes across the spectrum of subjectivity, the 
following discussion turns to the assessment of subjective changes as they were 
observed through the lens of the four subjective factors. 
Figure 6-3 provides an overview of changes to each deliberator's loadings on the 
four subjective factors during the deliberative process. The figure consists of four 
vertically aligned graphs, one for each of the factors. The graphs show each 
deliberator's loadings on one of the four factors at the three deliberative stages - which 
is represented by three overlapping bars. 
The hashed horizontal lines in each of the graphs in Figure 6-3 indicate the 
benchmark above which a factor loading is statistically significant (95%).30 The arrows 
in each of the graphs indicate both significance of individual shifts between deliberative 
stages, and the level of significance.31 The large arrows at the top of each graph indicate 
significant changes in factor loading that occurred over the whole of the deliberative 
process (between pre and post-deliberative stages). The smaller arrows at the bottom of 
each graph indicate changes that occurred within the deliberative process - over the 
fust and second deliberative phases (between pre and mid, and mid-post-deliberative 
stages respectively). 
The use of these arrows can be demonstrated by drawing examples from the 
figure. If we look at the changes to Adventure's (ADV) factor loading on Preservation 
in the uppermost graph, it can be seen that there are two small arrows. The first 
(downward) arrow on the left indicates that there was a significant decline in 
Preservation during the first deliberative phase, which was measured as the difference 
29 Notably, the deliberators were made aware of the boycott by local resident groups of the FNQCJ (see 
Chapter 5). 
Jo Based on a standard error SE, -1/.fn (Brown, 1980, p.222), for the FNQCJ data this is J/./TI = 0.29. 
J I Based on the standard error for differences in factor loadings of SED.b = ~SEJ, + SEJ, where 
SE1, = J - f,
2 /,Jn, x = individual factors a, b (Brown, 1980, p.300). 
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between pre and mid-deliberative factor loadings. The three stars above the arrow 
indicate that the shift is significant at the 99.9% confidence level. 
The arrow on the right-hand side of the same graph shows that there was a 
significant increase in Preservation in the subjectivity of Adventure during the second 
deliberative phase (between mid and post-deliberation). This increase is not as large, 
and is less significant (95%), but is large enough to cancel partly the initial decline during 
the first deliberative phase. Consequently, there has been no significant change in level 
of Preservation in the subjectivity of Adventure during the deliberative process; hence, 
there is no arrow at the top of the graph to indicate any overall shift. 
By contrast, Boat (BOA) did experience a shift between pre and post 
deliberation (with three stars indicating that it is significant at the 99.9% confidence 
level), which predominantly occurred during the first deliberative stage. Julie (JUL) also 
experienced a drop in Preservation, which was gradual throughout the deliberative 
process, hence, the absence of any small arrows. 
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'igure 6-3 Factor loadings measured at three deliberative stages 
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Changes in the discursive landscape can be readily seen from Figure 6-3. Overall, 
the direction and level of changes tend to be heterogeneous. Most factors, with the 
notable exception of Propitiatism, experienced both increases and decreases in factor 
loadings across the deliberators. 
The dominance of Preservation in the discursive landscape has already been 
alluded to in section 6.3.2(a). In terms of overall changes during the deliberative process, 
four of the twelve deliberators significantly decreased their factor loadings on 
preservation, with deliberators experiencing a significant increase. 
The conservatism of the Pragmatist is the next most dominant influence in 
deliberator subjectivity to Preservation, though affiliations with it are far more 
heterogeneous. Although it appears to feature in the subjective states of most 
deliberators, it is dominant in only a few. Notable among these are Keith and Julie, 
whose factor loadings remained relatively stable. 
Overall, Pragmatism saw a marginal increase m factor loadings during the 
deliberative process. It began with six deliberators significantly loaded, increasing to 
eight. Most of the increase in Pragmatism can be attributed to four deliberators -
Adventure, Janine, Koda and Snoopy. Adventure in particular increased factor loading, 
while decreasing loading on Preservation during the first deliberative phase. 
Levels of Optimism were highly variable among deliberators throughout the 
deliberative process. Pre-deliberation, five of the 12 deliberators were significantly 
loaded on Optimism, decreasing to three by the end of the process. Three significant 
decreases were detected during the deliberative process, compared with two deliberators 
who increased their factor loadings. The two upward shifts are those of Keith and Julie. 
By contrast, Janine, Rastus and Snoopy became less Optimistic. 
The fmal graph in Figure 6-3 shows changes to loadings on Propitiatism. 
Propitiatism saw the greatest decrease during the deliberative process - with a decline 
in average loading of 27 points (0.26 to - 0.01 ). Beginning with five deliberators 
significantly loaded, at the conclusion of the deliberative process it was not significant 
for any deliberator. The decline of Propitiatism is almost entirely attributable to the 
first deliberative phase, during which deliberators were provided with information in the 
form of witness presentations. 
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6.4.3 Synopsis of Changes to the Discursive Landscape 
The previous discussion has outlined the major changes to subjectivity, reflected 
in the discursive landscape, during the deliberative process. To summarise, the most 
significant changes were associated with the symbolic issues that had dominated 
political discourse. This has most profoundly been observed by the decline of 
Propitiatism in the discursive landscape - representing something of an extinction 
event in subjective terms. Associated with its demise was a decline in belief in 
politicised statements such as those concerning damage to the inshore reef and the 
importance of local community access. 
Other changes that were observed included a decline in levels of Optimism, an 
increase in personal concern for the future of the Daintree region and stronger conviction 
regarding the outcome of the Bloomfield Track issue. Mere acquiescence to the status 
quo was a less acceptable outcome following deliberation. Deliberators also appear to 
have increased their attentiveness to the issue at hand, evidenced by an increased 
attachment to the outcome. 
Having observed these changes to the discursive landscape, the remaining task to 
account for them. In the following section, the first tentative steps are taken toward 
achieving this task. 
6.5 EXPLAINING CHANGES TO THE DISCURSIVE 
LANDSCAPE 
The following discussion explores changes to the discursive landscape to draw 
insights into deliberative dynamics. It does so by mainly focussing on changes as they 
relate to each of the four factors. This is followed by an assessment of subjective 
dynamics as a whole. 
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6.5.1 Explaining Changes to Individual Factors 
(a) Preservation 
Despite the lack of a clear trend in changes to factor loadings, there are some 
specific inferences that can be drawn from changes within the Preservation factor. The 
most outstanding of these is an increasing emphasis on longer-term impacts associated 
with the Bloomfield Track.1 Importantly, there was a small increase in the perception 
that the Bloomfield Track contributed to environmental damage. This was not 
necessarily in terms of direct impact to reef and rainforest, but as part of a suite of 
impacts, interconnecting though space and time.2 Concern for indirect affects associated 
with bituminisation of the Bloomfield Track also increased significantly. 
These shifts - associated with statements concerning regional and accumulative 
impact - tend to reflect an increased concern about the way that the Bloomfield Track 
contributes to indirect impacts in the area.3 Consequently, as exemplified by statement 
38, there was a marked decrease in acquiescence to the Bloomfield Track and a greater 
willingness to reverse bad decisions - if they are proven so. This appeared to reflect 
an increased perception that many impacts are yet to be realised. 
There was also an increase in sentiment against (commercial) development in the 
Dain tree Region (statement 10). This occurred despite changing interpretation of the 
term 'development' during deliberation. Before deliberation, most deliberators used the 
term to refer to commercial development, such as privately owned tourist operations. 
However, at least one deliberator came to possess a wider view of the term to include 
environmentally benign developments, such as the construction of the interpretive 
centre referred to in the final report.4 This new interpretation (indeed reinterpretation) 
may have contributed to statement 10 being the most susceptible to individual shifts.5 
1 Statements reflective this include 2, 6, 31, 38 and 9. 
2 For example, statement 6. See section A.5.1 in Appendix 5. 
3 For example, statements 6, 9 and 3 L 
4 See Chapter 5. That varying interpretations of development had emerged during the deliberative 
process occurred to me when analysing the Q sort. Some deliberators' appeared to respond to 
statement I 0, concerning development in the Daintree inconsistently with the rest of their attitudes. 
After interviewing a number of deliberators, as discussed on page 168, it emerged that their 
interpretation of the term had evolved during deliberation to include both commercial and non-
commercial types. 
5 See Appendix 5. 
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It is therefore plausible that a more specific refinement of the definition of development, 
consistent with the commercial typology, may have attracted an even stronger shift in 
subjectivity, or at least more consistency among the changes. 
There is also an important difference pertaining to the relative stability of values 
compared to beliefs. Take for example changes within Preservation. It appears that, 
although deliberators may not have fundamentally changed their Preservationist values, 
there was a change in beliefs associated with it. Exemplary of this is Boat. When asked 
to identify what was most influential in changing his mind during deliberation, Boat 
nominated the realisation of 'the difficulty/impossibility to retain the status quo of the 
road'. As discussed above, this is a sentiment most closely associated with 
Preservation. Therefore, despite decreasing his loading on Preservation, this increased 
awareness of consequences activated in Boat's overall sensitivity to these issues. This 
suggests that there was a process of 'activation' in relation to the factor. As will be seen 
in Chapter 8, this process strongly influenced policy preferences. 
Thus, the tendency to activate certain values associated with Preservation 
through changes in belief was an important facet of the deliberative process. With 
improved understanding, deliberators were better equipped to anticipate the needs and 
consequences attached to the future. In other words, deliberators were able to increase, 
or 'activate' their Preservationist concerns through increased comprehension of the 
Bloomfield Track issue.6 However, these changes must be taken in the context of the 
discursive sphere as a whole. The forward-looking aspect of Preservation was not 
always consistent with other values that may have dominated individual subjectivity.7 
A particularly salient example of this will be seen in the following discussion about 
Pragmatism. 
(b) Pragmatism 
Significantly, the greatest shift in factor loadings on Pragmatism occtUTed during 
the first deliberative phase, suggesting that information played a strong role. A 
particular strong impact concerned information about the level of research conducted on 
the Bloomfield Track, or rather lack thereof. Many deliberators were shocked by the 
6 See discussion of value activation in section 2.4.4(a) of Chapter 2 (page 41). 
7 Which is most consistent with observations made about Optimists in section 6.3.2(c). 
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paucity of research done to investigate its specific impact. This was particularly the 
case for Adventure, who went so far as to cite it as a major influence on her opinion (and 
preferences). 8 
lt appears that those deliberators who increased their factor loadings on 
Pragmatism did so not because they felt better infonned during the deliberative process. 
Rather, a kind of Socratic dilemma emerged where they were provided with enough 
information to lean that not enough was known about the issue to make a conclusive 
decision. 
Where infom1ation encouraged the Preservationist to look into the future, it 
played a restrictive role in Pragmatism because of both the lack of infonnation and the 
lens through which it was interpreted. Those deliberators with a background in science 
tended to argue against the position held by Pragmatists that science could somehow 
find definitive answers. This debate took up a good part of deliberation on the final day. 
In the end, the two camps agreed to disagree. The important point here is that not only 
is the role of science pivotal, but so too is the lens through which it is viewed, which is a 
function of broader public understanding of science.9 
It is interesting to consider if Pragmatism would have been as strong a feature of 
the discursive landscape at the end of discourse if the infonnation presented to 
deliberators were different. A variation of the design of the FNQCJ could have included 
a briefing on interpreting scientific evidence (theories of falsification, burden of proof). It 
is interesting to consider whether this would changed the perceptions of Pragmatists 
with respect to the ability of science to provide definitive answers. 
Even more interesting is to consider how the deliberative dynamics may have 
differed if there was even a moderate level of research concerning the impact of the 
Bloomfield Track, much less than the Pragmatists would have liked. These 
considerations constitute an important constraint on deliberative design (and deliberative 
democracy). ln other words, there still remains a problem of bounded rationality with 
respect to the deliberative process. 10 Yet, it is far from novel. It affects any approach 
8 See Appendix 2. 
9 An issue that has led to a reconsideration of the role of juries in legal cases (see Edmond and Mercer, 
1997). 
10 See discussion in section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 (page 29) 
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to decision-making. Moreover, as will be discussed in Chapter 9, the problem may not 
detract from the legitimacy of deliberative outcomes. 11 
(c) Optimism 
Again, changes to factor loadings on Optimism appear to have occurred mostly 
during the information phase (except for Snoopy, who is most influenced during the 
second deliberative phase).12 Consistent with this, Janine - who decreased her loading 
on Optimism - cited increased awareness of interconnected and incremental issues as 
most influential. Where the Optimist might consider it possible to address these issues 
when thinking about them as separate effects, the evidence suggested otherwise. This 
contrasts strongly with Preservation, which is associated with this type of integrated 
perspective.13 This dynamic suggests tension between Optimism and Preservation. 
This may account for the inverse relationship between the two, apparent in Figure 6-3. 
The inverse relationship between Optimism and Preservation is particularly 
strong in the cases of Keith and Julie. Unlike the other deliberators, both have increased 
their factor loadings on Optimism (although neither becoming significantly loaded) and 
decreased Preservationism. This was because they felt that it possible to find solutions 
to the policy problem of the Bloomfield Track that could satisfy the competing 
demands of preservation and development. Most outstanding of these possibilities was 
Keith's emerging penchant for technological solutions to problems associated with the 
Bloomfield Track.14 His idea for some method of transport, such as a monorail -
gliding harmlessly through the rainforest - did not seem far-fetched. Indeed, this sort 
of idea has precedent in the Cairns region, where a cableway has been built traversing the 
11 Section 9.5. 
12 Which is also the case for Snoopy in Preservation, as discussed in section 6.4.2 above. 
13 Most notably, Peter Hitchcock's presentation. See section 5.3.2 in Chapter 5. 
14 See section 6.3.2(c). 
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ranges. 15 Whether this approach would be applicable to the area of the Bloomfield 
Track was not discussed in any detail. The technology theme emerged late in the 
deliberative process of the FNQCJ. The process was not equipped to deal with it; there 
being no time to call relevant witnesses and allocate time for discussion. As for the case 
of Pragmatism discussed above, this begs the question of whether the deliberative 
process was completed one. 
(d) Propitiatism 
Yet agam, changes associated with Propitiatism occurred during the first 
deliberative phase. This is not surprising. It was during the information phase that 
evidence countering the symbolic claims was provided. The issue of reef damage is 
particular case in point. It accounts for the three biggest shifts in average score for any 
statement16 and appears to be a direct result of evidence presented to the deliberators. 17 
The other feature of Propitiatism was the perception of the Bloomfield Track as 
an important transport link for the local community. This perception also declined 
during the deliberative process. Where damage to the reef was an important symbol for 
the anti-Bloomfield Track cause, community access was one of the most powerful 
arguments proffered by its supporters, and continues to dominate the issue. Responses 
to statements concerning community benefit of the Bloomfield Track changed 
dramatically. 
This was particularly the case for statements 18 and 1 (see Figure 6-2).18 
Responses to the two statements (18 and 34) referring to community access tended to 
change during the first (information) phase of the deliberative process. This appears to 
15 The Kuranda Skyrail, as it is known, is a major tourist attraction, and widely seen as consistent with 
presentation of the area, an important objective of World Heritage nomination The Skyrail comprises a 
cable car system that crosses the rainforested hills just north of Cairns. The project was particularly 
controversial in the early part of the 1990s in view of its construction within the recently listed Wet 
Tropics World Heritage Area (Beeh, 1994; Henry, I 995). In the end, the project succeed when the 
proponents demonstrated that the development was consistent with the goals of World Heritage, which 
included both preservation and presentation of World Heritage values - under Article 4 of the World 
Heritage Convention (UNESCO, 1972). Coincidentally, Aswad, who was a consistent Optimist, if 
not particularly strongly loaded, was employed at the time of the FNQCJ as a guide on the Skyrail, 
although there is no direct evidence to suggest that this was influential. 
16 Statements 7, 23, and 32. See section A.5.4 in Appendix 5. 
17 See Chapter 5. 
18 See Appendix 5. 
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correspond with increased perception that local community access was not as important 
as commonly argued. There was a growing belief that local and regional interests are 
both better served by improved access from the north via Cooktown, rather than south 
through the Daintree Region.19 
The issue of bituminisation experienced a particularly large shift during 
deliberation. It suffered the greatest decline of all statements in the Q sort. Moreover, 
unlike the reef issue, this occurred throughout the deliberative process, not just during 
the information phase.20 This probably reflects its secondary role in attitudes (indeed, 
preferences!), where responses to these issues were formed because of associated 
perceptions. Propitiatists' attitudes to bituminisation were not because of a desire to 
surface the road per se. Rather, they were a function of a desire to appease the 
symbolic claims within the political sphere concerning both reef damage and community 
access. Satisfying both claims appeared to limit potential outcomes, with bituminisation 
or upgrade the most feasible. However, with these claims dismissed, so too did 
attitudes to this course of action. 
Importantly, although symbolic issues played a smaller role in subjectivity at the 
end of discourse, they did not disappear altogether. Deliberators did not reverse their 
views on many symbolic issues, particularly with respect to potential for damage to 
inshore reefs attributable to the Bloomfield Track. Rather, responses to Q statements 
concerning the reef tended to converge around the zero point, indicating the reef issue 
decreased in relative importance, at least in the minds of the deliberators relative to other 
facets of the policy problem.21 Nor does it suggest that there was decreased concern for 
other forms environmental impact. Concern for the area did not dissipate. It was 
displaced to other, longer-term and broader issues. In other words, their environmental 
concerns were more post-deliberative expressed as Preservationism. 
19 A view proffered by the first technical witness, Peter Hitchcock who proved influential to many of the 
deliberators (See Chapter 5). 
20 Such as statement 9. 
21 A phenomenon referred to as 'distensive zero' in Q methodology, which hold that meaning 'distends' 
from the middle of the sort, or zero (Brown, 1980, p.22). 
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6.5.2 The Acquisition of Information in Deliberative Context and 
the Role of Pre-existing Knowledge 
One interesting conclusion from the findings so far concerns uneven impact on 
deliberative dynamics of different types of knowledge. An important case in point 
concerns the relative role of local versus epistemic knowledge. Those deliberators who 
were well versed with the community issues at the outset of the process tended to load 
on Optimism at the outset of discourse. However, this type of knowledge was 
unstable. During deliberation, Optimists tended to migrate to other factors. Most 
significant of these is Janine, who grew up in the area and had intimate knowledge of 
indigenous and broader community issues, but shifted very strongly on three of the four 
factors. 
Epistemic knowledge appears only slightly more resilient. Koda (who worked in 
an environmental consultancy) and Boat were the most educated of the deliberators. 
Yet, both shifted loading on Propitiatism. The same is true for Pearl, who worked in the 
region in a professional capacity and had a good knowledge of the issues, particularly 
the commercial importance of access. 
One possible conclusion from these observations is that knowledge does not 
insure against the impact of symbolic arguments in the political sphere. This stresses 
the importance of deliberation - as opposed to mere 'knowledge' - as an antidote to 
manipulatory politics. If it holds, such a finding is particularly important. It suggests 
that deliberation is more than just information acquisition, although many of the 
observed changes have taken place during the 'information phase'. The effect may also 
be one of engagement - a change in perspective from which the issue is viewed. These 
impacts will be explored in more detail in Chapter 9.22 
22 On page 278. 
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6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the subjective dynamics of deliberators participating 
in the FNQCJ. The first part of the chapter outlined the use of Q methodology and 
described the process of elucidating subjective factors from the raw data. These were 
extracted using a judgmental process based on the preferences provided by deliberators, 
the focus of discussion in the next chapter, as well as the discourse material. 
The factors that were extracted from the data were then described in detail using 
the scores for the Q statements that were typical for that factor (factor scores), but also 
draw from a wider array of material. This was then followed by an exploration of 
subjective dynamics. This included exploration of the way in which deliberators 
changed their affinity with each of the factors, as well as a finer grained assessment of 
what contributed to these changes and their implications for deliberative processes. 
A clear shift was observed in subjectivity among the deliberators. Although 
there is much heterogeneity among deliberators, there are a number of clear 
consistencies. Overall, the major changes identified above can be summarised as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
a mixed responses to Preservation (with both increases and decreases, 
although tended to be small), but important changes to elements thereof such 
as: an increase in emphasis on indirect and incremental impacts and regional 
implications of the Bloomfield Track; the maintenance of very high 
importance to the long-tenn implications for policy decisions about the 
Bloomfield Track; and increased anti (commercial) development sentiment; 
an overall increase in Pragmatism, attributed to poor levels of scientific 
information available for the Bloomfield Track issue; 
a mixed response to Optimism, with those deliberators loaded on it at the 
end of discourse placing faith in technological possibilities; and 
a dramatic decrease in Propitiatism observed as a decline in concern regarding 
the potential for damage to inshore reefs due to the Bloomfield Track and a 
decreased emphasis on ascribed benefits commonly associated with the 
Bloomfield Track. 
It is plausible that broader community representation during the deliberative 
process (or at least representation by the more vocal community groups) could influence 
these dynamics. Particularly if they presented a reasonable argument for the Bloomfield 
Track for community access - if indeed an additional case to be made. 23 If there had 
23 See discussion in 5.2 of Chapter 5 concerning the boycott of the CJ process by community groups. 
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been, the deliberators would have been interested. As discussed in Chapter 5, many 
deliberators felt that the representation provided, in the form of local government 
representatives, did not state their case very well. Perhaps for this reason there 
remained a good deal of disagreement among deliberators in their response to these 
issues, elements of doubt lingering in the absence of exhaustive evidence. 
Despite gaps identified by deliberators in information presented, there was 
sufficient evidence to result in the dramatic decline of the Propitiatism factor, which was 
most closely associated with symbolic politics. If the impact symbolic politics on the 
subjectivity has declined during the deliberative process, then it is also very likely to 
have declined in terms of its role in the construction of policy preferences, which I have 
yet to analyse. The changes to policy preferences during the deliberative process will be 
the subject of the following chapter. I will then more fully assess the interaction 
between subjectivity and policy preferences in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7 DELIBERATIVE DYNAMICS OF 
PREFERENCES: ANALYSIS OF 
TRANSFORMATION THROUGH 
DISCOURSE 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter continues the task of exploring the deliberative dynamics of the 
FNQCJ by directly analysing changes to policy preferences, driven by the hypotheses 
outlined in Chapter 2 that deliberation will tend to a change policy preference. The 
discursive preference model linked policy preferences to underlying subjective states, 
which were explored in the previous chapter using Q methodology. Under the model, 
given the significant changes to subjectivity, preferences should also change - although, 
as will be seen in the following chapter, only in a manner that can be understood through 
the lens of the factors outlined in the previous chapter. 
The analysis of policy preferences primarily initially draws on quantitative 
techniques. The results are later compared to qualitative data. Ultimately the 
quantitative approach will be found not to provide a satisfactory explanation of 
deliberative dynamics when used in isolation, which is consistent with the argument 
made in Chapter 2. 1 Even where inferences may be possible, they will be found to be 
essentially substantively meaningless. However, when used as part of a suite of 
approaches, quantitative analysis of policy preferences can provide important insights. 
Thus, incorporating quantitative methods serves to generate an additional source of 
information from which conclusions can be drawn on as part of an intensive analysis 
' Section 2.2. l . 
Chaixer-7 
involving the triangulation.2 It is following this process of analytical triangulation that 
the major conclusions for this chapter are drawn. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the following section (7.2) I briefly outline 
the process used to measure policy preferences. Section 7.3 presents the raw policy 
preferences and preference aggregations. This is followed in section 7.4 by the analysis 
of preference shifts using quantitative methods. Section 7 .5 then draws on these 
statistical results as part of a process of triangulation, using qualitative data to 
crosscheck the statistical results against substantive criteria. From this, inferences about 
the impact of deliberation on preferences are made. The final section (7.6) concludes the 
chapter by summarising the results. 
7.2 MEASURING POLICY PREFERENCES FOR THE 
BLOOMFIELD TRACK 
In this section I set the scene for analysis of policy preferences. Specifically, I 
describe the approach used to elicit policy preferences. This includes the rationale for 
choosing the particular method of preference measurement between the alternatives of 
ordinal and cardinal preferences. The process of selecting the policy options included in 
the ordinal preference survey is the briefly described. 
7.2.1 Measuring Policy Preferences 
An important consideration in the design of this research was the choice of 
method for eliciting policy preferences. There are two main ways in which policy 
preferences may be measured. The first involves an ordinal ranking of options, the 
second a cardinal evaluation of their relative desirability. Before discussion of which is 
the better option for the purposes here, I will briefly describe each of the approaches. 
An ordinal policy preference involves ranking of policy options from most to 
least preferred. In practice, it will look something like as follows. If we take a series of 
(5) policy options {A, B, C, D, E} which represent the domain of possible choices 
2 See section 2.6 in Chapter 2 (page 58). 
-208-
Sed:bn 7.2: Mea5ll!irg Policy Preferen::e.s for tlE Roomfield Track 
pertaining to a policy issue, a policy preference is the ordered ranking of the options 
from most to least preferred. If an individual chooses policy E as the most preferred 
policy, D second, C third, and so on in the reverse sequence to the original order above, 
this is expressed as the preference ranking { 5,4,3,2, 1}. The corresponding preference 
ordering is the vector {E, D, C, B, A}. 
Cardinal preferences involve the expression of choices in a way that permits not 
just ranking, but the relative weighting of options on a cardinal scale. In practice, 
cardinal preferences in relation to policy decisions are often measured in terms of market 
currencies. The best known and most relevant example of a cardinal preference elicited 
using surveys is Contingent Valuation. This involves eliciting a 'willingness to pay' 
(WTP) for a public good (such as environmental protection) under the cost-benefit 
analysis paradigm. 3 
It was decided to adopt an ordinal approach for the preference survey. Part of 
the decision was based on particular problems with the cardinal approach, despite 
theoretical advantages. The approach - particularly Contingent Valuation - is much 
criticised on two grounds. The first problem is technical, concerning whether it 
measures what it purports to.4 The second objection is on subjectivist grounds, 
pertaining to its assumptions about the nature of preferences (Sagoff, 1998) and even 
imposing a conception of the policy problem that individuals would not autonomously 
express (Burgess et al., 1998). 
This second objection is particularly problematic for adopting a valuation 
exercise in conjunction with a deliberative process. In short, it constitutes a particular 
from of pre-emptive consensus more serious than posed by the ordinal approach. This 
is because, by its very nature, it presumes a particular valuational perspective that 
contradicts the valuational autonomy discussed in Chapter 2. For these reasons, 
including others that I have suggested elsewhere (Niemeyer and Spash, 2001), it was 
decided not use WTP to measure preferences or preference shift in this research. 
3 For example: (Boxall et al., 1996; Carson et al., 1996). 
4 For example Spash (2000), Blarney (1998b) and Knetsch (1994). 
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7.2.2 Implementation of Preference Survey 
Having chosen the method for measuring policy preferences, this section 
describes the process used to develop the policy options used in the survey. I then 
describe the way in which the surveys were implemented during the FNQCJ. 
(a) Developing Policy Options for Politics in posse. 
Choosing the policy options to be included in the preference survey was 
problematic. This was not least because it had to balance a number of competing 
considerations. Most pressing of these was the need to balance tension between 
practical relevance and theoretical ideals. Policy options under serious consideration in 
the 'real world' are very different to those that might be part of the 'feasible set' under 
an ideal deliberative politics. 
Moreover, until fairly recently there were no real-world policy debates in a 
formal sense from which options for preference survey might be drawn. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the Bloomfield Track issue has been in policy stasis since construction. 5 
Those options debated by decision-makers under politics in esse, tend to be limited to a 
very narrow set, almost invariably limited to 'undertake works to reduce maintenance 
costs of the road', or 'leave as it is'.6 
The only guide to policy options that might be considered include a good range 
of possible options are those canvassed by WTMA in 1999 (Carrodous, 1999).7 These 
included: 
• 
• 
• 
maintaining the road to its present standard (status quo option); 
closing the road, rehabilitating the road footprint and creating a walking track; 
upgrading the road in critical sections to improve its reliability and safety 
whilst maintaining its essential 'wilderness' character; and 
5 It was not until 1999 when the need to address the enormous cost of maintenance forced the Douglas 
Shire Council into action that any formal debate has been undertaken, with talk of undertaking an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The imperative for an EIS emerged with the Douglas Shire 
Council applied to WTMA, to lay gravel over sections of the Bloomfield Track. Approval was given 
on the condition that a study on the long-tenn future of the Bloomfield Track be undertaken. 
6 A recent planning report (Rainforest CRC, 2000), completed shortly after the FNQCJ, is emblematic of 
this 'time bias' (Bovens and t'Hart, 1996, pp.22-27) or issue incrementalism. Nowhere in the report is 
closure of the Bloomfield Track discussed, although still conservationists support this option. 
7 See discussion concerning policy options and processes concerning the Bloomfield Track issue in 
Chapter 4 
- 210-
Sectbn 7.2: M~ Policy Preferen::es for~ Bloomfield Track 
• upgrading the road to two-wheel drive all-weather standard. 
This list of options is controversial under politics in esse by virtue of its 
inclusion of closure. The prospect of returning to the pre-Bloomfield Track status quo 
invokes strong passions from sections of the Bloomfield Community.8 This occurs now 
despite much indifference to it when it was constructed.9 These interests have played a 
powerful role in shaping the policy agenda, their protestations contributing to a much-
constrained feasible set. 
The dominance of local politics by community interests may suggest that 
politics in esse tends to exclude the 'interests' of nature. As Goodin (1996) points out, 
in the real world nature does not get to vote. However, here I wish to measure its 
appreciation under deliberative politics in posse, although I do not presuppose what 
nature would 'say' -through intersubjective (communicative) discourse of deliberators. 
To avoid pre-empting what this might be, as wide a range of policy options as possible 
has been included. 
(b) The Policy Preference Survey 
The policy options presented to deliberators to be ranked are shown in Table 
7-1. The table shows the abbreviation, short name and a brief description for each 
policy option. 
8 As reported in Chapter 4. Over time the Bloomfield Track has gradually come to hold greater 
significance as a means of communication with the broader community (Bums, 1999). rn discussions 
with representatives from the Bloomfield community, it was apparent that the issue over the 
Bloomfield Track was as much about local control of the issue and resentment of 'outside' interference 
as it was concern about use of the Track for transport. For more infonnation, see discussion in Chapter 
4 and witness presentations in section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5. 
9 The costs and benefits of closure to various stakeholders do not simply change sign with a policy 
reversal. Similarly, in economics it is well recognised that the (psychic) cost of losing a gain is often 
far greater than the gain itself (Layard, 1972, p.58). 
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Table 7-1 Five policy options used in the preference survey 
Abbreviation 
BIT 
MAI 
CLO 
UPG 
STA 
Short Name 
Bituminise 
Status Quo 
Close 
Upgrade 
Stabilise 
Description 
Upgrade the road to bitumen. 
Maintain the road in its current conditio n as a 
4WD track. 
Close the road and rehabilitate it. 
Upgrade the road, to a dirt road suitable for 
conventional vehicles. 
Stabilise specific trouble spots, such as steep 
slopes, on the road but leave it as a 4WD 
track. 
The order of options in Table 7-1 is the same as that provided to deliberators, 
which was determined using random numbers. The descriptions provided are also the 
same as provided on the survey form, which is replicated in Appendix 2. 
Policy preferences were elicited twice - pre and post-deliberatively 
immediately after the Q sorts.10 This contrasts with the Q sorts, which were 
administered at three deliberative stages. The preference survey was not administered at 
the mid-deliberative phase because of the potential for bias. It was considered that an 
individual might rank options to be consistent with the previous survey. 11 If such a bias 
were in operation, the measured difference between pre and post-deliberative 
preferences would be smaller than under ideal conditions.12 
10 To avoid confusion, it was stressed to deliberators that these options did not exhaust the range of 
options that they might consider. Indeed, the jury findings as reported in Chapter 5 consider a much 
wider array of issues. Nonetheless, there is consistency between the recommendations supported by a 
particular deliberator and the preference rank given to the policy options provided. 
11 Which was considered a far greater problem for ranking of five policy options than 42 Q statements 
12 Axelrod (1973, p.1254) refers to the problem as a 'Socratic effect' whereby individuals change options 
to achieve logical consistency. In social psychology, the problem is more commonly referred to in 
cognitive consistency theory (see Dillehay et al., 1966). In retrospect, this feature of the experimental 
design was probably conservative. Under the deliberative conditions of the FNQCJ, individual 
deliberators appeared very willing (and capable) of forming policy preferences without such biases. 
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7.3 POLICY PREFERENCE RESULTS 
7.3.1 Pre and Post-deliberative Policy Preferences 
The policy preference rankings of deliberators for the five policy options are 
shown in Table 7-2. The policy options have been ordered according to the 'level of 
access' issue dimension - that is, the level of access that would result if that option 
were to be implemented. The first option, Bituminisation of the Bloomfield Track 
(BIT) constitutes a major upgrade, resulting in a high access conventional bitumen road. 
At the other end of the scale, Closure (CLO) would result in a downgrade in the existing 
road, rendering it impassable to any type of vehicle. The remaining three options -
Upgrade (UPG), Stabilise (STA) and Status Quo (MAI) - fall between these two 
extremes m terms of level of access. The resulting ordering 
{BIT, UPG, ST A, MAI, CLO} will be the standard ordering of options used for 
reporting preference results for the remainder of the thesis. 
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Table 7-2 Pre and post-deliberative preference ranks 
Juror 
ADV 
ASW 
BOA 
JAN 
JUL 
KEI 
KOO 
MAT 
PEA 
RAS 
SNO 
TAM 
Biw-
menise 
BIT 
5 
4 
5 
2 
4 
2 
5 
4 
4 
2 
Pre-deliberation 
Upgrade 
UPC 
4 
3 
3 
4 
3 
5 
4 
3 
3 
2 
5 
Maintain 
Status 
Stabilise Quo 
STA MAI 
3 2 
2 
2 
3 2 
3 4 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
3 4 
3 4 
Bitu-
Close memu 
CLO BIT 
5 
5 5 
4 5 
5 5 
5 5 
5 5 
3 4 
3 5 
5 5 
s s 
5 5 
5 
Post-deliberation 
Upgrade 
UPC 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Stabilise 
STA 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Maintain 
Status Quo 
MAI 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Close 
CLO 
2 
2 
4 
4 
2 
It is clear from Table 7-2 that the policy preferences of deliberators have been 
transformed during the deliberative process. The most outstanding example of these 
changes is that of Snoopy (SNO), for whom the pre and post-deliberative preference 
ranks have almost reversed. By contrast, the smallest preference shift is that between 
Adventure's (ADV) pre and post-deliberative preferences, which simply involves a 
reversal of pre-deliberative first and second preference. The remainder of preference 
shifts fall between these two extremes. 
7 .3.2 Aggregate Preferences 
The following discussion considers the change in aggregate policy preference 
during the deliberative process. A number of possible methods can be used to calculate 
aggregate preference (for example Stern, 1993). No single method provides the definitive 
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outcome (Marden, 1995, p.143). 13 In view of this, three different methods are used here 
- Borda, Condorcet (or consensus), and Hare. 14 
The calculations of aggregate preference are performed in A.6.1 of Appendix 6. 
Table 7-3 shows the resulting rank for pre and post-deliberative aggregate policy 
rankings using all three aggregation-methods. 
Table 7-3 Pre and post-deliberative aggregate policy rank 
Option/Aggregate Rank 
Prt:-deliberation Po1t-dtliberation 
Aggregation 
method BIT UPG STA MAI CLO BIT UPG STA MAI CLO 
Borda 3 4 2 5 5 4 3 2 
Condorcet 3 2 4 5 5 4 3 2 
Hare 3 5 2 4 5 4 3 2 
Table 7-3 shows that aggregate preference has clearly changed during 
deliberation. This can best be illustrated by examining changes to the rank of different 
options. Most dramatic of these is the change in rank of Closure. Aggregate preference 
for Closure has risen from least-preferred using two of the three aggregate methods, to a 
Condorcet winner following deliberation - ranking first for all aggregation methods. 15 
Stabilise was the Condorcet winner before deliberation. After deliberation, it has fallen 
in rank to third. Bituminise has also decreased, from third to fifth. The shifts of 
remaining options (Upgrade and Status Quo) vary depending on which aggregation 
method is used. 
(a) Aggregate Ranks and Empirical Consensus 
It appears from Table 7-3 that consensus has increased. The pre-deliberative 
aggregations vary considerably. By contrast, the post-deliberative rankings are the same 
13 This conclusion is most famously demonstrated by the work of Arrow (1963), which concludes that, 
depending on the array of preference inputs, results of aggregations are contingent upon the method 
used. 
14 Each method is described in section A.6.1 of Appendix 6. 
15 It is notable that both deliberative stages produce a Condorcet winner. That is, there is an option that 
is preferred to all others by a majority of deliberators (see section A.6.2.3 of Appendix 6). 
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irrespective of aggregation method. From casual observation this suggests that 
consensus has indeed increased during the deliberative process. This may be a result of 
increased empirical consensus. 16 It may also be due to increased meta consensus.17 
7.3.3 Discussion of Raw Results 
From the preceding discussion of the raw policy preferences and aggregations, it 
appears prima facie that there has been a significant change in preferences among 
individuals. Further, these changes collectively contribute to a change in aggregate 
outcome. Thus, the analysis so far supports the hypothesis that the deliberative 
process has given rise to a transformation of preferences. The magnitude of this shift 
appears large. The analysis has also alluded to a higher level of consensus among post-
deliberative preferences. 
Although the results support of the deliberative preference shift hypothesis, I 
have yet to analyse the significance of these observations. To this end, changes to 
individual preferences, aggregate preference and level of consensus are subjected to 
statistical analysis in the following section. 
7.4 ANALYSIS OF PREFERENCE DYNAMICS 
As was stated in the introductory chapter, an important goal of this research is 
to gain some insight into the impact on policy preferences of conditions approaching the 
ideal of 'deliberative democracy'. To this end, preference dynamics are explored in this 
section using a number of quantitative teclmiques. These include tests of significance on 
changes to individual preferences; aggregate preference; trends in change in aggregate 
preference; and changes to the level of consensus. As was the case for subjective 
dynamics in the previous chapter, the discussion does not include detailed workings. 18 
16 Which is indeed the case as will be discussed further in section 7.4.3 
17 For a discussion of types of consensus, see section 2.2.2(b) of Chapter 2. As is shown in Appendix 7, 
the increased concordance among the results is due to increased empirical, rather than meta-consensus. 
For a formal description of the nature of the increase in of consensus, see section A.6.5.3 of Appendix 
6. This analysis also suggests an increase in empirical consensus. 
18 The workings of analyses can be found in Appendix 6. 
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7.4.1 Individual Preference Dynamics 
In the following discussion, the question of whether deliberators changed their 
preferences during deliberation is examined using two approaches. The first involves a 
simple correlation between the pre and post-deliberative stages. The second concerns 
differences between preference ranks or test for randomness of preference shift. 
(a) Correlation between Pre and Post-deliberative Ranks 
The extent to which there is agreement between a deliberator's pre and post-
deliberative preference rank was measured using Spearman' s correlation. 19 In short, the 
correlation coefficient (r) indicates the level of association between preference ranks.20 
A correlation coefficient of 'l' denotes perfect agreement; '-1' denotes perfect 
disagreement between ranks; and a value of 'O' denotes no agreement or disagreement, 
suggesting that the ranks are independent. 
The correlation between pre and post-deliberative ranks for each deliberator is 
shown in Table 7-4. It can be seen from the table that there is a statistically significant 
level of overlap between the pre and post-deliberative preference ranks of two of the 
deliberators (Adventure and Keith). In other words, the pre and post-deliberative ranks 
appear significantly related. By contrast, the results suggest that there is a statistically 
significant inverse relationship between Snoopy's pre and post-deliberative preferences 
(ie. a significant preference shift). 
19 See Section A.6.1.2 of Appendix 6 for a description of Spearman 's correlation coefficient and tests for 
significance. 
20 The square-product (r2) indicates the level of agreement between ranks in percentage terms, or more 
specifically, the level of variation in one set of ranks, that can be explained by another (see Gibbons, 
1993). 
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Table 7-4 Correlation between individual pre and post-deliberative 
preference 
Preference Ranks Correlation 
Pre-deliberation Post-deliberation Spearman 
Juror x y r(x ,y) z· (H0 : p~o) z 
ADV 54321 54312 0.90 1.80 
ASW 43125 5 4 3 1 2 0.20 0.40 
BOA 5 3 1 2 5 54231 0.40 0.80 
JAN 14325 54321 - 0.60 -1.20 
JUL 21345 5 3 124 -0.29 -0.58 
KEI 43215 53214 0.80 I.60 
KOO 25143 45231 0.50 1.00 
MAT 5 4 2 1 3 54321 0.70 1.40 
PEA 4 3 125 54321 0.00 0.00 
RAS 4 3 125 54321 -0.10 -0.20 
SNO 1234 5 5 4 3 1 2 -0.90 -1.80 
TAM 2 5 3 4 1 54321 0.30 0.60 
Although indicative of the extent to which deliberators have changed their 
preferences, in terms of making inferences, these results really do not reveal a great deal. 
There are two main problems. The first is the small number of options from which to 
derive the correlations (m = 5).21 This means establishing statistical significance requires 
a very large preference shift, in the order of 0.80! Even where significance is achieved, 
the result merely suggests something about the relationship between two ranks. It does 
not support inferences about whether or not a particular preference shift is large enough 
to be considered significant. 
(b) Testing Preference Shifts Using Distance Models 
To explore further changes to preferences, I will tum approaches that use 
'distance' between preferences rankings.22 One such approach helps to overcome the 
21 Where m is the number of policy options, as opposed to n, which tends to be used to denote the 
number of individuals performing a preference ranking. 
22 For a description of Euclidean distance, see A.6.1 of Appendix 6. 
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problems testing preference shift without a control group of individuals not 
participating in the deliberative process.23 Devised by Critchlow & Verducci (1992) it 
tests the probability that any given change in preference rank is due to random 
variation.24 It does so by generating a probability distribution using the distance 
between pre and post-deliberative ran.ks. The method is detailed in Appendix 6.25 The 
results of the analysis using Spearman distance are shown in the last column of Table 
7-5. The table shows the Spearman distance between the pre and post-deliberative 
ran.ks of deliberators, with the significance of the test for randomness indicated by the 
level of shading. 
Table 7-5 Distances between pre and post-deliberative preferences 
Juror Spearman Distance 
ADV 2 
ASW 1 6 
BOA 1 2 
J AN 3 2 
JUL 2 7 
KEI 2 
KOD 10 
MAT 5 
PEA 2 0 
RAS 2 2 
SNO 38 
TAM 14 
No. significant results 4 
# =p < 0.05 .. =p < 0.001 
Table 7-5 shows four deliberators yielding a significant preference shift. 
Curiously, the two smallest shifts (Adventure and Keith) yield significant results. This 
suggests that they are a result of ' deliberate' transformation. Although counter-
intuitive, the results make sense if we consider the nature of the test. If these 
deliberators did not have well-formed preferences at both deliberative stages, the chance 
23 This was considered, but decided against because of lack of resources and the likelihood that it would 
contribute little additional insight into preference transformation during deliberative processes. 
24 Details of the test can be found in section A.6.3 .1 of Appendix 6,. In short is related to Mallows 
(l 957) 'phi' model, which states that the probability of a post ranking decreases geometrically with 
increasing distance from a pre ranking (Critchlow and Verducci, 1992, p.19). 
25 Section A.6.3.1. 
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of yielding such a precise shift is relatively small. Put another way, if the preference 
shifts are random, the probability of a small shift is just as small as for a large change 
(with greater probabilities for shifts between these two extremes). 
7.4.2 Group Preference Shifts 
Preference transformation has important implications when applied to groups. 
Individual preference shifts can be significant, but if they do not follow a consistent 
pattern (ie. are non-systematic) they potentially cancel each other out, giving rise to no 
overall change. It has already been shown in section 7 .3.2 that this appears not to be the 
case. That is, there has been a change in aggregate preference such that the sum of 
individual shifts appears to have been systematic. Jn the following discussion, the 
statistical significance of aggregate changes is tested. This is followed by a test for trend 
among preference shifts. 
(a) Preference shift among the Deliberators as a group 
Testing for significance of deliberative preference shift for the group is done 
using a using a variation of a standard t-test. The workings of the test are provided in 
Appendix 6.26 In short, it uses distances between each deliberator's rank and the centre 
rank at the pre and post-deliberative stages to derive the probability distribution. The 
standard errors for these distributions are then used to calculate a z-statistic. The 
resulting value for z is 9.65 (p < 0.001) suggests that there is indeed a large difference in 
aggregate preference between the pre and post-deliberative stages. 
A similar result was obtained using a difference approach suggested by Marden 
(1995). The workings of the analysis are detailed in section A.6.3 of Appendix 6. The 
result also suggests a change in preference across the deliberative group (p < 0.001). 
(b) Trend among preference shifts 
So far, it appears that the group of deliberators significantly changed their policy 
preferences. From the discussion in section 7.3.2, we also know that the aggregate 
preference strongly converged on a particular ranking. This suggests that there is a link 
26 Section A.6.4. l . 
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between the deliberative process and increased preferenctfor ' Restrictive Access'27, the 
label given to the post-deliberative aggregate preference ranking. 
However, there remains a possibility that the convergence toward a single }Dlicy 
position is simply a matter of chance. Put another way, the convergence on Restrictive 
Access is a random event, rot a deliberate one. To this aid, below I test for a trend 
among the preference shifts toward the Restrictive Access position. 
Trend in preference shift was tested using a method similar to that in section 
7.4.2(a). Instead of the distance from the post-deliberative preference, an 'ideal' rank 
(Restrictive Access) is used to generate the probability distribution.28 
The results are reported in Table 7-6. The table shows the distance of individual 
deliberator' s pre and post-deliberative ranks from Restrictive Access, with the trend 
measured as the change between these two values. 
Table 7-6 Results of test for trend 
Ranks 
Juror Pre Post 
ADV 54321 54312 
ASW 43125 54312 
BOA 53124 54231 
JAN 14325 54321 
JUL 21435 53124 
KEI 43215 53214 
KOD 25143 45231 
MAT 54213 54321 
PEA 43125 54321 
RAS 43125 54321 
SNO 12345 54312 
TAM 25341 54321 
z (mean) 
Spearman distance from 
{54321} 
Pre Post Change 
0 2 -2t 
22 2 20 
' .. I ' 
---- - - - --
32 0 32 
36 
20 
22 
6 
26 
22 
14 
14 
12 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-2.19 
22 
8 
18 
6 
26 
22 
14 
# = p < 0.05 = p < 0.01 
- = p<0.001 
27 Restrictive Access: {CLO, MAI, STA, UPG, BIT}. 
28 See section A.6.3.2 in Appendix 6. 
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It can be concluded from the test that there appears to be a deliberate trend 
among the shifts of in deliberator preferences between deliberative stages toward the 
post-deliberative aggregate rank (p<0.01 ). Of course, this does nothing to explain why 
this shift occurred. Tentative answers are posited toward the end of this chapter, and 
more fully explored in the next. 
7.4.3 Empirical Consensus 
As first discussed in section 7.3.2(a), there appears to have been an increase in 
empirical consensus during the deliberative process. The above analysis supports the 
conclusion by virtue of deliberators converging toward the post-deliberative aggregate 
preference rank. In the following discussion, the hypothesis is tested using two 
approaches. The first uses distance of preferences from the centre rank.29 The second 
uses concordance between individual preferences. 
(a) Distance from Centre 
The test of consensus using distance from the centre rank in effect tests the 
hypothesis that the preference of deliberators have clustered more tightly about the 
centre rank. The details of this test can be found in section A.6.5.1 of Appendix 6. The 
z-statistic is derived from the array of distances between preferences and the centre, 
which is analogous to the mean in a paired t-test. The results are summarised in Table 
7-7. 
Table 7-7 Consensus test using distance from centre 
Deliberative Stage 
Pre Post Change 
Centre rank 34125 12345 
Average distance 10.83 3.33 7.50 
Standard error 2.41 1.48 2.83 
Z score 4.50 3.53 2.65 
Confidence level 0.01 0.01 0.01 
29 Centre rank has already been discussed in relation to the test for change in aggregate preference in 
section 7.4.2(a). For a more detailed discussion of centre rank, see section A.6.5.l of Appendix 6. 
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Table 7-7 indicates a large decrease in average distance from the centre rank 
during deliberation (p<0.01). From this result, it can be stated that there appears to be a 
significant increase in empirical consensus among deliberators during the deliberative 
process regarding the most preferred outcome (centre rank). However, it is interesting 
to note that, although consensus has increased, there remains a significant level of 
dissensus following deliberation. 
{b) Concordance 
The second measure of empirical consensus uses concordance among the 
preference rankings of deliberators. Where the probability distribution for the preceding 
analysis was derived using the array of distances from a centre rank, the test for 
concordance simply uses the array of distances between deliberator ranks.30 The results 
of the test for change in concordance are shown in Table 7-8. 
Table 7-8 Test for change in concordance 
Deliberative Stage 
Pre Post Change 
Average distance 17.03 5.45 11.58 
Standard error 3.39 1.54 3.72 
Z score 3.41 3.53 3.11 
Confidence level 0.01 0.01 0.01 
It can be seen from Table 7-8 that, as for distance from centre rank, the average 
distance between the ranks of deliberators has decreased during the deliberative process. 
Thus, it can be stated that, as well as converging on a centre rank, the preferences of 
deliberators have also converged toward one another. Moreover, as is the case for the 
last test, there remains a significant level of dissensus among deliberators on post-
deliberative preferences. 
7.4.4 Discussion of Statistical Analysis 
Taking stock of the .findings so far, the statistical analyses suggest that: 
• the changes in preferences of (at least some) individual deliberators are 
significant (ie. intentional); 
30 The details of the test can be found in section A.6.5.2 of Appendix 6. 
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there has been a significant change in the aggregate preference across the 
deliberators as whole; 
there is a clear trend in the direction of the preference shift of deliberators 
toward the Restrictive Access preference position; and 
there was an increased level of empirical consensus (ie. the preferences of 
deliberators where in greater agreement), although there remains a 
significant level of dissensus among post-deliberative preferences. 
Thus, overall it appears that the deliberative process has indeed had a significant 
impact on the preferences of individual deliberators. 
(a) An Assessment of Usefulness of Statistical Analysis 
One of the hypotheses drawn in Chapter 1 was that policy preferences under 
deliberative democracy should be significantly different to those under politics in esse. 
However, although statistically significant, the implications of these statistical findings 
may not be clear. Strictly speaking, they suggest (within the levels of confidence) that, 
if the entire population within the sampling area were subjected to exactly the same 
deliberative process (as the FNQCJ), then similar changes in preference should be 
observed.31 
Of course, such a conclusion is untenable. It is simply not possible to subject an 
entire population to exactly the same process as the FNQCJ. Apart from the obvious 
problems pertaining to limited resources, the actual process of the FNQCJ is not 
replicable.32 Even if it can be replicated, there remain problems. Unless it is possible to 
understand the reasons why deliberation changed preferences, it is not possible to make 
inferences about the impact of deliberative processes more generally. 
That these shifts are the result of deliberate transformation requires further 
analysis. This will be done in the following section using qualitative information 
regarding the reasons why these transformations occurred. In other words, although 
31 This is the very claim made in respect to deliberative opinion polls (Fishkin, 1995). 
32 It would be impossible to control any deliberative process after the FNQCJ such that it was an exact 
carbon copy of its predecessor. Although the basic components of design can be repeated (selection 
process, witnesses, deliberative process) there are nuances and potential wildcards in the deliberative 
process. These will always lead to variations, which may greatly affect results. The scope for impact 
of potential wildcards to alter the deliberative outcomes associated with the FNQCJ are considered in 
more detail in Chapter 8, and found to have only have marginal effects. However, such an analysis is 
possible only because of the use of qualitative data other than preferences to assess the deliberative 
outputs. 
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these statistical results are indicative, they can only be confirmed using when paired 
with qualitative analysis (see Lin, 1998). This is because statistical method, while 
useful for inference, cannot deduce. The objective of this research is not simply to 
determine significance of policy preference shifts, but also to understand process of 
deliberative preference transformation. The following section begins this process. 
7.5 DISCUSSION: DELIBERATIVE DYNAMICS OF 
PREFERENCES 
This section supplements and interprets the statistical analysis above. In 
contrast to statistically significant shifts in preference, the primary focus here is on 
substantive assessment of preference shift. ln the following section, differences between 
statistical and substantive assessments of preference shifts are examined and interpreted. 
Explanations for differences are suggested. Conclusions are then drawn about the nature 
of the observed deliberative dynamics based on the results, including the extent to which 
results may be extrapolated to the broader population under conditions that approach 
that of deliberative democracy. 
7.5.1 Self-Assessment of Substantive Shifts 
The term 'substantive assessment' here refers to the use of an array of data to 
understand the 'substance' of deliberative dynamics, rather than simply infer findings 
from statistical analysis. One important example of substantive criteria is that of 
subjective assessment of preference shift. In other words, whether or not deliberators 
themselves believe that they had changed their preferences. Subjective assessments 
were elicited during final survey administered following the deliberative process. 33 The 
results are summarised in the fifth column of Table 7-9, indicating whether a deliberator 
thought their mind had changed in relation to the issue. 
33 See survey results in Appendix 2. Importantly, this is not to suggest that surveying self-assessment 
provides the definitive statement of matter, which is precisely why a number of methods are compared 
to explore preference shifts. 
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From Table 7-9 it can be seen that the majority of deliberators (eight of the 
twelve) indicated a substantive shift. 34 These results are compared to the findings from 
the statistical analysis of preference shifts in section 7.4.1, shown in the second to 
fourth columns of the table, where a 'tick' indicates a significant finding. 
Table 7-9 Statistical versus Substantive Findings 
Juror 
ADV 
ASW 
BOA 
JAN 
JUL 
KEI 
KOO 
MAT 
PEA 
RAS 
SNO 
TAM 
# 
Distance/ 
Randomness 
Spearman 
./ 
Correlation 
Speannan 
./ 
./ 
,/ " I 
' "' 
·------· 
= p < 0.05 =p<0.01 
Self 
asessment 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
Substantive 
Change in position 
with respect to closure 
(CLO= 1 ~ CLQ.= 1) 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
./ 
- =p <0.001 
Using Table 7-9 to compare the findings from both statistical analysis and self-
assessment shows very little correlation between the two approaches. This begs the 
question: is there any way in which the preference data can be examined to produce a 
correlation with self-assessment? It turns out there is. It appears that the most 
(substantially) significant indication of a preference shift that can be gained directly from 
the preference data concerns whether or not deliberators changed their preference in 
relation to a simple binary choice. This choice was between closure of the Bloomfield 
Track, or any other option, whereby it remains open. 
The agreement between these assessment criteria is demonstrated in Table 7-9. 
In the last column of the table, a 'tick' indicates those deliberators who changed their 
position on the issue of Bloomfield Track closure. Comparing these results with self-
34 Note that the question put to individual deliberators did not explicitly concern preferences, but refers 
more broadly to subjectivity: whether or not deliberators had 'changed their mind' on the issue. 
-226-
Section 7.5: Disc:l.6mn: Delirera~ Dymrnics of Prefererres 
assessment reveals disagreement in the case of only one deliberator (Snoopy).35 This 
suggests that, when judging the substantiveness of preference shift, each deliberator was 
preoccupied with the issue of Bloomfield Track closure. 
(a) Substantive Preference Shifts and Symbolism: Bloomfield Track Closure as a 
Symbolic Issue 
A likely explanation for the findings above can be found in social psychology 
literature pertaining to symbolic politics. Despite the machinations within the political 
sphere that have tended to exclude closure from the feasible set, within the discursive 
sphere the issue is very much alive. Arguments for the closure of the Bloomfield Track 
appear at regular intervals in local newspapers.36 As discussed earlier in this chapter37 
and Chapter 4, the prospect of closure invokes strong passions from interest groups. 
Chapter 4 identified the Bloomfield Track as an important symbolic important 
link to the outside world for local residents; and as the harbinger of rainforest 
destruction for environmental groups. In this symbolic context, other measures beyond 
the issue of 'close, or not to close' are of comparatively lower significance in the 
discursive landscape of the individual. 
That symbolic issues dominate self-reporting in surveys has also been observed 
by Krosnick (1991). He argues that symbolic attitudes tend to remain stable over time, 
relative to other non-symbolic attitudes.38 This is not because symbolic attitudes are 
inherently stable, as far as they tend not to change. We have already seen from the 
previous chapter that concerning symbolic claims experienced the greatest level of 
change during the deliberative process. 39 Although beliefs changed, the values that made 
35 Nevertheless, Snoopy has dramatically changed in terms of preference, as can be recalled from section 
7.4.l. Although not favouring closure of the Bloomfield Track outright, it was elevated from fifth to 
second in preference ordering. The change is indeed large and probably substantial according to 
Snoopy. The same could be true for Janine, who also experienced a large preference shift and changed 
her mind on the Closure issue. Indeed, there is probably some function of change in relative ordering 
of Closure that yields perfect concordance with self-assessment - such as finding the difference rank of 
Close, which is weighted in proportion to the inverse of its rank. However, the main finding, that 
Closure is substantively the most important issue in the mind of deliberators, does not change. 
36 See Chapter 4. 
37 See page 21 l. 
38 Symbolic attitudes refer to those that are formed early in life by social conditioning (see section 
l.2.4(a) in Chapter l, esp. footnote 32 on page 15). 
39 As evidenced by the dramatic decline of Propitiatism. See section 6.5. l(d). 
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salient these beliefs may remain (such as underlying values that stress the importance of 
community access or the environment). 
What is most important about symbolic attitudes is their salience. Symbolic 
attitudes are those that are 'chronically accessible' during the evaluation of an attitude 
object (Fazio, 1986). Thus, without further priming, these attitudes are most likely to 
feature in the processing of a given issue, such as that of the Bloomfield Track. Because 
these attitudes are most accessible, any change in belief associated with them is most 
likely to feature in self-reporting. Thus, substantive changes in policy preferences 
reflects the symbolic nature of the politics in esse surrounding the issue, where citizens 
were primed to respond consider the issue along the polarised 'to close or not to close' 
issue dimension.40 
The importance of the closure as a symbolic issue should not suggest that change 
to preferences relating to other policy options are neither important nor substantive. 
They are. These policy options were carefully considered on the final day of the 
FNQCJ. Moreover, the fact that certain types of policy options were post-
deliberatively given low ranks by almost all deliberators is significant. Consequently, it 
is pertinent to investigate preference dynamics across the set of policy options, not just 
a dichotomous choice concerning closure. As will be seen below, this is certainly true 
for collective preference dynamics. 
7.5.2 Substantive changes to aggregate outcome 
Section 7.4.2 showed a significant shift in aggregate preference during the 
deliberative process. Moreover, there was clear trend among these shifts toward the 
Restrictive Access preference position. 
Turning to substantive analysis of these fmdings, although there is little 
qualitative data before deliberation it is possible to gain some appreciation of the extent 
of substantive change for the group by referring to Table 7-9. The table shows that 
eight of the twelve deliberators recorded a significant change in preference based on their 
own self-assessment. Seven of these were associated with a change in preference with 
respect to the choice between closure-non closure. Thus, it can be stated that, on the 
40 As can be seen in Appendix 7, the salience of this issue dimension in the political sphere led to 
deliberator's structuring their preferences accordingly. 
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symbolically important issue as to whether or not the Bloomfield Track should be 
closed, there is a change in preference among the majority of deliberators. 
There is also agreement between findings from aggregate preferences and the 
deliberator's report.41 The report included two recommendations. The majority 
recommendation was Closure; the dissenting finding favoured the status quo, pending 
further research into environmental impacts. Both recommendations precluded the 
remaining policy options of Stabilise, Upgrade and Bituminise, all of which have very 
low ranks in aggregate preference following deliberation. This finding also concords with 
the analysis of trend among preference shifts in section 7.4.2(b). 
7.5.3 Substantive Consensus 
For similar reasons to assessment of change to preference for the group - lack 
of data at the pre-deliberative stage - it is difficult to assess any snbstantial change in 
consensus. However, it is possible to draw tentative findings. In the previous 
discussion I referred to substantive dissensus among the group following deliberation 
over whether or not to close the Bloomfield Track. This is consistent with assessment 
earlier in the chapter that most important issue in the minds of deliberators was the 
choice over closure. In other words, there was a form of meta consensus over the 
important issue dimension (as confirmed by analysis in Appendix 7). 
The deliberator's report also points to both high levels of empirical consensus 
across the range of policy options; yet a strong residual dissensus. However, statistical 
and substantive assessment does not perfectly concord. It can be seen in Table 7-2 that 
two deliberators (Keith and Julie) nominated a first preference for Stabilise. In the 
deliberator's report they concurred with the minority positions, this expressed a 
preference for the Status Quo.42 
There are two possible reasons for this discrepancy. The first is that there may 
have been an element of coercion during the final phase of the deliberative process. If 
so, these deliberators may have forgone the expression of their 'true' preference position 
for the sake of enhancing the ability of the deliberators to produce a result. This finding 
41 Which is summarised in section 5.4 of Chapter 5, with the details provided in Appendix 4. 
42 See section 5.4 in Chapter 5. 
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concurs with a number of critics of deliberative processes.43 Indeed, such dynamics run 
counter to the design principles of the FNQCJ laid out in Chapter 3. 
There is, however, another possible reason for the discrepancy. There appears 
to be a higher level of random variation associated with surveyed policy preferences 
because they are not accompanied by reasons. This assertion is supported in this case 
to the extent that, when queried about their preferences, both Julie and Keith did not see 
a distinction between the policy options of Status Quo and Stabilise. This was because 
they acknowledged that some stabilisation works had already been undertaken. Both 
strongly disagreed with any works to the Bloomfield Track that would constitute any 
form of upgrade. In effect, their preferences acknowledged an approval of those works 
done to date, where the remainder of the deliberators attributed the option to further 
works that might be conducted in the future. 
Thus, as argued in Chapter 5 coercion leading to an oppressive consensus appear 
not to have featured in the dynamics of the FNQCJ process. Rather, differences 
observed in the analysis of preferences where due to subtle variations in the 
interpretation of the options presented. 
That resolving the gap between surveyed preferences and the findings of the 
FNQCJ involved combining a number of insights strengthens the argument for the use of 
triangulation in analysis. It also suggests that the results of deliberative processes that 
involve larger sample sizes, but only report findings based on preference aggregations -
such as deliberative opinion polls - may produce 'dumb' results. They do not 
properly communicate the true intentions of these deliberating the issue at hand. Only 
reasons can do that. 
7.6 CONCLUSION 
The major findings from the analysis in this chapter can be summarised as five, 
inter-related, components of deliberative dynamics: 
43 Such as Kuran {1998). As discussed in Chapter 1, these contend that any deliberative consensus is an 
artefact of deliberative processes that serve to constrict the expression of certain perspectives, and is 
thus oppressive (see also Mouffe, 1993; Femia, 1996). 
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a change to individual preferences (of at least half of deliberators); 
an emphasis on the issue of Bloomfield Track closure and changes in opinion 
on this issue as dominant in determining self-assessment of changes to 
preferences; 
a clear trend in the direction of changes to preferences toward a dominant 
position; and (consequently) 
a strong increase in the level of consensus, though a residual of significant 
dissensus; and 
a change in aggregate outcome . 
These findings go some way to demonstrate that deliberation does transform 
preferences. 
The triangulated analysis of deliberative dynamics served to illustrate the more 
general point that preferences are 'dumb' when analysed on their own. They cannot 
communicate reasons for preference ordering without recourse to an understanding of 
underlying processes. Thus, although the analysis conveys a certain type of 
information, the analysis is far from definitive. These statistical findings cannot stand 
on their own as a definitive assessment of the changes to preference during the 
deliberative process of the FNQCJ. 
To understand the deliberative dynamics in respect to policy preferences it is 
necessary to consider not just the magnitude of preference shifts, but also the reasons 
why they changed. To this end, the following chapter, which concludes the analysis of 
deliberative dynamics, brings together reasons (subjectivity) and policy preferences to 
explore how the two interact. 
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CHAPTER 8 ACTIVATING NORMS THROUGH 
DISCOURSE: DELIBERATION 
AND THE DYNAMICS OF 
SUBJECTIVITY AND 
PREFERENCE 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyses the reasons for the changes to policy preferences observed 
above in Chapter 7. It will do so by drawing the observations from the previous three 
chapters and bringing them together to describe the major processes operating during the 
deliberation to transfonn policy preferences. The approach is primarily empirical, but 
as has been the case throughout this thesis is complemented using analytical 
triangulation. The implications of the empirical findings in this chapter will be explored 
more fully in Chapter 9. 
The chapter begins in section 8.2 with a brief summary of the major findings 
made so far. Two competing explanations for the observed changes to preference are 
explored, with the 'activation ' hypothesis emerging as most likely to account for the 
deliberative dynamics of the FNQCJ.1 Evidence supporting this hypothesis developed 
so far in this thesis is briefly outlined. 
In section 8.4 the discussion turns to an empirical analysis of the activation 
hypothesis. It does so using a form of 'path analysis' to explore the extent of influence 
and manner in which each of the subjective factors contributed to the aggregate 
preference at both pre and post-deliberative stages of deliberation. Section 8.5 then 
1 See Chapter 2. 
draws on the 'preference contribution' data to examine the activation of Preservation 
and role of Pragmatism during the deliberative process. The results are used to test the 
hypothesis that the Preservation factor was activated during the deliberation process 
and that this was accompanied by a 'deactivation' of the localised factors. A subsidiary 
hypothesis is also investigated, that Pragmatism acted as a conservative 'brake' 
throughout the deliberative process. Finally, section 8.6 summarises the major findings 
of the chapter. 
8.2 REVIEW OF FINDINGS 
The previous three chapters have each provided insights into the dynamics of 
deliberative process. They have done so by focussing in tum on three aspects of 
deliberation - discourse, subjectivity and policy preference. In this section I begin the 
task of weaving together these threads to develop an overview of the major deliberative 
processes. Specifically, following the 'discursive preference model ' outlined in Chapter 
2, I seek to explain the changes to preferences by exploring the observed changes in 
discourse and subjectivity. 
The discussion begins with a brief overview of the findings from chapters 5, 6 
and 7. These are used to formulate potential explanations for the deliberative dynamics 
observed. The strongest candidate for explaining the dynamics - the 'activation of 
subjective states' - is then briefly discussed using simple exploratory analysis to 
provide a background for the more intensive analysis of the empirical data in sections 
8.4 and 8.5. 
8.2.1 Review of Findings so far 
It was observed in Chapter 5 that the major turning points during the deliberative 
process facilitated increased attentiveness of deliberators, particularly to the complex 
interrelations of the environmental issues that are associated with the Bloomfield Track 
issue. These complexities included consideration of the longer-term and interconnected 
nature of Bloomfield Track issues with other pressures on the Daintree region. Another 
feature of the issue, to which the deliberators became sensitised, was that of the 
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difficulty in holding back the 'incremental attrition' associated with the small decisions, 
which inexorably lead to a large impact.2 
By contrast, before deliberation, individuals were concerned about the 
envirorunent, but had comparatively unsophisticated ideas about how these concerns 
should translate into preferences. This was not least because of an information deficit 
regarding what was otherwise a complex issue. However, and more importantly, before 
deliberation deliberators were influenced somewhat by the simplified and polarised cues 
from the political sphere in relation to the Bloomfield Track issue. 
These cues have been characterised under the rubric of symbolic politics. The 
deliberative process appears to have dissipated the importance of symbolic issues. 
There are a number of inter-related reasons for this. First, the evidence presented did 
not sustain symbolic claims. Others were addressed by alternative policies to those 
proffered by interest groups. Symbolic claims not rejected during deliberation tended to 
be integrated into a more complex web issues pertaining to the issue. 
The issues of community access and damage to the inshore reefs are important 
cases in point. The issue of community access was dismissed in part due to evidence, 
but also because of newfound scepticism concerning the claims made by certain 
witnesses who attempted to perpetuate symbolic arguments. Moreover, deliberators 
considered alternative solutions to those put forward, which tended to stress the 
importance of the Bloomfield Track itself Specifically, the 'inland' route to the 
Bloomfield region via the Cape York Peninsula Development Road. This was seen as a 
viable alternative access to the Bloomfield Community.3 
The emphasis on damage to the inshore reefs, which had been associated with 
sediment runoff from the Bloomfield Track, also declined. This was also due in no small 
part to lack of supporting evidence. However, many deliberators still accepted that 
such damage was still plausible, though in less a spectacular fashion than claimed by 
some environmentalists. In any case, they became more engaged with more substantive 
environmental concerns, which subsumed these particular issues. These included an 
array of interconnected pressures associated with the region that threatened to 
2 Sec discussion on page 212. 
3 See map in Figure 5-1 on page 132. 
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inexorably degrade its environmental values. Consequently, although still potentially an 
issue in its own right, reef damage was no longer required as a symbol for mobilising 
environmental concern under politics in esse. Under deliberative politics in posse, 
citizens focussed on more substantive issues central to their environmental concerns. 
These discursive changes during the deliberative process were paralleled to some 
extent by the changes to subjectivity observed in Chapter 6. The smaller (localised) 
subjective factors - Propitiatism and Optimism - dramatically declined during the 
deliberative process. (Propitiatism disappeared altogether!) By contrast, the larger 
factors - Preservation and Pragmatism - persisted, although some large individual 
shifts were observed. 
The net effect of these subjective dynamics was such that there was a small, yet 
significant overall change in subjectivity during the deliberative process. As observed in 
Chapter 7, policy preferences were far more volatile. These were dramatically 
transformed from widely disparate pre-deliberative policy rankings to converge post-
deliberation upon a strong (empirical) consensus position - although there remained a 
significant dissensus. The aggregate preferences effectively eliminated certain types of 
policy options that would give rise to increased levels of access along the Bloomfield 
Track. 
These observations raise the question as to why was there such a strong 
disparity between these two (subjective and preference) dynamics? This question 
forms the basis of the analysis of deliberative dynamics in this chapter. 
8.3 EXPLAINING DELIBERATIVE DYNAMICS: 
EXPLORING THREE POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
In Chapter 2 I developed three related hypotheses that may account for any 
observed changes to policy preferences during the deliberative process - construction, 
transformation and activation.4 In the following discussion I will briefly consider the 
role of each in the changes in policy preferences observed during the deliberative 
• Section 2.5.5. 
-236-
Section 8.3: Ex~ DeliCera~ Dyrnmn: Ex~ 1hre (XlSSible e.xplamtion> 
process. I will begin the discussion with subjective transformation as explaining 
preference shift, mainly because this is the easiest to account for, before moving on to 
construction. I will then consider the activation hypothesis in some detail. 
8.3.l Subjective Transformation 
Can the deliberative preference shifts be explained by the changes across 
subjectivity, as measured by the Q sorts? To be sure, subjectivity was transformed 
during the deliberative process. This almost certainly had an impact on the changes to 
policy preferences. However, such an explanation is at best partial. That policy 
preferences shifted so dramatically compared to comparatively static subjectivity is an 
important feature of the deliberative dynamics. On the face of it, this suggests that the 
simple subjective transfonnation hypothesis in Chapter 2 - which implies that 
preference transformation maps onto subjective transfonnation - cannot adequately 
account for the observed changes. These findings are also backed by additional analysis, 
which is reported in Appendix 8.5 In order to account for the observed results, we need 
a better explanation. 
8.3.2 Preference Construction 
Preference construction may help to account for the discrepancy between 
preference shift and subjectivity. It can be recalled from section 2.5.S(a) in Chapter 2 
that the construction hypothesis operates on the assumption the pre-deliberative 
preferences were poorly (intersubjectively) constructed, at least relative to post-
deliberation. That is, pre-deliberative ends were not well (intersubjectively) matched 
with preferences for policy means across the deliberators.6 Thus, any observed 
preference shift is due not to changes in subjectivity, but an improvement in the 
intersubjective construction of preference to match means and ends such that all 
deliberators came to agree on how subjectivity should map onto preferences. 
Using the raw subjectivity data (ie. not differentiated into the subjective factors), 
this appears to be the case. Before deliberation there was little relationship between any 
two deliberators' Q sorts and their preference rankings. By contrast, there was a strong 
5 Section A.8.2.1. 
6 For a discussion of preference construction, see section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2. 
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relationship following deliberation. This can be quickly demonstrated by referring to 
Figure 8-1. The figure plots similarity between pairs of deliberator Q sorts 
(subjectivity, x-axis) against similarity between their policy preference ranks (y-axis) 
using Spearman's correlation coefficient. The pre and post-deliberative plots are shown 
as stars and dots respectively. 
Figure 8-1 lntersubjective construction of preferences using raw Q d ata 
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It can be clearly seen from Figure 8-1 that there is an increased relationship 
between raw subjectivity and policy preference during deliberation. The post-
deliberative regression is negative, suggesting that individuals who agreed on subjective 
grounds tended to disagree on policies, but the relationship is not significant. Using the 
95% confidence interval for the pre-deliberative regression line, before deliberation, there 
appears to have been no significant relationship. By contrast, the upsloping regression 
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line for the post-deliberative points (with the 95% confidence interval shaded) clearly 
depicts a clear (and strong) relationship between subjectivity and policy preference. 
These raw results strongly point to preference construction - that preferences 
shifted because deliberators simply came to intersubjectively agree on matching means 
to ends (epistemic consensus). However, all is not as it seems. Attempting to 
triangulate the results points us in a different dimension. 
Despite the apparently strong empirical evidence pointing to preference 
construction, evidence based on direct observation suggests otherwise. From 
observations of the deliberative process, it is clear that many deliberators held well-
fonned pre-deliberative views about the Bloomfield Track issue. Moreover, their 
preferences tended to be consistent with these views. Most importantly, there was 
agreement concerning what policy outcomes should be matched with particular ends. 
This suggests that there is more going on than reliance on raw results alone can 
reveal. And indeed there is. Detailed analysis, which is conducted in Appendix 8 
demonstrates that there was in fact a great deal of epistemic consensus among 
deliberators.7 This tends to suggest that, as for subjective transfonnation, preference 
construction can account for only a small amount of the observed preference shift. 
However, if we consider both scenarios together, under the activation hypothesis, then 
the explanatory power increases considerably. 
8.3.3 The Activation Hypo thesis 
As discussed in Chapter 28, the deliberative activation hypothesis is in effect a 
combination of both the subjective transfonnation and preference construction 
hypotheses. It works such that small changes in subjectivity give rise to large changes in 
preferences because of the 'switching on' or 'switching off of particular discourses 
during the preference construction process. At the same time, the discourses that 
influence the subjectivity of individual remain relatively stable, especially the more 
fundamental values resulting from political socialisation, as described under symbolic 
politics in Chapter 1. 9 
1 Section A.8.2.2. 
8 Section 2.5.S(c). 
9 Section l.2.4(b); see also section 7.5. l(a) in Chapter 7. 
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Political actors hoping to influence public opinion to serve particular interests 
readily invoke these symbolic discourses. 10 When they succeed this serves to 'crowd 
out' otherwise dominant discourses, including those based on more general (indeed 
generalised) interests hence. 11 Consequently, where individuals might make different 
choices under less strategic conditions, their policy preference come to reflect these 
particularised discourses, which manifests in symbolic preferences, or 'public opinion'. 
Under the activation hypothesis, these symbolic preferences can be transformed 
without involving a process of major subjective transformation, which simply would not 
occur during the deliberative process of four days duration. So long as individuals share 
generalizable interests the deliberative process may serve to activate them via the 
processes outlined in section 2.4.4 of Chapter 2. 
This suggests there are two types of activation in play. The first involves the 
deactivation of particularised interests, elevated by the symbolic political process in 
esse. The second concerns the activation of shared subjective states under conditions of 
communicative rationality, or politics in posse. In the following discussion I will 
explore the evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
(a) Preliminary Evidence: Preferences Structuration and Symbolic Issue 
Dimensions 
It is possible to support the activation hypothesis using relatively simple 
observations. This involves assessment of the structuration of pre and post-deliberative 
preferences - that it, the extent to which a particular issue dimension has dominated. 
The second involves an examination of the relationship between discourse observed 
during the deliberative process and subjective states. I will briefly discuss these 
observations below before going on to more specific analysis using the subjective 
factors. 
10 Giving rise to particular subjective predispositions to the issue, or 'symbolic attitudes', using the 
conventional terminology of social psychologists (for example Krosnick, 1991). 
11 A type of crowding out effect whereby particular kinds of motivations are thwarted by the prevailing 
political environment has been described by Frey ( 1997). Although Frey focuses on the impact of the 
policy settings chosen by decision makers on the motivations that drive the actions, the phenomenon 
also applies to the impact of specific arguments that are articulated within the political sphere and their 
subsequent impact on the activation of discourses in the subjectivity of individuals. 
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It was suggested in Chapter 212 that preference structuration might prove useful 
for probing preference dynamics without the need for additional data. A detailed 
description of preference structuration is provided in Appendix 7. In short, if there is 
some issue dimension that is influential to preferences of individuals, then this will be 
reflected to the extent the their preference ranks can be plotted along that dimension so 
as to produce a series of 'single peaks' . 
Dryzek and List (2001) have argued that deliberation should increase preference 
structuration, because of the possible emergence of generalised interests during the 
deliberative process. The result is that individuals come to agree on how alternative 
policies should be ordered according to the important dimensions of the issue, without 
having to agree on the preferred outcome on that dimension. 13 However, while politics 
in posse produces structured preferences, so too will politics in esse, as I have described 
it in relation to the Bloomfield Track issue. 
I have described symbolic politics as reducing complex issues to simple symbols. 
I have also described the Bloomfield Track issue as polarised between to main (pro and 
anti) positions whose advocates have employed symbolic arguments to elevate their 
cause. To the extent that these dynamics dominated pre-deliberative preferences, it 
should be possible to observe them manifesting in a structuring of preferences between 
the Close and Bituminise policies. 
Analysis in Appendix 7 shows that pre-deliberative preferences were highly 
structured along the Close-Bituminise policy dimension. By contrast, post-deliberative 
preferences were also highly structured. However, rather than being dominated by a 
single (polarised) issue dimension, structuration was possible along a number of 
preference orderings. This was because the main effect of deliberation was not to 
increase structuration (or meta consensus), but empirical consensus.14 
From this tentative evidence, it appears that symbolic politics may have served 
to fracture a potential consensus among deliberators. Deliberation, on the other hand, 
12 Section 2.2.l(c), 
13 Their hypothesis has been empirically tested by McLean et al (2000), with some success, except for the 
provisos that I consider in Appendix 7. 
14 See section 2.2.2(b) in Chapter 2. 
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aligned preferences not along particular (symbolic) issue dimensions, but shared 
subjective positions (or generalizeable interests). 
In order to be confident of these findings, I need to explore more fully the actual 
role of the subjective factors in the construction of preferences. That is, to see if 
discourses associated with particular (or localised) politics were dissipated by the 
deliberative process and whether generalizeable interests replaced these. In order to do 
this, I first need to find a way in which to gauge these impacts. The following section 
explores one approach, based on the extent to which policy preferences were 
intersubjectively constructed based on each of the four subjective factors. 
8.4 ASSESSING THE ROLE OF THE SUBJECTIVE 
FACTORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
PREFERENCE 
This section summarises the calculation of the extent to which each of the four 
discourses (subjective factors) contributed to the construction of policy preferences. 
The aim of the exercise is to develop the tools necessary to evaluate the activation 
hypothesis. The following discussion is synoptic. A detailed analysis of the results can 
be found in Appendix 8. 
8.4.1 The Contribution of the Subjective Factors to Aggregate 
Preference 
A subjective factor may influence the construction of preference in two ways. 
The first is simply by sheer strength of a subjective position, or its abundance as 
measured by the factor loading. The second concerns its relative strength in preference 
construction, or the consistency with which it has been translated into preferences 
across a group of individuals. By combining these two potential influences, it is 
possible to derive an index that can be used to assess the roles of subjective factors in 
preference construction. 
The simplest way to derive this index of preference contribution is to use the 
product of size of a subjective factor and the extent to which it has been constructed 
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into preference. The size of a factor is simply the eigenvalue.15 The level of 
construction is measured by the level of intersubjective agreement on the relationship 
between a given factor and policy preference, which is discussed in Appendix 8. The 
resulting product of factor size and level of (intersubjective) preference construction is 
the Aggregate Preference Contribution Index (APCl). 16 The results of ACPI for each of 
the subjective factors at both the pre and post-deliberative stages are replicated in Table 
8-1. 
Table 8-1 Contribution of Subjective Factor to Aggregate Preference 
Factor Size Construction Index ACPI 
Subjective (eigenvalue) (xlOO) 
Factor pre post pre post pre post 
Preservation 4.52 4.90 0.43 0.80 1.94 3.92 
Pragmatism 1.29 1.74 0.40 0.29 0.52 0.50 
Optimism 1.18 0.52 0.45 0.05 0.53 0.03 
Propitiatism 1.22 0.23 0.50 0.30 0.61 0.07 
The results from Table 8-1 suggest that Preservation (the most abundant 
discourse throughout the deliberative process) was relatively inactive in policy 
preferences before deliberation, compared to its pre-deliberative contribution. 
Moreover, the influence of both the 'localised' discourses, Optin1ism and Propitiatism, 
have dramatically declined during the deliberative process. Optimism in particular has 
declined because of a decrease in preference construction. 
Before deliberation, Propitiatism was most consistently constructed into 
preference. Following deliberation, it had very little influence because of its dissipation 
resulting in very small (negligible) abundance. The role of Pragmatism in aggregate 
preference appears to have remained relatively constant throughout the deliberative. 
15 See footnote 31 on page 170. 
16 
APCs - sf x FPCs, where abundance is measured by the average factor loading of deliberators on a 
subjective factor Sand Subjective Preference Construction is the level of consistency with which these 
deliberators construct that subjective factor into preference. 
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The consistency with which it has been constructed into preferences has declined during 
the deliberative process, but is offset by an increase in its size. 
Leaving Pragmatism aside for the moment - it presents a special case, which 
will be addressed more fully in 8.5.2 - these findings tend to support the activation 
hypothesis. Preservation, the most 'preferred' discourse throughout the deliberative 
process was crowded out by the remaining factors, particularly Propitiatism, which was 
slightly more strongly constructed into policy preferences. Following deliberation, 
Preservation jumped clear of the field. In other words, it was activated through 
deliberation. 
So far, these results seem clear enough. However, it is possible to increase the 
clarity of the findings using a simple 'standardisation' exercise. I will adumbrate this 
process in the discussion that follows. 
(a) Relative Contribution to Aggregate Preference 
Although ACPI provides a good indication of the contribution of each to the 
subjective factors to aggregate preference, it does not clearly show the level of 
contribution relative to its size. A better measure can be found by standardising the 
level of contribution to the relative size of the factor. The results of this exercise are 
shown in Table 8-2. It shows the relative size of each factor, the relative contribution to 
aggregate preference and activation index. The relative size of each factor is simply the 
proportion of the total level of variation explained by all four factors combined of a 
particular factor. 17 The relative contribution of a factor to aggregate preference is 
similarly the proportion of its associated ACPI to the total ACPI. 
The activation index, shown in the last two columns of Table 8-2, is the quotient 
of relative contribution and relative size. An activation index of 1 indicates that the 
contribution of the factor is proportional to its size. A value less than 1 indicates that it 
has been relatively inactive in constructing preference. Conversely, a value of greater 
than 1 suggests that it has been strongly activated. 
17 , Or RS = EV / EV 1 where EV,..., - ~EV for all four factors. A A tota £, 1 
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Table 8-2 Relative Contribution of Factors to Aggregate Preference 
Relative Size Relative Activation Index 
Contribution 
Subjective (% of total) (%} 
Factor pre post pre post pre post 
Preservation 55 66 54 87 98 1 3 1 
Pragmatism 16 24 14 1 1 9 1 47 
Optimism 14 7 1 5 103 8 
Propitiatism 1 5 3 17 2 1 l 4 4 9 
The pre and post-deliberative results for the activation index for the four 
subjective factors suggest that, given their size, their pre-deliberative role in preference 
consistent across the factors. However, following deliberation, Preservation jumped 
clear ahead of the field, to become strongly activated compared to the remainder. Post-
deliberatively, Pragmatism and Propitiatism have been poorly constructed into 
preference relative to their size. Optimism has effectively completely lost any influence 
on the construction of preference. These findings further support the activation 
hypothesis . 
8.4.2 Summary 
The derivation of ACPI as a measure of the contribution by each subjective 
factor to aggregate preference appears to support the activation hypothesis. Although 
by far the biggest subjective factor throughout the deliberative process, Preservation was 
pre-deliberative crowded out by the remaining factors. By the post-deliberative stage, it 
has emerged as the dominant factor influencing policy preferences. 
The next largest factor prior to deliberation, Propitiatism, was more consistently 
constructed into preference - with a construction index of 0.50 to Preservation's 0.43. 
This supports the hypothesis that symbolic politics played a disproportionate role in 
preferences under politics in esse. By then end of deliberation, Propitiatism has all but 
disappeared from the discursive landscape, with a corresponding decline in its influence 
on aggregate preference. Optimism also declined in influence, but more so due to a 
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decrease in its level of construction into preference. Pragmatism, by contrast, has 
remained relatively constant in its influence. 
Following from these broad findings, a more detailed analysis of the activation 
hypothesis is conducted in the following section. 
8.5 REFINING EXPLANATIONS OF DELIBERATIVE 
DYNAMICS 
So far, the results from this chapter have pointed to a combination of activation 
and deactivation as providing the best explanation of deliberative dynamics. However, 
the analysis is not yet complete. To strengthen the findings we need to look more 
closely at the data to see if specific relationships among discourses can be elucidated. 
To this end, this section conducts a detailed analysis of deliberative dynamics in 
view of these observations. It proceeds in two parts. The first examines empirically the 
activation of Preservation into preference relative to the two smaller localised factors 
associated with politics in esse. The second part of the analysis turns to the role of 
Pragmatism in acting as a conservative brake on preferences that might otherwise have 
been constructed based on the other subjective factors. 
8.5.1 The Activation of Preservation and Deactivation of Symbolic 
Politics 
A number of observations so far have led to supposition that the potential role 
of Preservation in preferences was impeded by symbolic politics. By contrast, these 
political dynamics tended to increase the influence of both the localised subjective 
factors, compared to their impact under deliberative conditions. In the following 
discussion I will take a closer look at the subjective-preference dynamics associated with 
each factor using Preservation as a benchmark against which to address questions about 
preference shifts. 
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(a) Shifts within the Preservation Factor 
That Preservation was activated during the deliberative process can be further 
evidenced by examining Figure 8-2. The figure plots the pre and post-deliberative factor 
loadings of individual deliberators on the Preservation subjective factor along the y-axis. 
Their policy preferences are plotted on the x-axis; more specifically, their correlation 
with the Restrictive Access preference ordering - which was both the post-deliberative 
aggregate preference18 and the ordering that was associated most strongly with the 
Preservation discourse. 19 This is done for both the pre and post-deliberative stages, 
which are shown as 'stars' and 'dots' respectively. The relationship between 
Preservation and Restrictive Access at each deliberative stage is indicated by the two 
regression lines, with corresponding 95% confidence intervals shown as shading. The 
lower and upper lines represent Pre and post-deliberative regressions respectively. 
A number of observations from Figure 8-2 can be used to support the activation 
hypothesis that was developed in the last section (that Preservation was increasingly 
constructed into preferences during deliberation). Indicative of this is the fact that the 
post-deliberative regression has shifted upwards and increased in significance. The 
increasing role of Preservation on preferences can be seen in the graph. Even where 
individual loadings on the factor decreased (ie. they became ' less Preservationist'), their 
affinity with the preference position that 'Preservationists' tended to most prefer has in 
fact increased. 
18 RA = {CLO,MAI,STA,UPG,BIT} (See Table 7-3 on page 215). 
19 See Table A8-19 on page 430. 
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Figure 8-2 Scatter plot of loadings on Preservation and Restrictive Access 
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By itself, this strongly suggests the activation of Preservation. However, as I 
have already suggested in section 8.4, there is more going on. The 'deactivation' 
hypothesis states that this activation of Preservation has been facilitated by the decline 
in influence of the localised factors (Optimism and Propitiatism). This in tum tended 
'liberate' individuals to construct preferences along their Preservationist perspective -
to the extent that they agree with it. 
(b) Analysing Residual Shifts 
In order to test the deactivation hypothesis it is necessary tease-out the effects 
of the localised factors. This involves analysing the extent to which the difference in 
preference construction on Preservation can be accounted for by a decline in these two 
discourses. The approach can be conceptualised by looking at the shifts of individuals 
within the Preservation-Restrictive Access continuum in Figure 8-2. I have drawn lines 
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in the figure joining pre and post-deliberative points of deliberators. Looking at these 
lines, we can imagine the effect of different types of transformation on the direction 
they should take. If the effect on preferences is due only to subjective transformation, 
then these arrows should fall roughly parallel to the regression lines. 
From Figure 8-2 it can be clearly seen that several of the observed preference 
shifts are not simply due to subjective transformation. Five shifts strongly defy the 
trend.20 Assuming that there has not been a change (intersubjective) construction21 , 
according to the deactivation-activation hypothesis the discrepancy should be accounted 
for by changes associated with either, or both of the localised factors. 
To test the hypothesis it is necessary to factor out the changes in preference can 
be explained by changes to loading on Preservation. This is in effect involves 'rotating' 
Figure 8-2 so that the post-deliberative regression line is parallel to the x-axis. The 
approach to 'factoring out' those changes in preference that can be explained by shifts 
along Preservation is depicted in Figure 8-3. The subjective-preference shifts from pre 
to post deliberation are represented by points A and B respective. The preference shift 
on Restrictive Access is represented by the line BE. However, the individual has only 
moved along the regressing defining the Preservation-RA trade-off (AD) such that only a 
portion of this shift in RA (ED) can be accounted for by the increase in loading on 
Preservation (AE).22 The remaining shift (BD) is the residual shift on RA that cannot be 
accounted for by changes to loading on Preservation. According to the hypothesis, this 
residual shift (L\RAres) must be due to a decline in pre-deliberative interference by one of 
the other subjective factors. 
2
° Keith, Julie, Boat, Janine, Tamarra and Matilda. 
21 That is, a change in the preference ordering associated with Preservation. From A.8.1.2 in Appendix 8 
it can be seen that there has indeed been a change. However, the results have not factored-out the 
interaction between different factors in influencing preferences. ln view of this, the post-deliberative 
ranking is the more reliable. Moreover, the differences between positions arc not particularly large. 
22 Using the regression line in Figure 8-2, relationship between Preservation and Restrictive access that is 
tJ.RA.1 / 11Pres1 - 0.93. Where 6Pres1 is the change in factor loading during deliberation and 6RA1 is 
the corresponding change in correlation on Restrictive Access. The residual shift in RA is then 
determined by the equation: LI.RAJ= .1RA1 - 0.93.1 Pres1 
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Figure 8-3 Calculation of Residual Shift on Restrictive Access 
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To explain LlRAresi a number of possible explanations were explored.23 The best 
predictor of LlRAres turns out to be a combination of effects caused by Optimism and 
Propitiatism. These different effects reflect the two different types of activation 
discussed in Chapter 2.24 
23 These include the deliberative shifts on Propitiatism, Optimism and Pragmatism individually and 
combinations thereof (using sum of shifts and average of shifts). Shifts in Propitiatism during 
deliberation were reasonable predictors oft.RA,.., for those deliberators who were loading on that factor 
pre deliberatively, but this did not work for Optimism because of the comparatively smaller shifts. 
24 Section 2.5.5(d) (page 57). 
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Propitiatism is the easiest to explain. Its impact on policy preferences declined 
as a function of its abundance. In other words, it was 'deactivated' as far as it no longer 
existed as a discourse. Thus its relationship with 15.RAres is linear, or: 
/lRA.res ex: 15.f PRo 
Where 15.f PRo is a change in factor loading on Propitiatism. 
The relationship between Optimism and 15.RAres appears to be different, 
reflecting more of a 'Gestalt' process where preference construction has switched 
between Preservation and Optimism. Thus, the relationship with 15.RAres is related not 
to the change in factor loading, but the pre-deliberative loading on the factor, or 
/lRA.re•· ex: j OPT 
The relationship between the change in factor loading on Propitiatism during 
deliberation (15.fPRo) and pre-deliberative loading on Optimism ifoPT) are each plotted 
against 15.RAres in Figure 8-4. The regression lines and 95% confidence intervals are also 
shown. The lower line corresponds with those deliberators who appear to have 
constructed pre-deliberative preference on both Preservation and Propitiatism. The 
upper line shows the regression for those deliberators who appear to have pre-
deliberatively constructed preference all or in part on Optimism. The deliberators who 
do not appear to have constructed preference along one of the factors were excluded 
from the regression. They are shown in Figure 8-4 as faded names.25 
25 The process of determining these outliers followed an iterative, logical process. Beginning with 
Propitiatism, the correlation between 6PRO and 6RA, • ., is (r = 0.10). There are, however, a number of 
outliers, most notably Julie. Janine and Snoopy also appear to be outliers. Julie is an exceptional 
case, and will be dealt with at a later stage. The latter two can be accounted for more readily in that 
they are also each pre deliberatively strongly loaded on Optimism. Therefore, it is possible that their 
pre deliberative preferences were more influenced by that factor. Eliminating these three from analysis 
of 6PR0-6RA,., dramatically improves the relationship, but it also reveals two other possible outliers: 
Aswad and Boat, who are also strongly loaded on Optimism. Excising these two from the regression 
- pending analysis using Optimism - leads a dramatically increased r = 0.95. The strength of the 
relationship can be seen in Figure 8-4 by the narrow range of the 95% confidence interval for the 
regression, shown as the shaded area. Turning now to Optimism, plotting jOPTpre of the remaining 
deliberators (excluding Julie) against i'.lRA,., reveals a positive relationship, albeit comparatively weak 
compared to Propitiatism (r = 0.61). However, it is clear that Snoopy's dramatic increase in loading 
on RA could indeed be due to the deactivation of his pre deliberative Optimism. Either Propitiatism 
or Optimism could have influenced Janine. However, in comparison to the other deliberators, it 
appears that Optimism played a greater role. The same is true for Aswad, who was also significantly 
loaded on both localised factors before deliberation. 
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Figure 8-4 Scatter plot of Optimism & Propitiatism versus Residual Shift 
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Figure 8-4 demonstrates a clear relationship between residual shift on RA and 
the loading, in the case of Optimism, and change in loading in the case of Propitiatism. 
This supports the hypothesis that the localised factors interacted with pre-deliberative 
Preservationism, their influence having dissipated following deliberation. 
(c) Explaining Two Modes of Activation: The Deactivation of Optimism versus the 
Disappearance of Propitiatism 
Having established the deactivation-activation hypothesis as a reasonable 
explanation of much of the observed changes to policy preferences, I will now explore 
the most recent finding made above in relation to the types of activation occurring. 
Why did these different factors interact in such different ways? More 
specifically, why did Preservation and Optimism interact as a type of 'switch' during 
preference construction - with either one, or the other dominating preferences, but not 
both. I will begin by exploring why Preservation and Propitiatism behaved m 
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comparatively predictable ways. Quite simply, the two were able to coexist because of 
a high level of similarity, particularly in relation to concern for the environment.26 By 
contrast, there is least similarity between Preservation and Optimism of all factors, the 
two being orthogonal. 27 
Thus, while the disappearance of Propitiatism might conceivably give rise to an 
increase in Preservationism in preference construction, without involving a dramatic 
change in worldview, the interaction between Preservation and Optimism requires a 
different model of deliberative dynamics. In support of this, it can be recalled from 
Table 8-1 that, unlike Propitiatism, the drop in contribution of Optimism to aggregate 
preference is not attributable to a decline in abundance. Rather, it is due to a drop in 
preference construction. In other words, Optimism was still evident post deliberation, 
albeit much reduced. 
This raises a question. If Optimism interacted with Preservation before 
deliberation, why did it not have a similar impact afterward? The only possibility under 
the activation hypothesis involves the possibility that Optimism can be 'deactivated', 
while still lying dormant in the subjective make-up of the individual and intersubjective, 
or 'cultural' landscape. 
Part of the explanation of the difference in the changing roles of the two localised 
factors lies within the nature of the factors themselves. As discussed in Chapter 6, both 
reflect the local political and cultural context of the Bloomfield Track issue. However, 
Optimism differs from Propitiatism so far as it represents a broader and longer term, 
somewhat vestigial, political culture of technocentricity which manifests at the local 
level. Indeed, in Chapter 6, Optimism was attributed to political socialisation in the 
FNQ context. There is no reason to suppose that deliber~tion can simply wind back 
these cultural processes over a period of four days. (This is more plausible for 
Propitiatism, which is more a creation of politics surrounding the Bloomfield Track 
issue.) Thus, by its nature, Optimism is less likely to decrease in size as much as 
influence. However, as the deactivation model shows, it is possible for it to remain 
intact as part of subjectivity, but not manifest in the form of policy preferences. 
26 As was observed in Chapter 6 (section 6.3. I). 
27 Orthogonal meaning unrelated (see footnote 32 on page 170). 
-253-
Chapter8 
Further, although there are important similarities, the 'logical' preference ranking 
for each of the localised factors are very different.28 Propitiatists are against closure of 
the Bloomfield Track for negative reasons. They are keenly aware of the need for local 
access, as well as environmental damage associated with the Bloomfield Track. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, Propitiatists seek to reconcile the competing demands within the 
political sphere by balancing environmental concerns - as enunciated by environmental 
interests - with the clarion of community access. 
It proved an unstable subjective position during deliberative process as far as 
neither position could be supported, in the opinion of deliberators, in the face of the 
evidence presented. Optimism, by contrast is a much more stable. A pure Optimist, 
not loaded on other factors, emphasises the access benefits of the track unfazed by the 
belief that it causes environmental damage. This is driven not by external cues from 
claims by community interest groups, but a culturally-based belief that development is 
positive and there is a 'win-win' outcome between it and environment concerns. 
Although Optimism and Preservation appear to be subjectively stable, 
withstanding deliberative scrutiny, the coexistence of both creates conditions of 
dissonance when formulating preferences.29 Therefore, it is difficult to imagine 
tradeoffs, particularly with respect to the most salient policy choice whether to close 
the Bloomfield Track or not. An Optimist who is also loaded on Preservation is thus 
faced with an 'either/or' choice between preference positions, or unstable and incoherent 
preferences, in intersubjective terms. The result is akin to a Gestalt 'switch' depending 
on which subjective position is activated during preference construction. 
8.5.2 Pragmatism as the Counter-Case 
So far, the focus of the discussion in this section has exclusively been on the 
activation of Preservation resulting from decline and deactivation of Propitiatism and 
Optimism. The remaining factor to analyse, in terms of influence on preference, is that 
of Pragmatism. The following discussion will focus on the role of Pragmatism in 
preference construction before and after deliberation. 
28 See section A.8.1.2 in Appendix 8. 
29 For a start, the preference ranking associated with the subjective factors - Factor Preference Ranking 
(FPR) - of each is almost the reverse of the other (See section A.8.1 in Appendix 8). 
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It has been asserted on a number of occasions that Pragmatism is associated with 
conservative 'minimalist' policies such as Status Quo and Stabilise. So far, this claim 
has been made in Chapter 6 based on the discourse associated with that factor. This 
suspicion is confirmed by the calculation of the preference rank associated with it in 
Appendix 8.30 
In contrast, the analysis of activation above, teasing out the dynamics associated 
with Pragmatism requires a different approach to those between Preservation and the 
'local' subjective factors. In section A.8.2 of Appendix 8, I outline case-by-case 
approach to exploring the role of Pragmatism to establish Restrictive Access as a 
benchmark preference ordering to assess its relative impact. 
Using the ordering Restrictive Access as a benchmark, it can be readily observed 
from Figure 8-5 that Pragmatism acted as a brake on the dominant Preservationism at the 
conclusion of deliberation. From the figure, which plots loadings on Pragmatism against 
Restrictive Access in a manner similar to Figure 8-4, there is no evident pre-deliberative 
relationship between the two. This is in no small part because of the distribution of 
preferences around all four subjective factors, such that interactions between the two are 
interfered by the influences of the remaining factors. However, post-deliberatively, 
where the Preservation-Restrictive Access relationship has become dominant, it can be 
seen that Pragmatism tended to act against this overall trend. 
30 See section A.8.1. This assertion should also hold when examining the preferences of individuals who 
arc loaded on that factor. There were four deliberators loaded on Pragmatism before deliberation -
Aswad, Boat, Julie, Keith and Pearl - all of whom, apart from Julie, had ranked Stabilise and Status 
Quo either first or second. Ifwe examine the preferences of these deliberators (see Table 7-2) it can be 
seen that all of these deliberators, except for Julie, ranked either Status Quo or Stabilise first or second 
of their pre deliberative ranks. Two of these five deliberators - Aswad and Pearl - have already been 
discussed in the preceding discussion concerning the pre deliberative interaction between Preservation 
and the so-called local subjective factors. It was shown that the each increased their preference 
construction on Preservation in accordance with the deactivation, in the case of the fonner, and 
defection from Propitiatism, in the case of the latter. 
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Figure 8-5 Scatter plot of loadings on Pragmatism and Restrictive Access 
TA M3 RAS3 MAT3 '/?t5;: Vt1
1 
JA: PEA3 
\ 
-.: \ -... BOA3 
60 \ \ .w " i 
~ \ \ I I f 40 \x/ I 1\ 
o 20 TAMt \ \ Bt1 
n I \ 
100 
80 
ADV3 
JUL3 
• 
KE/3 
........ 
~ \ ~ o~~~~~~~1--~-+-~-m-=-..,_...,,....~~....,_~....;.&..;.~~__,~~~~~~~~_.;.""--
~ I 
8 / i-20 I 
·a:: -40 
-
(/) 
~ 
a:: 
-60 
-80 
-100 
-20 
I 
* JAN1 
-10 0 
SN01 
RAS1 KOD1 ASW1 
10 20 30 40 
Pragmatism (factor loading x100) 
\ 
\ 
~ · 
:JUL1 
50 60 70 
So far, I have suggested that the impact of Pragmatism on preferences has 
declined, relative to its abundance. I have also suggested that this may be because it has 
been comparatively 'deactivated' relative to Preservation. There is one very important 
case where the reverse it true. Adventure was the only deliberator to move away from 
the Restrictive Access position and decrease loading on Preservation.31 It turns out this 
change has been accompanied by an increase in Pragmatism and it appears that this shift 
accounts for a reversal of preference between Closure and Status Quo. 
As for many of the findings made so far, this is not surprise. It has been pre-
empted by discussion in previous chapters. That Adventure was concerned about the 
lack of evidence to support claims of environmental damage (which if substantiated 
would have reinforced her preference for closure) has already been highlighted in 
Chapter 5. Again, triangulation has proved useful for explaining complex deliberative 
31 See Figure 8-2 on page 248. 
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dynamics. In the following section this process of triangulation will be completed by 
bringing qualitative data back into focus in view of the finding made so far. 
8.5.3 Summary and Findings 
The degree to which individuals constructed their pre and post-deliberative 
preferences along particular subjective factors is represented in Table 8-3 and Table 8-4. 
Pre-deliberative construction of preference is represented in Table 8-3. The extent to 
which a deliberator has constructed preferences on one or more subjective factor is 
represented by a 'tick', with two ticks indicating a strong and exclusive construction of 
preference on a factor. A question mark denotes a probable relationship that has not 
been detected with any degree of certainty. 
Table 8-3 Pre-deliberative influences on Preference 
Factor 
Juror Preservation Pragmatism Symbolism Optimism Outlier 
ADV 
-ASW ../ 
BOA 
../ 
JAN ? 
JUL 
KEI 
../ 
KOD ../ ../ 
MAT 
../ 
PFA 
../ ? ../ 
RAS ../ ../ 
SNO 
TAM 
../ ../ 
# = p < 0.05 I = p<0.01 .. =p < 0.001 
It can be seen from Table 8-3 that the influences on preference are highly 
dispersed, reflecting the strongly divergent array of pre-deliberative preferences. 
Preservation appears to have featured in many deliberator preferences, but its impact 
has been strongly diluted by the other subjective factors. One deliberator, Julie, is 
clearly an outlier, who has either not constructed her pre-deliberative preferences in any 
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intersubjective manner, or whose Q sort or preference rank is subject to a large amount 
of random variation. 32 
As can be seen rn Table 8-4, by the end of deliberation Preferences had 
overwhelmingly become constructed on Preservation, with Pragmatism leading a number 
of deliberators to stop just short of advocating closure of the Bloomfield Track. It is 
also notable that, while Propitiatism disappeared, a small number of deliberators 
remained loaded on Optimism. 
Table 8-4 Post-deliberative Influences on Preference 
Juror 
ADV 
ASW 
BOA 
JAN 
JUL 
KEI 
KOO 
MAT 
PEA 
RAS 
SNO 
TAM 
# 
Preservation 
? 
../ 
= p < 0.05 
Factor 
Pragmatism 
../ 
../ 
../ ../ 
../ ../ 
? 
It = p < 0.01 
Symbolism 
.. = p<0.001 
Optimism Otttlier 
These findings should come as no great surprise in view of the previous three 
chapters. The major trends in changes to subjectivity and discourse have begun to 
emerge in Chapter 5, which covered the deliberative process. While analysing the 
subjective data, Chapter 6 identified a sharp decline in Propitiatism and, to a lesser 
extent, Optimism. In Chapter 7 a strong shift toward Restrictive Access was elucidated. 
These findings appear to corroborate those in Chapter 5, where the focus of the 
deliberative process turned from localised 'symbolic' political discourse to broader 
32 Another possibility is that Julie's pre deliberative preferences were constructed along yet to be 
unidentified subjective factor, which may have been revealed with a different, or larger sample size. 
However, in view of the evidence, this is unlikely. The most plausible explanation is that of random 
variation. 
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issues of regional environmental and economic impact, which has been attributed to 
Preservation. 
8.6 CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this chapter has shown that one of the most significant impacts 
of the FNQCJ was to activate other-regarding values, associated with the dominant 
Preservation factor. This occurred by increasing the salience of associated possible 
motivations and then providing the means, through 'awareness of consequences', to 
construct them into preferences. The main point to be made is that the deliberative 
process did not foster these types of other-regarding values. They were already there 
from the beginning. 
This finding contrasts with Goodin (1996), though not detracting from his 
central argument. He considers the possibility that group deliberation facilitates the 
cognitive appreciation of objective values (intrinsic value of nature) into subjective 
value. However, for Preservationists, and indeed Propitiatists, such values were already 
expressed - at least when prompted by reading statements on a Q sort card. 
Although Preservation featured throughout the deliberative process, what was 
lacking at the pre-deliberative stage - and under conditions of politics in esse - was 
the impetus and means to consider the implications for such values when constructing 
preferences. During deliberation this widely shared subjective state came to be activated 
into preferences, once the symbolic assertions made salient by politics in esse were 
stripped away. 
This suggests that rather than (or in addition to) encouraging intersubjective 
behaviour, the deliberative process empowered individuals to activate what were 
otherwise dormant subjective positions during preference construction. Such a finding 
would come as no surprise in view of the 'biophilia hypothesis' (Kellert and Wilson, 
1993), which posits an inherent tendency for humans to appreciate nature. The 
mechanisms identified show bow it is possible to hold these dispositions, yet not act on 
them. It has also shown how the deliberative process serves to activate generalizable 
interests. 
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In the following chapter, these, and other findings are brought together by re-
examining the theoretical literature with a view to identifying the main barriers to 
politics in posse, which I address in the final chapter. 
-26(),-.., 
PART IV: FINDINGS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
CHAPTER 9 DELIBERATION AND 
PREFERENCE 
TRANSFORMATION: 
INCORPORATING FINDINGS 
INTO THEORY 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the empirical data in the previous three chapters supports the 
main hypothesis of this research. It suggests that the main effect of the FNQCJ was to 
reduce the influence of symbolic political dynamics of the Bloomfield Track issue, 
which were associated with the localised discourses. By contrast, deliberation facilitated 
the emergence of enlarged thinking1 in respect to the most strongly shared discourse, 
characterised by Preservation. Following deliberation, this discourse give rise to strong 
agreement in policy position. 
This chapter seeks to draw out some implications of these and other findings for 
theories of policy preference fonnation and deliberative transformation. The first 
section 9.2 revisits the major influences contributing to preference transfonnation during 
the deliberative process that were explored in Chapter 8. These include the role of the 
preference construction model, the role and nature of multiple values and the distortion 
of preferences by manipulatory politics. Section 9.3 picks up this last theme and 
describes the main processes of preference distortion. It then explores the role of 
deliberation as an antidote for symbolic politics. This is followed in section 9.5 by an 
examination of the normative and practical implications of the findings from the FNQCJ. 
1 See page 42. 
Secoon9.2: Policy Preferen:e Formationarrl tre lmµicationofMultiple Norms 
It includes consideration of the stability of the deliberative outcomes and the potential 
for process manipulation. 
9.2 POLICY PREFERENCE FORMATION AND THE 
IMPLICATION OF MULTIPLE NORMS 
9.2.1 The Preference Construction Model and Prediction of Policy 
Preferences 
The discursive preference model set out in Chapter 2 established a framework 
for understanding the construction of policy preferences based on the underlying values 
and beliefs of individuals (subjectivity). Under the discursive model, preferences were 
influenced by particular discourses, or subjective 'states' comprising values and beliefs. 
Through a process of cognition subjective positions are constructed into preferences for 
policy means to satisfy desired ends. 
It was observed in Chapter 6 that there was much similarity in the underlying 
subjectivity of deliberators, even before the deliberative process. Most important of 
these was a strongly held desire to ensure that the Bloomfield Track issue is resolved to 
ensure the long-term ecological integrity of the Daintree. However, Chapter 7 revealed 
that despite this there was much disagreement amongst pre-deliberative policy 
preferences. 
This anomaly reflects an environmental attitude-behaviour gap observed by 
researchers, who show that desires and beliefs (or good intentions) in relation to 
environmental issues do not readily translate into actions(Hobson, 2001 ).2 Before 
participation in the FNQCJ, deliberators also demonstrated a form of attitude-behaviour 
gap. Despite the fact that there was a widely shared (generalizable) concern for 
substantive environmental issues, there was no similarly shared policy preference. 
It would be easy to dismiss the pre-deliberative preferences as being poorly 
constructed. Concern for the environment simply could be said to be poorly reasoned 
2 See also:(Endo and 1974, 1974; Van Liere and Dunlap, 1982; Gill et al., 1986; Ahmed, 1993). 
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into preference, supporting Schumpeter's (1943 (1976)) dictum of the 'primitive' 
citizen.3 However, as was observed in the previous chapter, there was in fact a great 
deal of structure to preferences before deliberation. Moreover, the subjectivity of none 
of the deliberators was inherently anti-environmental. There was simply more going on 
than a straightforward pro or anti-environment dynamic or even citizen-consumer 
dichotomy. The distorting influence of symbolic politics appears to undermine the 
expression of widely shared desires for particular ends in terms of behaviour (expressed 
preferences). These dynamics were only observable by dropping a strictly 'rational' 
approach to preferences, observing them instead through the lens of the four subjective 
factors extracted using Q methodology. 
9.2.2 The Role of Multiple Subjective States in Explaining Preference 
Formation and Transformation 
From the analysis in the previous chapter, it appears that preference 
transformation during the FNQCJ resulted from a particular combination of both 
preference construction and subjective transformation. More precisely, comparatively 
small changes in subjectivity gave rise to large changes in preference. This was because 
of either a decline in abundance of subjective states or their 'switching-off 
(deactivation) during the preference construction process. Similarly the 'switching-on' 
(activation) of Preservation, which came to dominate post-deliberative preferences, also 
contributed to a large preference shift. 
Thus, the preference construction model is only useful in helping to describe the 
construction of preferences so far as it is used in conjunction with a conception of 
multiple subjective states through which a particular choice function can be viewed. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, multiple states coming to bear on preferences is not a new idea. 
However, to date there has been a tendency to presuppose certain modes of behaviour, 
or 'psychologisms'. 
By contrast, I have sought to explore, through observation of subjectivity, the 
actual contours of these states, and how they influence policy preferences change during 
deliberation. The results have shown that adopting pre-formed categories for 
3 See page 6 in Chapter I. 
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observation may be misleacling. At best, they decrease the explanatory power of the 
model. I discuss the problem below, using the citizen-consumer dichotomy as an 
example. 
(a) The Relevance of the Citizen-Consumer Dichotomy 
As discussed in Chapter 24, much of the discussion of multiple states in relevant 
politics and economics literature tends to delineate between self and other-regarcling 
norms. More specifically, they distinguish between situations where individuals act in 
their own interest, by contrast to actions taken for the benefit of someone else (society, 
nature, the unborn etc.). In respect to environmental preference, the tension between 
private and public actions is most recognisably identified by Sagofrs (1988) 'citizen-
consumer' dichotomy. 
Although conceptually important, it appears that the citizen-consumer dynamic 
did not feature in the four subjective factors or in the preferences of deliberators. 
Rather, it was only observable at the very margins of a broader discourse that embodied 
this simple dichotomy.5 This observation serves to highlight problems with the a priori 
nature of the citizen-consumer dichotomy.6 Although conceptually useful, it may not 
adequately account for the variety of subjective positions that come to bear on the 
formation of policy preferences. Reflecting this, the citizen-consumer dichotomy is 
most commonly invoked not in public debate, but as part of theoretical attempts to 
account for individual motivations, which tend to be contested between advocates of 
neoclassical economics, its critics and its apologists. 
Sagoff (1988) correctly points out that public issues need to be decided as a 
community of citizens and criticises the use of cost benefit analysis as incorrectly 
invoking consumer preferences. Where self-interest does dominate a particular issue, it 
may be because of factors other than the fundamental motivations of individuals. An 
apposite example is the example identified by Bruno Frey, where the policy institutions 
4 Section 2.4.2. 
5 Such as the discourse associated with Optimism regarding the enjoyment of property. 
6 Sagoffs (1988) assertions are initially based on an anecdotal survey of students, an experiment that 
docs not appear to be easily replicable. John Dryzek reports having tried to repeat Sagoffs experiment 
with his own students, without success. 
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operating on the assumption of self-interest serving to crowd-out other-regarding 
behaviour (Frey, 1997). 
Similarly, decision mechanisms based on theoretical accounts of self-interest may 
also serve to impose a particular perspective, or set of values, in relation to the issue. 
Worse, when combined with deliberative processes, they may actually succeed in this 
endeavour, or undennine the very advantages of deliberation in encouraging enlarged 
thinking.7 Building instruments based on these assumptions is a form of pre-emptive 
consensus.8 Consequently, the autonomy of citizens in compromised.9 Despite 
misguided intentions of theorists to impose particular perspectives on a decision, 
individuals may refuse to cooperate. As is well documented in relation to Contingent 
Valuation, there may be resistance among participants to conforming.10 Where they do, 
upon reflection respondents often feel 'tricked' and their views misrepresented (for 
example Burgess et al., 1998). 
It is certainly evident that the policy preferences of deliberators participating in 
the FNQCJ were not constructed based on self-interest at any deliberative stage. This is 
not surprising. None of the deliberators has a personal stake in the Bloomfield Track 
issue, although this is no guarantee that individuals will act according to self-interest 
where environmental issues are concerned. 11 
These findings support the conclusion of Brennan and Lemansky (1993) that 
individuals do tend to vote expressively as citizens in the political sphere, in contrast to 
'economic voting' as a consumer in markets based on. narrow self-interest. However, 
there is a twist. As will be discussed below, there is an epistemic dimension to the 
construction of policy preferences. This is not to suggest the existence of an 
7 See page 42. For a review of the processes whereby crowding out of enlarged thinking may occur when 
matching deliberation with monetary valuation, see Niemeyer and Spash (for example Niemeyer and 
Spash, 2001). 
8 See page 39. 
9 See section 2.4. l (b) in Chapter 2. 
1
° For example Blarney (1995). Well known examples of non-cooperation to WTP surveys include 
'protest bids' where the individual purposefully misrepresents their preferences (Stevens et al., 1991 ; 
Jacobs, 1996); and 'lexicographic preferences' where individuals refuse to engage in a process of 
trading-off environmental goods (Spash and Hanley, 1995; Spash, 2000). For an overview see Vatn 
and Bromley (1995). 
11 At least in relation to expressing a preference or attitude (see Rohrschneider, 1988; Blarney et al., 
1995; Blarney, 1995). 
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independently 'right' decision, (in the sense of Cohen, 1986). Rather, there are 
processes operating at the political level that may distort policy preferences. Simply 
expressing a preference in the 'public interest' may not actually ensure that it is served 
in the sense that the voter wishes. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, many existing accounts of the motivations driving 
human behaviour have neglected the possibility of a multitude of conceptions of the 
public good. Imposing a particular ontology of the citizen to counter to the consumer 
does so based on theory, without an empirical foundation. If it is a rhetorical strategy, 
then it is a bad one. Attempting to counter theoretical propositions with more theory 
simply invites more of the same. Moreover, it permits neoclassical theories of economic 
behaviour to be easily modified, such that debate goes around in ever diminishing circles 
(see Etzioni, 1986). 
Keat (1994, p.342) criticises Sagoffs (1988) citizen-consumer dichotomy along 
similar lines. He argues that that there is no particular culturally-shared perspective of 
what constitutes a citizen perspective, let alone one that is specifically concerned with 
respect for nature beyond that which is instrumental to consumer satisfaction.12 For 
any given issue there may be more than one legitimate perspective of what constitutes 
the public good. There may even be circumstances where this will include a consumer 
perspective. 13 
Rather than adopt rigid theoretical frameworks, surely a far better approach is to 
step back and observe how people really behave and then take an honest look at theory. 
This is precisely what I have attempted to do in this thesis. An important element of 
the approach has been the adoption of Q methodology. 
(b) Context-Specific Motivations and Q-Methodology 
The use of Q-methodology has permitted the elucidation of subjective positions 
in relation to policy preferences. This has been done so without the imposition of a 
priori conception of motivations. Instead, I have explored the discursive context of the 
12 Indeed, consumerism itself can be said to constitute a cultural value ( citing Featherstone, 1991; Keat, 
1994, p.349). 
13 Elster (1986a), for one, describes a number of situations where this may be the case, although it is 
arguably inappropriate for most environmental issues. 
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Bloomfield Track issue (or discursive sphere). The explanatory power of the resulting 
factors in accounting for preferences and deliberative transformation lies in its ability to 
extract information based on how individuals actually felt about the issue (see for 
example Dryzek, 1990, ch.9). 
Using Q method, four subjective states, or discourses relevant to the Bloomfield 
Track issue were identified - Preservation, Pragmatism, Optimism and Propitiatism. 14 
These subjective factors represented quasi-nonns, as far as each has been explored as to 
their role in guiding behaviour (preference construction).15 
Although there was much overlap between these factors, an important 
distinguishing dimension was identified in Chapter 6. Two factors reflected conceptions 
of the common good drawn from the political discourse specific to the Bloomfield Track 
issue. These related to localised cultural values, or local political discourses. By far the 
largest factor, however, represented a broader concern to determine environmental issues 
from a long-term perspective. These factors did not reflect a simple citizen-consumer 
dichotomy, but a much more textured and grounded range of elements associated with 
the Bloomfield Track issue. 16 
14 For a description of these factors and their extraction from the subjective data, see Chapter 6. 
15 The connection between a nonn and a subjective factor can be easily demonstrated. Io Chapter 6, it 
was stated that a factor (or discourse) consists of a shared set of beliefs and attitudes (constituting 
subjectivity) that potentially have bearing on the construction of preferences. For example, the 
subjective factor Optimism involves a belief that the Bloomfield Track is important for access by local 
Bloomfield Residents and that development is a good thing. Therefore, an individual who wishes to 
construct his/her preference according to their predisposition to Optimism would tend to prefer that the 
Bloomfield Track remain open, or even upgraded. 
16 One response to this claim would be that, since the Q statements were drawn from the local discursive 
sphere (or concourse) then of course the subjective factors would reflect this. However, recall from 
Chapter 3 that the citizen-consumer dimension was built in to the factorial design of the Q sort 
administered to the FNQCJ. If indeed the major change in subjectivity that gave rise to the observed 
preference shifts was due to changes along a citizen-consumer subjective dimension, then these two 
would have emerged as clear factors, with the remaining localised data disappearing into the 
background. As it turned out, only one of the three citizen-consumer statements (statement 11, and not 
28 or 36) distinguished between the four subjective factors. Moreover, as reported in Chapter 6 only 
one of the statements experienced a large change during deliberation (statement 28). This ostensibly 
reflected an increase in a tendency to adopt a consumer perspective, but upon detailed analysis appears 
to have been due to increased personal concern for the future of the Bloomfield Track area for the 
benefit of the community as a whole. Moreover, when surveyed about the reasons for changes in 
preference deliberators tended to nominate information as the most influential, with the impact of 
change in perspective to that of citizen ranked third out of four (see question 2.3 in Appendix 2). 
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9.2.3 Multiple and Dominant Nor ms; Particular and Generalizable 
Interests 
As discussed in Chapter 6, an important feature of the four subjective factors 
was that they appeared to be strongly cleaved between two major types. The first 
concerned localised political and cultural (symbolic) influences on subjectivity. The 
second pertained to more generalised conceptions of the Bloomfield Track issue as they 
would apply to any environmental issue. This categorisation of the subjective factors 
reflects the distinction between particular and generalizable interests as described by 
Habermas (197la). 17 
One interpretation of particular interests is analogous to the conception of the 
'consumer' outlined above. 18 However, another way of describing particular interests is 
to define them negatively according to what they are not (ie. generalizable interests). As 
discussed briefly in Chapter 2, generalizable interests represent norms to which all 
individuals would subscribe under conditions of 'ideal speech', where discussion is 
engaged by rational and knowledgable individuals in an uncoerced manner (White, 1980, 
p.1009; Dryzek, 1990, p.54). In other words, a norm that is invoked under conditions 
antithetical to ideal speech where there is strategic use of argument to influence 
outcomes. 
There is evidence of particular interests in the Propitiatism and Optimism 
factors. As I will argue below, these were invoked by the strategic use of (symbolic) 
arguments. The processes giving rise to the Pragmatism factor are less clear-cut. It 
appears to be a kind of ' cautious halfway house' where preferences were constructed 
based on incomplete deliberation, an assertion I attempt to clarify in section 9.5 below. 
Preservation, by contrast, appears to represent a kind of generalizable interest that was 
liberated through the process of deliberation. 
(a) Preservation as Generalizable Interest 
By what claim can Preservation be said to constitute a generalizable interest? 
Perhaps one argument could be based on its association with environmental concern. 
17 See section 2.5.3 in Chapter 2. 
18 For example, Dryzek ( 1990, p.54) describes particular interests in this way. 
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Indeed, Dryzek (1990, p. 54-5) argues that the 'continuing integrity of the ecological 
systems on which human life depends could perhaps be a generalizable interest par 
excellence'. It is difficult to conceive of anyone disagreeing with this as a fundamental 
goal. 19 Environmental concern of this sort may or may not be intrinsic to the human 
psyche. There has been at least one theoretical attempt under the 'biophillia 
hypothesis ' to describe it as such (for example Kellert and Wilson, 1993). There may 
also be a 'rational' explanation for concern for nature, borne out of a deeper 
understanding of ecological processes and their impact on humans (Leopold, 1933; 
Niemeyer, 2000). 
However, widespread concern for the environment is not sufficient grounds for 
claiming the Preservation subjective factor as representing a generalizable interest. 
Indeed, this particular feature was not unique among the subjective factors. All could be 
interpreted in terms of a desire to see the Bloomfield Track issue resolved with a view to 
preserving the ecological integrity of the Daintree region for the benefit of future 
generations. Whatever its source, there was a high level of environmental concern among 
all deliberators. They simply had different conceptions about how ecological 
'sustainability' - as far as the term actually defines anything - should, or could be 
achieved. 
As all deliberators subscribed at least putatively to sustainability, so did all the 
subjective factors. However, in support of its claim to the status of generalizable 
interest, Preservation represented the strongest manifestation of a generalizable concern 
for nature. This was because, unlike the remaining factors, it was undiluted by specific 
conceptions proffered by particular interests (Propitiatism), particular cultural norms 
(Optimism), or provisos based on uncertainty (Pragmatism). 
Preservation also constitutes a generalizable interest as it was the most dominant 
of the four factors, as measured by factor loadings. Indeed, consensus regarding the 
desirability of Preservation as the perspective through which to view the Bloomfield 
Track issue was far higher than policy preferences for any other option, both before and 
after the deliberative process. In other words, if the purpose of the FNQCJ was to 
decide upon a normative position to form the basis for a policy decision, then it was in 
19 As I have argued in section 2.4.4(b) in Chapter 2 (page 42). 
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fact unnecessary. There was a high level of normative consensus among deliberators 
right from the start, with Preservation persistently dominant throughout the process.20 
Perhaps the strongest argument that Preservation constitutes a generalizable 
interest is that it withstood the test of deliberative scrutiny. It came to dominate post-
deliberative preferences. Indeed, the major effect of the deliberative process was to 
translate normative consensus (agreement on subjective grounds) into empirical 
consensus (agreement on appropriate policies). 
This raises a question. Why did Preservation not dominate preferences from the 
start? I consider this, and the role of the deliberative process in activating Preservation, 
in the following section. 
9.3 PREFERENCE DISTORTION AND DELIBERATIVE 
REMEDIES 
The discussion from the previous section can be summarised thus. When 
confronted with pressing environmental questions, it seems most individuals declare a 
desire for solutions that take a long-term and integrated perspective (Preservation). 
That is, there exists a generalizable interest. Yet, dominant norms may not clearly 
reflect aggregate policy preferences due to competing subjective positions that distort 
them. In the case of the FNQCJ, there appeared to be two inter-related processes that 
distorted the dominant norm of Preservation. These are: 
• 
• 
normative crowding-out; and 
s ituational asymmetry . 
The use of the term crowding-out follows from Frey ( 1997), who demonstrates 
how individual behaviour can be influenced by institutional settings.21 The actual 
mechanism of crowding-out as used here differs somewhat. It refers to the way in 
20 For a description of normative consensus, see section 2.2.2(b) in Chapter 2. 
21 Specifically, the emphasis of economic individualism invoking self-interested behaviour, thus 
impairing the ability of society to provide common goods. 
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which otherwise generalizable interests are coopted by manipulatory politics in general 
and symbolic politics, distorting and the underlying normative consensus. 
The second related reason is the impeding of the expression of environmental 
norms through policy preferences by situational factors. These include factors such as 
infonnation asymmetry, which impedes awareness of consequences during norm 
activation. In such circumstances, there may be slippage into the construction of 
preferences based on other competing positions, particularly based on simpler symbolic 
arguments that activate salient attitudes. The following discussion describes these two 
processes and the role of deliberation in overcoming them. 
9.3.I Symbolic Politics: The Crowding-out of Dominant Nor ms and 
its Deliberative Dissipation 
The theoretical :framework that appears to account for the pre-deliberative 
preference construction of preferences is that of symbolic politics, briefly discussed in 
Chapter I.22 The following discussion charts the way in which the political dynamics 
of the Bloomfield Track issue was characterised by symbolic politics. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, symbolic preferences are not based on a cognitive 
process of matching subjectivity to preferences, as suggested by the preference 
construction model. Rather, it involves a process of 'instinctively' choosing preferred 
policies based on 'gut' reactions to evocative political and social objects' (Sears, 1993, 
p.138). Sears describes this affective process as follows: 
Affective reactions are primary; they do not depend on prior cognitive appraisals, and indeed 
they may become completely separated from the content on which they were originally based, 
but then they may be cognitively justified. In this sense, affect does not depend on deliberate, 
rational, or conscious thought, and it may not even depend on unconscious mental activity 
(Sears, 1993, p.134). 
There is little effort required to construct a symbolic preference. The approach 
well suits the needs of the cognitive miser23, overcoming the overwhelming complexity 
that often accompanies environmental issues. All that is required to invoke a symbolic 
preference is some external stinmlus to activate a chronically accessible, or readily 
22 See section l.2.4 in Chapter 2. 
23 As stated in Chapter 2, the 'cognitive miser adopts a minimalist approach to preference construction, 
taking cognitive shortcuts by engaging in ' top of the head' or 'peripheral' processing of informational 
cues' (page 31 ). 
-272-
Section 9.3: Preferen:e Distortionarrl De!iterame Remedies 
invoked (ie. symbolic) attitude (see Fazio, 1986; Fazio, 1990).24 In Chapter 1, symbolic 
attitudes were those formed as part of socialisation in the political context of the 
Bloomfield Track issue. In other words, they are attitudes that were developed during 
constant exposure to cultural and political messages. As discussed in Chapter 4 when 
discussing the case study and in Chapter 6 when describing the subjective factors, there 
were many such messages in context of far north Queensland, in specifically in relation 
to the Bloomfield Track issue. 
(a) Symbolic Politics and the Bloomfield Track Issue 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the cultural and political contexts of FNQ and the 
Bloomfield Track issue gave rise to two subjective factors that are specifically 
attributable to the region - Optimism and Propitiatism. The first of these, Optimism, 
reflects a regional political socialisation that would invoke a specific response to the 
Bloomfield Track.25 A symbolically processed policy preference might occur when 
arguments in favour of the Bloomfield Track appeal to the Optimist's desire for 
development and the defence of the right of landowners to enjoy their property rights. 
The instincts of Optimists are that all development is good, therefore, the construction 
(and further upgrade) of the Bloomfield Track is also good. This preference is then 
legitimised by finding ways to deny arguments against it or 'win-win' outcomes, 
particularly those based on technological possibilities, even if unlikely to eventuate. 
Propitiatism represents an issue-specific kind of political socialisation, reflecting 
the discourses in the political sphere at the height of the Bloomfield Track issue. It was 
labelled Propitiatism because it reflected not one side of the symbolic debate, but both 
extremes. Propitiatists were anxious to find solutions and appease both sides. 
The pre-deliberative role of these subjective factors was high, accounting for 
30% of the subjectivity captured by all four factors. Their influence on preferences was 
slightly stronger.26 Moreover, the policy preferences associated with these localised 
24 Indeed, there is widespread evidence that salience of particular attributes of an attitude object impact on 
those attitudes that are expressed through behaviour (Dunlap, 1975; Corsini and Ozaki, 1984; Shavitt 
and Fazio, 1991) and, more specifically, preference, in economic (Knetsch, 2000), as well as political 
contexts (Gill et al., 1986; Fredin et al., 1996; Franklin and Wlezien, 1997). 
15 See discussion in Chapter 4. 
26 See section 8.4.1 (a) in Chapter 8. 
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factors were very different to that associated with Preservation.27 The result was an 
aggregate preference outcome different from the post-deliberative one where 
Preservation dominated. 
(b) Conditiom Associated with the Bloomfield Track issue that gave rise to 
Symbolic Preferences 
Not every political issue can be characterised by symbolic politics and not all 
individuals are influenced by it (see for example Weatherford, 1983). Nevertheless, the 
political sphere of the Bloomfield Track issue can be characterised thus, as can the pre-
deliberative preferences of many deliberators. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, at the height of the Bloomfield Track issue, the 
Queensland Government (and the Douglas Shire Council) were able to successfully 
employ symbolic arguments to mobilise public support. In the face of the success of 
this strategy, those against the Bloomfield Track also employed symbolic arguments in 
an attempt to halt its construction. As well as campaigning 'on the ground' the anti-
Bloomfield Track lobby embarked on an effort to mobilise political support against the 
Bloomfield Track by invoking symbols of destruction of the rainforest and, most 
potently, the reef. As part of their campaign, environmental groups used evocative 
images of trees being felled an.d turbid creek waters meandering down toward the reef. 
Although they also adopted more substantive approaches, such as public education, the 
distorting role of the media ensured that only symbolic arguments got through (Doyle, 
1992). 
The most important contributing factor to the symbolic nature of the Bloomfield 
Track issue was not just the complex nature of the issue, but also the way in which it 
was played through the existing political institutions. To begin, the political culture of 
the region was antithetical to the deliberative ideal. As discussed in Chapter 4, from the 
outset the Bloomfield Track issue was carefully managed by political elites. Decisions 
were often based on petulant reactions and a tendency to play up the clash of cultures 
between environmental concerns and parochial political interests. There was also a 
tendency to engage in manifestly 'non-democratic' behaviour by decision-makers, and 
then justify actions as being in the interests of the community. There were no 
27 See section A.8.1.4 of Appendix 8. 
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institutions in place to counter these dynamics. Public participation over the 
Bloomfield Track issue was non-existent when it was constructed in 1984. In such an 
environment, symbolic politics took a suffocating grip. 
The Bloomfield Track issue is a testament to the enduring impact of symbolic 
politics. Although it is no longer a national environmental issue and the political elites 
operating at the time of its construction have since faded from public view, the basic 
dynamics remain intact. It remains a potent issue, tightly controlled by directly affected 
interests. 
Policy fiascos are not easily reversed (Bovens and t'Hart, 1996). This is 
certainly true of the Bloomfield Track. Once put on such a strong symbolic footing, it is 
difficult to change the political trajectory. However, the deliberative process of the 
FNQCJ has demonstrated that symbolic politics can be dissipated. The mechanisms 
that give rise to this are the subject of the following discussion. 
(c) Dissipation versus Displacement of Symbolic Myths During Deliberation 
It is significant that the deliberative process served to dissipate its influence on 
preferences.28 As demonstrated in the previous three chapters, this occurred because 
symbolic arguments could not be sustained when subjected to deliberative scrutiny. 
Yet, dissipation does not entirely account for the disappearance of symbolic 
preferences. As Krosnick (1991) demonstrates, predispositions that gave rise to 
symbolic preferences remain more or less in tact. 
This was certainly true for the high levels of environmental concern. Before 
deliberation, this tended to be focussed on damage caused by the Bloomfield Track to 
the inshore reefs. The deliberative process certainly did not diminish environmental 
concern. Rather, it channelled it into more 'substantive' concerns in a manner that I will 
now describe. 
28 Similar influences of deliberation can be observed for symbolically charged issues. The deliberative 
opinion poll on the Republic Referendum cited in Appendix 7 is one potential example. 
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Preservationist Norm 
The dissipation of symbolic politics, although important, forms only part of the 
deliberative story. The strong role of Preservation in post-deliberative of preferences is 
a major feature of the deliberative dynamics. To describe the process of activating 
Preservation in the construction of preferences I will return to Schwartz's ( 1977) (norm) 
activation, which was first introduced in Chapter 2.29 
(a) The role of the Deliberative Process in Activating Preservation 
The increasing domination of Preservation during the FNQCJ was a function of 
all three steps of activation described in Chapter 2, which included awareness of need, 
consequences and responsibility. 30 However, the latter two steps appear to have 
contributed most to the observed dynamics. 
Most deliberators were aware of the need to act in accordance with the 
Preservationist perspective, as evidenced by its prevalence throughout the deliberative 
process. However, although already present, the salience of the Preservationist 
imperative appears to have increased during deliberation. For example, the discussion of 
turning points in Chapter 5 considered particular events during the deliberative process 
that served to increase the salience of Preservation-like values, most particularly during 
the site inspection.31 
Thus, it appears that the deliberative context of the FNQCJ facilitated increasing 
recognition (or salience) of Preservationism. Increased awareness of the enviromnental 
context of the Bloomfield Track in not small part facilitated increased awareness of 
consequences attached to certain policy choices. It did so by facilitating the 
transmission of information. This occurred not only by providing information itself, but 
also creating the conditions whereby it would be heard; absorbed; and turned, via a 
process of deliberation (both within and without) into policy choices. 
29 Section 2.4.4. 
30 Section 2.4.3. 
31 See section 5.3 in Chapter 5. 
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To use the language of economics, one of the primary effects of the deliberative 
process was to greatly reduce the ' cost' of acquiring information upon which to form 
preferences (after Downs, 1957). Deliberators were given the means to learn and 
understand the environmental implications attached to the various policy options. 
Importantly, they were also able to directly scrutinise the information. As a result, not 
only were they aware of the need to adopt a long-term and other-regarding perspective 
with respect to the Bloomfield Track issue, the information they had acquired 
empowered them to construct preferences along the lines of Preservation. 
For many, the deliberative process also served to increase the awareness of 
responsibility to act on their otherwise latent Preservationist tendencies. Alerted to the 
need by the deliberative context and armed with new evidence, denial of responsibility 
was all the more implausible. Alternatively, individuals were less likely to deny their 
responsibility to the Preservationist cause because the deliberative process emboldened 
them to do so. 
However, in a few cases, the activation of Preservation was not quite complete 
where Pragmatism was also salient. Those Pragmatists who were also strongly loaded 
on Preservation had very nearly the same preference ordering as Preservationists, 32 
except for preference for the Status Quo over Closure. This was not quite due to denial 
of Preservation. As discussed in Chapter 6, Pragmatists did not merely wish to abrogate 
their responsibilities by defaulting to the status quo position. Many genuinely wished 
to produce the best outcome based on the information on hand and felt that more 
information was needed to make a conclusive decision. However, deliberators that fell 
into this category stressed that the availability of more evidence supporting adverse 
consequences of the Bloomfield Track for the Daintree environment would ultimately 
result in a wholesale switch to preferring closure. 
Yet, despite the role of Pragmatism, awareness of responsibility in relation to 
Preservation increased considerably during the deliberative process. This was most 
dramatic in a number of cases where there was pre-deliberative denial of effective action. 
At least two deliberators with high pre-deliberative loadings on Preservation did not 
vote for Closure of the Bloomfield where they might have otherwise done so. This was 
32 Which was Restrictive Access: {CLO, MAI, STA, UPG, BIT}. 
not because they did not prefer it. Rather, based on their readings of the politics 
surrounding the issue, they did not think it a likely to be implemented. Consequently, 
these individuals effectively reduced their perceived feasible set - of plausible policy 
options.33 However, by the end of the deliberative process, they were emboldened not 
to talce the 'easy', or 'politically pragmatic', option.34 
9.4 DELIBERATIVE DYNAMICS: AN OVERVIEW 
Before providing an overview of major dynamics of the deliberative process, let 
me quickly summarise the findings so far. An important feature of deliberation was to 
increase the feelings of personal responsibility of participants toward the Bloomfield 
Track issue. Consequently, deliberators tended engage the issue and constructed their 
preferences along the lines of Preservation. Before deliberation, policy preferences were 
just as likely to be based on symbolic cues from interests acting strategically in the 
political sphere. 
The increase in responsibility in relation to the Bloomfield Track issue during 
deliberation was accompanied by the salience of the Preservation discourse. increased 
engagement with the issue facilitated the uptake of infonnation, thereby increasing the 
awareness of consequences. Empowered to act autonomously to fulfil their desires 
based on generalizable interests, deliberators tended to prefer an outcome that was 
intersubjectively shared by all 'like-minded' individuals, which they themselves 
determined. Some deliberators did not quite subscribe to the position on the basis that 
they felt more information was needed. In short, apart from this latter case, all 'steps' 
of activation in respect to Preservation were achieved. The localised factors, by 
33 This perspective shares a number of features with Pragmatism. Indeed, were this feature of the 
discourse in relation to the Bloomfield Track issue to be built into a Q sort, it is plausible that it 
would produce a subjective factor that could appropriately be labelled 'Political Pragmatism'. 
34 Two deliberators were identified as falling into this category. As discussed on page 203, one of the 
these had epistemic insights into the Bloomfield Track issue through a professional capacity as an 
environmental consultant, and before deliberation notionally ranked Closure third, behind Stabilise and 
Bituminise. However, on the survey form, in reference to the option of Closure, Koda commented 
'Great! but unrealistic'. However, by the end of the deliberative process, Koda changed preferences to 
rank Closure first. Stated reasons for doing so were 'not opting for the "easy" option - ie 
maintaining status quo - was an important step in my decision-making' (emphasis added). 
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contrast, were either dissipated or 'deactivated' during the deliberative process. These 
processes were not sequential, but inter-related. I consider this inter-related feature of 
the deliberative processes in the discussion that follows. 
9.4.1 Two Processes of Dissipation and Activation; Same Deliberative 
Process 
The discussion so far has treated the dissipation of symbolic politics (and 
deactivation of localised discourses) and the activation of Preservation as a series of 
steps through which individuals progressed during the deliberative process. While the 
adoption of sequences helps to describe how deliberators came to prefer what they did, 
in reality all took place more or less simultaneously. 
The same deliberative context that facilitated the acquisition of information and 
dispelled symbolic myths also facilitated the acquisition of information, which increased 
the awareness of the consequences of not constructing preferences along the lines of 
Preservation. Similarly, the switching from peripheral processing35 to central 
processing, or an extended process of preference construction based on the mechanisms 
outlined in Chapter 236, played an important role in both processes. On the other hand, 
rather, it was part of the same process of switching from the simple connections 
between symbolic myth and preference, to the more demanding conclusions drawn from 
an appreciation of the complexities of the issue. 
(a) The Impact of Caring 
It appears that a major contributor to the transformation of preferences was the 
enhanced desire of deliberators to seriously consider the implications of their policy 
preferences, despite the knowledge that they would not have direct bearing on the issue. 
It was observed in Chapter 6 that one of the strongest impacts on subjectivity across all 
deliberators during the FNQCJ was an increased level of personal interest concerning the 
Bloomfield Track issue.37 In short, they felt that they had a stake in the issue once they 
35 Based on cognitive shortcuts (see page 31). 
36 Section 2.3.3. 
37 See section 6.4.1. 
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had more effectively engaged it. The impact of this was to increase their sense of 
personal impact. 
Personal impact generally refers to direct impact, but the level of perceived 
impact on an individual is in no small part a subjective phenomenon. Individuals 
respond according to how they feel that a particular issue affects them. According to 
Baldassare (1992), personal impacts are a good predictor of environmental behaviour. 
None of the deliberators had a direct stake in the Bloomfield Track issue. However, the 
deliberative process increased 'closeness' to the issue at hand.38 Consequently, they 
felt a personal stake in the future of the Bloomfield Track, and therefore were interested 
in determining the most appropriate means (policy) to meet desired ends.39 
This conclusion is supported by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), who have found 
that increased personal interest in an issue stimulates 'central processing', or systematic 
evaluation of an issue. Another way to describe central processes is in terms of 
' deliberate and thoughtful processing of persuasive arguments, evaluating each argument 
for its validity' (Sears, 1993, p.142 ).40 
(b) Deliberation as Exploring Possibilities: Expanding the Feasible Set 
The increased interest in the Bloomfield Track issue also served to increase the 
propensity of deliberators to consider policy options which were not pre-deliberatively 
part of their feasible set. As discussed earlier, this was observed in relation to the 
activation of Preservation. Yet, it is equally relevant to the dissipation of symbolic 
politics.4 1 Symbolic politics was not only instrumental in shaping the policy choices, 
but also in manipulating the perceived feasible set of policy options. By dissipating 
38 It is well established that participation in a deliberative processes increases the level of 'personal stake' 
in issues (for example Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; Woodward, 2000), as is also the case for legal juries 
(Hastie et al., 1984). 
39 See section 6.4.1 in Chapter 6. One deliberator in particular, Matilda, was so motivated by 
participation in the FNQCJ that she became involved in local politics in support of a green candidate 
in council elections. This trend is also evidenced by responses to statement 36 - Tm concerned that 
I will be made worse off by any decision about the Bloomfield Track' - which increased in average 
(forced) rank from - 1.17 to 0.50 between pre and post deliberation. 
40 Or at least impetus to learn more about the issue at hand. For an environmental example see Pierce et 
al (2000). 
41 In the words of Edelman (1964, p.20; cited in Udehn, 1996, p.139), the theory of symbolic politics 
seeks to reveal 'the mechanisms through which politics influences what [people) want, what they fear, 
what they regard as possible, and even who they are' . 
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symbolic politics, the deliberative process restored all possible options to the decision 
domain. 
(c) Deliberation as Politics in posse: Empowering Autonomous (vs Individual) 
Preferences 
It has been well established that deliberation served to dispel symbolic politics. 
If so, then what was the nature of politics (in posse) that were manifest in the 
deliberative process? I argued in Chapter 1 that deliberative democracy finds resonance 
in the classical conception of politics as a deliberate effort to decide on the best 
outcomes based on collectively desired ends (Fay, 1975, p.54). In Chapter 2 I qualified 
the 'collective' element of ideal democracy by stressing the importance of autonomy in 
deciding desired ends.42 
It could be argued that the deliberative process of the FNQCJ satisfied both 
conditions for an idealised deliberative democracy. As a result of the process the 
findings were 'deliberate', or 'reflective' (Goodin, 2002); they were also autonomous, so 
far as individuals cast off manipulatory processes to decide their own ends. In short, 
through the deliberative process individuals came to discover 'who they were' (in terms 
of a shared generalizable interest) as expressed through policy preferences. They 
discovered what was possible, in terms of the feasible set, which had pre-deliberatively 
been curtailed. Most importantly, they discovered what they wanted, independently of 
the cues provided to them from the political sphere. 
9.4.2 The Importance of Deliberative Context: The Relative Role of 
Information and Deliberation in Dispelling Symbolic Myths~ 
In discussing processes that might give rise to preference shifts, information 
acquisition (the process of learning about the issue and increasing knowledge) and 
deliberation (the process of sharing ideas and justifying positions) are two potential 
mechanisms. Which mechanism was most instrumental in dissipating symbolic 
preferences? Clearly, information played a major role. Chapter 5 observed that the 
major turning points of the deliberative process occurred during witness presentations 
42 Section 2.4.l(b). 
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when they learnt that the symbolic claims of both sides of the issue were largely 
unjustified. 43 
However, the conclusion that information played the dominant role in 
dissipating symbolic preferences is at best partial. This is in part because the 
conventional use of the term information in public choice concerns the transmission of 
facts, but in the political context information is used not for the purpose of 
communication, but persuasion (Udehn, 1996, p.143; Druckman and Lupia, 2000), or 
even manipulation (Goodin, 1980). As the example of symbolic politics reminds, 
information is imbued with many possible interpretations that render it amenable to 
manipulation and spin (for example Anderson, 1998). To this end Friedman (1998, 
p.401) argues that 'the demos must make judgments about facts; but it is factual 
information about nearly everything political that the demos lacks.' 
However, appealing to the use of facts is itself insufficient. The scope for 
interpretive interaction with information means that the subjective lens through which 
the individual views the information will be important (Elster, 1983, p.19). As studies 
into attitude priming44 and issue framing45 demonstrate, the context of information 
acquisition is crucial. 
The information acquired from the political sphere of the Bloomfield Track issue 
is different to that acquired during the FNQCJ. This was not only because of a 
difference in the factual content of the information, but also the way it was received. 
The possession of information does not safeguard against political manipulation. 
Importantly, those deliberators with high levels of pre-deliberative information were 
also those who were most prone to voting along symbolic lines because of the type of 
information to which they were exposed. That is, symbolically charged information 
designed to activate strongly held (symbolic) attitudes.46 
43 Another observation from Chapter 6 supporting this contention is the fact the Propitiatism subjective 
factor disappeared during the first (information) phase of the deliberative process. Although this is not 
a reliable measure of the role of information per se, the first deliberative phase is much longer than the 
second is, and there was much scope therein for deliberation. 
44 See: (Iyengar, 1991; Kinder, 1998; Clarke et al., 1999). 
45 See: (Tversky et al., 1981; Iyengar, 1991 ; Davis, 1995; Kinder, 1998; Clarke et al., 1999; Hoffinan 
and Ventresca, 1999). 
46 See discussion in section l.2.4(a) of Chapter I. 
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In contrast to the remedy suggested by Friedman (1998), the evidence from the 
FNQCJ suggests switching the modus operandi of preference construction from that 
under politics in esse to in posse. This involves a change from use of information as a 
tool for manipulation to acquiring it while striving to achieve communicative rationality. 
It was not information per se that contribute most significantly to served to dispel 
symbolic politics. Rather, information was acquired in the communicative context of the 
FNQCJ. In short, communicative rationality is an antidote to symbolic politics.47 
Other evidence can be found to support of the argument that deliberation 
provides an important (communicative) context for the acquisition of information. 
Chapter 5 argued that much of the scene for the subsequent deliberative process was set 
on the first day of proceedings, during which deliberators were instructed about their 
roles and familiarised with the case study site. This process focussed the deliberators 
on the task at hand, where before the 'cognitive miser' minimised effort by making 'top 
of the head' associations between information and salient attitudes (Taylor, 1981). 
Because deliberators were set the task of considering the information and hand, as well 
as having to defend their findings during discussion, they were increasingly attentive to 
the task of absorbing and processing information. In other words, they switched from 
'peripheral' to 'central' processing of information (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). 
The communicative context of the FNQCJ also provided an appropriate filter to 
the strategic use of information to elicit a particular outcome. Friedman (1998, p.406) 
states, 'The ideologue uses his relatively large store of political information as an arsenal 
for intellectual combat, not as a resource for open-minded and well-informed decision 
making'. The act of bringing together members of the public to hear evidence does not 
guard against ideological attack. As discussed in Chapter 5, a number of the witnesses 
attempted to use information in an attempt to influence the outcome, much of it 
resonating with the symbolic political discourse described in Chapter 4.48 What was 
important was that the deliberative context engaged participants such that they 
employed a healthy level of scepticism when hearing evidence, which they crosschecked 
using direct questioning and additional sources of evidence. 
47 See discussion on instrumental versus communicative rationality in section 1.2. l of Chapter I (page 
4). 
48 This prompted one deliberator to cite these 'biased' presentations in the final survey. See survey 
results for 'Rastus' in Appendix 2. 
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Thus, it can be stated that neither information nor deliberation played a decisive 
in the dispelling of symbolic myths. Rather it set the scene for the construction of 
preferences on more substantive grounds. It was the deliberative setting in which 
information was acquired and scrutinised in an environment characterised by 
communicative rationality that was pivotal. 
9.5 THE STABILITY AND LEGITIMACY OF 
DELIBERATIVE OUTCOMES 
The FNQCJ was not the definitive deliberative process conducted on the 
Bloomfield Track issue. There are arguably many variations in discursive design that 
would have led to different outcomes. This is precisely why so much attention was 
paid in Chapter 3 to the design of the deliberative process. A more pertinent question, 
then, concerns the legitimacy of the design of the FNQCJ and the level of variation in 
deliberative outcome within the parameters of discursive design. 
Given that the FNQCJ is not (and cannot) be definitive, to what extent are its 
results stable? How stable in relation to different duration; changing information; or 
different witnesses? The following discussion addresses these questions, given possible 
variations within the design parameters laid out in Chapter 3. 
9.5.1 Stability of Deliberative Outputs Over Time 
(a) Stability Depend-ent on the Duration of Deliberation 
It was observed in Chapter 6 that the greatest subjective changes during the 
deliberative process occurred during the first deliberative phase, where there were often 
slight shifts back towards the original subjective position. Notably, the first deliberative 
phase was much longer than the second. This is worthy of comment. Chapter 5 noted 
also that the early phase of the deliberative process had the greatest impact on 
deliberators. The evidence points to a sharp change in subjectivity, possibly reflecting 
something of a 'shock' from an initial period, following by a period of consolidation. 
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What appears to have taken place was something of a Gestalt whereby belief 
system of deliberators underwent sudden and dramatic changes because of the 
information very early in the process. They then began formulating their findings on the 
basis the information. These positions were then consolidated during deliberation. 
(b) Stability of Preferences Following Deliberation 
Do policy preferences remain stable following deliberative events? 
Alternatively, does the process of deliberation within (Goodin, 2000a) continue long 
after the forum is concluded? To address this question deliberators were reassembled six 
months after the FNQCJ and their (first) preferences elicited.49 Only one of the 
deliberator' s (Rastus) indicated any change in his initial preference (from Close to Status 
Quo). This transformation occurred following another trip to the region, where the 
enjoyment of the trip gave him second thoughts regarding closure. This may simply 
reflect the fact that the experience did not take place under conditions of communicative 
rationality, giving rise to a partial shift back to particular interests, rather than 
generalizeable ones.50 In any case, when further questioned by remainder of the 
deliberative group, he did not think the changes strong enough to alter his views on his 
preferred policy option. 
9.5.2 Stability Dependence on the Content and Duration of the 
Deliberative Process 
The discussion of the deliberative process in Chapter 5 included a number of 
chance events, or 'wildcards'. These wildcards included unexpected events that took 
place during the FNQCJ that appeared to influence the trajectory of the process. This 
raises an important question: how sensitive is the deliberative outcome to the particular 
circumstances and events that take place within a given deliberative forum? 
Importantly, as pointed out in chapters 7 and 8, the changes in preferences were 
deliberate. That is, the post-deliberative preferences had an epistemic component as far 
as there were reasons attached to them.5 1 However, there was also a normative 
49 Nine of the twelve initial deliberators attended. Two deliberator's were uncontestable and another 
unable to attend. 
50 Thanks to John Dryzek for pointing this out. 
51 That is, they were broadly rational in the sense of (Elster, 1983). 
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component. As I have repeatedly stated, the major impact of the deliberative process 
was to deactivation of the localised factors and activation of Preservation. An important 
contributor to this deactivation was the absence of information capable of sustaining the 
major claims associated with symbolic politics. Of these, an important claim that the 
Bloomfield Track was needed for community access. 
(a) Impact of Improved Arguments for Community Access 
An apposite question concerns whether or not there was potential for a major 
change in the outcome of the FNQCJ if a different representative from the Bloomfield 
Community had presented. In particular, one capable of making a strong case for the 
Bloomfield Track based on community access. If this had occurred, then arguably the 
Propitiatism subjective factor would not have disappeared. By definition, if the claim of 
the need for local access could be substantiated, then it is no longer symbolic. Thus, the 
hypothesis that deliberation serves to dispel symbolic politics still holds (the same 
argument also holds for the claim that the Bloomfield Track damages the reef). 
Deliberators did not dismiss the normative claims of local residents lightly. 
They were very sensitive to the issue of community representation and were aware of 
the circumstances behind the refusal of certain community representatives to 
participate.52 Despite this knowledge, some deliberators were satisfied that there was in 
fact no reasonable case for community access to be made, given the altematives.53 For 
others, the pre-eminence of the Preservationist imperative overrode any claims that may 
have been made. Still more powerfully, in the minds of many deliberators, there was a 
strong case that the needs of the community and the environment could be captured by 
the closure of the Bloomfield Track. 
(b) Impact of Improved Environmental Research and Risk Assessment 
One area where there may have been greater scope for variability in the results 
concerns the evidence pertaining to long-term environmental consequences. Many of 
the dissenting Pragmatists did so as a reaction to the paucity of research specific to the 
Bloomfield Track the issue. Arguably, if more research had been conducted, and the 
52 For a discussion of these issues see page 80; section 3.6.2; and footnote 3 on page 115. 
53 See discussion in section 5.3.2(b) in Chapter 5. 
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findings consistent with the other evidence provided, it appears that Preservation would 
have yielded an even stronger result. 
Another avenue that provides scope for reconciling the difference between 
Pragmatists and Preservationists concerns the interpretation of scientific evidence, and 
the implications for risk assessment. The interpretation of risk and understanding of 
science fonns an important difference between the two factors. The approach of 
Preservationist to scientific uncertainty was consistent with the precautionary 
principle.54 Pragmatists, however, acted on an impression that science could, and 
should, provide definitive answers.55 
In short, Pragmatists defaulted to what K.ahneman and Tversky (I 979) refer to 
as a certainty effect whereby individuals prefer certain outcomes to probabilistic ones. 
However, answers in relation to environmental problems are inherently probabilistic (for 
example Adam, 1996, pp.97-8). As discussed in Chapter 6, such a position was based 
on a misrepresentation of science and a different appreciation of risk to that of 
Preservationists. It is plausible that the inclusion of this dimension, by way of 
workshop on science and scientific method as part of the deliberative process, further 
facilitating the activation of Preservation, and increasing both consensus and stability of 
the outcome. However, building this into the deliberative process in order to achieve a 
particular outcome could be interpreted a form of manipulation. I will briefly consider 
some avenues for manipulation of the deliberative process below. 
9.5.3 Avenues for Process Manipulation 
Another important argument against the assertion that formal deliberative 
processes be used to determine policy is the very broad scope for process manipulation. 
The design of the FNQCJ was done with careful attention to theoretical and practical 
considerations.56 However, despite this, a number of aspects of the process identified 
in this chapter could have led to variable results. 
54 See footnote 3 on page 177. 
55 While this suggests that Pragmatists had a strong degree of trust in science and scientists, the real 
reasons are almost certainly more complex (for example Wynne, 1996). Although important for the 
use of deliberative processes, discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
56 See Chapter 3. 
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These variations in results were not necessarily a product of design, but were 
beyond the control of the organising team. Other types of concern about process 
manipulation were discussed in Chapter 3. Some, such as Kuran's (1998) about 
silencing certain voices, was certainly not a feature of the FNQCJ. However, it is 
possible that some voices were not present in the first place because of the self-selecting 
process of choosing not to participate in the FNQCJ. 
Even with the best of intentions, there is much scope to manipulate the 
parameters of deliberative processes in order to achieve a particular outcome. I argue in 
this section that the design of the FNQCJ is as close as feasibly possible to deliberative 
ideals within the scope of the project. I also argue that the results appear to be 
relatively stable, within specified parameter. However, it should be stressed that where 
particular outcomes are sought, the process of design of the may be manipulated to 
achieve them. In the concluding chapter, I consider the implications of this for the use 
of deliberative processes where manipulatory politics in esse remain dominant. 
9.5.4 Summary: Legitimate Conclusions from the FNQCJ 
The results from the FNQCJ cannot claim to be the definitive finding on the 
Bloomfield Track issue. There is scope for variations in the outcome depending on 
design of the process, as outlined in Chapter 3. However, the objective of this research 
was not to provide the definitive answer to a pressing policy problem. Rather, the aim 
is to explore the processes of preference transformation during the deliberative process. 
These processes were outlined in sections 9.2 and 9.3 as the dissipation of competing 
norms - particularly those construed by interests contesting the issue within the 
political sphere - and the activation of the dominant, stable norms during deliberation. 
There is nothing in the previous discussion to suggest that this conclusion does not hold. 
Changes in the process of deliberation as discussed above may have led to variations in 
which preferences came to be constructed on the Preservation factor. However, the 
basic processes that activated it during deliberation still hold. 
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9.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has highlighted the major processes whereby the FNQCJ 
transformed the policy preferences. In short, the major effect of deliberation was to 
peel away the effect of symbolic politics. Following deliberation, preferences came to 
be dominated by Preservation, which was the largest subjective factor throughout the 
process and one I have characterised as a generalizable interest. Where before 
deliberation this shared interest was distorted by symbolic assertions; the deliberative 
process empowered individuals to focus on their preferred normative dimension. Thus, 
although existing democratic process is putatively concerned with expressing with 'will 
of the people', the theoretical implication of these findings is that it in fact distorts 
outcomes by incorrectly translating desires (norms/values/attitudes) into policy 
preferences. 
As will be discussed in the following chapter, a citizens' jury is merely one 
instance of deliberation amidst the prevailing status quo; it alone does not a deliberative 
democracy make. As such, the challenge to deliberative democracy is not creating 
idealised conditions of politics in posse, but mitigating the processes that dominate 
politics in esse. 
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OUT OF THE WILDERNESS? 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
The results so far suggest much promise for the application of deliberative ideals 
to democratic processes, but before focussing on the potentialities of deliberative 
democracy a reality check is needed. From Chapter 4 it was evident that the actual 
outcome of the Bloomfield Track issue was far from 'deliberative'. This serves to 
remind us of Shapiro's (1999) dictum that politics in esse is about power, and that there 
is a yawning gap between politics in esse and deliberative democracy in posse. 
However, acknowledging this gap and accepting it are two different things. It is the gap 
between these two states and exploration of ways in which to (or not to) close it that I 
wish to explore in this concluding chapter. 
In the introductory chapter 1 argued that critics of deliberative democracy tend to 
look at it from the perspective of politics in esse. In the following section (10.2) I aim 
to tum this problem on its head by developing a conception of politics in esse in view of 
the findings of this thesis in relation to preference construction under deliberative ideals. 
In section 10.3 I return to politics in posse. As part of the discussion, I consider the 
nature of deliberative politics and the prospects for and implication of widespread, 
indeed institutionalised, participation of citizens in political decision making. 
I then turn to a pressing problem with respect to deliberative democracy. 
Although the results of this thesis are promising, suggesting that deliberation may act as 
an antidote to politics in esse is only part of a larger story. Although important, 
instances of deliberative practice such as the FNQCJ are merely isolated examples of 
deliberative democracy amidst the prevailing status quo. Worse, given the potential to 
manipulate deliberative outcomes or dismiss their results, these isolated examples may 
well be subsumed or even coopted by politics in esse. I will briefly consider this 
Section 10.2: Polit:icsines<>e: TuDrerfrarcli'iirg Powerof Preferen:::es 
problem while arguing that a citizens' jury does not a deliberative democracy make. 
However, there are good reasons to believe that if implemented consistently with 
deliberative ideals, it may transform the status quo. 
10.2 POLITICS in esse: THE DISENFRANCHISING 
POWER OF PREFERENCES 
In Chapter 2 I discussed the principle of citizens' sovereignty, or autonomy. 
The term embodies the idea that citizens know what is best for themselves and therefore 
the only task of the state is to ' create a mechanism that allows individuals to express 
their preferences over the whole range of social arrangements' (Elster, 1983, p.33). I 
then explored the idea of citizens ' autonomy further, arriving at a deeper notion of 
autonomy concern not just the choice of policy means, but also particular ends. I also 
considered in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 the arguments against participatory forms 
of democracy because of poor judgemental capacities of citizens. 
In contrast to this, the findings of this thesis suggest that citizens do have the 
'right stuff' to make deliberative democracy work. The underlying problem is 
structural; rather, it is both structural in nature and based on judgemental capacities. 
The problem concerns the manner in which existing democratic processes tend to 
structure political process as contestation between policy outcomes, rather than means 
to attain desired ends. 
In the following discussion I outline the nature of this politics in esse. I begin 
the argument by briefly revisiting the issue of 'dumb' preferences. I will then outline 
the mechanisms whereby decision processes that involve the contestation of preferences 
result in the disenfranchisement of citizens. 
10.2.1 'Dumb' Preferences 
The overriding problem with democratic processes that are concerned exclusively 
with the aggregation of preferences is that, as I have argued in Chapter 2 and again in 
Chapter 7, that preferences are dumb. They are dumb in two senses of the term. The 
first dimension of dumb preference concerns their muteness in as far as they do not 
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communicate reasons. The second dimension of dumb preferences is a consequential 
product of preferences because they are mute. Preferences can be foolish because they 
do not require the force of reason. Consequently, they do not reflect a judgemental 
process of matching policy means to desired ends, or cognitive rationality.1 
This is bad enough, but what is most significant about dumb preferences is that 
they lend themselves to manipulation by external forces. In later discussion I will 
describe this process in terms of 'reverse politics'. Before going on to describe reverse 
politics, in the following discussion I will flesh out what I mean by dumb preferences in 
view of the findings from the FNQCJ. 
(a) Mute PreferenceJ: Poor Communication of Desires Through Choices 
Chapter 2 considered the problem of muteness of policy preference as unable to 
communicate underlying reasons. The significance of this muteness has been reinforced 
by the findings from the FNQCJ. The loss of information associated with preference 
orderings was highlighted by the analysis of policy preferences in Chapter 7. This 
occurred in both static and dynamic senses. That is, preferences were poor indicators of 
underlying reasons. They were also poor indicators of substantive changes in intentions 
underling different policy rankings. In short, these findings reinforce a broader concern 
with public choice: the problem with preferences is that they serve to conceal more than 
they reveal (Elster, 1986a, p.107).2 
The key to understanding the deliberative dynamics of the FNQCJ involved 
more than analysis of preferences. It was achieved by a process of triangulation: 
combining analysis of preference outputs with a range of quantitative and qualitative 
data. This was most dramatically demonstrated in Chapter 7 following the analysis of 
changes between the two sets of (pre and post-deliberative) preferences using a number 
of methods. Significance of change in policy preference turned out to be best 
understood by interpretation of a simple survey question asking whether or not 
deliberators had thought that they had changed their mind with respect to the 
Bloomfield Track issue. 
1 See section 2.2.3 in Chapter 2 (page 27). 
1 A similar point has been made by Sen (1977, p.335-6) with respect to the use of an 'one all-purpose' 
preference ordering. 
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Most instrumental to the analysis of deliberative dynamics in this research has 
been the adoption of Q methodology in conjunction with policy preferences. The 
combination permitted systematic examination of the underlying rationality 
(subjectivity) associated with particular preference orderings and the way in which these 
relationships changed during the deliberative process.3 
(b) Foolish Preferences: Poor Translation of Desires into Choices 
The muteness of preferences would not necessarily be problematic if their 
shortcomings were limited to their explanatory power to experimental research. The 
implications of foolish preference are particularly troublesome for democratic ideals 
because of uncertainty that expressed preferences map perfectly onto some desire for a 
specific end. To use the language I have adopted in this thesis, we cannot know that 
preferences are well constructed or that ends are well chosen. The expression of 
preferences may be putatively based on good intentions, but this is no safeguard against 
foolish choices. 
Sen (1977, p.335) comments that an individual who is content to communicate 
all their potential perspectives with respect to some choice through a single 'all-
purpose' preference ordering must be something of a fool. He is primarily concerned 
with the loss of information associated with the act of expressing a simple ordered 
preference. For him, an even more daunting prospect is the possibility that individuals 
may act as 'morons' and construct their preferences based on narrow self-interest. 
However, the findings of this thesis support arguments that suggest moronic (self-
interested) behaviour may not be as strong a feature in the motivations of citizens as 
widely accepted.4 
As was argued in Chapter 9, none of the FNQCJ deliberators were morons. All 
made policy choices based, at least putatively, on what was thought to constitute the 
common good. The real problem associated with pre-deliberative preferences was that, 
according to the definition of the fool I use here, they might have been pre-deliberatively 
3 It is worthy of mention that the use of Q methodology facilitated the identification of modes of 
preference construction that were not anticipated at the outset of the research. The results from the 
analysis of the Q-sorts gave rise to a number of unexpected findings. These have ultimately led to the 
incorporation of symbolic politics into the analysis. Indeed, the idea of symbolic politics has been 
central to describing politics in esse. 
4 At least prior to Brennan and Lomasky (1993). 
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foolish. A fool is someone who acts unwisely or imprudently.5 In the case of 
expressing a preference it would be unwise to construct preferences poorly - to choose 
an option that is inconsistent with one's desires. This is not just foolish; it is irrational. 
However, rationality is not the end of the matter where there are many potential ends to 
choose from, as described by the 'multiple-self model' in Chapter 2. 
There were indeed a number of potential 'selves' among the deliberative group 
that came into play in the construction of policy preferences. The analysis of 
subjectivity using Q methodology revealed four subjective groupings pertaining to the 
Bloomfield Track issue. These represented ways in which constellations of values and 
beliefs have crystallised into coherent discourses. Each was associated with a policy 
end, which was constructed into a particular policy preference ordering. In short, there 
were a number of perspectives potentially coming to bear during preference 
construction. Thus, the choice confronting the individual was not only what constituted 
the most appropriate policy means, but also the most desirable end. 
In Chapter 8 it was shown that the impact of these discourses on policy 
preferences changed during deliberation, which brings me to the nub of the problem with 
foolish preferences. From a deliberative perspective, it is particularly important to the 
democratic process that desired ends are carefully chosen. That their policy preferences 
changed so dramatically in association with affiliation to discourse suggests that before 
deliberation there had been little reflection on what end should prevail. That is surely 
foolish. 
Moreover, without conscious choices between competing ends, there is much 
scope for manipulation. There are numerous ways in which situations can be 
manipulated to give rise to predetermined preferences. One commonly cited method 
concerns the framing of survey questions (as summarised by Zaller, 1992, p.93).6 
Symbolic politics represents another form of preference manipulation using particularly 
strong and accessible attitudes in order to mobilise support for a particular policies. 
Both forms of manipulation represent a reversal of the preference construction model I 
5 Or, according to the Oxford dictionary (1989), 'one deficient in judgement or sense, one who acts or 
behaves stupidly'. 
6 See also Knetsch (2000) for a summary of the implications of question framing for the use of valuation 
survey instruments. 
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have outlined in Chapter 2. Rather than beginning with desired ends, particular means 
are justified by invoking the right predispositions. The resulting preferences are in 
effect constructed backwards. They begin with particular means (preferences) from 
which arguments are employed to invoke particular ends, rather than the deliberative 
ideal of ends being used to choose means. In the following discussion I will characterise 
this process of politics in esse as 'reverse politics' -re versing the ideal political 
sequence. 
10.2.2 The Revised Political Sequence: Questioning Autonomous 
Preferences 
The FNQCJ deliberators may have been foolish, but they were all far from 
stupid. Their pre-deliberative preferences were not baseless, but reflected the variety of 
discourses that pervaded the political sphere. Moreover, there was a strongly shared 
discourse among deliberators, which has been characterised under the Preservation 
subjective factor. I have argued in Chapter 9, that this discourse reflects a generalizable 
concern. 
By contrast, the motivations driving the politics in the discursive sphere did not 
reflect the generalizable desires of these citizens, but the particularised interests of 
certain political actors. Unlike citizens, these actors tended to be motivated by self-
interest. Their mode of operation was based not on communicative, but instrumental 
rationality; such is the nature of political contestation in esse. Yet, when arguments 
from the politics sphere were framed in the right way, they were not antithetical to one 
another - if linked only by symbolic connections. The potency of the arguments lay in 
the fact that they were located at the margins of the generalizeable interests, where they 
stood to have greatest effect. This resulted in the activation of particularised discourses 
in the policy preferences of citizens. Thus, the democratic process under politics in 
esse is not one characterised by autonomy or citizens' sovereignty, but the manipulation 
of preferences through a process of reverse po1itics. 
(a) The Revised Sequence in Politics in esse 
The political dynamics of reverse politics finds precedence in economics. The 
same arguments used in relation to citizen sovereignty used in politics are also used in 
economics under the rubric of 'consumer sovereignty'. So too, the same processes of 
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reverse politics has an analogue in the operation of markets in reverse to theoretical 
ideals. 
John Kenneth Galbraith (1979, ch.19) challenged the idea of consumer 
sovereignty in markets with his notion of the 'revised sequence'. The sequence begins 
with the necessity of large corporations to exert some control over the preferences of 
consumers, through the medium of advertising, in view of the large-lead time required to 
bring complex goods to markets. The revised sequence questions the idea that 
consumers act autonomously in markets, constructing preferences for goods in ways 
that optimise their personal satisfaction by trading-off marginal utilities. 
Citizen sovereignty has also been long criticised in political theory, in view of 
the potential for the centralised manipulation of outcomes through agenda 
manipulation7, centralised vote trading,8 propaganda, spin doctoring and so on. Other 
concerns stem from a dim view of citizenry, such as concerns with respect to unstable 
attitudes discussed above and a more direct questioning of the competence of individuals 
to construct well formed opinions/preferences.9 These concerns are based on either the 
manipulation of preference outputs, or the poor quality of preference inputs. Another 
possibility, however, is the manipulation of preference inputs by exogenous influences, 
in a manner parallel to Galbraith's revised sequence. 
As described earlier, the mechanism driving the revised political sequence is the 
yawning gap between the strong motivations of actors in the political sphere and the 
relative 'disinterest' among citizens in political processes. Those with a personal stake 
in the outcome of a policy decision quite naturally tend to desire a particular outcome. 
Further, they are motivated to act in the political sphere in order to achieve it. Citizens, 
by contrast, particularly those not directly affected by the issue, have no particular 
stake in the issue, and generally have no well-constructed preference (Slovic, 1995) 
possessing only 'non-attitudes (Converse, 1970). 
Where public opinion counts, in order to mobilise support for their cause, an 
interest must win-over citizens. Much as consumer sovereignty is anathematic to large 
7 For example: (Long and Rose-Ackerman, 1982; Grofman and Feld, 1992) 
8 For example: Koford (Koford, 1982) 
9 For example: (for example Schumpeter, 1943 (1976); Converse, 1970; Somin, 1998) 
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corporations - in revised economic sequence of Galbraith (1979) - where the stakes 
are high, political actors forgo the luxury of political discourse necessary to inform 
sovereign citizen preferences. Rather, they seek to influence preferences to suit their 
preferred outcomes. 
The mechanism whereby it is possible for interests acting in the political sphere 
to manipulate preferences are grounded in the absence of a concretely expressed wish 
(generalizeable interest) on the part of the community. Rather, these wishes exist as a 
constellation of values and beliefs that are formed, transformed and crystallised in 
relation to a policy issue by political discourse. Of course, these discourses are also 
grounded in the everyday experience of the 'lifeworld'. Further, some are more 
accessible than others. The most accessible of these (symbolic) attitudes provide 
important anchor points that may be levered using symbolic arguments to invoke 
particularised preferences. The result is reverse politics. 
The Bloomfield Track case study appears to be exemplary of reverse politics. 
Pre-deliberative preferences were strongly heterogeneous, tending to reflect the 
dynamics of the political sphere, rather than the underlying consensus that was evident 
in underlying subjectivity. The reverse politics of the issue served to fracture this 
underlying (normative) consensus, collectively disenfranchising citizens through the 
political process. As I will suggest in the following discussion, not only did it 
disenfranchise citizens, it also served to disenfranchise nature. 
10.2.3 Reverse Politics: Disenfranchising 
Citizens/Disenfranchising Nature 
The implication of the revised democratic sequence is that even if 'green values' 
are pervasive this may not necessarily result in outcomes that reflect the existence of 
this generalizable interest. Indeed, the example of reverse politics demonstrates 
mechanisms whereby widely held 'green' values do not translate into 'green' preferences 
if reverse politics prevails. 
Consequently, although 'ecocentrism' may be a necessary condition for green 
democracy (Eckersley, 1992), it is not sufficient. Indeed, if applied under conditions of 
reverse politics, ecocentrism may give rise to political outcomes that cannot claim any 
superiority on normative grounds. In short, where these dynamics prevail it remains 
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possible to use symbolic levers to wrest outcomes away from generalizable 
environmental concerns. In other words, if a 'green democracy' is to prevail, there is a 
structural dimension to politics in posse that must be addressed.10 A predominance of 
green values may even exacerbate reverse politics by simply increasing the stakes such 
that particularised interests will have to find increasingly novel ways to manipulable 
environmental values. 
The negative environmental effect of reverse politics can be found even where 
green interests 'win the day', particularly if it is by the thinnest of margins to maintain 
the status quo. The fracturing of consensus under reverse politics means that it is at 
best an unstable situation. Inevitably, the victory will succumb to the incremental 
attrition of the sort discussed in Chapter 6. 
Where reverse politics prevails there is also no guarantee that a victory on the 
part of self-described green interests will lead to ecologically rational outcomes. If we 
consider in the case of the Bloomfield Track, what would have happened if the green 
movement had prevailed on the issue? Given the nature of the campaign, or at least the 
way in which it was portrayed though the media, a victory would have entrenched 
already widely held false premises. Moreover, it may have also given rise to reactions 
by interests in the political sphere seeking to tip the balance back in their favour. 11 
Thus, to transform reverse politics and its negative environmental consequences 
the structural dimension must be addressed. As will be shown in the following section, 
as well as an antidote to reverse politics, the application of deliberation has the potential 
to provide an important structural remedy. 
10 On similar grounds, Dryzek (1995) questions the extent to which the tensions between democracy (in 
esse) and the environment can be addressed by more of the same. He argues that what is needed is the 
implementation of political structures that enhance ecological communication between ecological and 
human spheres. 
11 As discussed in Chapter 4, this was indeed the situation that contributed to the Bloomfield Track 
issue. In view of the victory by green groups in the Franklin River, the Queensland Government 
decided to use the construction of the Bloomfield Track to take a stand against federal intervention in 
state affairs in the name of the environment. 
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10.3 DELIBERATIVE POLITICS in posse 
In contrast to the reverse politics described in the previous section, the 
deliberative process of the FNQCJ facilitated autonomy during the construction of 
policy preferences. This facilitated increased salience (or activation) of the Preservation 
imperative. Where the subjective basis for policy preferences had been pre-
deliberatively fractured, the deliberative process focussed participants on 
intersubjectively shared conceptions of the common good or generalizable interests. 
Moreover, because of their participation deliberators were highly engaged by the issue. 
Thus, they developed a high level of resistance to attempts to influence them using 
strategic arguments. In short, the deliberative process reversed the reverse politics, 
creating the conditions under which preferences approached the ideal conditions of 
citizen sovereignty outlined in Chapter 2. In this section I will discuss the implications 
of these findings for politics in posse. 
10.3.1 Enfranchising Citizens Through Reason 
The findings in this thesis reinforce the argument of Goodin (2002) that 
'premises count, not just conclusions'. The democratic process should not simply be a 
matter of ' counting heads'. Any serious democrat should be concerned not with 'what' 
people want, but 'why' they want it. 
If, as I have discussed in Chapter 1, preferences are the currency of politics in 
esse, then reasons are the basis upon which deliberative (or strong) democracy in posse 
is made possible. Strong democracy requires participation by citizens as well as 
deliberation. 12 Not all citizens' can participate in a given policy decision, which has led 
some deliberative theorists to explore the relationship between deliberation and voting. 13 
The findings of this research suggests that, in contrast to the disenfranchising power of 
preferences discussed in the previous section, the possibilities of preference aggregation 
under politics in posse require the force of reason. This reasoning has an enfranchising 
effect on expressed preferences. 
12 See page 57. 
13 See section 1.2.3 in Chapter 1. 
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(a) Enfranchising Citizens/Enfranchising Nature 
Moreover, deliberative reasoning not only enfranchises citizens. It also serves to 
enfranchise nature. This is because, if given the tools to do so, citizens do not 
consciously intend to make decisions that have severe environmental outcomes. 
A significant fmding in this thesis has been that environmental concern was 
strong before deliberation. Its expression in the form of policy preference was hindered 
by the fragmentation of generalizable interests, through the reverse politics of the 
Bloomfield Track issue. The deliberative process did not so much serve to 'enfranchise 
the earth' (Goodin, 1996) as simply make it salient and enfranchise the participants to 
intersubjectively realise their shared environmental concerns. This occurred by changing 
the mode of preference construction from that of reverse politics, to the sequence of 
transfonning desires into preferences through the vehicle of shared reasoning - or 
'communicative rationality' in the words of Dryzek (1990). 
In short, the FNQCJ approximated the classical conception of politics whereby 
ends are autonomously chosen and the means for achieving them are evaluated - albeit 
as part of a group process. Fay (1975, p.54), draws a comparison between political and 
individual action by claiming that 'politics is to collective affairs what the striving for 
autonomy is to personal matters'. In the case of the FNQCJ, before deliberation the 
reverse politics gave rise a fonn of political schizophrenia where there were shared 
desires but wildly differing opinions. By contrast, the deliberative process facilitated 
the recognition of a generalizable interest. 
This is not to suggest that deliberators became part of some unthinking 
collective. Importantly, the communicative environment also supported dissensus 
where different interpretations of the evidence could be expressed.14 The important 
achievement of the deliberative process was to create the conditions under which shared 
interests could be autonomously recognised, as well as differences expressed. 
Moreover, as will be discussed below, these differences do not disenfranchise nature, 
but reinforce the real nature of environmental problems. 
14 For example, Dryzek (1990, p.18) cites Hannah Arendt (1958), who claims that 'authentic 
politics ... can only flourish with the interplay of different opinions (his italics). 
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10.3.2 Ecological Complexity: Do Deliberating Citizens Have 
the Right Stuff? 
The fact that we [deliberators participating in the FNQCJ] did not come to definite solution, I 
think, shows how successful the [deliberative] process is at tackling any problem, ie. this 
problem does not have a definite solution. 15 
In much the same way that there is an enduring question in democratic literature 
concerning whether citizens have the 'right stuff (Tetlock, 1998), there is a parallel 
theme within the environmental literature questioning the ability of citizens to secure 
'sustainable' environmental outcomes. Of particular concern is the ability of the 
layperson to grasp the complexity of environmental issues, even in deliberative formats 
(for example Edmond and Mercer, 1997).16 
The evidence from this research suggests that, if given the chance, autonomous 
citizens do have the right stuff to grasp the complexity of environmental issues and 
make good decisions. One potential limitation to this finding concerns disagreement 
between Preservationists and Pragmatists over the issue of environmental risk and the 
ability of scientific research to produce definitive outcomes. However, where one 
interpretation might point to bounded rationality on the part of Pragmatists, their 
cautious approach may serve to identify the gap between the politics in esse and in 
posse. 
If the recommendations of the Pragmatists were adopted, particularly in relation 
to an increased research effort, then the resulting information may assist in dissipating 
the symbolic politics. This may occur because symbolic politics is somewhat parasitic 
on the ability to manipulate uncertainty. Explicitly recognising this dimension during 
deliberation forms an important part of its dissipation. Thus, the Pragmatists cannot be 
dismissed on the grounds of competence. In fact, their recommendations serve to assist 
in the longer-term quest to understand the complexity of environmental issues. 
(a) Environmental Policy: Communication Through Reasons 
The case of Pragmatists also serves to reinforce the imperative for politics in 
posse that preferences must follow reasons. A superficial assessment of deliberative 
15 Comment from deliberator (Rastus) participating in the FNQCJ (see section A.2.10.2 of Appendix 2). 
16 See section 1.2.2 in Chapter 1 and 2.4.1 (c) in Chapter 2. 
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dynamics might suggest that because Pragmatists tended to favour the status quo they 
were insensitive to the problems of incremental attrition. 
Not so! All deliberators, Pragmatists included, were keenly aware of the way in 
which incremental adjustments in the face of structural tensions will lead to inexorable 
environmental decline. For this reason, even those deliberators who preferred the status 
quo did so on the explicit proviso of strict regulation of usage of the Bloomfield Track. 
Moreover, they expressed a willingness to change their preference in the face of evidence 
from the research that they recommended. 
10.3.3 Deliberation and the Wilderness: Against Pre-emptive 
'Sustainability' Consensus 
The review of the literature in Chapter 1 alluded to an argument associated with 
ecological economics. It concerns the problem that 'sovereign' preferences might not 
lead to ecologically sustainable policy outcomes. This concern was used to justify a 
mild form of 'social engineering' involving some measure of suasion to nudge preferences 
in the right direction (for example Common and Perrings, 1992; Norton et al., 1998). As 
I argued in Chapter 2, the problem with this approach is that it relies on some pre-
determined (most likely technically defined) notion of what constitutes sustainability, 
thus constituting a form of pre-emptive consensus (Myerson and Rydin, 1996). 
Myerson and Rydin (1996) suggest that pre-emptive consensus reduces the 
contestation of different values in democratic process. This thesis suggests that the 
democratic problem of achieving sustainability concerns the nature of the political 
system, not the capacities of citizens. Or more precisely, it involves both citizens and 
political structures where the uncertainty with respect sustainability can be exploited by 
manipulatory politics. 
Contrary to concern with diverse values in policy systems, I have argued that 
there is also a strong level of underlying consensus. Indeed, with respect to 
environmental issues there is much in-principle support for the broad goal of 
sustainability. This support is widely shared, even crossing cultural boundaries 
(Macnaghten and Jacobs, 1997). It may even be compared to a generalizable interest. 
However, the problem with achieving sustainability concerns the uncertainty attached to 
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the meaning of the term as well as the operation of complex environmental and human 
systems. 
This uncertainty lends itself to wide disagreement about how sustainability can 
and should be achieved, even what it is. Moreover, the combination of anxiety in 
relation to environmental issues and epistemic uncertainty creates ripe conditions for 
symbolic politics. That there may be widespread anxiety with respect to the 
achievement of the shared goal of sustainability among citizens in view of this 
uncertainty provides precisely the conditions conducive to the manipulation of 
preferences through processes such as symbolic politics. However, the solution does 
not involve curtailing democratic principles. 
Any attempt to steer society in a pre-defined sustainable direction is fraught 
with nonnative problems, such as who chooses what constitutes sustainability in the 
first place. There may or may not be a 'truth' in relation to environmental problems 
that needs to be 'made safe for democracy' - to use the words of Estlund (1993). 
However, deciding who is right may be just as complex as the problem itself. Worse 
still, attempting to impose a conception of sustainability will probably tend to act 
against its stated objective. There are two fundamental problems associated with the 
approach. First, given the Realpolitik of environmental issues, attempting to technically 
determine what constitutes sustainability will simply increase the stakes for political 
interests to influence the outcomes, thus exacerbating the structural dimension of reverse 
politics. Secondly, it exacerbates the mechanism of reverse politics by encouraging 
individuals to ignore the reasons and simply fall back on acceptance of outcomes, 
creating an unreflective and unreflexive democracy is one not well suited to dealing with 
its environmental circumstances (see Dryzek, 1987a). 
Thus, any attempt to pre-empt sustainable outcomes is hopelessly self-
defeating. The net result is a loss of both citizen autonomy and communication between 
social and ecological spheres.17 Based on the evidence outlined in this thesis, a better 
approach is not to detract from democratic principles, but to reinforce them. As Barber 
(1984, p.xi) argues 'there is little wrong with liberal institutions that a strong dose of 
17 Communication here is akin to Dryzek's (1987a, p.47) condition of negative feedback, whereby 
'ecologically rational' policy choice mechanisms must be responsive to changing environmental 
circumstances. 
- 303-
ChlfterlO 
political participation and reactivated citizenship cannot cure' .18 This involves not 
simply choosing means to suit sustainable ends, but also deciding through deliberative 
processes the nature of these ends (Barry, 1996). To paraphrase Rydin (1999), we can 
talk ourselves into agreement on the terms of sustainability and at the same time the 
policy means by which it may be achieved. Through a thoroughgoing deliberative 
process, reflective preferences may become safe for the purposes of sustainability. 
(a) Making Preferences Safe for Sustainability 
There is an important dilemma posed by deliberative democracy, which I 
considered in Chapter 1. It has to stop somewhere and decisions have to be made. It is 
not sufficient to maintain an ongoing dialogue with nature as doing so simply exchanges 
one fonn of policy paralysis for another. Where choices must be made in a democracy, 
even an ostensibly deliberative one, this implies the need for preferences. 
This recognition has given rise to a problematic trend in the literature on both 
deliberative theory and practice. The recognition of the decision imperative has led 
many, including Habennas ( 1996) to collapse the deliberative process back into the 
aggregation of preferences. These concessions have re-introduced the possibility that 
communicative rationality can be subsumed by instrumental rationality. Indeed, this has 
already led to allegations of parallels between 'utopian' deliberative and 'dystopian' 
social choice conceptions of democracy (Van Mill, 1996).19 
Given the structural dimensions of politics in esse of the sort I have described 
above20, even models of decision-making that are sensitive to the tension between 
communicative and instrumental rationality such as Habennas' 'two-track' model are 
prone to subversion by the dominant reverse politics. Thus, even where there is a 
genuine will to deliberatively communicate with nature in a predominantly ecocentric 
culture, there is always a risk that interests will prevail, or at least dominate the 
dimensions of the decision, if not its outcome. 
18 Cited in Dryzek ( 1990, p.119). 
19 Most disturbing of these trends is the emergence of a synthesis between deliberative democracy and 
economic approaches to environmental decision-making - where instrumental rationality reigns 
supreme (Niemeyer and Spash, 2001). 
20 In section I 0.2.2. 
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from reasons lends itself to the domination of interests and instrumental rationality. By 
contrast, the example of the FNQCJ demonstrates how citizens can represent - or at 
least act consistently with - the (shared) 'interests' of nature so long as they are free to 
autonomously construct policy preferences. The mechanism for the autonomous 
construction of preferences is that of a 'ground-up' process whereby desires are 
transformed into preferences through a process of reason. Without the reasons, 
autonomy is lost and nature is disenfranchised, as are citizens. 
Thus, the structural challenge for (green) deliberative democracy is to find 
mechanisms whereby, even where outcomes are communicated as preferences, the 
reasons that underlie these preferences are maintained as paramount. ln this way, 
preferences may become safe for sustainability. Using the experience of the FNQCJ, in 
the following section I will consider some possibilities whereby this may be achieved in 
view of the tensions that continue to exist in politics in esse. 
10.4 BRINGING DELIBERATION OUT OF THE 
WILDERNESS? 
It was good to be part of a deliberative process before they became mainstream [and therefore 
corrupted by political processesJ.21 
This research has clearly demonstrated the possibilities of deliberation as 
antidote to politics in esse. Harnessing these possibilities as part of an objective for 
transforming political processes is more problematic. Indeed, the question is far broader 
in scope than covered by this research effort. However, the findings herein do point to 
some of the possibilities for bringing deliberation out of the wilderness. 
The discussion of deliberative possibilities constitutes the concluding section of 
this thesis. l will begin by considering the outstanding problems for transformation of 
democratic systems toward deliberative ideals. l then consider those features of 
deliberative dynamics that might lend themselves to playing an important transformative 
21 Statement made by one of the deliberators at the conclusion of the FNQCJ. 
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role in democratic systems, so long as deliberative ideals are preserved when running 
isolated deliberative forums. 
10.4.1 A Citizens' Jury does not a Deliberative Democracy Make 
There are two reasons why a citizens' jury or any similar deliberative forum 
does not constitute a deliberative democracy. The first involves the impossibility of 
replicating the deliberative ideals that such events may embody but often do not. The 
second concerns related problems of running deliberative forums without sensitivity to 
the broader political processes in operation under politics in esse. I will briefly discuss 
each problem in turn below. 
(a) The Impossibility of Broad Participation 
The pressing challenge for the realisation of deliberative democracy can be easily 
described by considering the following. It took four days of intensive preparation, 
information gathering and deliberation to peel away the symbolic layers of the political 
sphere of the Bloomfield Track issue. All this to achieve deliberative ideals for twelve 
individuals. Moreover, it was an expensive process.22 
Given these facts, what would it take to transform the symbolic politics of 
political sphere as a whole? As discussed in Chapter 7, clearly it is not possible to 
replicate the process among the broader population.23 One solution might be to adopt a 
'minimalist' approach, perhaps using the information provided or even looking to 
'electronic forums as a truly democratic and deliberative alternative.24 However, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, deliberative designs are not exercises in satisficing -
compromising ideals in the face of practical considerations. The benefits of deliberative 
processes are emergent properties, not additive ones - they are greater than the sum of 
their parts. Any compromise, no matter how small, greatly increases the chances of 
compromising deliberative ideals. 
22 The cost of the FNQCJ was in the order of AU$50,000. It was funded by the federal government 
research body Land and Water Australia as part of a larger research project investigating the role of 
citizens' juries in natural resource management. 
23 Goodin (2000a) also considers these related problems. 
24 For example: (Etzioni, 1972; Abramson ct al., 1988; Finney, 2000). 
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(b) The Futility of Intensive Deliberation 
For all the interesting results that they produce, there is little point in running 
deliberative processes if they make little difference to actual political outcomes or 
transform the polity toward deliberative ideals. They may be theoretically interesting 
but practically useless. 
The case of the FNQCJ is but one in point. It is very unlikely that the findings 
from the process will have any impact on policy.25 Indeed, in order to implement the 
project it was necessary to play down the policy impact to anxious public servants, 
pragmatic politicians and angry interest groups. I have at various stages throughout this 
thesis alluded to some of these, often enormous, difficulties. Without elaborating in 
lurid detail, these can be summarised as problems associated with the clash between 
deliberative politics in posse and the politics of power in esse. 
As encapsulated by the quote at the beginning of this section (page 305), 
deliberators were aware of these problems. They were sensitive to their political 
environment and, consistent with deliberative ideals, were fully appraised of the 
perceptions of political actors in relation to the FNQCJ. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, although the deliberative process emboldened 
deliberators to vote according to their 'true' preference, their understanding of these 
processes had manipulated their pre-deliberative preferences through a perception of 
what was possible under prevailing political institutions. This points to a vicious circle 
in relation to politics in esse. In order for individuals' policy preferences (and hence, 
public opinion) to approach deliberative ideals it is necessary to transform political 
institutions. Yet, these institutions give rise to unreflective preferences in the first place 
through political manipulation. That the deliberative process of the FNQCJ broke this 
cycle points to one way in which public decisions can be wrested from politics in esse. 
25 Another recent example is a deliberative opinion poll conducted in Australia on the issue of the 
Republic Referendwn which resulted in similar outcomes, which were easily dismissed by those 
opposed to its recommendations who also prevailed on this issue by winning over the public at large 
(Nicholson and Overington, 1999; cited in Dryzek, 2001, p.656). 
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10.4.2 A Citizens' Jury may a Non-Deliberative Democracy Transform 
In an important sense, the use of formal deliberative processes should not be 
seen as exercises in decision-making, but as processes of facilitating evolution within the 
public sphere toward a deliberative democracy. Perhaps the prospects for harnessing 
deliberative possibilities can be conceptualised if we imagine for a moment a fictional 
scenario where in 1983 a citizens' jury was conducted in much the same format as the 
FNQCJ. Imagine that it resulted in much the same findings as the FNQCJ. If given 
proper standing in the decision making process, the Queensland government may have 
attempted to dismiss the findings. However, the issues raised may have turned public 
opinion on the issue such that the government was reluctant not to implement its 
findings. 
In the scenario the findings were implemented not because of deliberation by all 
concerned with the issue, but because a number of citizens were given the opportunity 
to engage in intensive deliberation. One could respond to the scenario by arguing that 
the outcome of this process is not legitimate because it was not given assent by all 
concerned. In response one could consider what would have happened if the Bloomfield 
Track not been constructed. What if instead the inland route was upgraded some ten 
years before the current timeframe? Would the political dynamics in esse that gave rise 
to 1983 the Bloomfield Track decision still prevail? Would the nature of the politics 
surrounding the issue change? 
The first part of this question is speculative. The Bloomfield Track is built. 
However, the second is historical fact. Since its construction, there has been much 
change in Queensland politics. So much in fact, that it can be stated with some 
confidence that the Bloomfield Track would not be built today. It took this, and a 
number of policy fiascos to achieve this change. However, if deliberative processes 
(approaching deliberative ideals) were accepted as a legitimate part of the decision 
process perhaps much of the cost and irreversible damage could have been avoided. If 
so, then the benefit of running the deliberative process would far exceeded the cost. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 FNQCJ SURVEYS 
This appendix reproduces the two surveys administered to the FNQCJ jurors. 
The first survey, which was administered before the beginning of proceedings on day 1 
is provided in section A.1.1. The survey administered on the final day, which is divided 
into two parts (1 & 2) is provided in section A.1.2. The raw results for the surveys are 
reproduced in Appendix 2. 
A~rrlix 1 FNQCJS~ys 
A.I.I. PRE-DELIBERATIVE SURVEY 
Citizens Jury Questionnaire-Day One 
To protect your identity, please pick a codename that you would like to 
use for all the surveys you will fill in during the Citizens' Jury (make sure you 
b . "') remem er 1t. . . : 
QI. 
Have you traveled to the Daintree area 
before? (that is, have you crossed the 
Daintree River on the ferry before?) 
Q2. 
How many times have you visited the 
Daintree region in the last two years? 
Q3. 
How familiar would you say you are 
with the Daintree Area. 
Please tick 
Yes 
No 
Please tick 
Once 
2 - 3 times 
4 - 5 time.s 
6 - 10 times 
More than I 0 times 
Please tick 
Totally unfamiliar 
A little famil iar 
Reasonably familiar 
Familiar 
Very familiar 
Extremely familiar 
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Q4. 
Have you travelled the Bloomfield Track 
before? 
QS. 
How many times have you travelled on 
the track? 
Yes 
No 
Once 
2 - 3 times 
4 - 5 times 
6 - 10 times 
Section A.1.1 Pre-de~ SLIM!y 
Please tick 
Please tick 
More than I 0 times 
Q.6. There are any number of options for the future management of the 
Bloomfield Track. A small number of these are listed below. Assume for the moment 
that these are the only options available. Which do you prefer? Please rank the 
following options in your order of preference from most preferred to least preferred 
using the numbers "1" to "5". For example, put a number " l " next to the option you 
prefer the most, then "2" next to the next best option and so on until you have filled all 
the boxes. 
Rank with a number 
Upgrade the track to a bitumen road. 
Maintain the road m its current 
condition as a 4WD track. 
Close the road and rehabilitate it. 
Upgrade the road, to a dirt road 
suitable for conventional vehicles. 
Stabilize specific trouble spots, such 
as steep slopes, on the road but leave 
it as a 4WD track. 
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A~rrlix 1 FNQCJSUIWys 
A.1.2. POST-DELIBERATIVE SURVEY 
Citizens Jury Questionnaire-Day Four: Part 1 
lease write your codename here: 
.1. As you know, there are any number of options for the future management of the 
Bloomfield Track. A small number of these are listed below. Assume for the moment 
that these are the only options available. Which do you prefer? Please rank the 
following options in your order of preference from most preferred to least preferred 
using the numbers "l" to "5". For example, put a number "1" next to the option you 
prefer the most, then "2" next to the next best option and so on until you have filled 
all the boxes. 
Rank with a number 
Upgrade the track to a bitumen road. 
Maintain the road in its current condition as a 4 WD track. 
Close the road and rehabilitate it. 
Upgrade the road, to a dirt road suitable for conventional 
vehicles. 
Stabilize specific trouble spots, such as steep slopes, on the 
road but leave it as a 4WD track. 
f not listed above, briefly describe your most preferred option: 
~330~ 
Section: A.1.2 Past-Delirerailie Surwy 
Citizens Jury Questionnaire-Day Four: Part 2 
Please write your codename here: ·------···------···-··---···------·-·····--··---------
2. Has your preferred option changed since the beginning of the Citizens' Jury? 
Please tick 
Yes 
No 
3. If you answered yes to the last question, what do you think helped to change your 
mind? Please rank the following statements. 
Rank with a number 
The fact that I learnt a great deal 
about the Bloomfield Track and its 
imolications. 
Listening to the views of the speakers 
who came to present as witnesses. 
The fact that I had to look at the 
issue from the perspective of what is 
best for the community rather than 
what I personally would like to see 
hannen. 
The fact that I had to discuss the 
issues with other members of the jury 
and iustify my reasons to others. 
Are there any other things that you can think of that helped to change your mind? 
~331~ 
AJ¥rrlix 1 FNQCJSucwys 
Q 4. If the talks given by witnesses helped to change your mind, which speakers 
proved most influential (you might like to look through your list of witnesses)? 
Witness Name. Why they were influential? 
5. Were there any major gaps in the information that you have been provided? 
Please tick 
Yes 
No 
-332~ 
Section: A.1.2Post-De1iberatmSuP.ey 
If there were major gaps, what sort of information would you have liked to have heard? 
Q 6. Was there any part of the process in which you felt that the information provided 
was too technical to be useful to you? (Yes/No) 
Please tick 
Yes 
No 
If so, which part? 
Q 7. Was there any part of the process in which you felt that the information provided 
was too general (not relevant to the issue) to be useful to you? 
I Pkru;e tiek 
~333~ 
Awrrtix 1 FNQCJSmcys 
If so, which part? 
8. Did you enjoy the process? 
Please tick 
Yes 
No 
hat did you enjoy, or dislike most about what you have experienced over the past 
few days? 
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Section: A.1.2 Pc.N-Deliberame ~y 
Please feel free to write any comments you have about the Citizens' JUI)'. 
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APPENDIX 2 RAW SURVEY DATA 
This appendix reports the data elicited from the surveys that were reproduced in 
Appendix 1. filled out by jurors before and after the deliberative process. 
A.2.1. ADVENTURE 
A.2.1.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
QI. Have you traveled to the Daintree area before? (that is, have you Yes 
crossed the Daintree River on the ferry before?) 
Q2. How many times have you visited the Daintree region in the last 6 - 10 
two years? 
Q3. 
Q4. 
Q5. 
How familiar would you say you are with the Daintrec Area 
Have you travelled the Bloomfield Track before? 
How many times have you travelled on the track? 
A .2.1.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
Familiar 
Yes 
2-3 
Ql. TfNo't /i,;ted ill tlu policy options, bricfllj describe your most prt!ferred optio11: 
Leave existing track with minimal maintenance but [with] strict regulation to stop 
"creeping" to a further developed road. 
Q 2. [fas yo11r prt!fcrrcd op/ion cliangcd since the /Jegi1111ing of tl1t' Cif'b!11s' fury? Yes 
Q 3. lf you n11swe.1·cd yes to the last q11cstio11, wl111t do 11011 think ht!l1•cd to clrn11ge your 111iurl? Plenst' 
mnk the followi11g .~tn temc11 l's. 
Rank 
Tire! fact lltn l l /camt a srcat· denl 11!1011r the Bfoomficlil Track 1111rl its implic111io11~. 1 
U ste11ing to t/11111iews of the speakers who came to pr<.>sc11 t fl>' wit11t!sscs. 3 
111e fllct t11nt r h11d to look at flit' issue lr.i(ll/l tit<! perspective of wltat 
comnnmit11rather111111! w ltat 1 verso11n 111 w ould like to sec l11w11c11. 
i5 best for the 2 
1'1te fact thM 1 lrnif to 
rM so11s t o otlrer,:. 
discus::: the issues witlt o tlier 111em/1er;; i~l the jury mid j11sf'ify my 4 
Q3!11) Are thel'I! any ot/1cr t!Jings tltal' you mn tit ink 4 tlmt Jrt!lpetl to clrange your 111i11d? 
Lack of "concrete" research to back up many of the claims made 
Q 4. lf t11e f(l /ks 1~i11e11 /111 wit1ws5t!S liel1•e<l to change y<lt11' 111i11d, wl1icl1 SJ'Cllker.> ,.n·oi•cd 1t111st i1~f1uc11U11/ 
(you might )ike to ltlnk tliro11gli yo111· list 11( 10it11esses)? 
~'\fitness Nrw1~. Why they were i11flue11tial? 
Haynes Lack of research on environmental impact 
Scott A refreshing insight into indigenous values 
Berwick 
Q 5. Wltc re t·Trerc r111y mnjor gaps in the i11fon11aticl/I tltnt yo11 l111ve U<'t!t1 7Jrot•ided? Yes 
Tf thae were major gaps, wltnt sort t>f infornuition w ould 11ou lrnve liked to hm1e lrt!aril? 
Is the Bloomfield Track impacting on the fringing reef 
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Section: A.2.2 ~ 
Q 6. Was tl1ere rmy pnrl of tlte Jll'occss i11 wliid1 you .fclf· Nrnt tlte i11fomrntio11 provided was too tecimica/ 
tcJ be 11stf11l to yo11? (Yes/No) No 
If so, wlriclt pnrt? 
Q 7. W11s tllere any pnrt of the im.Jcess i11111J1icl1 yo11 felt lhnt the inji1murtfo11 provided was too general 
<Not rcle1.•11nt tt> the iss11e) to be 11scf11l to !fOll? Yes 
If >01 wilich part? 
Indigenous information was not neccessarily pertinent to Bloomfield 
Q 8. Did !fOll e11jo.1J tlit' vrocl!ss? Yes 
Wltnt dirl yo11 enjoy, or tlislikl:' 111osl 11bo11t wli11t yo111iave expt~rieacc:d 01•1:r tl1c 1•11stfew rlriys? 
I have enjoyed recieving bulk information and being able to channel the information in 
a catalyst for changing my mind 
Plciu.e feel free to write •ltl!J com1111'11ts you /iave about the Citi::c11s1 jury. 
A totally enjoyable experience. I have learned an immense amount and will be boring 
friends for weeks to come with the Bloomfield Track issue .... 
A very interesting concept for community management - mabye we should have a 
Citizens' Jury "policing" the track management 
A.2.2. ASWAD 
A.2.2.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Q1. 
Q2. 
Q3. 
Q4. 
Q5. 
JJm•e 11011 tr.ivc/e1l to the Daintrel! .ire11 lnf!lrl!? <that is, lrnve you Yes 
c'ros::.<'d the D11iutree Wm•r 011 lire ferry bcforc?j 
H ow t111111y times l1t1t1e you uisited thl! Drd11tt-cc regio11 i11 Nie last' 
two !J<'urs? 
How,1;unilhlr would you say you 111"' witlt tire D11i11tree A.rea 
flcn>e you ITavellcd the Bloomfi,,ltl 'tmck [,cforc? 
How numy tilllt'S /11wc you travelled 011 f'ltc tn1ck? 
6 - 10 
Familiar 
Yes 
6 - 10 
A.2.2.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
QI. lf Nof' /iMcd in tire policy opti011s, briefly describe your mo•t prefen-cil optia11: 
Maintain road as a 4wd track with strict guidelines as to not slide into the effect of 
upgrading 
Q 2. Hai; yo11r pr<'ferrcil oytfo11 c/11111ged since the begi1111i1tg of the CUi::c'lts' /r11y? No 
Q J. If yvu 1111~wercd yes to tl1r last· question, wlrllf do yo11 tlii11/i: helped to clw11ge yo/Ir 111ind? Ple11sc 
rnuk tlre ,1i1//(lwi11g stcrteme11ts. NR (NO 
RESPONSE) 
QJ{a) Ar<' tl1crt' nny otlta tlii118s thnt you c1111 thin/..: of tl!nt lrclperl to chnnge your 111iiul? 
My opinion hasn't changed much as there were no specific damage that has been 
recorded. If, however, there was recorded damage I'm sure my opinion would be 
different. 
Q ·l. If the 111/ks git'Cll /1y wittic•sscs 11elped to cl1m1gc your mhul, w/Jicli ;;penkers proverl most influential 
(you miglrt· lik·e l'v look through your list' of witnesses)? NR 
Q 5. IV/1crc• there ull}/ mnjM g1111s i11 thl! inji>m1ativ11 th11t you have /JeeJ/ r1rov idcd? Yes 
ff tlll!rr.>. Wt' rt' 11111jvr gaps, w /1111 sorl of information W<'uld 11011 Ir ave liked I-.> l11we lre11rrl? 
-Not enough solid material on damage done. 
Also, a local point(s) of view would have been good 
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Q G. Was tlicr11 r111y part ll/ the process in wlticlz you fch tl1t1t tlu i11fomwl"i1l/1 prot>idcd w11s 'loo tec/111ical 
to he usejitl to you? O'i>s/~!o) No 
If so, whicli part? 
Q 7. Was there any p11rl" oftl1e process ill which you felt thnt tl1c iufornrntimr fJrOVided was /"c>o seneral 
(Not relt>Vtlllt to the issue> to be 11sefiil to you? No 
lf so, whiclr p11rl'? NR 
Q S. Did you enjoy tire proccs;.? Yes 
'l'Vlrnt did you 1111joy, or dislike m1>st about wlrnt you ltave C"'tf'l'l'fr11ccd over Ill<' past few days? 
I found the process very successful, it helped me put into perspective all the information 
I needed to determine the outcome of my opinion . 
.Please jeel free to write any co111111t•11t s yo11/zave111!011t tire Citizc11,;' fury. 
I found it most enjoyable and acknowledgable process to take part in. I felt all of the 
jurors got a lot out of it. 
Peter was a great facilitator. 
Also, the help of Jane, Simon and Russell proved to be a valuable asset of supporting 
each of the jurors. 
A.2.3. BOAT 
A .2 .3.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
QI. 
Q2. 
Q3. 
Q-1. 
Q5. 
ffow yo11 travc>lled to the Daittlrec area IJefare? (that is, lzm1c you 
·osscil the Dai11ttel' River on tire fen·y be_filre?) 
flow 111,111y tim1·s have yo11 f!isited t/ie Dai1itrc!e region i11 /lie Inst tuio 
!ars? 
ffow ji1111ifiar would yo11 sriy you ill't' rvil'/r the [),riutret' An•11 
llr1ve yo11 l'l'lnicl/e<i tire 8/c1om(icld Track before? 
Efow mrmy times lwve. you truvelfe,f 011 the trtick? 
A.2.3.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
Yes 
Once 
A little familiar 
Yes 
Once 
QL ~{Not listed in tltt! pofic!f optio11s, lJfiefly descrilit! yo11r 1nost prefcriwl optio11: 
Providing that the road is closed over a considerable number of years in stages. 
Q 2. Jfas yor1r preferred optiou d1a11gcd si11ce tht' begi1111i11g of the Cili::e11s' jury? NR 
Q J. lf you n11swcrccl yes f1> tlre lust questio11, whnt do yo11 thi11k helped to c/11111ge y1111r 111iud? l'lc>r1se 
ra11k the fil/lowi11<> stale111c11ts 6 .. 
Rank 
The fart thai I learn I a :;retlt deal t1b(l1lt the B h10111 field Track mid its i mpl u:nl ions. 1 
Listc11ing /(l flu fJiClUS (f tl1e speakers wlto t:.nne lu present a5 wilnesses. 2 
The fact l!wr r ha,f lo look at the issue from the perspcdive tJf wlu1 I is bes/ for t Ii e 3 
co1111111111i ty rat/tN t/11111 what I pN!IO/Wl/y would like ttJ sec happr!n. 
The fact that l hart to discuss the issues with ofhrr lilf l/l /1r I~ ~f the jury mtd f 11stif1J 4 
1111,1 rl!clSClns tu other~. 
Q.3(11! Arc i!icr,• flll!J other tirings tliat you ca11 tlii11k of that ili'lpcd lo change your 111i11d? NR 
Q 4. 1( tlte talks ~il'e11 1111 wit11esses helped to r/11111ge your witul, ui/1ic/1 speakers pnnicd most i1~/"fttc11t·hrl 
(you might Yn,·e to /,)(>k through your list of witncsse;.)? 
Witness Name. w·1iy thfy WCI'(' i11Jl11e11tial? 
Hitchcock Al.most impossible to maintain the status quo - Always 
creep. Tropical rainforest only covers 0.1% of Australia 
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Baade 
Section: A.2.3 Boat 
Maintenance costs are 3x higher than for other roads. 
The road was built in haste without proper survey or 
consultation 
Q :). \'\'here there 111111 tnflj<>r gap;; iii t/ze i11fomu1thm that you hm.'t' l1ee11 provided? NR 
lf there were nu1jor gaps, wlrat sorl' of injim11atio11 wou/il !JCl'll ls1n1e liked to Jrnve /le111·1f? NR 
Q 6. ivas tlri>re 1111y part of the proc,•ss in wl1ic:l1 yo" felt tl111t /he i1~formntio11 pre>vided was tot> f!'clm icril 
to IJ<' 11sefi1/ ro yo11? (Yr.s/No) NO 
.If so, w ltic/z purt? NR 
Q 7. \Vas thac t111y part· of tl1c process ill wl1ir:Jz yo11 felt t-11 •. rt· tin• i1tfcm11atio11 prc>z>ided w a,; too ge11cral 
(Not relevant to tile issue) to be 11sej11l to you? 
~f so, w/ric/1 J'rlfl? NR 
Q 8. Did y1>11 L'11joy t11e procc;s? 
IV/rr1t did yo11 enjoy, or dislike! 1110:;111bo11t wllnt you /ro ve fXperie11ced over tftc past few days? 
The opportunity to have some input into a process which may influence future decisions 
in the area. Normally one feels powerless to influence decisions corning from the 
political process. 
P/cr1sc feel ji'ef! It> writr? any com111<'11fs y1J11 haPe t11!011t· tlrc Citizc11s' J11r.11. 
I am very impressed with the Citizens' Jury concept. Particularly if it has legal 
standing with its decisions. I see it as a vehicle for the Grass Roots of society to have a 
voice in the various subjects, preventing the total hijacking of government decision 
making by powerful and professional lobby groups who represent only a narrow section 
of society. 
A conduit for real world thoughts and opinions to be transferred direct to the top, 
bypassing biased advisors. 
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A.2.4. JANINE 
A.2.4.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Q1. Have you frrwe/lcd to the Daintree arrn /.Jeforc 7 (t/wt is, Yes 
linr>c you ,;rnssed /he Dni11trrc Riuer (111 lite ferry 
be.furc?) 
Q2. How 1111111y times h11Fc yru vi.>i/·1!d the Daintrrc rrxion i1t 6 _ 10 
t/Jc las/ two .1fe11rs? 
Q3. How familiar wuuld you say y ci11 nre with llte Dr1i11l1111· Very familiar 
A ren 
Q4. 1-lavc yru irirudled the Blt10inficlrl Track before? 
QS. How many times hr.pc !fVt! travelled r;1 the lrr?ck? 
A.2.4.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
Yes 
>1 0 
Q1. f{Not listed i11 the polit'y options, briefly desrri/Jc! yo11r most pn'.fem:rl option: NR 
Q 2. lftrs your prefl!l'rcd 1>1•tio11 clr1111ge1f since the be.~i1111ins o( the Citi::ens' /'ui-y? Yes 
Q 3. If you 1111swerr:d yo!s to tl1e /11st q11cstio11, what do you tlri11k helpr1f to c11<111g<' your mind? J>lensl.' 
rank· t11e j()/fou•itlg stn lc111ent~. 
Rank 
Tlte f 11cl tlwl I learn/ (I great Je11/ about the Bloo111fiel,f Tmck a11d its implicat io11s . 2 
Ustc11ing to the Piews of tlie ~reakcr:-- who ct? 111e ta present as wilncsses. 1 
Tile ji1ct tl1at l had to luok nt the issue f rom the pcr~pective of what is he~t for t Ii f 3 
cominun i tv 
" 
rather lil11n what 1 perso11nlly tL'O ll iri like ftl sec itnppe11. 
The fact Iha/ I had lo discuss the iSSllCS with ollrer mcm /Jers of lite jury 11 11d j11sl.i/1f 4 
ill 11 reasn11s to tJthers. 
Q3l11) Are tiicre 1111y other thing,; tllat !IOI/ cuu think of thllt ltclped to cl11111gl.' your miml? 
Other pending issues for area, ie. power supply 
Q 4. Tf tlte talks s iven by wit11cs;;es lwlped to clumge your mi11d, wltid1 spe.ikers prnr•r:d most i1tfl11e11ti11l 
(you might likl.' to look tlm >ug/1 y_our list of wit1wsscs)? 
l'\'itlles5 Name. Wlty tltcy were i11fluentinl? 
Hitchcock _U!'~'!e.!.'e_ss_ o.f £2r~s_! \!1f2 _______________ _ 
_ E.!,l~irE~_el,!t~ !!n.P~C!.5 lnfor~a~op __________ _ Turton 
---------------------~~~ --------------- - _P,9i_!!t~ t,g ~o.!'~d_!:!~ __________________ _ Scott Cultural information 
-------------------- ---------------- -------------Berwick 
Q 5. Wl1ere there any 111ajor gap:< i11 tile infilmtcrtio11 thnt you hrwl' l1et•11 providctl? Yes 
If f'11t!fe were 11/djor 3a11s, w l111t sort of i11fonn11liott w ould you lrcri•I.' lil.·c!d f'o l11n>c ltcard? 
More accurate history of the road. 
Local's views on the road (Cape Tribulation and Wujal Residents). 
Q 6. Was tlterc any purt uf t/11.' 7Jrocess in 1(1/tich you felt tlrnt tlte illf(mm1thm pr,n•itlerl wus too te.-!111ic11/ 
to be 11,;e/11/ lo you? (YcdNo) No 
lf so, wlticli 1••ut? 
Q 7. Wn;; there 1111y p.11·t vftltL' pro('ess i11 w/zidt yo11 ft!lt that thl' i11formatio11 prnvided u•11s too ;\<'ll<'ml 
(No t rl.'levm1t to t!tc issue) to l•<! 11se(11l to you? Yes 
If s£l, w11ich /Jlltt? 
Gralie111c Elnu:s - .Nr.ctieii tn<ll'I.' illfom1atio11 OH Tris Shrl! Rc,.ide11ts 
Q 8. Di1i you e11joy the procc>ss? Yes 
W!tat did you enjoy, or dislike 1110,1 about wl111t yo11 Jwrc experie11ct•d m1er /Ire p•1st few days? 
It would have been nice if all (instead of a few) witnesses could have presented a more 
unbiased view than they did {only 2 /3 d id so) 
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Section: A.2.5 Julie 
Plt'11se fed .fret! to write n11y co111111c11t s you lrnr•c n/1(lut 0 1e Ci ti;;ens' }11ry. 
I feel this experience has been one of great enlightenment for myself and am very 
grateful to the organisers for giving me this opportunity. 
It was a challenge for me to consider a topic on behalf society; rather than for me 
personally. 
A.2.5. JULIE 
A.2.5.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Q1. Hape you tr11ve/ler/ to the Daintree r11c,1 before? (that is, No 
hai•e y<1u cro:;sed !hr! Dai11 I rec River (Ill I he ferry 
!1eforc?) 
l]2. 1-lotJ• 111a11y times lun-'r yru visit.~d the D11i11trrc regi<1n in 2 - 3 
!he last twu year.>? 
Q3. llo:.i• familiar wviild .11011 say you 11rr! with t/;1! 011i11Irec Reasonably familiar 
A r~a 
Q4. Ht1V{' yu11 tnl\!cllcd the Blr>0111fifld Track re/Me? No 
Q5. How many l"iinrs have y01t tmvelled on the !rack? O 
A.2.5.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
QI. If Not lisll!d in fltc policy optio11s, briefly describe your most prl?_fi't-red optio11: NR 
Q 2. T-las your preferred option clumged since the l1t?gi1111i11g of tlte Citi:ze11s' /11ry? No 
Q 3. Tf yo11 nnswt•red yes to the Inst q11cstio11, wJr,,1 do ~1011 think hdtied to clu111gc your t11ind? I'lt!11sc 
nrnk the followins s lllt"e111c'nts. NR 
Q3ft1) Arr there any other tl1i11gs tlta l you Cill1 tlti11k or thnt /it'lped to cllilltS<' your miml? NR 
Q 4. If tile talks 8iul!n by wif11cs~es lrt!lpeJ t.o ciuwge your mim/, whic/1 speakers prm>cd most in.f111c11f'fol 
(you migltt lil;c: lo look t/1ro11gl1 your list of witl/cs;;es)? NR 
Q 5. Wht!t'e there nny 11111jor gnps in tlte i11fom111ticm that .IJ<>ll ltavc bNn providt'd? NR 
If tfurc wc.>ri> major gaps, whnt sort of i1~fornmtio11 would you It ave liked f'o lrnr•e lr1!11rd? NR 
Q 6. w,,,. tl11!re illl!f p11.rt of tl1e process ill wllic/1 you .kit tlwf' the i11formatio11 provided wns too tech!licnl 
to l•c useful t·o y<111? (Yes/No) NR 
If so, whic/1 part? 
Q 7. W11s tltl!re nny T'nrt of ll1e pn>cess i11 which you felt tlwt 01c i11.f11miaf"io11 proi•idl!d wa; too gener11I 
(Nol relc».111111' ID tire issue) Iv IN 11sl!.fiil to you? NR 
lf so, wlr iclt 1111 rt? NR 
Q S. Did yot1 enjoy the prncess? Yes 
Whllt did you c11;oy1 or dislike most nl>out w/111t you luwe experienced m>er l/1c ptr;;t few days? NR 
Plen1;e fc.><'l free Iv write mry c1>111111e11t5 yo11 hnur al!out Ilic Citizens' Jury. NR 
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A.2.6. KEITH 
A.2.6.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
QJ . Have you trn11rlled fa lhl' Daint1cc area /:icfme? (that is, Yes 
i:a<1e yo11 croc;scd /he! Dai11tree l~iver 1.lH lht? ferry 
befr>re ?! 
Q2. J-lm:u ntany f'imes havt? y1m visited !lie Drri11lrce rt'gio11 i11 6 _ JO 
the last two years? 
QJ. J-fow familiar wo11/d yru sny yl)11 are will! thr Doi11/ree Reasonably familiar 
Arca 
Q4. Jfrruc you lmz1rilcd lht.! Bloor11field Tra.:k before? Yes 
Q5. Hflw ;111111y ti111t~i' lllli't' you trnvdlert 011 tile !me.!:? Once 
A.2.6.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
Q1. T/Not Ti sled ill tltl' policy 011ti1>11s, /1rie/1y rkscril•c your 111ost 7Jrcferred option: NR 
Q 2. flas yo11r prefcrrP.rl optio11 clumgcd since 1"111! /1egillnittg of the Citi:w11s' fury? No 
Q J. If you answered yes to tlre Inst qucstio11, wltat do yo11 think helped to cltm1gc your 111i11tl? l'le.1sc 
r1111f< t/1c following statemo1t.;, NR 
Q3<11) A.n• there ai1y of"hcr tilings that yori Cf111 tltiuk of tl111t helped to dumgc your miud? NR 
(J 4. lf tile talks giw11 by witnesses helped to cl1nn:;:e yo11r mi111I, whicli ,:pe11kcrs 1•rmn•1i most" i1~/1ue11tit1l 
(you might' like to look tllro11sh your list of wifltcsses)? NR 
Q 5. Where tiler<' 1111y 11111jor gaps il1 the i11formntia11 f"11at you hm•c /lcc11 1iro11irlP.d? No 
If there ·were major gaJ'S, w1rnt sort ofinfi>mrnti011 wo11/1/ y1>11 ltavc likrd to lrnve lrerml? NR 
Q 6. Was tliere any part of the process i11 wliic/1 yo11 felt tlrtrl tlie i11for1natia11 provided wrts too ter:Ji111rnl 
to be 11scf11l to yo11? ('ie>/No) No 
lf so, whiclt part? 
Q 7. Was tltt•re nny part of the' process in which you felt flttd tltc i11fornu1 t"it111 providt?d was ttJo generul 
<Not rcleva11t f(l llze issue) to be 11se/11 / to !fOtt? No 
Tf so, which part? NR 
Q S. Did you enjoy Ille process? Yes 
Whal did yo11 c11joy, or dislike wost n/1011t wlrnt !fO!I lim;e "~'pcric11cer! over tlti: p11st f1•w 1lays? NR 
Please fed free to write m1y co1mnents yo11 luwe fll1011t the Citizi:11s' Jur!f· NR 
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Section: A.2. 7 Kofa 
A.2.7. KODA 
A .2.7.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Ql . Have y1J11 frape/led tCl the D11i11trcc are11 flcfrre? (tl111l is, Yes 
it11ve you cn1sscd tltr Daintree River 011 l/Je ferry 
before?) 
Q2. Hon.• many ti1111!s l11we yrm Pi~iterf tiw Dainlree regiou in 4 _ 5 
tlie l11sl two yi:a1 s? 
Q3. How f111nili11r m11i/rl y('lf -;:.ny _110 11 arc with lhc Dain tree A little familiar 
Arca 
Q4. Haue yirn lrai!elled the Blor111fidd Tmck /J~(orc? 
QS. 1-l(lit' 1111111y lime~~ have yo lL tmrfl/ed 1111 the track? 
A.2.7.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
Yes 
4-5 
QJ. If No t· fisted i11 the policy options, bricf1~11lcscri1Je your most 11refl!rred option: 
-protect [the] area's unique biological and cultural values as a whole ecosystem 
-international significance of the area 
-rainforest values not best appreciated in a 4wd 
-rainforest values to very subtle to appreciate diversity, beauty of area ... need to walk, stop, 
listen, look etc 
-alternative accommodation [is] available elsewhere 
-alternative 4wd experience [is] available elsewhere 
Q 2. Has !f<lllf preferred optiu11 clumgcd since f"11e /legi1111i11g of the Cit i::.e11s' Jury? Yes 
Q 3. l f yo11 1mswel'l!.d 11cs to !hi! last question, wli llf" do yor1 t/Jiuk helped t u c11m1se your mind? Ple.ise 
mnk tl1e fullowi11g .;f'1te111e11ts 
'-
.. 
Rank 
Tltc fa<"f l/111t I /e.nrut 11 great- dl!al nlioul ll1e Bloom{iclcl Trac:J..- and its i111plic:ntio11s. 3 
Liste11i11g to the vfrws of t/w spt'flker,: who C•lllll! to presrmt 11s wit11esses. 1 
The fact tli11t l /inil to /o()k "' the is>11t' from lite perspective o( wlu1t i~ flt'St for tile 4 
r:0111m1111ity r.1tha 1"11a11 whflt T pcrs;1111rlly would like to see lrnppe11. 
"1'11 <' fact tltnt T /rad t·o ,fisrnss thi• iss11cs w ith Offli!I' llle'1ltbl!I S of the junr flltd j11sti/y 111y 2 
reasons to others. 
QJ(a) Are f/1er.: am1 other things t/wt you can think of t-1111t liclpl!rl to ch1111ge yo11r mind? 
I didn't really learn much new but the site visit was good in terms of seeing the current 
sta te of the road - thinking about the big picture issues - international significance etc 
and that local access issues and 4wd road aren' t really gcxxl reasons to compromise the 
area's intrinsic values. Also, not opting for the 'easy' option ie maintaining status qoo 
was an important step in my decision-making 
Q 4. f{ t/w talk:; '.?iven by w itnesses hel111!d to c/1n11gc y o11r mint!, which spcr1kcrs proved most inJ711e1rtinl 
(yo11 111iglrt )i/..-e t·u look tlm111gl1 your list of wit1wsses)? 
Witne,.;,.; Nom e. Why they were infliie11f'ial? 
Haynes Science will never have all the answers 
Burns Locals use coast road because it's 'relaxing' - not a great 
reason in my mind to keep the road open given the 
alternatives 
Q 5. INl1en• there a11y mnjor gap;; i11 tlw i11J(>1111C1tio11 lhat you lint•e ber11 prnviiled? Yes 
If tlrl!r~ tt>!!l"I! lllajor gap;:, whal sort of i11fonnatio11 W(>uld you ha1Je liked It• l11wc Jrecrrd? 
-more about international significance of the area 
-local perspective 
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-management framework (solutions [are] so difficult as it requires coordination between 
so many agencies and stakeholder interests) 
Q 6. Was tlicre 1111y Jlrlrl of the process i11 w/tich !f011.felt" that the i11fomuilit111 prot>itlcd tl'f!s too l<'d111icnl 
to be 11sef11l /o you? (Yes/No> No 
If so, wllid1 pill"/'? 
Q 7. Was tltcre r111 y Jl<ll't of the process ht which yo11 felt thnt the i11formntio11 proi•idcd wns too ;;;maa/ 
(Not r1!h•i1mrl to flit> issue) to lie 11sl!fiil to yon? No 
lj so, whidt part? NR 
Q 8. Did yi111 e11joy tlie process? Yes 
Wlrat did you enjoy, or rlisfik·e mast nl1out what yo11 l111ve cx1•crie11ced over tl1e past few il11ys? 
Having time to focus on one issue for four days in a relaxing forum. In my business rare! 
l'lc11,;e fed free to write 1111y comments you ftave about. the Citiw11s' frrry. 
thought the first three days (were) excellent: organisation of speakers, facilitation etc. 
-liked the process a lot 
-fourth day, liked the p rocess, but needed tighter time management 
- think more backup re. information requests would have assisted the group in some 
areas b ut appreciate the difficulties 
-overall you did a great job. 
A.2.8. MATILDA 
A.2.8.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Ql . lfrmc Y• '11 traricllt!d to the D11i11trrc arer? before? (I/int i.;, Yes 
have yo11 cro>scd the Dai 11 fret! River rm tire ferr y 
/lcfMe?) 
Q2. 
Q.3. 
Q4. 
Q5. 
1-:lvw many limes hll<N !fOll visiied tlte Oaintree resirm Ill 
the last I il'O years? 
Haw familiar WClulri you sny yo11 are ;11it/1 Ilic Daintrre 
Area 
Hape you trauellerf tl1e Bloomfield Tmck bi/ore? 
Jfo1u many times have yru tmirclied 0 11 the track? 
A.2.8.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
Once 
A little familiar 
Yes 
Once 
Q1. lf Not listed iu thi! poli,·y ovti011s, briefly descrilw your most pn'ferrcrl optio11: 
Close the road, revegetate and create a walking track in its place where possible. 
Q 2. Hns yo11r pri!fl!tTeli option cJ11111getl since the begi1111iug 1~f the Citi:ens' Jury? Yes 
Q 3. fl you 1111swere1l yes fo f/1e "1st question, wltnt do !/011 N1i11k helped to r./11111ge your 111i11rl? l'/ea,,:e 
ra11k l11e foffouiillg 'tntcmr!t1 ts ( '. 
Rank 
The fact tltal l foamt u g re11t rfeal llbo11t the B/tJ(lmffrld Track 1111d it; hnplicaf"io11s. 2 
Us·tening fo the Pieivs oj tile speakers who ca111c to present as witnesses. 3 
The far.t tlrnt I h1rd fo look lit t!rt.' i.ssue /!.iom tire 11er·sp,•ctivL' of wlrnt is bc~t for the 1 
comnnmit:y mtlrer tl1m1 what l perso1111 ly would likc• t·c1 Sl?e l111ppc11. 
1'1te fai,;t Nia t .T 7111rl lo dist'uss tire issues wil/1 ot11er 111cml1t.'rs t>t' t/ir jury mul j11st~f)! 111 !I 4 
reasons to otlters. 
Q3{a) An: tlrac 11 11y other thiugs tlrnt you c1111 think of tlrnt ltc /perl to change your minrl? 
Being in the rainforest itself (especially when the busdriver turned off the engine). 
Also, the values of the speakers themselves. I wasnt impressed by ' tourism at all cost' 
or 'develop at all cost', or even the road itself. 
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[I was] more interested in the speakers who showed that the cared about the 
environment, or about the future etc. 
Q 4. If the talks <siwn 1111 wit11e:<ses ltel1•cd to d1a11g(' your mi11d1 wlr ic/; SJ'cukers prmrcd most i11f1uc11 f'i ll l 
01011 might 1ikc lo look tltro11gh yo11r list of"wit·11c.>>1es)? 
Wifnt'ss Nc11ni1. Wlty they we,.c inf111e11ti11/? 
Hitchcock Passionate, environmental aspects 
Berwick _s~c~s~~l~ b_?l~n_c.i:_d _E~v~r~~_:r:t :n_d ,:=:<:,o~o_:nx ___ _ 
Scott the intergenerational aspects and priorities impressed me 
Q 5. Wliac th<!re any 111ajor gap:;. i11 l/1t' i11_t(>rnrntio11 tltat yo11/U1i><!11ct'11 pro iri,fcd? Yes 
If tltt'l't' were major gci11s1 w/Jat sort of information would you hav<! liker/ to have l1ccrr.I? 
-visitor numbers in categories - self drive / tours/hire 4wd etc 
-what visitors want from their experience (ie. walk, drive, quiet, action) 
-video presentation of 1) History of the Bloomfield Track, 2) basic environmental issues 
(ie. David Suzuki etc ... ) ie. why the area is so unique and why it is so necessary 
-pre-reading on the issue? 
Q ti. H'as t.IH'I'<'. •lllY part of the process i11 wliiclr Y<'" felt t·l1.1t /Ju; i1'.f orm11tio11 provided w as too lcchnfri?I 
tv /1c 11scful to yo11? (Yes/No) Yes 
~f so, which part? 
Some of the edge effects talk 
Some of the engineering aspects 
Q 7. ~V11s there""!! part of Ilic pmccss ht wliicli yo11 felt tlr iH the i11fomwtio11 1mn•hlcd ll'clS too gcucrnl 
(Not rclc-v1111t lo lite issue) t£> l1c 11sef11l ftl you? Yes 
if so, wliiclt p11rt? 
Some of the edge effects - Kuranda Range Road information 
Some of John [Scott]'s talk about Aboriginal Communities (I realise that's probably 
because he couldn't prepare) 
Q 8. Vii.I 11011 e11jO!f lhe process? Yes 
\Vl1c1t did you mj1>y, i>r ili~ like mo~t about what yo11 lwrrc expaimced over tltc pa,;t few rlt1ys? 
Eu joyed tlte process, tile i11formatio11, tit<! ra i11forcst (enjoyed Not l11wi11g to cook rli1111er tov!/) 
-Would have like more opportunity to see different rainforest experiences - ie. what is 
already provided at Cape tribulation? 
- Was apprehensive about the final day - didn't sleep well because I was worried about 
conflicting views and potential for arguments. 
Plcn,;e feel free to wri ft' 1111.11 comments yo11 liave about llie Citi::.1111s' Jury. 
I learnt a lot and enjoyed the experience. 
I feel the Citizens' Jury process is an excellent method for consultaton with average 
citizens. 
Hope all goes well with the future of Citizens' Juries and with your research, Simon. 
I would have like to pre-read the 'Trials of Tribulation" book etc etc. 
Thanks to Simon, Jane and Russell for organising. 
Thanks to Peter for an excellent facilitation!! 
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A.2.9. PEARL 
A.2.9.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Q1. 1-InPf you tmvellcd lo the Daintree area befvn·1 (that is, Yes 
linvc yau crossed t11f D11i11trrr Ririer on the ferry 
/Jefi>rr.:?) 
Q2. 
Q.3. 
Q4. 
Q5. 
I-iaw many times ltnvc you riisited tltr Dainfre,~ regi<>11 i11 
f/Ir inst lwt1 ,11ears? 
How f11111il inr woµ/d yo11 .-;a.11 you llfl' wi/11 the Dain I rel! 
Area 
Hm.Je you Lnwf!iled the Blnvmfirlri Tmrk IN(orc? 
!-!.ow many times hllvc y,1u I rmieJled o;i the track? 
A.2.9.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
2 - 3 
Reasonably familiar 
Yes 
Once 
Ql. u· Not listed i11 th,, poliry 011tions, btiefly dPscribe your most l"''.ferrerl option: NR 
Q 2. Hns your 1•refe1Tcd optio11 c/11111ge.t since th<' begilrnin.~ 1'.f the Citizens' f11ry? Yes 
Q 3. ~( yo11 a11swcred yes to t/1c last q11estio11. what do you N1i11k lrcl11e1I lo cl11111ge yo/It 111i11d? Plensl! 
nmk the fo/Tou>i11g staf"c111e11ts. 
Rank 
1 he fact that I leczrni" n great deal abo1it the BiiJ0111field ?'me k mu! its in111limtio11s. 3 
Listc11i11g f(l tlil' Piew:, of tile speaker.~ who .:11111e io present as witm:~:;cc; . 2 
The jrlCI tlznt I had tu lvnk nl the issue from the pcrsp1~ctive of what is best for th (' 1 
1mn11nity milter than wltot 1 µer~m1111/y wn11/d I ike le> :;er happe;1. 
The fnct that I had to di~wss tile issues ivi th oflrer ntc111/Jers cf tltc j11ry 1111J iustify 4 
11 reasons /1.1 othas. 
QJ«r.J Are there any otlicr t-/Ji11gs t/1111" yo11 can tlii11k 1~( Orn/ ht!lpcd to clumgc y1111r 111i11rl? NR 
Q 4 . . If tl1e t11lks given 11.11 wit11e::se~ hl'fpcd to cha11g<' your 1ni11d, w/1id1 speakers prnl'cd most i11/1ucuti1rl 
(you migltt likt! l"l• look tliro11glt Y.O llr list of wilm:sscs)? 
Wit11ess Name. W/1!/ lhey were i11fl11enti11l? 
Elmes 
Berwick 
Burns 
Hitchcock 
---------------------~~E~-- -------------
His "Bulldozing" approach made me realize that we have 
to act Now 
The closure won't affect the area commercially or tourist-
~~~~~~~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Wants to push development with little consideration of 
.fu_tu!e_ c~~~~a~O,!l .,Y~lt:,e~ ______________ _ 
_ U_n~q~e_teri;;tln~ Ea.!t_of_t~e-~o~<! __________ _ 
-~Il2eJr!nzi.!)g_r~e§; 2-lE_e~dy 9e2<! ___________ _ 
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Q .i. Where tl1c1v any J11iljor gnµs i11 lite iufornwt io11 tlwl' Y<JJI hrn•c bcc11 pnn1i<lerl? No 
lf tf1err.> wert? 111<1jor gup>, wh11t sort of i11formn.tio11 wv11/d !JOit have liked lo /11n>t! ilea rd? NR 
Q 6. W11s tl1cre nn!J prirt of the process m 11'i1ich you felt that the i11fom 1<Ttiou 11rovidcd was too tul111icnl 
to be 11scf11l l't> you? (frs/No) No 
If so, wJricl1 pa rt? 
Q 7. W•1s tlien' any p11rf o(the procc>ss in which you felt tlltlf 
<Not r<'le?1a11t to tile issue} to be 11sef11/ to yo 11? 
t /11: i11.fi>rmation provid,•d was too general 
No 
If so, wlric/1 f'tltt? NR 
Q 8. Dirl you ,•11joy i-lic process? Yes 
iVJ111t did !fOll enjoy, m· .Jislil.:e 111ost nl•out what !/Oii have experic11ced ouer tire past fet1.J days! NR 
J>le11scfel'lfree to writ<' any coH1111e11f·s you hm•e a/1out tire Citizens' Jury. 
A.2.10. RASTUS 
A.2.10.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Ql. Have you traveled to the Daintree area before? (that is, have you Yes 
crossed the Daintree River on the fcny before?) 
Q2. How many times have you visited the Daintree region in the last 2 - 3 
two years? 
NR 
Q3. How familiar would you say you are with the Daintree Area Reasonably familiar 
Q4. Have you travelled the Bloomfield Track before? Yes 
Q5. How many times have you travelled on the track? Once 
A .2.10.2. Post-0 e lib erative Surve y Results 
QJ. ljNot listed i11 lhl! policy options, briefly de.>cribe your most preji•rrcd optio11: N R 
Q 2. Has your /11"<'/<'rretf optio11 cil1111gerl siHcc tire begi1111i11g ,~f the Citi::e11s' fury? Yes 
Q 3. lf you crn_swcre'.f y~s to t ltc /r1st q11estio11, wltat rlo y11u tl1iuk lti'l/'<'d ta r.111111ge ya11r mi11tl? Please 
rc111/.; the jollow111g stlltcwcnts. 
Rank 
The fart that 1 lmmt ii src11l Je11! aliCJrll thf Bl (l() 111fi eld TrnrJ.: m1J ifs i 111piirntio1Ls. 1 
Li:,ff11i11g lo lite Piecus <U. the speakers w!to unne to pr,;sen I as zpif'ncsses. 3 
The ji1.:t t/11 I 1 ltnJ /() look at the issue from the pcrspccl iue of <1•/iat is /1csf jiJr l ii(' 4 
111/nlln i ty mt11er lhcrn wlwl l personally wo11/d liJ.:e to !:'CC lwpprn. 
T!1c fnct that 1 had to discuss I l!c i:;s1;c.; with ot11e1· members <f tile j11ry 1111d just ifl/ 2 
I/ rcaso11s to othcrs. 
<.!3<1d A r<' tl1l'r<' any other 1"11i11g!f tJw t you can tl1i11k t~f tliat hell'cd to change yciur 111i11d? NR 
Q ~. £( l"lrc f"alks (\il't!ll 111/ witne:'Sl'S ilef/•Cd lo cJ11111ge your 1t1iud, w/tich Sf'CUk<'rS JlTOllCd l/10St i11fl11c11/"ii1/ 
<!1011 might like lo look tltrougli y_Clur list 11fwit11csses)? 
Wit11css N11m<!. Wl1y I.hey were i11f111c11ti.I/? 
Baade 
Hitchcock 
Well presented ideas, winners/losers/compensation [I 
think this refers to Berwick] 
Show ed why the area is so original [important] 
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Q 5. Where then! fl ll!J ntfljor gflps i11 the brfor111<Jtfo11 tlwt yo11 IJ11ve bet"n provided? Yes 
Tf there were mfljM gt1ps, w hrit sort of in.fi1m1<1tio11 would you ltt1vc liked to ll!lt't' heflrd? 
Locals representation, but I understand [the] reasons 
Q 6. Was there flny part <lf lire process iii w llich you f elt- tlint t.he i11fom1ulicw pr011idcd wt1s too tecl111iwl 
t·o be usefitl to you? (YesiNo> No 
If so, whic/1 part-? 
Q 7. Wtrs t /1cre nny part of the process in which you felt tliflt 1'11c i11formnl"i(ll1 provi1fol wns too s en era/ 
(Not re1et>1111t to tltt' issue) to lie 11sef11/ to you! Yes 
If so, wlrich part? 
tourism w11s 011/y elite sided (vehicl<! lnwcl a11d tours) 
Q 8. Did yo11 r11joy the process? Yes 
ivluzt did yo11 enfoy, or dislikl' most· 11/1011t <.l'l1t'1 t yo11 lume e.rpericnc<'d 07't'I' tlte past few days? 
The fact that different people picked up on different parts of any one subject 
The fact the different overall opinions had so many similarities 
Interaction with other people and view-points made a big difference 
Plense f ee.I f ree to write 1l/ll/ comments you lrnve al10ut Iii!! Citi::e11s' jury. 
The fact that we did Not come to definite solution, I think, shows how successful the 
jury process is at tackling any problem. ie this problem does Not have a definite 
solution. 
A.2.11. SNOOPY 
A.2.11.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Q1. Hm't! !{{I ll travdlrd lo the Dainlree arra i;ef,J1 c7 Uhat is. Yes 
/1r11,c you crosst!d the Dnintrcc Rir•i:r (>11 tltc f erry 
before ?) 
Q2. How 1n1111y times ltniie you vis if-1~d the Dr1i11 1Tee region i11 6 _ 10 
t lte last lwo years ? 
Q3. How fa miliar wvuld ,11011 say you 11 rc with l11e Dain t •·ec Reasonably familiar 
Area 
Q4. Have y o11 trnvelled the Bloomfield Tmck be.fort?? No 
Q5. I-low numy timc5 have yo11 tmve/lcd on flit' I rack? 0 
A.2.11.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
Ql. rf Nol listed ill the policy options, briefly describe your most preferred optio11: NR 
Q 2. Has your prefared optio11 c/11111:;"'1 since tire begi1111ing of tl1c Citi::ms' f11ry? Yes 
Q 3. lf you £111swcretf yes to tile las t question, w/1111 1/o yt•ll lliiuk '1elpeil to cluwgl! your mi11d? P/e11s<' 
m11k the follawilllf ~tate111e11ts 
' . 
.. 
Rank 
The fac t that I lea ml 11 grecit deal abo11t t lte Bfoo111fidd Trnck rl!ld its i 111 pl i cu I irms. 1 
Lisle11 i11g to the views of the f.)1cakrrs who came lo prese11t as witnesses. 4 
The fact t !r11t l had to look 11t the ic;s11e from the pN~pecfiPe cif what is best fiJJ t Ii r 2 
mm unity mtha than wlml I personally W(•Hfd /ike tr. see '111 ppm. 
Thi' fncf t !tat I had ro discuss t lie issw:s wi I It otl1er 1wu11/lers of the j11rycwd ju:-:tify 3 
y rcaso11s lo (1/hers. 
Q.1(11j ; l n• there m1y other tliiug" that yo11 ca11 tl1 i11k of tlrat helf'e1/ to c/1ausc y our 1ni11J? NR 
-348~ 
Section: A.2.12 Tamarra 
Q 4. it t/1c t nlks givl.'11 Vy wil'11essl.'s /1t!lpcd to rlrn11gl.' your 111i11d, wlriclr s1iccrkers prm•cd most i1if/11c11ti11l 
(you m isftt· like ti> look thr·ouglr your lis t of wif'lrcsses)? 
\Vit11l.'ss Nnme. \Vlr11 t11el! w ere i11flrlL'11ti r1/? 
_ !:l~~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Y!s~~ts _oL r~s~a!c!' __________________ _ 
_ !~~~--------------- _l<p£~~g~~~--------------------
- ~t;_I">Ji_sk_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Alt!;o~g_h_h~ i2 ~S!e!~e-h~ ~ ~_bi;!ls!c!. ________ _ 
Q 5. l\'llt're tl1t•re a11y llltJjor gaps in lite in(or111ntio11 t/rat you /uwe /1ec11 proi1i</ecl? Yes 
If tit ere were major snps, wlrat sort· oj i11f or111atio11 ·would yo11 have liked t-o !rave lte1ml? 
Local witnesses (access, needs, employment, financial [impacts]) 
Q 6. 1'\'11s there any part of tile! proct'.5s in which you felt tl111t the i11form11tio11 provided wa!' ttJo lccl111in1/ 
to /JI! 11sc!.fi1/ to you? (Yc,:/N,1) No 
If s1>, wl1ic/1 p11rt? 
Q 7. Was t11erc a11y 1iart of tire process i11 w/liclt you fc!lt t!tat tltc! i11for111atio11 prm•icled WtlS too x1:ilcrnl 
(Not rc/cvn11l to /'Ire iss11ej to l•e 11sef11l t·!• you? No 
If so, wltich part? NR 
Q 8. Oitl you cnf<>!f the proct'SS? Yes 
W/111t did you e11foy, or di;,/iJ..c 1110s/' about wh11l you Jrnve experienced <Jl'l!I' tire 1•irst)'ew ilnys? 
I enjoyed the easy to follow methods of questioning the witnesses and the help of Peter 
to better express what we wanted to ask. Wherever possible all help was given to u; 
for further information be it for maps, follow-up phone calls on whatever which 
calrified any queries we had . 
Plcasefccl.fi·ee to writ·I.' nny com111e11ls !J''" have about the Citi::c!ns' ful'y. 
I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to p articipate in this exciting 
exercise and h ope that in some way I will have helped in the conservation of this area. 
A.2.12. TAMARRA 
A.2.12.1. Pre-Deliberative Survey Results 
Ql. Hewe yc1u frrwelicd to the D11intree 1llC(I i;efo1r? (that· is, Yes 
luwc you cmssed the Dniutrcc Riua (l/1 lhc f1•rry 
/Jeforc?) 
Q2. F-/ow 1111111y time:> lrni'c you vib i/·1~.-1 the D11inln'<' 1rgion in 6 _ 10 
tire fast two yenrs? 
(!3. /-low famiiiar <.01urld !IOIL S•IY y(lu 11re with tlte Dr!i n i 1 er Familiar 
A tea 
Q:f. f11rue y(l11 tr,rvdli:d the Bloo111ficlrl 'l'mck· flcfrre? 
QS. 1-fow 1111111y limes llm·e you travelfrori r1t Ilic track? 
A.2.12.2. Post-Deliberative Survey Results 
Yes 
6 - 10 
Q:l. ~f Not Tistt'tl in tire policy opti.ms, 1'1'iej1y desailic! y1>11r 11111.<.t preferred option: NR 
Q 2. Jlas y1>11r pri!ferred opl'iv11 clw11gc1f siucc t/11.' /1l.'gi11ning of t he Citi=l'11s' /ury? No 
Q 3. l( you n11swercd yes f'o llu: last q11c6tio11, whal do you lhi11I.: hl!ft•cd f(> dltl11ge your 111i11tl? Plensc 
m11k the folfvwing staf't'm1mts. NR 
QJ(r1) Are ll:ere 1111y (l/hcr things that you c1111 tlii11k of that helped to c/11111ge your 111i111f? NR 
Q 4. lf tire! t11lks given by witnesses helf11.'tl to clinnge yo11r 111i11d, wi1icl1 speakers J>rOi't!d 111ost inj711e11tiaT 
(you might fiki: to h>ok through !}(!Ur list of'wit11csses)? NR 
Q 5. vVllerc tlzere u11y major gaps in tire inf(>mrntion l/111t you luwe /1cc11 proriidcd? Yes 
If tlrcrc were nwjor gap.s, wltat sort of i11fonntJ/'io11 wo11lil yo11 haN.> likc1i lo /1<1ve ltcard? 
Local Community input 
Information regarding the state of inshore reefs prior to building of the Bloomfield 
Track 
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Q 6. Was Oien: any p1irt of the pri>ccss in which you jell that the i11f on11ulfo11 proriided was too fl'C/111icnl 
to lie useful to you? (Yes/No) No 
If ,;o, w/tidr purt? 
Q 7. Wns tltere l'lll!J part oltlie process in wliiclt you felt that Ilic iufor111atio11 provided WllS too smnai 
(Not rele<•a11t to the issue) to 1Ji> 11sl!.fi!l to yo11? No 
If so, ·whirlt pnrt? NR 
Q 8. Did yo11 i>njoy tlic 1•roces.;? Yes 
Wl1i1t did yo11 e11joy, <'f' dislike most C1bo11t wl111t you have cxperie11ccd over the past few rl1111s? 
I most enjoyed the professionalism of the whole process and the large amount of 
information provided and the variety of the witnesses and their opinions. 
l'lc>11se feel free to cPl'ite m1y comin1•11ts you /111 ve rdwut tl1c Citize11s' Jury. 
Before the Citizens' Jury started I though that our role would be more in line of a legal 
jury but was pleasantly surprised by the peronal interaction of the jury and the ANU 
members, and I found the whole process fascinating 
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APPENDIX 3 TECHNICAL WITNESS 
HANDOUTS 
Each of the technical witnesses who gave presentation to the FNQCJ were 
required to provide a handout to the jurors summarising their major arguments/findings. 
These handouts are reproduced below. 
Af¥rrlix 3 T echnk:al W itr1:$ Han:iouts 
A.3.1. BOB BAADE 
Far North Queensland Citizen's Jury Engineering Management Issues - Cape Tribulation Bloomfield Road 
1. THE CALL FOR BETTER 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Community pressure for a coastal link between Cairns and Cooktown date back many years. 
In 1935, the then Member for Cook, Mr H H Collins, said that the road link would prove 
an'inestimable boon'. In 1966, the then ALP candidate for Cook, Mr Jack Bethel, said: "With the 
ALP as the Government, you are not promised, you are guaranteed a coastal road to Cooktown". 
In 1984, these are just some of theorganisations supporting the new road: 
Federation of Chambers of Commerce of Far North Queensland 
Wujal Wujal Aboriginal Community Council 
Bloomfield River and District Residents Association 
Baileys Creek - Cape Tribulation Development League 
Mossman District Canegrowers' Executive 
Cairns and Cooktown Police 
Mossman, Cooktown and Cairns Chambers of Commerce 
AN EARLY START 
The increasingly popular Daintree River to Cape Tribulation Road had its origins more than 40 
years ago. A roughly built extension from Cape Tribulation to Bloomfield, established by local 
residents in 1968, was followed in 1979 by a Council pilot track between Cape Tribulation and 
Woobadda Creek. At the request of the Douglas Shire Council, a road reserve for the Cape 
Tribulation to Bloomfield extension was set aside in the new national park, officially gazetted by 
the State Government in August 1981. 
Actual construction of the new road was completed by the Council in two stages: November-
December 1983, and August-September 1984. The State Government officially gazetted a new 
route for the road in April 1984. 
2. T H E A L T E R N A T I V E S 
The CREB Track: While the new road is a logical extension of the existing Daintree River to Cape 
Tribulation road, there has been considerable debate about the so-called alternative, the CREB 
Track, a power line service track from the upper Daintree River to Bloomfield. This unsurveyed 
track is notorious for its steep grades, particularly where it climbs to 700m over the McDowall 
Range. By comparison, the highest point on the new road is some 200m near Cowie Bay. A 
shortage of suitable gravel deposits and a clay base, which could have caused extensive silting of 
the Daintree, were major disadvantages against the CREB Track alternative. 
The Penninsula Development Road: Will be the major heavy transport link to Cape York. 
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Far North Queensland Citizen's Jury Engineering Management issues - Cape Tribulation Bloomfield Road 
THE NEW ROAD 
The Budget: The $430,000 cost of completing the new road in 1984 was shared between the State 
Government and the Douglas Shire Council. 
Dimensions: the width of the road reserve varies from 60m in flatter areas to 1 0 0 min hilly terrain. 
The actual width of the road clearing is approximately 20 m ,with some rugged areas cleared up to 
25m. The steepest gradient is 1:5. 
Ve hi clEi.Jse : Like most far north roads, the wet season may at times close this road for short 
periods. The road is accessible to 4WD vehicles in dry weather and for most periods in the wet 
season. 
SAFEGUARDS 
Construction: Basic engineering, environmental and survey field work was undertaken both 
before and during construction 
3. COUNCIL'S 
5 UPPORTING THE 
REASONS FOR 
ROAD CONSTRUCTION 
Distances: The new road would more than pay its way in big savings in fuel, vehicle wear and 
tear and travelling time for motorists who previously had no option but to use the rough inland 
route. 
Compare these distances• now: 
INLAND COASTAL SAVING 
Cairns to Bloomfield 341 kms 181 kms 160 kms 
Cairns to Cooktown 336 kms 242 kms 94 kms 
Mossman to Bloomfield 260 kms 105 kms 155 kms 
Mossman to Cooktown 264 kms 166 kms 98 kms 
approximate 
National Park access: The road would allow many more visitors to see an area of the Cape 
Tribulation National Park previously accessible to only the most hardy bushwalkers. The small 
area attected by the road will still leave a huge wilderness for the experienced bushwalker to 
explore. 
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Far North Queensland Citizen's Jury Engineering Management Issues - Cape Tribulation Bloomfield Road 
Tourists: For Cooktown, the new road would remove a major 'distance barrier'. A proposed 'ring 
road tourist circuit'. from Cairns to Cooktown returning via Lakeland, Laura, Palmer River, the 
Tableland and looping south to Cardwell and Tully, would be possible. 
Surveilarce: The new road would markedly improve Police, defence, emergency service and 
ranger access to one of the most inaccessible stretches of Queensland's coastline and a known area 
for illegal drug cultivation. The State Government's stepped up drug surveillance in the far north 
would be assisted by ground patrols through this previously closed section of the park. 
The Federal Government decision to establish a Coastal Protection Unit in Cairns was an 
indication of the need to counter illegal poaching. immigration, exotic diseases and drugs. The 
main shipping channel hugs the Cape Tribulation coast. 
The safety of bushwalkers and boat owners, faster local medical attention for residents and better 
access for emergency services such as the Bush Fire Brigades are other important benefits of the 
new road. 
4_ LONG TERM ROAD STRATEGY 
Council is considering gazetting a Local Law empowering it to have stronger powers in relation to 
the enforcement of load limits, prohibition of vehicle chains and other relevant issues. 
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A.3.2. PETER HITCHCOCK 
BLOOMFIELD TRACK 
ESTABLISIDNG THE VALUE OF THE PRECINCT 
The first step in planning is to identify the resources and people within the planning 
area - inventory and identification of stakeholders. This has been done. 
The next necessary step in planning is to establish values- assessment or evaluation. 
Values can only be assessed by establishing the context of theplanning area or feature 
being assessed. 
e.g. A house - Port Douglas or Alice Springs. 
CONTEXT 
GLOBAL 
• WORLD HERITAGE. The Bloomfield Track is mostly within the Wet Tropics 
World Heritage Area· a globally recognised protected area. One of only about 
120 areas listed on the UNESCO World Heritage list for outstanding universal 
natural heritage values. 
• WORLD HERITAGE: The Bloomfield Track is adjacent to and drains into the 
Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area. 
• The Wet Tropics World Heritage Area and the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage 
Area now one of the few areas in the world where protected tropical rainforest 
and protected fringing reefs are immediately adjacent. 
• The Bloomfield Track is therefore located in aglobally significant precinct. 
Further, the Australian Government has international obligations, backed up by 
Commonwealth legislation, to ensure that the valnes of both the Wet Tropics 
World Heritage Area and the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area are 
protected and not impaired. 
• The Wet Tropics World Heritage Area is regarded as one of the safest and most 
accessible tropical rainforest tourism destinations in the world. 
NATIONAL CONTEXT 
• Bloomfield Track passes through the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area which is 
the subject of Commonwealth legislation regarding Australian foreign affairs 
respsonsibility for the protection of World Heritage. 
• The Wet Tropics World Heritage Area is recognised nationally as oneoftbe most 
biologically diverse ecosystems in Australiaand has by far the highest 
biodiversity of any rainforest in Australia. The Daintree in particular has the 
highest biodiversity within the Wet Tropics. 
• The rainforests of Wet Tropics World Heritage Area represent only about 0.1 % of 
the total area of Australia. (40 seconds of a 7 hr flight to Perth.) 
• 23% of species of plants in Wet Tropics World Heritage Area are endemic to 
Wet Tropics · 500 are rare or threatened. 
• The Wet Tropics World Heritage Area is the premier destination for tropical 
rainforest based tourism in Australia. 
• Major tourism accommodation and other infrastructure has been developed in the 
Cape Tribulation area, mostly by private enterprise. 
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REGION AL CONTEXT 
• The greater part of the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area is located in the rugged 
sub-coastal hinterland of the region, with only a small proportion actually 
extending to the coast. (Sugar cane south of Daintree resulted in extensive 
clearing) Of the sections which include the coast, the Bloomfield- Cape 
Tribulation coast is one of the two largest sections of the Wet Tropics where 
continuous tropical rainforest extends right to and along the coast. (The other is 
Yarrabah) Regionally and Nationally significant. 
• The Daintree - Cape Tribulation area in particular is regarded as the centrepiece 
of tropical rainforest tourism in Far North Queensland. 
• The Bloomfield - Cape Tribulation coast is contiguous with a very extensive tract 
of wild landscape extending westward all the way to the Cape Development road 
between Mareeba and Lakeland Downs and Cooktown. The Bloomfield Track 
and the CREB track are the only significant formed tracks which traverse this 
tract of wild landscape north - south. 
• Apart from the Bloomfield Track and the CREB track, the large hinterland tract 
represents the largest single tract of potential wilderness in Coastal Queensland 
between Cooktown and Shoalwater Bay near Rockhampton. This assessment is 
based on a consultancy I undertook to map wilderness in Coastal Queensland. 
LOCAL CONTEXT 
• The Bloomfield Track precinct is located between the Bloomfield River, which 
includes private lands and residential lands outside the Wet Tropics World 
Heritage Area · and the Cape Tribulation precinct which is partly in and partly 
outside the World Heritage Area. 
• Until the construction of the Bloomfield Track in the early l 980's, the two 
precincts had no direct vehicular connection. 
• The Cape Trib precinct is a major nature based tourism attraction - probably the 
premier destination in the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area. (e.g 250,000 
visitors, $100 million north of Daintree River) 
• The visitor experience in the Cape Trib area is based on a combination of 
rainforest, coast and a sense of remoteness. The road journey is a part of the total 
visitor experience. 
• The southern end of the Bloomfield Track contributes several minor visitor 
experiences which enhance the Cape Trib experience. (Emagen Creek) 
• The Bloomfield River precinct experiences only transient tourism. 
WORLD HERITAGE AREA PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS. 
NOTE: I am presenting primarily from a protected area management perspective.I 
acknowledge there are other considerations. 
PLANNING IS GREATLY INFLUENCED BY EXTERNALITIES (Roads into 
and through, diverse range of stakeholders. 
ASSESSMENT OF VALUES-
Any assessment of the value of a locality or feature must look at the time context. Not 
just the present. Should look back in time and look forward in time. 
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Backwards 
We look at what was there and see what has been lost- or gained. 
Construction of the Bloomfield Track resulted in LOSS of conservation and nature 
based tourism VALUES. 
• tropical rainforest wilderness coast 
• loss of Cape Trib cul-de-sac values (nature based tourism) a rare 
resource. 
• clean rainforest catchmentsreplaced by source of on-going run-
off and siltation of marine environment. 
The Bloomfield Track also added an additional recreational/tourism experience - a 
fairly common resource in the region. 
Forward 
Planned rehabilitation can both restore lost values and in some cases, enhance values. 
• Closure and rehabilitation of the Bloomfield Track could restore all lost values. 
Tourism and recreation could be significantly enhanced by adding a walking track 
experience, a highly valued asset (More in a moment) 
OPTIONS. 
Three logical options presented in theplanning process. 
OPTION 1 
Rehabilitation of the Bloomfield Track AND enhancement of the nature-based 
tourism values of the area. This was a logical conclusion we reached in the Wet 
Tropics planning. The BENEFITS would accrue both to the Cape Trib precinct AND 
the Bloomfield Track precinct. 
Obviously externalities prevented implementation of that option given other 
stakeholder interests in the use of the Bloomfield Track. 
OPTION2 
Option 2 would be maintenance of STATUS QUO. 
Option 2 would be an acknowledgement that what was lost by construction of the 
track is a permanent loss. 
OPTION 3 
Option 3 is the upgrade of the Bloomfield Track as a through-road for general use not 
related to the rainforest or World Heritage Area. 
This would result in further losses of heritage and premium tourism values. 
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COSTS AND BENEFITS 4 
Each has particular costs and benefits, depending on the perspective. 
Heritage Conservation and Nature Based Tourism Perspective 
From a heritage conservation, ecological and nature based tourism perspective, the 
maximum on-site benefits could be obtained from OPTION I. 
The Benefits 
• Rehabilitation of tropical rainforest wilderness coast (highly valued asset) 
(removal of road structure, dust, noise, pollution) 
• Removal of siltation source· benefit to creek and marine environments. 
• Permanent enhancement of nature based tourism experience in the Cape Trib 
precinct. 
• Promote a Cooktown based nature based tourism industry detached from other 
tourism centres. Could include visitor node development in the Bloomfield River 
area to complement and not compete with Cape Trib (Attractions such as 
Bloomfield Falls, Roaring Meg, Cedar Bay etc could only be accessed from Cook 
Shire and require accommodation being established in Cook Shire) 
Enhancements: 
• A high standard walking track Cape Trib to Bloomfield River- enhance nature 
based tourism in both Cape Trib AND Bloomfield precincts. 
• Incorporate an indigenous cultural component into the walking track experience. 
Costs 
• Opposition from current users ofBloomfield Track, especially local Bloomfield 
community. 
Cost Offsets 
Once costs have been identified, attempt to identify possible off sets to minimise 
costs. 
• Promote acceleration of upgrade of inland access road· Cook Shire to 
Mareeba. While in Wet Tropics I actively promoted this anyway. 
• Assign Kuku Yalangi sole guiding rights over walking track. 
• Provide guide training for natural and cultural heritage interpretation. 
• Promote air link from Ayton. 
• Establish a Cultural heritage visitor centre at Bloomfield to promote Bloomfield 
as the Cultural Heritage node to complement Cape Trib as the Natural Heritage 
node. 
OPTION 2 
COST AND BENEFITS. 
BENEFITS 
• Reasonable certainty established. 
Positive relationship with Bloomfield community more likely than Opion t 
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COSTS 
• Permananent loss of tropical rainforest wilderness 
• On-going siltation and or pollution of marine environment. 
• Impairment of Cape Trib visitor experience. 
• Loss of opportunity for a high quality walking track experience. 
Enhancements 
• Select and manage nodes on Bloomfield Track for nature based tourism. 
Cost Offsets 
• Strict environmental impact measures on condition and use of track. Selective 
surface sealing. 
• Traffic regulation to minimise impacts on environmental and visitor/tourism 
experience. 
OPTION 3 
COSTS AND BENEFITS 
BENEFITS 
•NIL 
COSTS 
• Permanent loss of tropical rainforest coastal wilderness. 
• On-going impacts on wildlife as a result of through traffic. 
• On-going conflict between local land use andthrough tnifi:. 
• Incremental loss of value of Cape Tribulation precinct as a premier nature 
based tourism destination. 
• Greatly reduced incentive for development of aBloomfield or Cooktown nature 
tourism node. 
Enhancements 
Cost offsets 
• Progressively convert Cape Tribulation precinct to roadside day visitation 
emphasis in lieu of a destination in its own right. 
• Place speed limit and speed limiting devices on through traffic. 
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SUMMARY 
HERITAGE AND NATURE BASED TOURISM PERSPECTIVE 
OPTION 1 CLOSURE AND REHABILITATION 
• HAS MOST BENEFITS 
• COSTS, INCLUDING COSTS TO BLOOMFIELD 
COMMUNITY, CAN BE AT LEAST PARTIALLY OFFSET. 
OPTION 2 STATUS QUO 
• FEW BENEFITS AND DEFINITE COSTS 
SOME OFFSETS POSSIBLE 
OPTION3 
• DISASTROUS FOR CONSERVATION AND NATURE-BASED 
TOURISM -ESP. CAPE TRIB PRECINCT. 
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A.3.3. STEVE TURTON 
Environmental Impacts of 
the Bloomfield Track 
.!Oft .,. 1 
Dr Steve Turton 
Rainforest CRC/JCU 
Leader 
Program 4: Rainforest 
Access: Monitoring & , ~ 
Managing Impacts 
Rainf oreat CRC 
Summary of Erosion Impacts 
of Roads 
I Mo~f the Wet Tropic1s WHA has ~ig~ or ~e?:; 
high erosion potential 
I The Wet Tropics lies at the very wet end of the 
hydrological spectrum 
I The Bloomfield Track traverses an area with medium 
to very high erosion potential due to a combination of 
high rainfall, easily eroded metamorphic soils and 
steep terrain 
I High rates of overland flow associated with high 
intensity, short duration rainfall events 
I Erosion appears to be less under closed canopies 
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Summary of Edge Effects for 
Roads in the W e t Tropics 
I Bi~I: 'and' aBlofac e~t! @iieM .SPe greate§L lbf 
roads with grassy verges 
I Vehicle noise (at least 100rn into rainforest) 
I external climate variables (mostly <30m) 
I vegetation changes (mostly < 12m for 
understorey, but up to lOOm for canopy) 
I heavy metals ( <5- lOm) 
I non-rainforet fauna (verge and rainforest edge) 
e.g. house mouse, canefield rat, grassland 
melomys 
I reduction in two rainforest rats near roads 
Impacts to be considered 
9 
_ ....................................... .... 
I Edge effects (weeds, dust, vehicle. noise, etc) 
I Run-off effects 
I Clearing of rainfon~st 
I SecHmentation of creeks 
I Levels of activity along the road and impact on 
forest areas 
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Environmental Impacts of 
Roads in Protected Areas 
DARR I ER 
R.01\DSJDF, HAHlTAT 
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A.3.4. DAVID HAYNES 
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A.3.5. JULIE BROWN 
CITIZENS JURY PROJECT 
20/1/2000 
Julie Brown - Secretary FNQ Tour Operators Association 
- Regional Manager Australian Pacific Tours 
Session 5 - Tourism: 
* Use of the road by t ourists 
1 Tourism requirements 
* Future tourism devel opment 
* Economic i mpacts on local communit ies and businesses 
* Faci l i ties for tourists 
"CONTROVERSIAL BLOOMFIELD TRACK" 
"INFAMOUS BLOOMFIELD TRACK" 
"THE CHALLENGE OF THE BLOOMFIELD TRACK" 
Above are descript i ons that you 'll find in brochures displaying 
itineraries that include the Bloomfie ld Track. 
Use of the road by tourists : 
* Multitude o f uses including - Private vehicles 
Hire vehicles 
Walking tours 
Tour operators 
Sceni c route through t he icon "Rainfo reH 
Provides round trip to Cooktown 
Maj or Adventure/ 4WD/ Eco- Tourism destination 
Tourism RE!$Jirements: 
* 
Accessibl e all year rou nd (road condition and weather 
permitting) 
Accurate and up to date r oad condition reports 
Safety of passengers prime concern 
Fu1Iue Tourism DeyeloEments : 
As usage increases as does opport un i ties for t ourism 
development 
Research required including accessibility and length of s tay 
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Economic impacts of local communities and businesses : 
Recently a survey was carried out by FNQTOA of 52 Daintree Permit 
hol ders with regard to Dai n tree Permit Issues. The preliminary 
findings of this survey incl uded the following; 
When operators were asked to estimate their total sQ.le~ of 
Dain t ree produc t for 98/99 t he tota l was $10, 327, 500. (This i s a 
conservat ive fi gure as some operators either could no t provide 
accurate figures or did not want provide figures at all. 
* Flow on affect f rom t ourism is huge for the region 
i .e. accommodation houses 
food and beverage 
vehicle repair and fuel 
souvenir stores 
empl oyment direct and indirect 
Inpact on Employment : 
From the 52 tour operators surveyed recent ly the following figures 
were estimated; 
The businesses surveyed empl oyed 1236 peopl e locally . 
Of this total, employment of 371 people was di rectly dependent on 
their ·Daintree product . 
* The effect of t ourism on employment inthe regi on, although 
hard to measure, i s cert ainly very important. 
Facilities for tourists: 
• 
* 
Currently l imited faci lities , however r· believe that this is 
part of the attraction t o t ouri sts. 
There i s always opportunity for well maintained t ourist 
faci l ities in an area like t he Bloomfield Track. However i t 
i s the cost of establishment, maintenance and limited access 
to these facilities which is prohibitive. 
Julie Brown 
20/1/2000 
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APPENDIX 4 FNQCJ JUROR FINDINGS 
This appendix provides the major arguments and detailed findings of the jurors 
participating in the FNQCJ in support of the Jurors report which is discussed in 
Chapter 5. The text is paraphrased from papers prepared by jurors on the final day of 
deliberations. 
A.4.1. MAJORITY POSITION: STAGED CLOSURE OF 
THE BLOOMFIELD TRACK 
Those of us who favour closure of the Bloomfield Track do so because of the 
uniqueness of the area. It would be a great a loss if it were left open and subjected to 
incremental upgrade under the guise of routine maintenance, leading to increased 
pressure on the region. We believe that leaving the Bloomfield Track open increases the 
risk of this happening. We also feel that future generations should not be robbed of the 
opportunity to experience or see this unique part of the world in its pristine state. We 
strongly believe in the conservation of this pristine rainforest. Given its unique qualities 
it should be saved now for future generations to enjoy! 
Close Bloomfield Track Recommendation 1. That the Bloomfield Track be closed 
over a 15 year period according to the 
sequence outlined in Table 1. 
A.4.1.1. Mitigating Impact on Local Communities and 
Capturing 0 pportunities 
Although we feel that the Bloomfield Track should be closed, we recognise that 
there may be some losers if this is done without adequate attention to needs of the local 
community. By local community, we refer to residents near, or north of the Bloomfield 
River. We feel that the Cape Tribulation community is not fully reliant on the 
Bloomfield Track and would not suffer greatly if it were closed. However, if closure 
was done without accompanying measures we recognize that there will be some adverse 
impacts on the Bloomfield communities and, to a lesser extent, 4wd tour operators. To 
reduce these impacts we have considered the option of upgrading the road from the 
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Bloomfield River to the Cape York Developmental Road to improve access for local 
residents. 
Close Bloomfield Track Recommendation 2. That compensation for closure of the 
Bloomfield Track be provided to local 
residents by upgrading the Bloomfield 
to Cooktown road access. 
The effectiveness of the above recommendation is heavily dependent on the 
upgrading of the Cape York Developmental Road to Cooktown thereby affording 
improved access from Bloomfield to the south. The implementation of 
Recommendation 1 will result in the Bloomfield area once more becoming a cul-de-sac 
community. We believe that, in view of its position at the end of an improved road in 
conjunction with Recommendation 2, closure of the Bloomfield Track would lead to 
improved commercial opportunities for Bloomfield locals in areas such as tourism. This 
would particularly hold for the Wujal Wujal Community, in view of its position adjacent 
to the World Heritage Area. This situation contrasts with the status quo in which the 
area is mainly a thoroughfare for tourists on their way to or from Cooktown. 
To capture the opportunities mentioned above, the range of facilities for the 
community and the tourism market will need to be improved and expanded. We envisage 
that, as part of an integrated strategy for the area, accommodation facilities and services 
would need to be enhanced to accommodate extra tourists. Commercial opportunities for 
the locals in the region need to be explored - such as seed collection from the forest, 
establishing native plant nurseries, growth of native fruit trees, growing tropical root 
crops of taro, cassava and yams, aquaculture, Indigenous native bush guides for bush 
interpretation and commentary and tropical fruit growing .In this way many jobs would 
be created for local residents. While private capital may become available for this 
purpose, it will require at least some use of public funds. Infrastructure provided should 
include shops, services and other facilities, which would have to be established at 
Cooktown to cater for the people in the Bloomfield area and tourists. 
Close Bloomfield Track Recommendation 3. That infrastructure catering for the 
community and tourism in the 
Bloomfield area be expanded and 
upgraded. 
A .4.1.2. Timeline for Closure 
We recommend that the closure of the Bloomfield Track be staged over a I 0-15 
year period. By this time current road works to seal the inland road from Mt Molloy to 
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Cooktown should be completed allowing improved access to the Cape York Peninsular 
region. (In proposing the following time line, we understand that sealing of the section 
from Cooktown to Mossman will be completed by the year 2005.) Table A4-l below 
provides an outline of the proposed sequence for Bloomfield Track Closure. 
Table A4-1. Sequence for Bloomfield Track Closure 
Immediately 
Establishment of Ranger Station/ • 
Visitor Centres 
Develop access alternatives ( eg. 
seal road from Bloomfield to • 
Cooktown , investigate alternative 
options, transport subsidies, air 
and sea links etc) 
Develop and regulate alternative 
4WD opportunities (eg. CREB 
track or logging tracks) 
Consult with affected users and 
research impacts of Bloomfield 
Track closure 
Investigate appropriate eco-tourism • 
based options cg. minimal impact 
ways to present values unique to 
this section of the Bloomfield 
Track and which are not available • 
elsewhere (eg. world class 
walking track) 
Short-Term 
(to 5 years) 
Develop supporting tourist • 
nodes (eg. facilities in the 
Bloomfield area) 
Regulate vehicular access (cg. 
restrict heavy vehicle use - 5 • 
Tonne Gross suggested) 
Continue to upgrade the 
Ayton, Helensvale to 
Cooktown Road 
Accelerate completion of Mt 
Molloy to Cooktown 
(Peninsula Development) 
Road upgrade 
Investigate option for one-
way road option (as an 
interim step to Bloomfield 
Track closure) 
Public Notice of Bloomfield 
Track Closure (3-5 years) 
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Long-Term 
(5-15 years) 
Alternative transport 
access in place 
Alternative 4WD 
options available 
Appropriate 
presentation 
opportunities in place 
(eg. establishment of 
ranger stations/visitor 
centre and, if 
appropriate, long 
distance walking track) 
Close Bloomfield 
Track and rehabilitate 
(rip and revegctate) 
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A.4.2. MINORITY POSITION: LEAVE THE 
BLOOMFIELD TRACK OPEN WITH STRICT 
MANAGEMENT 
Those of us in the jury who prefer the option of leaving the Bloomfield Track 
open consider that closure would lock up the area, which should otherwise be available 
for the local and tourist community to enjoy. We believe that the track should be 
maintained to maximise safety, but in an ecologically sensitive manner-with particular 
attention to environmental impact of road use. Maintenance should only undertaken to 
preserve the status quo. There should be no upgrading of the Bloomfield Track. Creek 
crossings should not be upgraded into concrete fords; and concrete paving should only 
be installed where it is considered necessary for safety. Use of the Bloomfield Track 
should be restricted, with preference given to local road users and within specified 
weight limits, followed by tourist operators who should also be restricted to five tonnes. 
Open Bloomfield Track Recommendation 1: That the Bloomfield Track be left open 
to vehicular access pending the 
development of a management plan to 
provide for the regulation of 
Bloomfield Track use and halt any 
future upgrade. 
The development of an integrated management plan, which addresses the above 
issues, should be done within the objective of maximising the presentation values of the 
Bloomfield Track that cannot be found elsewhere. The management plan would provide 
the basis for a coordinated and integrated approach to the application of controls and 
measures to protect the area's unique World Heritage values. The Bloomfield Track's 
management plan should identify specific strategies, time-lines and responsibilities for 
actions. Importantly, the management plan should be strictly enforced. 
Open Bloomfield Track Recommendation 2. That, once it is approved, the 
management plan for the Bloomfield 
Track be strictly enforced. 
We agree with the principle of user-pays for the Bloomfield Track. Such a 
system would help to pay for upkeep of the Bloomfield Track and the services 
provided. 
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Open Bloomfield Track Recommendation 3. That a user pays system for Bloomfield 
Track users be introduced. 
Provision of service facilities, such as toilets, is !!Q1 recommended along this 
section of Bloomfield Track. Facilities, such as boardwalks, should not be provided 
along this section of the Bloomfield Track if similar experiences can be provided south 
of Cape Tribulation or north of the Bloomfield river. Comfort stations-restrooms 
etc.-should be located at both ends of the track in conjunction with ranger stations but 
not situated along the track. These stations would help with the task of regulating the 
use of the track. Appropriate regulatory instruments would be required to give the 
ranger the necessary power to carry out this function (Figure A4-l). 
Open Bloomfield Track Recommendation 4. That the provision of facilities in 
conjunction with the Bloomfield Track 
be restricted to either end of the 
Bloomfield Track, and in conjunction 
with Ranger Stations. 
We agree that use of the Bloomfield Track should not be allowed to increase 
beyond the present vehicular loads. Commercial vehicles, aside from licensed tour 
operators, should not be permitted access. In the longer term, should demand for access 
to the area necessitate the provision of increased traffic infrastructure, alternative 
ecologically sensitive transport options should be explored to allow non-4WD access. 
This would enable a greater number to enjoy the experience that the area offers and 
could be constructed in the future without further overloading the track. 
Open Bloomfield Track Recommendation 5. That complementary transport options 
along the length of the Bloomfield 
Track be explored over the long -term. 
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A.4.3. FINDINGS BY ALL JURORS 
A.4.3.1. Ranger Station /Visitor Centre 
The Jury is in unanimous agreement that Ranger Stations be established at either 
end of the Bloomfield Track, and preferably both- be it to manage a road or a walking 
track. These Stations could act as a base providing educational and interpretative 
displays, enforcement of provisions for the management of the Bloomfield Track, 
research and monitoring on the local environment, training and employment within the 
local community (specifically Wujal Wujal), and service facilities for users of the track 
(see Figure A4-1). 
Jury Recommendation I. That of Ranger Stations be established 
(preferably) at each end of the 
Bloomfield Track to function as service 
and visitor information hubs. 
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Figure A4-l. Role of the Ranger Stations at each end of the Bloomfield 
Track 
RANGER 
Education and Interpretation ...... 1------....... -------l~Research and Monitoring 
v' Static and audio visual displays 
v' Maps and pamphlets 
v' Visitor information etc 
Seivice Facilities 
v' Toilets 
v' Waste disposal 
Telephones 
v' Car parks, picnic facilities, 
quality souvenirs, etc. 
v' Collecting information on use patterns 
visitor flows etc 
v'Interprct:ing scientific and cultural 
information 
v' A base for monitoring irupacts 
Enforcement 
v' Direct ranger presence 
v' Traffic and use management 
v'Boom Gate 
Training and Employment 
v' Ranger program 
v' Guided walks 
v' Infrastructure maintenance 
A.4.3.2. Consultation 
Ideally, the recommendations of this report should have followed a 
comprehensive assessment and consultative process regarding the Bloomfield Track. 
The findings of this report withstanding as recommendations, the jury as a whole believe 
that, in conjunction with an immediate and ongoing environmental impacts assessment 
process, discussions about the future of the Bloomfield Track should be undertaken. It 
should include discussion among the following bodies: 
0 Wet Tropics Management D Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority Authority 
0 Douglas Shire Council 
D Wujal Wujal Community Council 
0 Cook Shire Council 
0 Queensland Parks and Wildlife 
Service 
0 Queensland Tourism Commission/ 
Far North Queensland Promotions 
Bureau 
D Concerned community groups 
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Jury Recommendation 2. That, jury findings withstanding as 
recommendations, a process of community 
assessment and consultation be undertaken 
regarding the future of the Bloomfield Track. 
There should also be provision for notices of objection to any proposal arising 
out of this process. 
A.4.3.3. Sensitivity to Local Indigenous Issues 
Currently the Kuku Yalanji people have a Native Title claim over the area 
covering north from Roaring Meg /Wujal Wujal south to Mossman Gorge through to 
Mowbray River. The jury understands that the area surrounding the Bloomfield Track 
is associated with significant Aboriginal cultural values and that it contains important 
sites such as burial grounds, sacred sites, story places-such as the bouncing stones and 
a creation story attached to Roaring Meg Falls. As far as we understand the Native 
Title process, the recommendations contained in this report should not interfere with 
the claim. However, as a matter of important principle we feel that the future 
management of the Bloomfield Track should be sensitive to the attachment of the 
indigenous community in the area. 
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APPENDIX 5 QMETHOD: DESIGN AND 
ANALYSIS 
A.5.1. SELECTION OF Q STATEMENTS 
Methods for selecting statements to be included in a Q sort vary. The most 
common method is through the use of interviews, but may also draw on written material 
about an issue and television, inter alia (Brown, 1993). Similarly, the raw statements for 
use in the Q survey was complied from an array of material, including interviews with 
actors involved in the Bloomfield Track issue, newspaper articles, parliamentary reports 
and from discussion during a focus group conducted in the lead up to the FNQCJ. 
Many of the sources used to compile the concourse are cited in Chapter 4. 
The selection of the final statements for use in the Q survey loosely followed the 
'factorial design' approach used by Q methodologists. According to Brown 
(1980, p.201), the most important consideration in the design of a Q survey is Fishers' 
(1960, p.17-21) principle of randomisation. 
Unlike many Q studies, I did not attempt to allocate statements among strictly 
defined factorial categories, but sought rather to satisfy the principle that the choice of 
Q statements should seek to provide a 'minutae' of ' the larger processes being modelled' 
while also using Q methodology to analyse the 'subjectivity' underlying the 
construction of policy preferences. Consequently, there are two layers to selection of 
statements: one driven by the need to explore theoretical implications, the other by the 
need to gain a representative sample of the 'discourse' surrounding the Bloomfield Track 
issue. Theoretical considerations included the need to categorise statements according to 
whether they pertained to a belief pertaining to some aspect of the Bloomfield Track 
issue, or a motivational value.1 The selection of statements was also done to fit within 
one of more 'thematic' areas pertaining to the Bloomfield Track issue. The range of 
themes are listed in Table A5-2. Note that some of these themes are also driven by 
1 See Chapter 2 for discussion. 
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theoretical considerations, such as the 'consumer vs citizen' and 'present vs future'. 
Although statements were selected to fit within these broad areas, this was only done so 
far as they fitted into one or more other thematic areas specific to the Bloomfield Track 
issue. 
Table A5-2. Thematic groupings of discourses concerned the Bloomfield 
Track 
Discursive Theme 
Benefits associated with the BT 
Personal versus broader community 
Interests 
Local versus broader community needs 
Need for local access 
Present versus future needs 
Problems of incremental attrition 
asspclated with the BT 
Environmental damage to the inshore 
reefs due to the BT 
General environmental damage due to 
the BT 
Conservation issues related to the 
Daintree area in general 
Short Name 
Benefits of Track 
Consumer vs Citizen 
Local vs Broad 
Local access 
Present vs Furure 
lncrementalism 
Environmental damage (reef) 
Environmental damage 
(general) 
Daintree conservation 
Another consideration for the selection of statements concerned the extent to 
which individuals might be confident about their values and/or beliefs. To this end, a 
series of statements that were complementary to the broad thematic areas were selected 
to gauge the level of confidence, and the extent to which these changed during the 
deliberative process. The rationale for doing so is driven by the discussion in Chapter 2 
pertaining to confidence in one's 'awareness' pertaining to a need and the consequences 
of not acting on that need. 
The resulting statements, and the categories in which they fall are shown in 
Table AS-3. The statement number is shown in the first column, followed by the 
statement, the belief/value and thematic categories in which they fall. The final column 
indicates whether or not the statements was designed to capture the level of confidence 
in values/beliefs. 
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Table AS-3. Q Statements administered 
No. Statement 
U.yinc bicu~n on tht 81.:.omficld Tru.li wou.ld br bcneftcial fur th.c c:rwirorunenc:. h rna1 c11rn hdp rcduu f..d 
uu J:,e znd tbt J;ttcn.hnu1c f'ffoc,, 
l don't ""'°"" if improvi!l& 1h .... Bloomfield 1'rack would k W to a upld. :11.ccdc-ndon of drvdoprrient in 1hc aru. 
to the dttriment of the cnvironmt'nt. 
In deciding on wliat 10 do with t he Bloomfirld Track I dol''l ~!Mt"" whC'ther it'1 more imponuu 10 mn:t 1hc 
nc.-cds of thC' conununit 1 or cf..c cn'l'ironmcm. 
4 Whilu imp.KU on loc.a.l,i; in dW: 8~mfitld :1n:-a :arc a co~n. K is ~ ln~dtr cor11mu11i1y Lh;at \ho11ld u.uy 
more ~i iln when dccidin C wh.u 10 do with 1b.c Bloomfil'ld ·rndc.. 
5 I don't kno..- wMc dw- people of lUoomftdd think ai>ot.ir 1he Bloomfid d ·rnc.k. 
6 The road is iun the '1hin cd~ of t he- W<"d&c'. Furth« imp1owmrn1 of die ro:i.d will lt1d to mo1e dtvdopniem 
in rhc :un rnu.ltin t, i.n uvironmcnra.l dama 1 e. Thi1 ftU )' not ha pptn for .a lori g time. bu' i' will ha ppcn. 
7 Ero1ion from Ilic Bloom(tdd Tnd: U ~rmancn1ly damaginc the: cor~ rcdJ 1hat fringe du· beach~ hdo•. 
8 ::.: ;~~::i~:n11:c0~l;~::4fi~I~::. people l\viri.g in Cairns arc in no positM>n 10 juda;r wh•t die intcmu 
9 If tbc Bloomfield Track is IC"•lcJ (bitumcnized) tbc:rc will noc be a rapid incrcaw in cnviro111mcnu.lly cbmagiog 
dcv.:lo pment in tht Daintra: area in the fa1u1c. h ma y even bmefo the crwiroruncn1 Wrc. 
I 0 No ckvdop~nr should bc pcrmiuc.d in World Hc-:riug.:- arn,f JUC}t as the OainH«. 
1 I I would ht: w.:irK off j( more .:if 1hc DaintreC" rainfomt is prot.cc1rd. 
I 3 J'n1 nut ~ure ir the fut utC" of the Bloomfield Tn.dc ahovld be rktcrminc:d by loa.ls, ouuiden or bo1b. 
I~ The f~t of the Bloom(ldd Trd 15 of no concern co mt. 
1 5 F.conqrnk dC'WloprnC'nt n t0<iatcd wttlt the Bloomfield T radi will proridc more opponuni1iel fo1 futurc 
1tcl'Kf .. i«l1 in Nonh ~C(:ndand. 
1 6 Thc t\iture of the Bloomfield Tn.cl1 1hou.ld b.: detttmiMd by cv..ryol)C a rld not juat by thog who liv.. ln the 
Bloonlftcld arn.. 
I 7 There mun be: lOm.C" war in wf.iM:h c-veryboJy t>c:ncfos from prottt1ing the n.inforcn ncu the Bloomfield 
Tuck. 
18 The 8Joomfidd TucSc ii imporum Ma.uW: ic allow1 quidc acc;us 10 rc1no1r uc.u o( chc North, 
20 Using c:m on the Bloomfield T rKk is bad for the- rainfomc. 
2 1 Aay dccis~n abou1 the Sloomfidd T u ck wlll 1rrnly affo::c people like me 
2 3 Erosion from thc 81oomfic:ld Tm.-k docs noc c:u 1..:: silcauoo or damage 10 1hc fri11.c1rig imhort tttr. IK-1wec:n 
Cape Triboub.tion and Cook1own 
2 ~ ff wt do n't cake t tqu to protcc:r the Dainuct JUu1.fotn-t f'lturt stnrrationJ will miu out on tile oppom1ni1y 
to npcricncC" d1c area iu - da now. 
2 5 We don'r nci::d 10 worry 100 much •bout tnvironnuntal J a.m.gC" in the- Dair.utt region Mc.auk futuR" 
1,t ntn.tion• will be bc1u:r able: to du.I whh rhnc ptDblcml ' " "" WC' "K· 
2 6 Thtrc ii oo 1cuon to belitVC" 1hat the thc Daintru Rainforut is undH threat. 
2 7 I( fut\.lrc gtnemioru a>U.ld h a,·c their uy 1bout •he Bloomfield 11"-Ck, 1hty would he Im concrrocd abO\lt 1hc tnvironmcmal impx u than m.any peopk make out, 
28 The ptotcc.don of pbnc' .1.n d al\imal. in d1C" Dain1rft i1 O K iO long u u cloun'• d ftcr rrv:. 
19 Ltt'1 &x the problcmr in che Dainuroc jl.l5f (or now. The {1nu1t will ta.kc- urc o( iudf. 
30 The m.orc diu it ii pouiblc for th<: il.""UJC No rth Qi-ruland rcsi<knf can -.cccu 1hc Bloom(idd Tr;ack cht 
b~urr 
3 1 I don'1 likC" hnw cl.vclopmcot U c rttpin1 furthcr ,.nJ fun~c Nonh I.Mo rhc Ol.intrc-e and bcyo nd lwa\UC of i11 rff~t on chc rnviNinmirnt. 
H Tht coral tcdi '1ong the (ofC'~ore below 1hc Bloomfield Tn.clc arc n01 ba.dlr alf't<1nl by 1k road, 
33 Native:' an imah M the Daintrft need pr<Kcaic:in h«11.u1e th<y havC" a righl co life whic.h c.annoc bc traded 
a.gainst economK: comid.crauonJ. 
34 The Wu.jJ Wuj~ Commu.U17 U btrccr oil' nnw chac chc Bloomfield Tr:M:lc ha1 lxt!n bllilt. 
3 5 The most important o,1..c of d1C" Bloomfidd 1'uclc is fur touritm. 
36 I'm conamc:d cha1 I will he made wom otTby a.n.r dtthj()n about the:" Ble>omfic{d T n <.k. 
3 7 I ~hin.k 1hn boc" thou ano.:l long tc:rm pcnprttivcs arc rw.:drd •n ckciding wh1.t d1o uld bc doht' wtth thto 
Bloomlic:lJ Tuck . bur J don'1 lcnow which 011c is nwrc im cortat1t, 
}8 TM 8Jogmfitld Tuck rm.y not haw been L.h~ bc1t idCA, but. I guns 1hc:rc is pr<1li•bly little poim in do.Ung i1 
IMnY rhn it ku br:cl\ buLh. 
39 I don'c rally know who bcn~fiis rnoir frolll\ thC" pr0ttcriun or R11.infomt in dn OaiRmt . 
4 0 A Jo11g crrm peopecU¥t on the Bloontfteld Trade j, c:UC'flti.a.I. 
4 1 When it c;on\c-.1 to the Bloomfic-ld. Tradt, It'• not imponanr to worry abouL wha1 1hc N1urc will h~d. W e- nttd 
to worry about riow. 
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Value/ 
Belief 
Beliirf 
V aluC' 
V alue 
Bclic:f 
Belief 
Be 1;i::t 
Bclicf 
Bt lie f 
Va1u.c 
BclicffValue 
Br lid 
Value 
lklief 
Bdicf 
Bc licf 
Be-lie( 
Bc l Kf 
Bclitf 
Belir(Na!ue 
Vail11it 
Value 
v.i .. 
Ya.!ur 
Val'ut 
St-lief 
Bclitf 
6t"licf/V~lue 
Bclirr/Valuc 
Btlid 
Theme 
Bu wfot of l'ud1. 
l n.ctemr r.1alism 
Local\'$ Broad 
Loa! YI Broad 
Local " Broad 
l ncrcm<'.ntafom/ 
Ecolo "1 vs E.cor.om y 
Environmental impKU 
(riref) 
Loa.J va Broa.d 
lncrtmt n u.liJ.m 
F.c:oloi:;y vs F..conomy/ 
Oain1rec Comc-rvation 
Cornumer VJ C ititcn 
Loa! w Broad 
Loc:a.I v1 Broad 
Ecology " Econoiny/ 
Ptt.1;1:nc vs Fu1u1r 
Oainm~c Contervation/ 
Ecology vs F..cnnnmy 
lkncfiu of Tuc k/ 
Local acc:tu 
Dain Lrtt Conkrvaiion/ 
Ecolo Cf w Eccnom r 
Environmcnlal impacu 
( ,;encral ) 
Co,..aumtt "'' Ciriien 
lA<:al y' BrHdl 8ft1itfio 
of Aoccu 
Envi.ronmcmal i rnp.acu 
( rc:cf) 
Prncn1 "'' Future: 
P retent "' Fururt 
D1inu c:e ConKrvation/ 
Environmrntal concern 
P rtKnt vt f uturd 
Environmental con«rn 
Cnruumr1 v5 Citiun/ 
Environmtnn.J concern 
Benelil4 of 1'cack 
1nc:rcmcn1a.l i1m/ 
J:..colo tn' YI Econn.m y 
Environlnll:fln.I impacu 
( •C't'() 
Ecology w Economy/ 
[nvironltW'nc.J concc-rn 
Dcnd iu of Ar.ctS&l 
Local YI Bro•d 
8 u 1rftu o ( Track 
Conwmc:t vs Ciliun/ 
En~·iromnn1uJ a.nccrn 
lnctcn1cn l:1.li1m / 
fkncfiu nr T rack 
ConJumcf '\"$ Cicitc:n/ 
Oa1ntrtt ConkfV.lt ion 
Prcu:nt ,., Future 
P 1cii.:nt VI Future: 
Scnrfirs o' Ttac.k/ 
I CtU 
Confidence 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
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Another way of conceptualising the Q statements selected for use in the Q sort 
follows the discussion in Chapter 2 where the discursive sphere surrounding the 
Bloomfield Track issue consists of four discursive subsystems - political, ecological, 
economic and social - which interact with one another. In the discursive system, 
individual discourses represent one part of a complex whole. Using the basic schema, a 
well-designed Q sort should cover as wide an array of discourses in the discursive 
sphere as is possible, within the limitations of 42 statements. In Figure A5-2 the 
location of each individual Q statement is very roughly located in the discursive sphere. 
The entire sphere consists of the four overlapping subsystems. The statements are 
located according to which of the discursive subsystems it has come from, or impacts 
upon. For example, all the statements that are located in the political sphere have there 
(being issued by political actors, or political representatives in order to gain political 
influence over the issue). Statements within the social sphere tend to concern the 
personal or social impact, and so one for the ecological and economic spheres. Where 
statements are located in the overlap of one of more spheres, this reflects an 
interpretation that it potentially affects them all. 
Sectbn: A.5.2 Q~ 
Figure A5-2. Spread of Q Statements in the discursive sphere 
Political 
3 
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·- 4 38 10 6 -(.) 22 5 11 2 0 0 12 co Cf) (') 18 7 Q.> 
as 
24 21 
28 18 81 36 17 
42 
34 39 
35 
Economic 
It can be seen from Figure A5-2 that the 42 statements selected for the Q sort to 
be administered to the FNQCJ jurors reflect a good representation of possible 
discourses within the discursive sphere. 
A.5.2. Q-SORTING 
Once the statements are selected they then need to be sorted by respondents in 
order according to a rule of operation - typically in order from most agree to most 
disagree (Brown, 1993, pp.11-12). One approach is to put statements on individual 
cards which respondents physically sort. Another approach to facilitate sorting is to 
ask respondents to assign a value along an attitudinal scale (for example a 9 point scale 
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where +4 indicates 'strongly agree', and -4 indicates 'strongly disagree') from which 
relative levels of agreement can be obtained. 
The ranking of statements typically yields a quasi-normal distribution of 
responses about the median value. (Brown, 1985; Brown, 1993, p.12). The approach is 
referred to as ' forced distribution'. The idea behind the approach is to yield equality 
between means and variance among different sorts to facilitate analysis. 
However, 'unforced' distributions were also obtained from deliberators, who 
initially went through the cards, nominating scores for each as they went. The 
deliberators then began sorting the cards into the nine categories. Where categories were 
overfilled, deliberators were asked to compare statements in the category to see if any 
could be sorted up, or down to the next category depending on what remained to be 
filled. 
Some deliberators reported difficulties in doing so, at least for the first Q sort. 
Both sets ofresults then factor analysed. Similar factors were extracted, but with lower 
factor loadings for the unforced data, which was subsequently discarded. As well as 
yielding better results from analysis, it is also arguable that the forced data better reflects 
the relative ordering of statements because deliberators were forced to make marginal 
trades between pairs of statements, rather than simply nominating a rank.2 
A.5.3. QRESULTS 
As discussed in chapter 3, two types of rank data were obtained using the Q 
survey. The first, unforced data set resulted from jurors simply ranking the statements 
on a scale from -4 to 4 according to whether the disagreed or agreed with the statement. 
The second, forced, set of data was obtained by requiring the jurors to sort the 
statements into categories. The categories corresponded to the same ranges as for the 
unforced data, but were restricted by quotas. The following discussion is restricted to 
the forced data set. Comparisons between forced and unforced data revealed a large 
difference in shape a reasonable level of agreement, in terms of relative ordering. It is 
worth noting that there are occasional inconsistencies between the two where the order 
2 See Brown (1980, pp.201-3) for a discussion of the use of forced versus unforced distributions. 
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of statements has changed, but it is accepted that of the two sets of data, the forced 
distribution is more appropriate for the analysis conducted herein.3 
The (forced) Q sorts provided by jurors are reproduced in Table A5-4. The 
representation of individual Q sorts are analogues for the actual grouping of statements 
under rank categories by the jurors. Despite being given freedom to depart from quota 
restrictions for the categories, most jurors were able to maintain their quotas, resulting in 
a bell-shaped sort. A small number of Q sorts depart from the predetennined 
distribution - for example: Aswad, Boat, Julie, Pearl, Rastus and Tamarra (pre 
deliberation); Keith (mid deliberation); and Snoopy (post deliberation) - though only 
by a small margin. 
3 This has implications for the most important assumption underlying correlation of data, and hence 
analysis ofQ sorts, that of transitivity of statement scores (Brown, 1980, pp.53 & 201). However, the 
problem only occurs in a small number of instances, and then only changing the score by no more than 
2 categories. 
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TableA5 -4. Forced QSorts 
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Pre-deliberation Mid-deliberation Post-deliberation 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 J 4 --4 -3 -2 -1 0 l 2 J 4 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 J 4 
11 2 2~ 18 i 6 1(, 10 11 2 l 7-23-:,-5-1012 -·--14·--1-2-8?~·2110 
14 9 3 25 21 5 7 17 19 14 9 26 I.• 32 ·i 6 17 19 26 'J 3 JS 13 12 •tiJ 19 
26 l 5 29 28 22 3 12 24 33 29 18 27 15 34 8 22 2·1 40 28 11 15 !.• 20 21 16 .; J 33 
32 30 ~5 27 l.'I 20 31 21 30 2fJ 35 16 31 4 1 29 25 30 32 22 17 !2 
34 ,,, 36 )"l 40 36 15 37 .\3 42 27 ,5 34 31, 31 
i .! 41 3k 2.~ 38 3') 37 39 ~~ 
11--1-31--0 -9-:~33-- -ii~'-i'T--924-J - 1-2 l'"mi9 -- I ).7 3 11 1 5 6 24 -
13 25 8 .!6 20 15 J') 34 27 25 18 14 8 ~ 15 17 24 9 7') B 12 1'\ JO H> 33 
14 27 23 !'• 21 I> 16 24 40 41 26 30 l-~ 13 16 3 1 40 25 YI 30 15 14 2tl 18 17 40 
41 28 .\() 35 ., 17 31 29 36 .\1 22 i; 32 35 11 35 21 28 2! 31 ]') 
.\2 37 ll 39 42 .\7 23 r 35 39 2..> 38 34 32 
~QU ~HM m o % 
JS 
·23 ·-2-il-1- -3 1.!5·244· 
25 ') 26 ~ 13 16 10 3 J 6 
28 27 30 14 20 1 ~ 17 3.i 7 
29 32 15 22 19 37 j (l 
~8 34 21 41 
·12 35 39 
36 
7 n·-1 ·T1-i6· 41o- -- 1- -;;·-·i-1 11.\ i5- r;--1·0- · 
25 9 26 3 12 15 16 ,, 24 37 25 14 5 21 ·1 16 l"/ 32 
27 35 29 H 18 L7 20 2.1 40 27 28 ~ 34 U 19 2.i 40 
4.~ 30 1'1 21 27 31 12 3$ 29 l.' 35 IS 24 .II 41 
38 28 36 ~3 41 42 22 36 20 33 
37 39 :'·i }0 39 2(• 
~-9-~--s-2-----:r1-7---13--:r2- -s- 41216"_1_1 ____ 91 iTI" 8 "! 3 IG- 2T6 -
25 .!S 27 10 12 3 16 6 19 14 9 27 !2 5 I<.> 10 2.-i 26 10 15 18 13 2 j 20 26 19 
26 ~? 29 jl 13 1 L 18 17 24 29 1.5 30 .!.~ 7 20 15 .l l 40 28 1.7 22 15 7 5 21 33 31 
32 53 20 15 21 40 28 39 :12 17 21 19 3'\ 30 38 2.1 17 12 35 •ill 
35 56 22 34 42 .-16 18 _q 37 42 2') 32 36 41 
41 ~ 2 30 3~ 4 L 38 .\4 39 34 37 
37 
· 11··-i····4· :;--:z -17·s- ·,x·io 1 s 11 · 5 3 r -c:-·10 1 •) ·23-··~,-·- 2 8·-·4·· c;··i?"-· 
13 l•l 8 l'i 7 18 6 1(, 33 28 25 9 L<) 7 \6 15 18 37 7 11 26 5 20 15 12 16 31 
25 ?(, 36 2() 9 29 39 2·1 34 29 2(• 14 2? 12 17 31 2·1 4 1 JO L-1 29 21 22 I•) 13 } I 38 
28 42 21 19 .12 4o .•1 D 21 :rn 13 w 34 .•3 2' 30 ·" 27 .12 18 40 
2._.\ 22 35 41 36 .\C) 23 J . \ 35 33 3? 28 .li 24 
27 30 37 ·12 32 ·10 12 36 ·l L 
--------1~-- - ---- --·----·--·- --- -- ·-·---- ----··--· ----------14 23 3 1 11 4 Ill 34 14 7 3 12 5 9 6 19 7 I l I 4 L2 2 '> 10 
15 25 7 9 17 24 12 38 19 13 10 ~ 23 22 32 38 35 20 3 l 1 13 2l 6 :;_; 16 
28 29 8 2 1 18 r, 32 16 41 28 2? 11 I'> 27 ?ll 24 .H 42 25 9 lk 15 l4 8 ~7 32 
.10 19 21. 33 13 35 40 42 18 16 30 3.l 26 .l5 28 17 21 27 .\1 23 .•8 
20 27 36 22 37 25 17 31 39 37 29 .10 36 -''' 26 
·12 39 31 21 36 •\[) 41 40 39 
•ll 
25 1"1 ·-3 11 - 2 -1 12 i 16 15- i3 .. 2 ··9 1 •I 5 IT 6 J • :l i --18 17 5 .j "1"6 
28 2.' I 0 ~7 9 22 6 33 26 \ ~ 3 I i I 0 8 16 33 26 9 13 27 23 21 10 <> 24 
39 26 13 21• 15 24 7 40 29 25 II W 23 J7 19 2tl 40 28 LL 14 37 29 22 12 S 33 
·i2 14 30 17 20 31 l'J 2S 27 )'l 32 21 22 24 2S 15 .l8 32 .Ii 19 .ll 
32 _;r, 34 21 41 41 .1'> 34 .15 31 30 .;o 36 ,,, 20 
Jtl 37 _:15.. .;2 38 J(, 42 41 .~9 
29 1 15 3- B ,, 7 I> .j l ·f· 2 1"1 l · 2 ··, 4 17 6 29 ') 8 l 2 .; -. Ill 6 
36 2 23 1.1 II IS 10 Lu 19 29 8 15 23 7 10 19 16 30 LI 14 .l 17 7 12 II> 19 
42 9 26 14 32 ll 12 11 40 38 2r. 9 2~ 32 1~ 12 24 40 38 2<; 27 n 25 22 20 24 4o 
.tJ 30 2~ 34 22 20 2.; ~o 13 ,. 36 21 20 31 ·12 37 is 32 •_; 21 31 
37 .~7 35 3.< 31 37 2S 39 ~,; 33 41 1$ 34 J' 33 
28 39 .IS 41 42 '15 2.S 39 .l6 2611-9 -631217 ____ l!_J_2_ 53_7_4 __ 1_6_·--;·---1-3--}-~. ;-"Q .. 
27 JI, 25 10 7 13 12 5 19 30 ') 28 l I 13 8 10 l'l 20 26 9 2 28 18 12 2•i 19 
28 25 30 32 8 IS 15 !4 40 41 11 29 22 15 18 16 3 24 4 11 4 29 21 i 16 J 40 
29 31 36 20 21 16 }(, 38 2:1 34 21 17 10 .JS 23 JO 34 lZ 17 53 
35 ii 22 .\3 33 39 1' 37 31 35 27 .l2 36 .15 20 
34~V EQ~ ~V~ 
39 
-25Ji·5·L··-2--;;--i0 -.\i'9---ii--c;r·-2-51-T-61-1i--·Til-;;-2·T- 5- ?T io1T4-
26 27 JI ? 3 7 18 .13 37 26 27 3 x 10 16 19 ~ 17 14 2' 3 7 6 J'> 22 ~ 6 
32 .!8 29 1.1 8 15 21 31 40 41 29 25 9 13 21 20 .'3 40 18 ~6 8 9 31 .% 24 17 10 
.19 36 2.1 12 16 24 3~ ~6 37 J' 18 2.1 31 35 2? 13 23 32 3~ 33 19 
42 ~o 17 "\ I 41 42 3k 22 ~iJ 32 27 2~ 34 39 40 
35 20 39 28 3··i t! 37 i i 
22 
25 10 - 6 ··-716 1 2 ·s 24 
29 27 14 11 20 5 3 I! 33 
41 2~ 26 l'5 21 11. 4 IS 40 
35 36 23 22 32 9 1 ~ 
42 .lO 31 37 13 
3~ 34 .l9 
9 IO 7 r,- ( ~ 2 r · 1 
25 JI> 14 1 l 19 1; 3 5 37 
29 27 30 1? 23 18 15 It> 40 
•II 38 21 31 2() 22 2·i 
42 28 34 .12 33 
3'> 36 39 
l 3 1. 10 (, 8 4 
14 '' 27 7 13 IS 12 16 24 
9 2) 30 :?_I 15 3 17 22 40 
2(, 38 28 20 :;.i 19 .l 
41 31 21 37 39 
.l5 36 
·----------------------- ------ .... -------- - -23 H 2 15 13 l 5 7 6 I 11 2 4 8 5 7 
25 3.! 3 18 22 4 10 16 19 9 14 3 15 13 12 16 
27 39 9 26 28 17 12 .13 24 38 25 23 22 8 18 20 
<i i 11 2\1 30 !I 20 50 26 2'1 37 ~I 24 
14 'i l 36 .14 40 29 32 39 3 I 41 
35 37 42 31• 42 35 
38 
~388~ 
6 10 
;7 33 
19 40 
.\1 
6 18 .1 1 13 4 lO IO 
15 ~) 27 ' 8 !I 7 24 19 
38 26 29 II 14 .14 12 .II 33 
41 30 2l 23 .16 16 40 
42 2~ 28 9 17 
.12 35 '" 
SecOOn: A.5 .4 Changes to Statemenr Scores 
A.5.4. CHANGES TO STATEMENT SCORES 
Table A5-5. Changes to Statements During Del iberat io n 
. ~ V¥_~q_E__~l-/!FT_ __ !!YE.!0..G~ ~.C.98§ __ t!§[_C.f!#!_c,;E_ 
N o. Statem e n t 1 2 Overall 1 2 OwraJl 1 2 o-oJJ 
Laying bitumen on rhe Bloomfield Track would be beneficial for the environment. It 
may even help redua: fud usage and the greenhouse dfec1. 
1.75 208 1.67 ~.75 -l.17 - 2.08 0.42 0.92 1.33 
2 I don"r know if improving the Bloomfid<l Track would lead'° a ropid aa·derolion of 
development in the area to d1e detriment of rhc e11viro11mem. 
3 In deciding on what'° do wirh the Dloomftdd Track I don't knowwherher it's more 
import.ant co meet the needs of die mmmunicy or the cnvironmcnc. 
4 Whilst impacts on locJs in the Bloomfield area ar< a concern, il is rhe hroader com 
muniry diar should carry more weight when deciding what m do wid1 d1e 
5 I don'< know what the people ofBloomfield chink abou< rhe Bloomfield Track. 
l.75 1.33 l.83 
l.50 2.08 0.92 
J.58 1.08 l.58 
l.25 1.17 l.75 
6 The road is jusr che '1hin edge of the wedge'. Furrher improvemem of <he road will 1.25 1.67 2.00 
lead co more development in the area resill<ing in environmental damage. This may 
7 Erosion from che Bloomfidd Tracie is permanently damaging che coral reefs that fringe 1.83 0.50 2.33 
the beaches below. 
8 When it comes to the Bloomfield track,.Jl<Ople living in Dims are in no position to l.50 l.17 l.92 judge what the intercsrs of the local residents ofBloomfidd arc. 
9 If the 131oornfield Tracie is sealed (birumeniicd) there will not be a rapid incrca.ic in en 1.67 l.17 1.67 
viroamenrally damaging development in the Daintree area in the future. It may 
I 0 No devdopmc:m should be permiued in World Heritage areas such as che Druntree. 2.00 2.67 2.83 
1 I I would be worse off if more of che Daintn:e rainforest is protected. 1.33 2.25 1.58 
l 2 The Bloomfield Track issue is intportant for Q=sland.. J.67 1.08 0.75 
I 3 I'm not sure if rhc furun: of rhe Bloomfidd Track should be de1ermined by locals, out 208 1.50 1.50 
sidm or both. 
I 4 "!be fate of the Bloomfield Track is of no con=n to me. 0.83 1.42 1.25 
I 5 &anomic development associated with che Bloomfield Track will provide more op 1.92 1.67 2.08 
porrunicies for litture generations in North Queensland. 
l 6 The future of the Bloomfield Track should l><: cktermined by everyone and noL just by l.33 J.08 0.83 
th<.lSe who live in the Bloomfield areJ. 
I 7 I don't know how, but! tlllnk that chere mw< be some war. in which everybody bcnc 1.33 1.00 1.75 
fits from protecting chc rainforest near the Bloomfield T ra&. 
I 8 '!be Bloomfield Track is important h=usc it allows <1uick access to remOLe areas of 1.92 2.00 1.67 
thcNonh. 
l 9 Conservation in 1hc Dairmee area is worthwhile at whatever cost. 
2 0 Using cars on the Bloomfield T r•ck is bad for the rainforest. 
2 I Any decision about the Bloomlidd T rack will grcody alfca people like me. 
2 2 I have no idra what the ""'pie in che llloomfidd "'"" rhink about rhe Bloomfield Track. r--
2 3 Erosion from che Bloomfield Track docs not c:>usc siltation or damage to the fringing 
inshore reefs bccween Cape Tribulation and Cookiown 
2 4 If we don't rake steps to protect che Daintree Rainforest limm generations will miss 
ouc on the opportunicy r:o ex.pt:rimCC' the area as we <lo now. 
2 5 We don't need ro worry too much about environmental dam>gl' in rhe Daintree re 
gion because furun: generations will be berrer able 10 deal with these problems. 
2 6 There is no r=on to bdit\•e that <he che Dainrrec Rainforest is under thrcai. 
2 7 lf furure gencrauons could have chcir say about the Bloomfield trad<, they would be 
less concemo:I about the environmentaf impacts than many people make oui. 
2 8 The protection of plants and animals in rhe Dainctee is OK so long as it doesn't affi-a 
!Tl('. 
2 9 Let's fix che problems in the Daintree jwt fur now. The future will rake c:tte of itself. 
3 0 ;TI'.;,;;:r.~tr:.lis ,t'~~~~/°' rhc average Norch Queensland resident can access rhe 
3 I I don't like how <levd<11>ment is creeping further md further North into the Doincree 
and beyond bocausc oflts effect on the environment. 
3 2 The coral ree& along the foreshore below rhc llloomfidd Tr:ick ase not badly affected 
by the road. 
3 3 Native animals in rhc Dain1rec need protection because <hey have a right to life which 
cannot be traded against economic considerations. 
3 4 ~llrWujal Wujo.l Communi<y is better off now 1har the Bloomfield Track has bern 
3 5 The most important use of chc Bloomfield Track is for tourism. 
3 6 \~ncemed dm l will be made wo"e off by any decision about the llloomfidd 
3 7 I chink chat both short and lo!!f; term ~SP,<Ctives arc needed in deciding what should 
be done with the Bloomlidd Tr.ck. but I aon't know which one is more 
3 8 The Dloomlidd Track may nor have been the best id<:>, but I guess there is probably 
littl< point in closing it now that it h;1s been built. 
3 9 I don't really know who bencfilS most from chc prorection ofRainfotcst in the Dain 
tree. 
4 0 A long <erm perspective on die Bloomfield Track is esscnci:tl. 
4 I When ir comes to che Bloomfield Track, it's not impottant 10 worty about what the 
future will hold. We need to worry about now. 
4 2 Ev"')'onc in Queensl:uid is better off for having a road like rhe Bloomfield Track. 
- 389-
1.42 1.17 0.58 
l.75 1.08 1.17 
l.00 l.00 0.50 
J.00 
2.42 
0.75 
0.67 
l.58 
I.l7 
l.08 
I.SO 
1.33 
1.42 
2.17 
1.42 
l.17 
2.17 
l.25 
1.83 
2.08 
1.75 
0.83 
2.75 
1.58 
1.17 
0.92 
0.67 
LOO 
0.92 
0.83 
0.92 
l.08 
l.00 
0.92 
0.67 
1.08 
0.92 
1.75 
1.75 
1.25 
0.92 
0.92 
l.08 
l.92 
1.08 
l.00 
2.33 
0.67 
1.17 
l.67 
l.00 
l.58 
l.17 
1.50 
1.75 
2.00 
l.58 
1.42 
1.92 
1.67 
1.n 
2.25 
2.25 
l.17 
2.00 
l.50 
~.08 - l.83 --1.08 
--0.67 --0.83 - 1.25 
l.67 l.42 1.92 
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A.5.5. CHANGES TO SORTS 
The significance of changes to Q sorts were tested using two types of approach. 
The first involves the differences between statement responses, averaged across all 42 
statements as a way of gauging the magnitude of changes in the way jurors responded to 
the statement - ie. the average score given across the group. The resulting average rank 
changes can be seen in columns 2 to 4 in Table AS-6. Tests for significance have been 
perforn1ed against a hypothesised difference of zero and the resulting t statistic 
provided. As will be the usual convention in this thesis, significance indicated by 
shading. The confidence levels of 95%, 99% and 99.9% rejecting the null hypothesis are 
indicated by gradations of light to dark shading. The net average change (across all 
jurors) and corresponding test for significance are shown in the bottom row.4 
The second type of test concerns the Pearson's correlation between paired sorts. 
Using this approach, the square of correlation (r) between paired individual sorts 
indicates the level of overlap; that is, level of variation in percentage terms that a 
particular sort can be accounted for by another. Alternatively the coefficient of 
alienation (1 - r) accounts for unexplained variance, or the residual amount of variation 
that cannot be explained by the juror's previous sort (Brown, 1980, p.284). Using this 
logic, the statistic 1 - r2 is used to test significance of difference between paired sorts 
under the hypothesis that the population parameter p is less than 1, or that there is 
significant level of alienation between sorts. 
4 The approach is very crude and, unadjusted, appears to result in a leptokurtic distribution. If instead of 
score differences we use Spearman distance between sorts (see section A.6.1 .2 in Appendix 6) the 
resulting t values about half those for score differences. Because score difference and Spearman 
distance are related measures, there is a strong correlation between the results (r = 0.92), simple 
solution is to apply a crude kind of 'bootstrap' to the results, doubling the standard error to SE 
= 2a/-Jn. More sophisticated measures of change are available, which are applied to the preference 
data, but not applied to the Q data because of the large number of ranked objects. 
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Table AS-6. Summary of tests for difference between paired Q statement 
responses 
Test for change to statement scores Correlation Test for Sigruficance (Petmon) (Fishn-'1 Z traniformation) 
Average Change t value (H0: 6.S > 0) r2 (x!OO) tvalue (H~· p > 0) tvaluc (H,,: p < 1) 
Juror 1-2 2-3 1-3 1- 2 2- 3 1- 3 1-2 2 - 3 1-3 1-2 2-3 1-3 1-2 2- 3 1-3 
ADV l.43 I. JO 0.95 J. 45 2.95 4 8 6 4 66 1.27 l.20 
ASW 1.69 1.43 1.40 1.84 11!1 27 45 44 
BOA 1.57 1.14 1.62 1::;1 24 40 l l JAN l.83 1.4 8 1.98 l 8 3 7 I 5 JUL 1.62 1.48 1.90 2.24 36 25 11 
KFl J.69 1.5 5 1.76 2.3 1 26 25 25 
KOD 1.29 1.10 1.29 1.60 2.86 55 5 8 42 
MAT 1.00 0.76 1.10 59 76 5 3 
PEA 1.74 1.48 1.88 20 4 5 26 
RAS 1. 86 I.I 0 l.67 24 64 28 
S'I<) 1.1 9 l.19 l. 52 52 56 40 
TAM 1.55 l.33 1.69 36 38 25 
Overall I. 54 1.26 l.56 22 33 20 
# = p < 0.05 # = p < 0.01 .. = p <0.001 
From Table A5-6 it can be seen that the similarities between each individual's 
paired Q sorts tend to outweigh the differences. However, significant differences can be 
detected. In both types of test it appears that the greatest shift was experienced in the 
first phase of the process between pre and mid deliberation. In Adventure's case, the 
shift in phase one is even greater than measured between the beginning and end of the CJ 
process. 
These findings are at this stage tentative, explorative tools, requiring further 
exploration within changes to affiliation to the Q sort factors, preferences, and 
interactions between the two. The next section, following investigation of aggregate 
changes to policy preferences, explores particular thematic areas that were experienced 
the greatest level of shift, thus contributing to the overall changes observed in earlier 
discussion. 
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APPENDIX 6 ANALYSIS OF POLICY 
PREFERENCES 
This appendix provides detailed working of the analysis of preference data 
elicited from jurors before and after the proceedings of the Far North Queensland 
Citizens' Jury. The analysis includes both descriptive statistics and formal tests for 
significance. 
The analysis begins with aggregate measures used to report the outcomes of 
voting before and after deliberation. This is followed by analysis of conformity or 
consensus among jurors. Finally, the data is analysed to determine of the change in 
ranks is significant. 
A.6.1. SPATIAL 'DISTANCES' BETWEEN RANKS 
The distance between two ranks is some function d(ofre,ofos~ <?: 0 for any vector 
of policy orderings w ESm, where Sm is the set of permutations of the ranks for options 
{1,2,. .. ,m}, and m = 5 policy options. (see Marden, 1995, pp.2 & 21). (Here I will 
tend to simply refer to the pre and post-deliberative orderings of policy options as x and 
y respectively.) 
A.6.1.1. Euclidean Distance 
The simplest distance to conceptualise is Euclidean distance. Euclidean distance 
is simply the distance between two points when plotted in m-dimensional space. This 
is demonstrated using a hypothetical case in Figure A6-3. It represents the simplest 
case of Euclidean distance between preference ranks for two options (i and}). The pre 
and post-deliberative rankings for the options Y (iJ) and x(iJ) at plotted along their 
respective axes (with pre-deliberative preference plotted at the origin for convenience). 
The relationship between change in rank shown by tJ.i and tJ.j respectively. 
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Figure A6-3. Euclidean Distance 
Euclidean 
distance ~ _ _ 
I \ 
y( . . ) l,) 
11} 
x( .. J l,) 
1t can be easily seen from Figure A6-3 that the (Euclidean) distance between 
these points is simply the hypotenuse of the triangle formed by the change in rank for 
the two options. Using Euclidean geometry, the distance between pre and post-
deliberative rank orderings x and y is: 
Equation 1. dE11cC x,y) = ~Yt2 + Y/ + ... + Ym2 
For m = 5 policy options. 
A.6.1.2. Spearman Distance 
Spearman distance is simply 
(Marden, 1995, p.24). 
A.6.1.3. Kendall Distance 
the square of Euclidean distance 
Kendall Distance is the number of pairwise transformations between ranks (see 
Marden, 1995, pp.21-7). Taking for example the pre and post-deliberative ranks of 
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Adventure and Snoopy, the number of transpositions between ranks is represented by 
the number of 'crosses' in the lines joining the ranked options in Figure A6-4. 
Figure A6~4. Kendall Distance 
ADVENTURE Rank SNOOPY 
Pre Post Pre Post deliberation deliberation deliberation deliberation 
CLO -
-
-MAI BIT"'- / MAI 
- 1 
--
/ 
-< 
" - -MAI-- -- - .CLO 2 UPG ......._ / / CLO 
" 
.......... 
/ / 
-.........'\Y 
STA _ 
- - - -
STA 3 STA 9 ~4 5/ STA 
- -~- ~-
/ / 7" .......... UPG 
- - - - -
UPG 4 MAI / / 
" 
......._ UPG 
/ 
" BIT_ - - - - - BIT 5 CLO / , BIT 
It can be seen from Figure A6-4 that the distance between the pre and post-
deliberative ranks of Adventure is 1, and Snoopy's is 9 (out of a maximum 10). 
A.6.2. MEASURES OF AGGREGATION 
The following discussion considers way in which the preference ranks can be 
interpreted and assessed to determine an outcome. 
A.6.2.1. Marginals and average rank 
The pre and post-deliberative policy orderings of FNQCJ jurors is presented in 
Table A6-7 as the marginal matrix, showing the number of jurors who assigned a 
particular rank to each of the policy options, along with the average rank for each option 
(see Marden, 1995, p.18). 
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Table A6-7. Table of marginals and average rank 
Prerankings {stage 1) Postrankings (stage 3) 
rank rank 
Option 1 2 3 4 5 Average 1 2 3 4 5 Average 
BIT 2 3 0 4 3 3.25 0 0 0 1 11 4.92 
UPG 1 1 5 3 2 3.33 0 0 2 9 1 3.92 
STA 4 3 5 0 0 2.08 2 2 8 0 0 2.50 
MAI 3 5 0 4 0 2.42 3 7 2 0 0 1.92 
CLO 2 0 2 1 7 3.92 7 3 0 2 0 1.75 
A .6.2.2. Borda Count 
Borda Count is by far the simplest method of aggregation. A Borda Count 
produces and aggregate preference ordering of options according to the decreasing 
median rank (Chamberlin and Featherston, 1986, p.350). The process can be easily 
calculated using the average rank, or vector of averages for policy options, shown in 
Table A6-7, or 
- 12 i . K; = - Yj ; for all 1 
n " 
where y~ is the rank given by the }th juror for the i1h policy option. The aggregate 
ranking can then be read-off for each deliberative stage by numbering the resulting 
summations sequentially from smallest to largest. Another approach is to simply use 
the sum of ranks rather than average (see Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999, p.27). The 
resulting summations of juror rankings for each of the policy options are shown in 
Figure A6-8, along with the resulting aggregate ranks at both pre and post-deliberative 
stages. 
Table A6-8. Calculation of Borda Rank 
Stage Pre Deliberation Post Deliberation 
Poli~ oetion BIT UPG STA MAI CLO BIT UPG STA MAI CLO 
Sum of ranks 39 40 25 29 47 59 47 30 23 21 
Aggregate Rank 3 4 1 2 5 5 4 3 2 1 
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A.6.2.3. Paired Comparisons and consensus rank 
The second aggregation mechanism, consensus rank, uses pairwise comparison of 
policy options. In effect, the process involves choosing between all possible 
combinations of pairs of policy options. The order of the remaining options are ordered 
according to the number pairwise ballots that they win, or the number of other options 
over which it is preferred. Comparing options across all jurors produces a Pairs matrix 
(Marden, 1995, p.19), K, which shows the proportion of jurors who prefer option i to 
} , where 
Equation 2. Kij = _!_#{y(kljyVl < YY)}, 
n 
The calculation of the pre and post-deliberative consensus ranks is illustrated in 
Table A6-9.1 Each column of the table shows the proportion of jurors who prefer the 
policy option at the top of the column to the corresponding option on the left-hand 
side. Then, counting down the column, the number of options over which a particular 
option is preferred (ie. the value in the cell is greater than 50%) is summed. 
The resulting summations are shown in the second last row of Table A6-9. The 
consensus rank is found by ranking the resulting number of options over which it is 
preferred in descending order. The consensus ordering for each deliberative stage is 
shown in the bottom row of the table. 
Table A6-9. Calculation of Con sens us Rank 
Option Preferred by (%) 
Pre Deliberation Post Deliberation 
tion BIT UPG STA MAI CLO BIT UPG STA MAI CLO 
a BIT 67 58 33 33 92 100 100 100 
1 UPG 33 83 42 33 8 100 67 ~O' STA 42 17 42 17 0 0 67 I. ~ 
~'-
;: MAI 67 58 58 25 0 0 33 ·~ 
~ CLO 67 67 83 75 0 17 17 42 
No. majority preferred 2 3 4 0 0 I 2 3 
Rank 3 2 4 5 5 4 3 2 
The option that 'wins' the greatest number of these pairwise ballots is ranked 
first. If it wins all pairwise ballots, it is the Condorcet winner. There is no guarantee, 
1 See also (Marden, 1995, pp.19-20). 
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given an array of preference ordering, that such a winner exists. Jn that event, the emost 
preferredf option is that which preferred to the remaining options by the highest 
proportion of voters. The pre-deliberative preferences orderings reveal Stabilisation as 
the Condorcet winner; by post-deliberation ranks this has changed to Closure. 
Importantly, a Condorcet winner is produced at both stages - that is the outcome is 
stable and determine. 
A.6.2.4. Hare 
Hare (or single transferable vote) involves the sequential elimination of options.2 
The process begins with the counting of first ranks among options. Once all votes are 
counted, the preferences of option with the least votes (which is thus ranked last) are 
redistributed to the remainder according to the allocation of the second preferences of 
these voters. The redistributed votes for the remaining options are then recounted, and 
again, the option with the least votes being eliminate and it votes redistributed, and so 
on until a majority is reached. 3 
A.6.2.5. Centre Rank 
The centre ro of a population of ranks is a rank (or group of ranks) that minimise 
the average distance4: 
Equation 3. d(co)f .!.. td(yCi',co), coeSm 
n ;~1 
For any set of ranks there may exist more than one centre rank, where a unique 
centre exists, and the distribution of ranks is unimodal. Strong unimodality occurs 
where the frequency of ranks decreases as distance increases from the centre (Marden, 
1995, p. I 37). 
The software package SPSS 10 was to calculate the Spearman distances of all 
possible ranks (m! = 120) to each juror's rank at stages 1 and 3. we find that for the 
population of pre deliberation ranks has a unique centre x = (4,3,1,2,5}, corresponding 
to the rank ordering {MAI,STA,BIT,UPG.CLO}, with an average distance 
2 The approach has been adopted for electing the house of representatives in Australia. 
3 For example: (Hare, 1873; Chamberlin and Featherston, 1986, p.350; see also Stern, 1993, p.176). 
4 See section A.6.1.2. 
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d(x,i) = 5.1 7. The post deliberation rankings have a centre rank y = { 5,4,3,2, I }, or 
rank ordering {CLO, MAI, STA, UPG, BIT}, with an average di stance d(y,y) = 2.00. 
A.6.3. ANALYSIS OF PAIRED RANKS 
The following analysis is concerned with testing the hypothesis that jurors 
changed their ranks as a result of deliberation, and that the overall outcome is 
significantly different (ie not due to random variation). 
There are a number of possible methods investigating the significance of 
differences between paired ranks. The first of these use of distances between ranks, 
testing for difference within individual pairs and inferring for the group as a whole. T hi s 
also enables the testing of trends in the data to see if jurors have moved in the direction 
of a particular rank. The second type of test uses measures of correlation between 
individual ranks to examine the amount of agreement or overlap between ranks. 
A.6.3.1. Critchlow and Verducci test for paired ranks. 
One major challenge to examining changes to preferences as a result of 
deliberation in this study is the lack of a control group to compare changes against. 
Critchlow and Verducci ( 1992) provide a possible solution whereby a particular shift is 
tested against all other possible ranks the same distance from the starting point. It 
permits investigation into paired ranks for both the individual and the group to 
determine whether shifts are random and directionless, or improbable and, by inference, 
intentional6although i t does not exclude the possibility that probable shifts are also 
intentional. (It also permits investigation in to whether the direction of preference shift 
is in the direction of an idealised rank, which is performed below.) 
Using the approach, the distance between paired ranks x<iJand /iJ are investigated 
us ing the hypothesis: 
The hypothesis states that for a given shift in preference ranking it is equally 
likely that the final rank is any CV , or rank that is the same distance from x(l) as fiJ where 
ro is random and ro E Sm, m = 5 policy options. 
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The test entails finding the distance between each juror's before and after ranks, 
d(x(i) /V), for and then find all ranks, w, which are equidistant from the first rank, d(x(t) 
/0) = d(xm, w). The distances between w and y (i) form a probability function 
approximating a normal distribution (see Critchlow and Verducci, 1992, p.23) with a 
standard deviations;. The z statistic can then be calculated using Equation 4. 
Equation 4: z;"' {d(x (iJ, w)}ls; 
{a) Explanation 
To describe the approach conceptually I will use Janine's pre and post-
deliberative ranks as an example. These ranks are represented spatially in Figure A6-5. 
It projects the location of Janine's pre and post-deliberative preference ranks within a 
sphere, which represents the 5-dimensional space in which the preference rankings for 
the five policy options for the Bloomfield Track are plotted. Because we are interested 
in where her preferences have shifted from, the pre-deliberative rank is located at the 
centre of the sphere. The sphere is bounded by the maximum possible distance between 
any two rankings. That the distance between the ranks is large is reflected by the 
proximity of the post-deliberative rank to the edge of the sphere. 
The test for randomness of a preference shift involves taking the distance 
between pre and post-deliberative preferences and then finding all possible rankings of 
the five policy options that are equidistant from the pre-deliberative rank. The distance 
measure used for the test is Speannan distance.5 Using the example of Janine, the 
distance between her pre and post-deliberative ranks, shown by the line between the 
two points in Figure A6-5. (A description of what is meant by distance will follow 
shortly.) There are eight other possible ranks of the same distance from her pre-
deliberative preference, shown by the small stars in the figure. 
s Critchlow and Verducci (1992) use Kendall distance. However, when applied to the FNQCJ data the 
results could not be calculated for three jurors because the distances between the post-deliberative rank 
and those equidistant from the pre-deliberative rank were all the same. Consequently the standard 
deviation is zero, rendering the z statistic incalculable. This omission from the analysis of these jurors 
is significant, not least because one of those jurors, Snoopy, recorded the greatest magnitude in 
preference shift. This problem is avoided when Spearman distance is substituted. 
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Figure A6-5. Spatial representation of test for randomness of preference 
shift 
Kendal Distance = 4 (distance between post rank and dpre8 ) 
Kendal Distance = 2 (distance between post rank and dpre8) 
Kendal Distance = 8 (=distance between pre and post rank) 
Rank where distance from pre rank= distance between pre and post rank 
The probability distribution for the shift between pre and post-deliberative 
preferences is generated using these eight equidistant points. This is done by calculating 
the distance between these points and Janine's post-deliberative rank - which is shown 
by the curved lines in Figure A6-5, which are of varying length. The variation among 
these distances produces a standard error that can be used in deriving a z-statistic. The 
z-statistic is simply the original distance between pre and post-deliberative ranks, 
divided by the standard error. 
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Indeterminate Samples 
Jn some instances it may not be possible to derive a probability distribution for 
an individual sample. For example, take the first juror, Adventure, who has a pre 
rankingofx(adv) = {5, 4, 3, 2, I}' and post-deliberation rankingy(adv) = {5, 4, 3, 1, 2} '. 
Using Spearman distance6 we find d(x(advJ, yradv)) = 1. Using tables for distances 
between all possible rank orderings for m =5 we find three other ranks are the same 
distance dKen(x(advJ, /adv)) = 1, Q = { {45321}, {53421 }, {54231} }. The distances 
between these ranks and Adventure's second rank are all 2. While the difference 
between these and the actual distance between paired rankings produces a reasonably 
large ratio, they cannot be further analysed because s 1 = 0 and z 1 is undefined. 
Critchlow and Verducci (1992, p.20) suggest treating such cases as z; = 0. Three 
of the twelve jurors fall into this category leaving n• = 9. 
(b) Results 
The results of this analysis for the entire jury are reproduced in Table A6-l 0 
with significant values shaded and probability levels indicated by asterisks c• = p<0.05, 
0 
= p<0.01 , ...,.. = p<0.001). From the table it can be seen that the null hypothesis is 
falsified for four jurors. The average statistic z = 2.64, suggesting that the change in 
preference rank appear not to be due to random motion. 
6 See section A.6.1.2 for a description of Spearman distance 
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Eqidistant ranks Test for significance 
,,,~.w 
x; d(", w) • d(x, y) 
Jucor P,,,.J,Gb,,"""('/) d(x, y) J(ffi,y) d(w,y) s Z; 
ADV 54321 45321 53421 54231 54312 2.00 0.00 ot 
l 2 2 2 
ASW 43125 13Z.f5 14325 15234 21345 23154 23415 25143 25314 31254 31425 32514 12153 45132 45213 51243 51324 52413 53U2 54231 H~12 5.11 2.08 l.92 8 6 6 8 8 6 6 4 8 6 4 3 4 2 6 4 2 4 2 
BOA 53 124 24135 32145 34215 35124 41235 42153 42315 54231 45132 452/J 51243 51324 52413 53142 54312 4.57 l.70 l.77 
3 7 6 6 5 6 4 6 2 4 4 6 4 2 2 
JAN ~~-;~J 31.!51 ;2351 3,152 ,5321 513;1 5.!113 52•31 51132 3.2) J.04 7.73 
8 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 
KEI 43215 24135 32145 34215 35124 41235 42315 52134 54123 ot 53214 2.00 0.00 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
KOD 25143 13254 14235 14352 15324 15432 23145 25341 45231 32154 34125 34251 35214 43152 45123 54132 5.14 2.03 l.48 
3 7 4 9 5 7 5 7 5 3 7 3 5 3 2 
MAT 5 4213 35214 43215 45123 45312 54321 52314 53124 53412 54132 3.25 l.04 l.93 
2 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 
PEA 4321 5 13425 14235 15324 21435 23145 23514 25134 25-113 31245 31524 32154 42513 45123 45312 51234 51423 52143 53412 54132 5432 1 5.42 2. 14 l.87 
4 8 8 7 8 8 6 6 4 8 6 6 4 4 2 6 4 4 2 2 
RAS 43125 12345 1325-1 13425 15234 15324 21354 21435 235U 24153 25413 31524 35142 il253 42513 43512 45231 45312 51342 51423 53241 53412 5.19 2.36 54321 2.12 
5 10 8 8 6 6 8 8 6 6 4 6 4 6 4 3 2 2 4 4 2 2 
SNO 12345 45321 53421 54231 543 12 2.00 0.00 ot 
9 2 2 2 
25.Ul 12453 13254 13542 14235 14523 15324 24153 25134 25413 31452 32541 34521 42351 43152 43521 45123 45312 53241 54123 4.84 TAM 5432 1 6 6 6 6 6 4 6 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 2.03 1.97 4 8 8 8 
# = p < 0.05 
' 
= p < 0.01 
- =p < 0.00 1 
Table A6- l l. Results of test for trend toward idealised ranking 
Eqidistant ranks Test for significance 
Juror 
~-(<) ~IY! d(x, ).>. d(x,y) 
d(34 a) d(y, a) d( co, a) d( w, a) n s z; 
ADV 54321 54312 45321 53421 54231 
0 1 1 1 1 1.00 3 0.00 ot 
ASW 43125 54312 132/5 14325 15234 21345 23154 23415 25143 25314 31254 31425 32514 42153 45132 45213 51243 51J14 52413 53142 54231 
5 2 9 7 7 9 7 5 5 7 7 5 5 3 3 5 5 3 3 1 7 5.42 19 2.17 -1 .58 
. . 
• , • • • I 1 1 • , 
' . . - .. ' :::-:· 
JAN 14325 54321 34251 42351 34152 45321 5J:W 52143 52431 54132 
8 0 4 4 5 1 4 4 2 2 3.25 8 1.39 -2.34 
JUL 21435 53124 14352 15243 15432 23451 24153 24531 25134 25f13 34125 34512 35214 42351 43152 43511 51342 51143 52431 53412 54213 
9 4 6 6 4 6 6 4 6 4 6 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 2 4.21 19 1.47 -0.14 
KEI 43215 53214 24135 32145 34215 35124 41235 42315 52134 54123 
4 3 7 7 5 5 7 5 5 3 5.50 8 1.41 -1.77 
KOO 25143 45231 1325'( 14235 Jef352 15324 15432 23145 25341 32154 34125 34251 35214 43151 45123 54132 
5 2 8 8 6 6 4 8 4 6 6 4 4 4 4 2 5.29 14 1.86 -1.77 
MAT 5'1213 51321 35214 ~w; q;J2i ,5JI! 52JU ;3121 H112 51/Jl 
2 0 4 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 3.2'i 8 1.04 - 3.1-t 
RAS 431.25 543 21 12345 13254 13425 15234 15324 21354 21435 23514 24153 25413 31524 35142 41253 42513 43512 45231 45312 51342 51423 53241 53412 
5 0 10 8 8 7 6 8 8 6 6 4 6 4 6 4 3 2 2 4 4 2 2 5.24 21 2.39 -2.20 
SNO 12345 54312 45321 53421 54231 
JO I 1 1 1 1.00 3 0.00 Ot 
TAM 25341 54321 12453 13254 13542 14235 14523 15324 24153 25134 25413 31452 32541 34521 42351 43152 43521 45123 45312 53241 54123 
4 0 8 8 6 8 6 6 6 6 4 6 4 3 4 4 2 4 2 2 3 4.84 19 2.01 -2.42 
t Value for z set at zero due ro absence of variarion in the distribution of ranks equidistant from x. 
# = p < 0.05 = p < 0.01 
- = p<0.001 
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A.6.3.2. Test for trend in rank data 
The focus of the test developed by Critchlow and Verducci (1992) is not 
randomness of shifts in rank data, but whether there is a trend on which the post ranks 
tend to converge. It is noted in the discussion concerning shi ft in ranks in Chapter 5 that 
there appears to be a strong trend toward the mean ranking post deliberation. The 
following section performs a test for trends in the ranked data to determine if jurors 
tended toward a particular, idealised rank( a), in this case the modal rank vector post 
deliberation, or {5,4,3,2,1}'. 
(a) Critchlow and Verducci test for trend in ranked 
data. 
To test whether the changes in juror's preference have tended toward an 
idealised rank using Critchlow and Verducci ( 1992) a similar process is undertaken to 
that above, but instead using the distances between each jurors rankings and a = { 5, 4, 
3, 2, l}'. Analysis is conducted as for section A.6.3.1, but with the z statistic calculated 
on the distance from a. Results are shown in Table A6-l l. 
The estimated deviation from H0, z = 2: Z; /n. is, -2.28, which is significant at 
the level p<0.05 (one tail). The result suggests that there was a shift toward the post 
deliberation modal ranking that cannot be attributed to random changes to juror rankings. 
(b) Marden approach 
Marden (1995, p.104) also provides a method for testing for trends in paired 
ranks. One advantage of his approach is that it avoids the exclusion of data on the 
grounds of zero variance. The approach is similar to the calculation in section A.6.4.2 
for changes to paired rankings, except that z is set to d(y, a ) such that: 
Equation 5 . w; =d(x<il,a)-d(ylil,a) (cfEquation8) 
The average distances from a before and after deliberation are 23 .20 and 3.00 
respectively (see Table A6-13) Using Equation 5 we get w = 20.20. Using Equation 9 
we find that a(w) = 124.70 and t2 = 31.80, which compared to x; is large (p<0.001 ). 
A.6.3.3. Correlation between paired ranks 
Another way of investigating the relationships between the paired ranks is to 
examine the correlations between them. Correlation provides information pertaining to 
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the extent to which variation in one set of data can be explained for by another, or the 
extent to which two sets of data agree with one another. As for the preceding analysis, 
since the rank data is interval rather than scale it is not possible to use Pearson's 
correlation coefficient for investigating the relationship between paired ranks. Instead 
we will use Spearman' s rho. 1 Calculation of rho is obtained by: 
6°2d2 
Equation 6 . r, = 1- 2 ' n(n -1) 
where d is the difference in rank for policy option i and n is the number of 
policies. For example, take Adventure's before and after rankings {5,4,3,2,1} and 
{5,4,3,1,2}, with difference in rankings D = {0,0,01 ,l). Using Equation 6 gives rs = 
0.90. Table A6-12 below shows Spearman's rho for the paired ranks jurors. 
(a) Test for significance of correlation 
The two approaches used for testing significance in correlations for the Q sort 
data, F distribution and Fisher's Z (see Palumbo, 1977, pp.120-123; Brown, 1980, 
pp.279-288) are not applicable to the ranked preference data (Gibbons, 1993), which are 
restricted to nonparametric methods. Instead, the value for the normal statistic Z is 
calculated by: 
Equation 7. Z = r, ~ 
For the null hypothesis that there is no association between the paired ranks for 
a particular juror. The values for Z are provided in Table A6-12, along with the level of 
significance. From the table two of the 12 jurors show a statistically significant 
correlation between before and after ranks, one a positive correlation (Adventure), one 
negative (Snoopy), with Keith falling just short of the critical value for Z of 1.65. 
1 Speannan's rho is used in preference to Kendall's tau. The latter is more properly used where there are 
a large number of ties in the ranked data, which is not the case here (see Palumbo, 1977, pp.89-91). 
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Table A6-12. Test for Spearman's correlation between paired rankings 
Test for significance of correlation 
H 0 : p ;z'o HQ : p < 1 
Juror Pspear (x lOO) z probability z p roba bility 
ADV 90 1.80 0. 04 0.2 0 0 .4 2 
ASW 20 0.40 0. 34 1.60 0 .05 
BOA 40 0.80 0.21 1.20 0. 12 
JAN -60 -1. 2 0 0.12 3.20 0 .00 
JUL - 2 9 - 0. 5 8 0.38 2.5 8 0 .0 1 
KEI 80 1.60 0.05 0.4 0 0 .34 
KOD 50 1.00 0.16 1.00 0 .1 6 
MAT 70 1.40 0.24 0.60 0.27 
PEA 0 0.00 0.50 2.00 0 .02 
RAS - 1 0 -0.20 0.42 2.20 0.0 1 
SNO - 9 0 -1. 80 0.04 3.80 <. 0002 
TAM 30 0.60 0.27 1.40 0 .08 
A.6.4. TEST FOR CHANGE IN PREFERENCE 
ORDERINGS ACROSS THE GROUP 
A.6.4.I. T-test using Distance from Centre 
The approach of using a paired t-test to test of significance of difference in centre 
rank is diagrammatically represented in Figure A6-6. The figure shows two axes, along 
which individual preferences for two options (x and y) are plotted. The pre-deliberative 
plots are shown as stars and post-deliberative preferences are plotted as dots. The pre-
deliberative plots depict a tendency to give options x and y low ranks compared those 
shown for post-deliberation. These two groups of preferences are significantly 
different, which is represented in the diagram, the two spheres that bound the pre and 
post-deliberative plots respectively do not overlap. Thus, the statistical test for 
significant change to group preference in effect examines the extent to which each of the 
two groups are different to each other (spatially separated). 
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Figure A6-6. Diagrammatic representation of test for preference shift 
among the jury 
,' 
The null hypothesis, that jury preference did not change during deliberation (that 
is, that the paired ranks of jurors have the same distribution in m dimensional space), 
was tested using the centre rank (see section A.6.2.5 above) for the pre and post-
deliberative stages in the same way that an average is used in a standard t-test for 
differences between means. 
The probability distribution for the test is derived in the same way as for the 
test in section A.6.5. l for dispersion from the centre. From Table A6-13, the standard 
error for the distributions are SE(d(x,x))= 2.41 and SE(d(y,y))= 1.48 and SEx.y = 
2.83. Thedistancebetweenthecentreranks dspear(x,y) =7.50and z=d(x,y)/SEx,y = 
2.65 (p < 0.01). 
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Thus it appears that the pre and post-deliberative centre ranks are significantly 
different. 
A .6.4.2. Marden Test for difference using Paired Rankings 
Marden (1995, pp.103-4) provides method for analysis of paired rankings by 
the same judge before and after some treatment (in this case participation in the 
FNQCJ), which tests the null hypothesis that the distance between ranks is zero. 
Using data (xm,y<u), to represent the ranking of policy options where x(iJ is the 
pre-deliberative policy raking of juror i and /iJ is their post-deliberative ranking of the 
same policy options. 
The assumptions include: 
• random quantity (X,Y) E Sm: that paired ranks are vectors in the subspace 
defined by Sm, which consists of all possible ranks. 
• pairs are independent and identically distributed. (ie. that one juror's 
ranking did not effect another's '. Not necessarily independent within pairs 
such that pre and post-deliberative ranks may be causally related!) 
The approach involves transforming the ranked data on some statistic, z, which 
is used to find the parameter w using Equation 8. 
Equation 8. w = _!_ ~ wi, w; = z(x(iJ)- z(y(i)). 
n i -1 
The covariance of w is estimated by Equation 9. 
1 " Equation 9. i:(w) = --2: (w1 - W)(w1 - W)' 
n -1 i - 1 
Using the inverse of i:, the statistic I' is calculated using: 
Equation 10. T2 = nw'i:-1(w)W, which is asymptotic on x;. 
For evaluating the difference between paired ranks Marden (1995) uses the z 
statistic z(y) = ( y1U>, .. ., y~~1 ) for x(l) and y m, or the rank data with the final rank omitted. 
Analysing the rank data elicited from the jurors, average rankings before and after 
the FNQCJ are respectively {3.25, 3.33, 2.17, 2.42, 3.92}' and {4.92, 3.92, 2.50, 1.92, 
1.75}'. Taking the difference between the first four options we find w'= {-1.67, -0.58, 
-0.33, 0.50}. 
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To test w, the covariance is calculated using Equation 9, which generates the 
following 4x4 matrix. 
i:(w) = 
2.24 0 .21 -0.88 -1 .36 
0.21 0 .81 -0.21 -0.32 
-0.88 -0.21 1 .88 0.64 
-1.36 -0 .32 0.64 1.91 
The inverse i: -1 was calculated using the MATRIX command INV m 
SPSS( version 10), which results in the following matrix. 
0 .86 0.05 0.22 0.55 
0 .05 1.33 0.10 0 .22 
0 .22 0.10 0.66 -0 .05 
0 .55 0 .22 -0 .05 0.9 7 
Using Equation 10 fl= 69.49, which has a probability p<0.001. Thus the null 
hypothesis is rejected and we find that the two sets of ranks for the jurors appear 
significantly different before and after deliberation. 2 
A.6.5. MEASURES OF DISTRIBUTION, 
CONCORDANCE AND CONSENSUS 
A.6.5.1. Distribution from Centre 
One approach to measuring the spread of ranks about the centre is to use the 
average distances cited above. Another is to reduce the figures to mimic a correlation 
coefficient for all ranks to the centre by the equation (Marden, 1995, p.23): 
Equation 11. r(w) = 1- d(w) 
Do 
Where c50 is the population average distance from the centre for all possible 
ranks, (<50 = 20, m = 5) (Marden, 1995,p.77), such that if the average (Spearman) 
distance is 20, the, the ranks are uniformly distributed about the centre. The results for 
2 A major weakness with this finding, however, is the small sample size and the use of chi-square for the 
statistic. Palumbo (1977), warns against the use of chi-square for sample sizes less than n = 50. 
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average distance the centre are provided in Table A6-13, as are results for tests for 
significance. 
Table A6-13. Average distance from the centre 
Jurors Average Standard error of 
d istance from distance Centre 
Rank cen rre from centre z 
Stage (J) ADVASWBOAJANJULKEIKODMATPEARASSNOTAM '7(x,ciJ) SEJ..d(x ,w)) H, :a, (x,o)) = O 
PRE 34125 24 2 6 8 18 4 10 10 4 2 16 26 10.83 2.405 4.504 
POST 12345 2 2 2 0 14 14 4 0 0 a 2 O 3.33 1.484 2.246 
The z values in the right hand column of Table A6-l 3 indicate the significance 
levels of the distance of the population mean and correlation from zero. The levels are 
significant in all cases, indicating that, although there is a measure of clustering about the 
centre in both pre and post deliberation ranks, there is also spread from the centre (ie. 
there is not a distinct consensus). However, the amount of spread has decreased 
dramatically between pre and post deliberation, difference in spread is 7.50. Combining 
the standard errors for the distances we get SE1,3 = 2.83 and z = 2.65 (df = n- 1 ), 
indicating that there has been a significant decrease in spread at the 0.01 confidence level. 
Therefore, there seems to be more agreement among jurors on the centre rank following 
deliberation than before. 
Marden (1995, p.58) provides a slightly different method for testing uniformity 
based on the chi distribution using the statistic: 
2 12n 11- ""112 2 2 Equation 12. Tn = ( I) y- Y , where Tn ---7 Xm-1 as n ---7 00 
mm+ 
Where y and ~are the average and centre ranks. Using the values calculated 
above, the values for T2 are 23.04 and 3.99 for pre and post deliberation stages 
respectively, which fall into the probabilities >0.001 and 0.05 respectively, which are 
similar to the probabilities for z in Table A6-13. 
A.6.5.2. Concordance 
Instead of using the average distance from a modal rank, another approach is to 
find the average distance between all ranks in a sample. The distances between juroris 
pre and post deliberation ranks are provided in Table A6-14. 
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Table A6-14. Pre-deliberative Spearman distances 
Pee Deliberation Post Deli be ration 
ADV ASW BOA JAN JUL KEI KOO MAT PEA RAS SNO TAM ADV ASW BOA JAN JUL KEI KOO MAT PEA RAS SNO TAM 
22 14 32 38 20 22 20 22 40 14 0 6 
22 2 14 16 2 16 8 2 0 18 32 0 6 
14 22 22 4 18 4 4 2 26 30 6 
32 14 22 14 12 14 22 12 14 22 2 
38 16 22 14 18 24 32 18 16 2 32 10 10 12 
20 2 12 18 22 6 0 2 20 34 10 10 12 
22 16 18 14 24 22 20 22 16 18 8 8 8 2 
6 4 20 36 6 20 R 34 24 2 2 
20 2 4 12 18 22 6 2 20 34 2 2 
22 0 2 14 16 2 16 8 18 32 2 2 
40 18 26 8 2 20 18 34 20 18 26 0 6 
14 32 30 22 32 34 2 4 34 32 26 2 
The average Spearman distance between ranks are 
5.45. Variance is calculated using Equation 13. 
E . • ~n-D quation 13. Var( a)= 3 Var(d(em -y) 
n 
Where em is the population mean distance ( e,. = 80 ) 
2 10 10 8 2 2 0 
2 10 10 8 2 2 0 
12 12 2 2 6 
14 14 4 0 0 
14 0 16 14 14 14 10 
14 0 16 14 14 14 10 
4 16 16 4 4 4 
0 14 14 0 
0 14 14 0 0 2 
0 14 14 0 2 
2 10 10 2 2 l 
0 14 14 0 0 
17.03 and -y a Spear 
The resulting 95% confidence intervals for average distance between juror ranks 
is shown below: 
upper 
lower 
Pre 
23.61 
10.45 
Post 
8 .82 
2 .09 
As for distance from the centre rank above, there is no overlap between the 
intervals at the 95% confidence level. Moreover, the result also finds that there remains 
some level of discordance at the post-deliberative stage, since the 95% CI is greater than 
zero. 
More interesting than discordance is a test to see it jurors increased concordance 
during deliberation, for which Marden (Marden, 1995, p.88) suggests the normalisation 
of average distance to produce a correlation coefficient, in a similar fashion to that in 
Equation 11, using the maximum possible average distance ~ = 20, so that R2 = 0 
denotes uniformity. Thus R2 for pre deliberation ranks is 1-17.03/20 = 0.15 and pos t 
deliberation 1-5.45/20 = 0.73. As for distances, the variance is calculated using Equation 
13. Using the standard error SE = ~Var(R2) (Marden, 1995, p.90), we get SEx = 0.059 
and SEy = 0.0302 and 95% confidence intervals {0.28, 0.02} and {0.79, 0.66} 
respectively. Which do not overlap, such that it appears that concordance has increased 
significantly during deliberation, but not quite reaching complete consensus. It is also 
2 
2 
2 
0 
14 
14 
4 
0 
0 
0 
2 
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noteworthy that concordance for pre deliberation rankings is only just greater than zero, 
suggesting that the distribution of ranks in nearly uniform. Very similar results are 
obtained using Kendallis coefficient of concordance (see Gibbons, 1993). 
A.6.5.3. Formal Measures of Consensus 
(a) Modal Rank 
For a given distribution of ranks Y; E sm(Where Sm denotes all possible ranks 
with strong preference ordering), a rank ro is the modal ranking if it has a higher 
probability than any other (Marden, 1995, p.136). 
At the pre-deliberative stage, the distribution of ranks is disperse, with ten 
unique orderings; two of which {STA,MAI,UPG,BIT,CLO} and {MAI, STA, UPG, 
BIT, CLO} have frequenciesf(j/) = 2. 
At the post-deliberative stage, there are only five unique orderings and a unique 
modal ordering { CLO,MAI,ST A, UPG,BIT}. 
(b) Strong Unimodality 
Strong unimodality occurs when the density of ranks decreases as the ranking 
become farther from the mode, or with respect to a partial ordering<., ro <. y<. z, fly)> 
j{z). 
Which can be interpreted as a decreasing frequency of rankings with increasing 
distance from the centre rank 6J. Unimodality for pre and post deliberation preference 
orderings can be ascertained from the histograms in Figure A6-7 and Figure A6-8 for pre 
and post-deliberative ranks respectively. The histograms plot the frequency of policy 
rankings at vanous distance from the centre rank. Where 
x = {MAI,STA,BIT,UPG,CLO} and j> = {CLO,MAI,STA,UPG,BIT} (see section 
A.6.2.5 above). 
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Figure A6-7. Distribution of Pre-deliberative Ranks from Centre 
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Figure A6-8. Distribution of Post-deliberative Ranks from Centre 
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It can be seen from the figures that neither pre nor post-deliberative rankings are 
strongly unimodal, although post-deliberative ranks are more unimodal than for pre-
deliberation. 
. 
{c) Marginal Stochastic Ordering 
An set of m options are marginally stochastically ordered if the marginal 
distributions (see section A.6.2.1) are unique for each option and for any k, 
P(t; s k]~P(Y2 sk]~ ... ~P(r;,, sk] (Marden, 1995, p.137). 
Table A6-l5 shows the workings ofMSO, where each of the columns shows the 
probability that a given option will yield a score of k or less. 
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Table A6-15. Marginal Stochastic ordering of policy options 
Pre-deliberation Post-deli bera ti on 
P[Yi s k] P[ Yi~k] 
Option I 2 3 4 5 Ordering I 2 3 4 5 Ordering 
BIT 0 .17 0.42 0.42 0.75 0 0 0 0 .08 5 
UPG 0.08 0. 17 0. 5 8 0.8 3 0 0 0 . 17 0 .92 4 
STA 0.33 0 .58 1 0.17 0.33 3 
MAI 0.2 5 0.67 0.67 1 0.25 0.83 2 
CLO 0.17 0. 17 0.33 0.42 0.58 0.83 0 .83 I 
Working backwards, all options will always have an average of rank less than or 
equal to 5. From the pre-deliberative ranks, Closure least likely to have a rank of four or 
less, followed by Bitumenise and Upgrade with Stabilise and Bitumenise equally 
unlikely. The same order is achieved fork = 3. However, the order of Bitumenise and 
Upgrade reverses fork = 2, therefore there is no MSO. The post-deliberative MSO is 
{CLO, MAI, STA, UPG, BIT} 
(d) Consensus Ordering 
Moreover, it satisfies the condition in Equation 14 for consensus ranking 
(Marden, 1995, p.137), 
Equation 14. P[Y; < Yjlyk = rk, for all k.., i, j] > 0.5, where i > j, 
(e) Complete consensus 
The existence of complete consensus suggest a number of important features 
attributable to the set of ranks, including strong unimodility (see section A.6.5.1) and 
that a real consensus exists (Marden, 199 5, p .13 8 
There is complete consensus about the consensus ordering if for all i <j 
for all sets of ranks rk. 
The interpretation of this is that for any juror whose rank for option I or j is not 
the same as for the consensus rank, there is a majority who still prefer i to j. 
Sea:ion: A6.5 Measures of Distribution, Concordan:e mi Com:nsus 
The calculations of complete consensus for post-deliberative preferences are 
shown in Table A6- l 6. 
Table A6-16. Post-deliberative complete consensus 
Option 
Option CLO MAI STA UPG BIT 
CLO 
Q 
.. 
MAI 0.29 
"';! 
.. 
.. STA 0.78 0.43 .. 
~ 
.. 
.. UPG 0.67 1.00 0.67 Cl., 
~ BIT I. 00 1.00 1. 00 0 .67 
From Table A6-16 it can be seen that post-deliberative preferences do not 
yield complete consensus. This is because, although there is consensus among the 
group that Closure>Status Quo, and Status Quo>Stabilise, there is not complete 
consensus on these orderings. 
(j) Findings 
Table A6-17. Summary of findings 
Pre Post 
Dimension deliberation deliberation 
Modal rank x ./ 
Consensus Ordering ,/ ,/ 
Marginal Stochastic 
ordering 
j[ ,/ 
Strong Unimodality j[ j[ 
Complete consensus j[ j[ 
In summary, the results of that analysis reveal that, although consensus has 
increased according to at least one criteria (marginal stochastic ordering), post-
deliberative preferences do not constitute 'complete consensus' (ie. there is still a 
significant level of dissensus). Importantly however, although there is not complete 
consensus for all orderings, there is complete consensus for a number of partial 
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orderings. The strongest of these is consensus on the fourth and fifth ranking for 
Upgrade and Bitumenise respectively. There is also strong consensus on preference for 
Closure over Stabilisation. For an explanation see Marden (1995, pp.136-8). 
APPENDIX 7 STRUCTURATION OF 
A.7.1. 
PREFERENCES 
PREFERENCE STRUCTURATION AND SINGLE 
PEAKEDNESS 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is possible to gain some insight into the influences 
on the preferences of the jurors participating in the FNQCJ without use of the 
subjectivity data by investigating the extent to which preferences were structured along 
an issue 'dimensions'. If there is a particular dimension dominating an issue then 
preferences may tend to organised around the issue. Take for example the issue of Level 
of Access afforded by the Bloomfield Track, which was discussed in Chapter 8. The 
Level of Access ordering {BIT, UPG, STA, MAI, CLO} organises policy options from 
most to least vehicular access afforded along the Bloomfield Track. If the dimension of 
level of access is dominant for the Bloomfield Track issue, then preference orderings 
should reflect this. For example, an individual who favours high levels of access should 
tend to most prefer bituminisation. 
Single peakedness is illustrated m Figure A 7-9 using the example of the 
Bloomfield Track. The policy options are ordered in the same manner as has been used 
to report preference ranks in this thesis. Using the same rationale discussed in Chapter 
7, the ordering {BIT, UPG, STA, MAI, CLO} reflects the issue dimension of ' level of 
access'; that is, the amount of vehicle use that would result from its implementation.' 
The preference order of the remaining options then descend along decreasing 
levels of access, represented by preference profile A. The converse case where an 
individual prefers minimum access is represented by profile E. The intermediate cases 
(B, C, D) occur where individuals most prefer something between maximum and zero 
levels of access, the remaining preferences. Preferences can be said to be single peaked 
on this issue dimension if the plot of each preference ordering results in a single-peaked 
1 This is not to say that it is the only issue dimension that would lead to structuration along this 
preference ordering. 
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curve. Such is the case for each of the hypothetical preference plots {A, B, C, D} m 
Figure A7-9. Conversely, the preference plot Eis not single peaked. 
Figure A7-9. Single Peaked Preferences along 'level of access' issue 
dimension 
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The implications of structuration of preferences, or "single peakedness" was 
first identified by Black (1948). The implication of single peaked preferences is that, 
irrespective of preference orderings (with the domain of all possible orderings that are 
single peaked on an issue dimension) a stable (Condorcet) winner is always the outcome. 
This is in contrast to an outcome that is cyclical, or intransitive, thus unstable.2 Where 
all preferences are single peaked along an issue dimension, and there is an odd number of 
2 For example, an outcome where the outcome of voting on three object (x, y, z) yields and outcome 
where xis preferred toy; y is preferred to z; and z is preferred to x such that no clear winner emerges. 
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voters, the Condorcet winner is the median peak (Black, 1948; Riker, 1982, p.126).3 
The emergence of a clear winner contrasts with Arrow (1963), whose "paradox of 
voting" has captured an entire discipline dedicated to finding mechanisms whereby 
stable democratic rule (by voting) is possible. Thus, preference structuration is one, but 
not the only, escape route providing stable outcomes. A reasonable level of 
structuration (75%) dramatically decreases the likelihood of a stable, transitive outcome 
(Niemi, 1969). 
An emerging proposition from among the literature searching for escape routes 
from Arrow's paradox of voting is that deliberation can encourage agreement about the 
dimensions about a particular issue, giving rise to stable, transitive outcomes. The idea 
was first proposed by (Miller, 1992), and developed by Dryzek and List (200 l ). They 
speculate on mechanisms that might lead to increased preference structuration where a 
single issue din1ension may come to dominate, possibly in the form of 'generalizable 
interests'. The posit that such interests are more likely to emerge in deliberative 
processes (that satisfy four criteria) where positions must be defended as in the public 
interest. 
A.7.1.1. Case Study The Deliberative Poll on an Australian 
Republic 
The hypothesis of Dryzek and List (2001) has been subjected to some empirical 
testing using data obtained from deliberative polls by McLean et al (2000) using, inter 
alia, an 'index of singlepeakedness'.4 From three deliberative polls that were analysed to 
ascertain increases in structuration, McLean et al found an increased level of 
structuration for two. The third Poll, on the issue of whether to change Australia's 
constitution to a Republic, found high levels of structuration before and after 
deliberation. I would suggest that the reason for this concerns the (symbolic) nature of 
the issue in the public domain before the deliberative process began. I will briefly make 
the case in the following discussion, before revisiting it once the analysis of the FNQCJ 
data has been performed. 
3 A Condorcet winner is an option that is preferred to all others by a majority of voters. See Appendix 
6, section A.6.2.3 for a more detailed explanation. 
4 In simple terms, the index is the maximum ratio of individuals with single peaked preferences within 
the sample population. 
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{a) The Impact of Symbolic Politics on Preference 
Structuration: Tentative Mechanisms 
McLean et al (2000) recognise that most participants began to the conference 
with well formed preferences because of the salience of the issue, where non-salient 
issues tend to produce poor structure (Converse, 1964). The issue was salient in 
participants minds, and therefore preferences tended to be well structured. However, 
McLean et al. appear to equate salience with information. 
A contrary position is argued here, that the observed pre-deliberative data can be 
accounted for by the dynamics that I have described as symbolic politics. Under these 
mechanisms, structuration of pre-deliberative preferences was not a product of 
information in a general sense, but the dissemination of a certain type of information 
disseminated by interests designed to invoke maximal subjective response to their favour 
- in short, symbolic information in a discursive environment of symbolic politics. 
A brief outline of the evidence for symbolic politics dominating the Republican 
issue is as follows. At the time of the deliberative poll, the Australian Republic issue 
was deliberately (as opposed to deliberatively) polarised issue - perhaps even more so 
than for the Bloomfield Track and certainly on a larger, national, scale. The Monarchist-
Direct Election alliance had successfully captured the public imagination, polarising the 
issue along the dimension of 'should one trust politicians to choose the head of state' by 
portraying Republicans favouring the appointment model as 'elitist' (Irving, 2000, 
p.112). The resulting outcome, in terms of preferences, is one where posturing and 
pique give rise to the wrong peak! In section A.7.2.2 I will explore these processes 
more fully, once I have analysed the data from the FNQCJ. 
A.7.2. ANALYSIS OF SINGLE PEAKEDNESS FOR THE 
FNQCJ DATA 
I will now adopt the approach to analysis of preferences using structuration, as 
discussed above, to the policy preference data from the FNQCJ. 
Following from Dryzek and List (2001) and McLean et al (2000) a population of 
preferences (n) can be said to be single peaked to the extent that there is some rank 
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ordering w' for which the number of individuals with single peaked preferences is at a 
maximum, i,,,ax or 
max { # x;jx; is single peaked} 
Where x; is the ranking of policy options along w'. 5 
The index of single peakedness then is simply the ratio of i,,,ax to n. 
The most onerous task in determining the index of single peakedness is to find 
w'. Where McLean et al (2000) performed the task, analysing populations in the 
hundreds, using a computational algorithm, the small sample (and strong preference 
ordering, or absence of tied ranks) means that it is possible here to perform the task 
manually. This was done by graphing the preferences of jurors on various rank 
orderings. Rather than perform the task for the entire population of possible orderings, 
ml = 120, permutations within 2 Kendall distances of the aggregate outcomes listed in 
section A.6.1. The findings for changes to "simple structuration" on the FNQCJ 
preferences data is summarised in Table A7-18with the number of single peaks for juror 
preferences indicated for four preferences profiles. 
A.7.2.1. Results 
Table A7-18. Preference structucation of pre and post-deliberative ranks 
Preference Profile 
Integrative Do a Lot or Do 
Level of A<"(':CU Irrel evant Pufucnce Little 
BIT. UPC. STA. MAL CLO UPC. STA. MAL CLO. BIT UP G. MAL CLO. ST A. BIT UPC. MAL STA. BIT. CLO 
fur o r Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Poa:t 
ADV ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
ASW ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
BOA ,/ ,/ ,/ 
JAN ,/ ,/ ,/ 
JUL ,/ ,/ ,/ 
KE! ./ ,/ 
KOO ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
MAT ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
PEA ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
,AS ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
W) ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
TAM ,/ ,/ ,/ ,/ 
Tota.I 
single 9 l 0 3 l 0 2 I 0 5 l 
peak.! 
5 Say for example that we are analysing structuration along a preference ordering reflecting positions 
between Bitumenise and Closure, using the ordering set out in Table 7-2 (page 214), or 
w' = {CLO,MAI,STA,UPG,BIT} and individual with a preference ordering of 
{BJT,UPG,STA,MAI,CLO} results in a preference ranking x1 = {5,4,3,2,1}. 
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The results for simple structuration lead to similar findings to the final case 
study in McLean et al (2000). Overall, there appears not to have been a marked increase 
in the level of preference structuration between pre and post-deliberative rankings. The 
profile 'Level of Access' is dominant at the pre-deliberative stage, with 9112 of jurors 
preferences single peaked on that profile. Structuration on this profile has only 
marginally increased at the post-deliberative stage (10/12), which is still the maximum 
number of peaks for all possible profiles. However, it is not the only profile yielding 
this level of structuration. Two others also produce ten single peaks, though not for the 
same set of jurors (see Table A 7-18). 
The hypothesis that deliberation induces preference structuration is confounded 
by the high level of structuration at the outset of the FNQCJ. One clue to the high level 
of structuration is related to the discussion pertaining to symbolic politics. Recall from 
Chapter 7 that Symbolic attitudes seemed to be a product of two extremes of the issue 
spectrum weighing on the mind of jurors at the outset of deliberation. It is probably not 
by accident that these two positions represent respectively each end of the Level of 
Access preference profile. If, as intended by their various proponents, such arguments 
shaped the issue in the public sphere-succeeding in political contest by setting the 
agenda (Long and Rose-Ackerman, 1982). The result of such an issue environment is to 
produce structuration, but also high levels of disagreement among individuals, as can be 
seen in Figure A 7-10, which plots jurors pre-deliberative preferences along the 'Level of 
Access' profile, which it has been argued above dominates the issue because of polarised 
and symbolic politics. 
In Figure A 7-10 there are ten unique pre-deliberative preference orderings among 
jurors. By the post-deliberative stage this is reduced to five (Figure A 7-11 ). This 
observation by itself dramatically increases the probability of structuration simply 
because it lowers the probability that there exists some preference ordering that does not 
fit that issue dimension. Indeed, this probably explains why there is not one, but three 
equally dominant issue dimensions. 
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Figure A7-10. Pre-deliberative preferences on Level of Access profile 
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Figure A7-l 1. Post-deliberative preferences on Level of Access profile 
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Overall, it appears that the findings support something between what Dryzek & 
List (2001) and Elster (1986a, p.112) respectively assert that deliberation leads to 
increased preference structuration and increased consensus.33 From the evidence found 
in the preference data of the FNQCJ, deliberation appears to give rise to both increasing 
levels of structuration (at least in the absence of the influence of symbolic politics) and 
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consensus. Yet, it does not lead to perfect agreement in either. One way in which these 
dynamics might better be described concerns the exploration of the way in which 
preferences were structured before deliberation (under symbolic politics) as well as 
following deliberation. In the following discussion I will explore the arguments. 
A.7.2.2. Symbolic Politics, Deliberation and Preference 
Structuration 
If it is indeed reasonable to assert that the highly structured nature of juror pre 
deliberation preferences is a result of highly polarised, symbolic politics, then what of 
those individuals who were found to be influenced by both poles of the issue; that is, 
those who were significantly loaded on the Propitiatism factor? As was first noted in 
Chapter 66, such a subjective position does not easily translate into a coherent 
preference ranking of the policy options available because it requires trading off 
seemingly irreconcilable tensions. 
Some evidence of what did happen to those jurors can be found in Table A 7-18. 
It turns out that, at the pre-deliberative stage, those jurors who did not have single peaks 
on the issue dimension of 'Level of Access' comprise three of the five who were also 
significantly loaded on the Propitiatism subjective factor. One explanation for this 
observation might be that, in seeking to reconcile seemingly irreconcilable tensions, 
Propitiatists' preferences depart from issue polarisation to issue integration. At the 
very least Propitiatism creates issue dissonance such that it is not possible to view the 
issue as a simple one of level of access. 
As it turns out, Propitiatists tend form single peaked preferences along the 
preference dimension labelled in {UPG, MAI, STA, BIT, CLO}, which is the last 
profile in Figure A7-10. Rather than polarise the issue between Closure and Bitumenise, 
this issue dimension is polarised between those options that involve minor, or no 
adjustments to the status quo with those that will bring a major change. With the 
6 Section 6.3.2(d). 
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disappearance of Propitiatism by the post-deliberative stage, so too went the preference 
profile, apart from Koda.7 
Although the issue polarisation may account for preference structuration (as well 
as lack of structuration) at the outset of deliberation in the FNQCJ, it does not explain 
the level of structuration at its conclusion. Nevertheless, despite the evidence so far, 
Dryzek and Lists'(2001) hypothesis may still hold. Once the symbolic claims that 
drew the 'battle lines' and created issue structure had dissipated, that effect alone might 
be expected to confuse the issue, resulting in a decline in structuration. Yet structuration 
increased following deliberation, if only marginally. Deliberation, having destroyed 
existing structure, may have contributed to increased structuration along the lines that 
they propose. 
If anything, the number of issue dimensions has increased during deliberation. In 
addition to the first profile (Level of Access) there are two other profiles, shown in 
Table A 7-18, that have similar levels of structuration at the post-deliberative stage, but 
little before deliberation. Indeed, there appears to be not one issue dimension that 
dominates post-deliberative preferences. 
Evidence from the Q sorts in the previous chapter also suggest that generalizable 
interests - such as future generations and ecological sustainability-were uppermost at 
the outset of deliberation, not emergent during the process. Indeed, in terms of 
subjectivity, there was a reasonable level of agreement on the broad issues pertaining to 
the Bloomfield Track- as measured by the Q sorts; at least those sorts of issues, such 
as ecological sustainability and future generations that might have claim to being 
generalizable interests. 
7 Interestingly, although no longer loaded on Propitiatism at the post-deliberative stage, Koda was 
instrumental to the discourse that took a risk averse approach to the scientific data, thereby contending 
that the fringing coral reefs could still indeed be under threat, although the scientific data does not 
support the conclusion. Thus, it is plausible that Koda ranked her preference rankings along this issue 
dimension with a view to addressing the reef issue. 
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These changes to preference structuration do not appear so much a product of 
increased consensus on generaliz.able interests. Rather, it appears to be a product of 
increased consensus among preferences. This increased preference consensus is the 
subject of discussion in the following section, but it can be demonstrated easily by 
comparing individual preference profiles on the level of access issue dimension in Figure 
A 7-10 and Figure A 7-11 showing pre and post-deliberative profiles respectively. 
APPENDIX 8 COMBINED ANALYSIS OF 
SUBJECTIVITY AND 
PREFERENCE 
In this section I will begin the process of testing the hypotheses that preference 
construction and subjective transformation during deliberation contributed to the 
preference shifts observed in Chapter 7. This will be done using the subjective (Q sort) 
and preference data across the jury as an undifferentiated set. 'Undifferentiated' refers 
to the fact that it does not use the subjective factors that were extracted from the data in 
Chapter 6. These will be introduced to the analysis in the section that follows. 
Following the investigation of the roles subjective-preference construction and 
subjective transformation in changing preferences, attention is turned to exploring any 
trends in changes to the subjective-preference landscape as a prelude to analysis using 
the four subjective factors. Finally, the findings so far are summarised before moving on 
to this next stage of analysis. 
A.8.1. PREFERENCE OUTPUTS FROM THE FOUR 
SUBJECTIVE FACTORS AND THEIR 
TRANSFORMATION 
This section focuses on subjective-preference dynamics through the lens of the 
four subjective factors extracted in Chapter 6 in the anticipation that they will assist in 
teasing out the discursive landscape contributing to pre-deliberative preferences, and 
changes to it that transformed preferences. And well they should. The subjective were 
extracted on this very basis, using the process of judgemental rotation outlined in 6.2.6. 
The discussion begins with analysis to elucidate preferences that are 
intersubjectively associated with each of the four subjective factors. This will be done 
for both pre and post-deliberative stages. The level of change to these ranks during 
deliberation is then examined. In the discussion that follows, the reasons for these 
changes, and the relative role of each subjective factor in the formation of preferences are 
Ai:prriix 8: Combirfil ArnlysisofSubjectivity an:i Prefererre 
explored. Insights into subjective-preference dynamics that result from this process will 
be highlighted and the implications for the reasoned-action model discussed. 
A.8.1.1. Associating Preferences with Subjective Factors: 
Calculation of Factor Preference Ranks 
The four subjective factors extracted in Chapter 6 represent archetypal 
subjective positions extracted from jurors Q sorts using judgemental rotation to 
maximise the observed difference in subjectivity between different preference types. 
Each subjective factor was then described using principally the factor scores, or ranking 
of Q statements that characterised them. In Chapter 6 these factor scores were 
compared to descriptions of species that were identified during the survey of a given 
area. To extend the analogy, 1 now wish to explore the output of each 'species' in terms 
of preference, much as a botanist might observe the changing colour of leaves through 
the seasons in their patch of forest. So far l have only explored the overall change 
among the subjective species as a collective, using a few individual examples to draw out 
possible trends. ln the following discussion I will focus primarily on changes associated 
explicitly with these subjective species in terms of preference output at different stages 
deliberation. 
These preference outputs associated with each of the subjective factors will be 
referred to as Factor Preference Ranks (FPR). The calculation of FPR is represented in 
Figure A8-12, which is a variation of Figure 6-1. The method for calculating FPR is 
essentially the same as that used to determine the factor scores for the subjective 
factors, as described in Brown (1980, pp.239-41) - with the difference that pre and 
post-deliberative FPRs are calculated separately, whereas the scores for subjective 
factors were calculated across all deliberative stages. I 
The first part of Figure A8-12 (step 3 of the original figure) depicts the 
preference driven judgemental rotation used to extract the four factors in Chapter 6 such 
that factors were rotated to maximise the differences between jurors with different 
preference positions. Post-deliberative preferences were given greatest priority when 
conducting factor rotation because it was assumed that these preferences would be 
better constructed. It was also done because of a desire to use the changes to FPR 
1 This was done because I am not interested in how the species change. The aim is to keep these 
constant and investigate changes to both their abundance and their preference output. 
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between deliberative stages to examine the subjective-preference dynamics during 
deliberation, which will be explained in more detail as the discussion continues. 
Two preference positions are represented in Figure A8-12 as the two clusters of 
individual plots. Position 1 represents a 'pro Closure' preference ranking. The second 
represents a group of jurors who prefer Bituminisation of the Bloomfield Track. In step 
3 of the factor extraction process the existing factors, represented by the factor axes, 
have been rotated so that Position 1 and Position 2 lie along the new Factor 1' and 
Factor 2'.2 
The process of calculating each FPR is represente.d by the 'FPR Calculation' 
stage of Figure A8-12. In short the FPR for a given subjective factor is determined by 
all jurors in proportion to how strongly loaded they are on that factor. For example, 
Juror l in the figure is strongly loaded on subjective factor I ', so will have a strong 
influence on the FPRI. By contrast, Juror 12 is only weakly loaded on SFl, but is 
strongly loaded on SF2, such that FPR2 will more strongly reflect her preference. 
Figure AB-12. Derivation of Factor Preference Rank 
Stc ;i 3 
JtJdgtnenta1 Rota!1011 
Step 4 
F<Ic.tor lnlt"i-pr~?IJtion FPR Calcuation 
{5 , 4. 3. 2 , 1} 
(1, 2, 3 .•• 5} 
Juror 11 00 
Juror20 75 
Jwor1-100 
Jtiror2 ·0.75 
JUf"Of 121,00 
That the FPRs should reflect the preference position of the jurors who were 
used to rotate the subjective factors in step 3 of factor extraction is represented in Figure 
A8-12 by the arrow linking the group of jurors with the resulting FPR. The degree to 
which each juror's actual preference agrees with the FPR is represented by the 'factor 
preference loading', also shown in the right-hand side of the figure. 
2 For a good description of this process, see Brown (1993). 
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A.8.1.2. Factor Preference Ranks and Changes between 
Deliberative Stages 
The resulting pre and post-deliberative calculation of FPR from the previous 
section for each of the four subjective factors are shown in Table A8-19. It can be seen 
that that there are indeed differences in FPR between deliberative stages, but there are 
also a number of important similarities, depending on perspective from which the two 
ranks are compared. 
Table AB-19. Factor preference ranks 
Factor Preference Rank (FPR) 
Option l'RfS PRAG OPT SYM 
Pre Post Pre Post fu Post Pre Post 
BIT 4 5 4 5 5 3 2 
UPG 5 4 3 4 3 4 4 
STA 3 2 2 2 3 3 
MAJ 2 2 4 2 4 
ao 3 5 3 5 2 5 5 
The dependence of statistical difference on the approach adopted is 
demonstrated in Table A8-20. The table shows four measures of correlation. The first 
two, Spearman and Kendall, are standard measures of correlation for rank data. The 
second two are variations of Kendall correlation. The first uses Kendall distance 
between ranks for Bitumenise and Close, the second for Close only. The rationale for 
doing so is based on the finding in Chapter 7 that jurors tended to weigh certain types of 
shift more so that others when self-assessing change in preferences.3 
3 It was found in Chapter 7 that jurors appeared to place greatest significance to changes to thei.r positions 
on whether or not the Bloomfield Track should be closed. This was not detected using any of the 
statistical methods alone, but in conjunction with qualitative information, namely each juror's self-
assessment about whether they changed their preference or not. 
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between deliberative stages to examine the subjective-preference dynamics during 
deliberation, which will be explained in more detail as the discussion continues. 
Two preference positions are represented in Figure A8-12 as the two clusters of 
individual plots. Position 1 represents a ' pro Closure' preference ranking. The second 
represents a group of jurors who prefer Bituminisation of the Bloomfield Track. In step 
3 of the factor extraction process the existing factors, represented by the factor axes, 
have been rotated so that Position l and Position 2 lie along the new Factor 1' and 
Factor 2'.2 
The process of calculating each FPR is represented by the 'FPR Calculation' 
stage of Figure A8-12. In short the FPR for a given subjective factor is determined by 
all jurors in proportion to how strongly loaded they are on that factor. For example, 
Juror 1 in the figure is strongly loaded on subjective factor I', so will have a strong 
influence on the FPR l. By contrast, Juror 12 is only weakly loaded on SF 1, but is 
strongly loaded on SF2, such that FPR2 will more strongly reflect her preference. 
Figure AS-12. Derivation of Factor Preference Rank 
Step 4 
Facl'lr lnl•'rprelat:on 
Factor 
Loadings 
FPR Fac1or Preference 
(BT,l..f'G.STA,MAl,0.0) Loadings 
Juror 1 1 00 
Juror 2 0 75 
Juron2 ·1 oo 
.klf'Ot1·100 
Jvtot2 -0.76 
Juror 12 1 00 
That the FPRs should reflect the preference position of the jurors who were 
used to rotate the subjective factors in step 3 of factor extraction is represented in Figure 
A8-12 by the arrow linking the group of jurors with the resulting FPR. The degree to 
which each juror's actual preference agrees with the FPR is represented by the 'factor 
preference loading', also shown in the right-hand side of the figure. 
2 For a good description of this process, see Brown (1993). 
- 429-
A.r:pillix 8: Combired Amlysis of Subjectivity ani Preferen::e 
A.8.1.2. Factor Preference Ranks and Changes between 
Deliberative Stages 
The resulting pre and post-deliberative calculation of FPR from the previous 
section for each of the four subjective factors are shown in Table A8-19. It can be seen 
that that there are indeed differences in FPR between deliberative stages, but there are 
also a number of important similarities, depending on perspective from which the two 
ranks are compared. 
Tab le AB-19. Factor preference ranks 
Factor Preference Rank (FPR) 
PRf5 PRAG OPT SYM 
Option Pu Post Pre Post Pre Post Pu Post 
BIT 4 4 3 2 
UPG 4 3 4 3 4 
STA 3 2 2 2 3 3 
MAI 2 2 4 2 4 
ao 3 3 2 
The dependence of statistical difference on the approach adopted is 
demonstrated in Table A8-20. The table shows four measures of correlation. The first 
two, Spearman and Kendall, are standard measures of correlation for rank data. The 
second two are variations of Kendall correlation. The first uses Kendall distance 
between ranks for Bitumenise and Close, the second for Close only. The rationale for 
doing so is based on the finding in Chapter 7 that jurors tended to weigh certain types of 
shift more so that others when self-assessing change in preferences.3 
3 It was found in Chapter 7 that jurors appeared to place greatest significance to changes to their positions 
on whether or not the Bloomfield Track should be closed. This was not detected using any of the 
statistical methods alone, but in conjunction with qualitative information, namely each juror's self-
assessment about whether they changed their preference or not. 
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Table AS-20. Correlation between pre and post-deliberative factor ranks 
Factor 
Measure of 
Corrleation PRES PRAG OPT SYM 
r sp-•r 0.5 0.7 -0.8 0. 1 
r K,n 0.2 0.6 -0.6 0 
rB/T,CLO 0.25 0.25 -0. 75 0.75 
Y CLO 0 0 -0 . 5 
Using conventional measures of correlation, the results in Table A8-20 suggests 
that Preservation has changed substantially. However, there are some substantive 
similarities. Preservation is associated with low rank for Bitumenisation and Upgrade at 
both deliberative stages, although the actual rank of the two is swapped. The most 
notable change is the increase in rank of Closure from third to fust, as represented by 
lt is notable that the post-deliberative FPRPres in Table A8-19 is the same as the 
Restrictive Access preference, which emerged as dominant during the deliberative 
process.4 This makes intuitive sense. Preservation and RA have already been 
associated in the previous section when discussing trend, where it was found the jury as 
a whole shifted toward Adventure's Preservation-RA position. It is also interesting to 
note that Preservation is by far the most abundant factor throughout the deliberative 
process. With increased intersubjective consensus one could expect it to be associated 
with the dominant preference position. However, its pre-deliberative FPR is different 
to the pre-deliberative aggregate outcome (irrespective of method of aggregation) and 
very different to the post-deliberative FPR. I will attempt to explain this at a later 
point. 
It can be seen from Table A8-20 that the FPRPrag has remained fairly constant, 
except using the latter two measures, suggesting that it has changed just as much as 
Preservation on ' substantive' grounds. However, it was suggested in Chapter 6 that 
Pragmatism is inherently conservative and less focussed on 'radical' solutions, such as 
Bitumenise and Close than conservative policies, such as Status Quo. This is reflected 
in the consistently high ranks for Status Quo and Stabilise for both deliberative stages in 
4 See Chapter 7. 
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Table A8-19-with a first and second rank respectively - such that the two FPR are 
perfectly correlated on these two options, or rMAI,STA = 1. 
The FPR of Optimism has changed dramatically between deliberative stages 
irrespective of measure of correlation, Table A8- l 9 showing an almost complete 
preference reversal. This suggests a prima facie instability in preference construction 
along this subjective dimension. 
Given the level of cognitive dissonance attributed to Symbolism in Chapter 6, a 
similar level of instability in FPR to that of Optimism might be expected. Yet 
preferences associated with Symbolism appear fairly robust - although it is a highly 
unstable factor in terms of factor loadings. Conventional measures of correlation in 
Table A8-20 show a significant level change in FPR between deliberative stages, but its 
position on the contentious issues of Bitumenisation and Closure remain quite constant. 
It can be seen from Table A8-l 9 that Closure in particular is least preferred of all the 
options at both deliberative stages. 
A.8.1.3. Explaining Changes to Factor Preference Rank 
The observed changes to FPR in Table A8-l 9 represent of change in preference 
output associated with each of the subjective species identified in Chapter 6. This may 
simply be due to random variation because really there is no consistency in output at all 
because preferences were not very well constructed along these subjective themes. This 
may or may not hold for pre-deliberative preferences, but is unlikely to be the case post 
deliberation where increased preference construction has been observed across the 
spectrum of subjectivity, particularly when these factors were extracted on the basis of 
preferences. It is possible that the changes may be due to increased preference 
construction, despite evidence of some pre-deliberative construction above. 
lt was observed in section A.8.1. l that Preservation was pre-deliberatively 
associated with a first preference for Stabilisation and post-deliberatively with Closure. 
Assuming constructed preference and the absence of random variation, how might this 
come about? Let us say that an (archetypical) Preservationist begins the deliberative 
process with a view that the Stabilisation is preferable to Closure because of a belief that 
it addresses environmental concerns about damage to the reef by reducing run-off such 
that there are no longer adverse long-term impacts associated with that option, and that 
is best serves the needs of future generations. However, during deliberation the 
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Preservationist discovers that the long-term concerns are not associated with reef 
damage, but incremental and intertwined impacts of the sort identified in Chapter 5 such 
that they find that the only feasible options is to change their first preference to closure. 
Now of course this pre-deliberative individual would not really be voting along 
the lines of a Preservationist, but as a Symbolist. It is possible for them to be both, but 
they can only truly vote according to one. As discussed in chapter 6, there is a varying 
degree of subjective overlap between the four subjective factors such that it is possible 
for an individual to be simultaneously loaded on more than one. Preservation and 
Symbolism have a particularly large overlap (64%)- the largest between all factors. It 
turns out this overlap occurs in just these types of subjectivity considered above, except 
that Symbolism places far greater emphasis on damage to the reef, which was attributed 
to the connection between the subjective factor and the political posturing of 
environment groups. Having been constantly reinforced within the political sphere, this 
claim, in addition to community access, were foremost in the jurors' at the moment at 
the moment of pre-deliberative preference construction - or, 'chronically accessible' to 
use the language of political psychology (for example Fazio, 1986). Thus at the moment 
of preference construction, these exclusive elements of Symbolism, based on symbolic 
politics, interacted with Preservation such that the latter has influenced what would 
otherwise have been straightforward Preservation preference position. It can also be 
recalled from chapter 6 that Symbolism disappeared as a factor altogether during 
deliberation. Thus, Preservation no longer interacted with Symbolism simply because 
the latter barely existed. Consequently, post-deliberative preferences were more 
consistently intersubjectively constructed along the lines of Preservationism. 
Thus, although Symbolism appears to have had a similar impact on post-
deliberative preferences as Pragmatism in terms of factor-preference construction, its 
actual influence was marginal because of its sharp decline in abundance. And, because of 
its pre-deliberative interaction with Preservation, its disappearance led to a more 
coherently intersubjectively constructed preference on that factor. 
The argument thus far is based on speculation. I will now explore it further 
using the empirical data. 
A.8.1.4. Calculation of Factor Preference Construction 
The level of construction can be represented by the following equation: 
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Equation 15. ISPC(factor) = r(SFj'J,PFR'j!) 
where sFJ'' is the juror i's loading on a given subjective factor and FPRj' is the 
loading of their preference rank to the corresponding factor preference rank. I am 
assuming that there is no interaction between the subjective factors in construction 
preferences. 
A.8.2. PREFERENCE TRANSFORMATION: DETAILED 
ANALYSIS OF CAUSES 
A.8.2.1. Assessing Preference Shift due to Subjective 
Transformation 
Although the range of subjective consensus appears to have been comparatively 
static, it was observed in Chapter 6 that significant changes to subjectivity did occur 
during deliberation. Thus, preference construction may not alone account for the 
preference shifts observed. If there was some level of pre-deliberative preference 
construction - even if not intersubjectively shared, ie there were reasons for 
preferences - then adopting the version of the preference construction model outlined 
in Chapter 2, preference shift must in some part be attributable to subjective 
transformation. That is to say that there were reasons for preference shifts other than 
the construction of preference from the miasma of subjective-preference states. Indeed, 
contrary to an emerging perspective in some of the literature concerning preference 
construction, there is nothing to suggest that pre-deliberative preferences were 'made 
up'.s 
Further, the emergence of a significance trend among preference shifts in the 
previous chapter clearly demonstrated most of the observed changes were intentional; 
there was a clear trend in the direction that preferences shifted amongst the jury. That 
s It is notable that these assertions tend to be made in relation to preferences expressed as willingness to 
pay (WTP) for a common good (for example Schkade and Payne, 1994). That individuals have been 
observed as engaging in ' making up' values when responding to WTP questions probably reflects the 
fact that they have no precognition of the issue in monetary terms. Tho has, wrongly, been interpreted 
that individuals do not have constructed preferences about the issue whatsoever, when clearly it is 
possible to hold preferences pertaining desired policy options without having predetermined a WTP. 
This supports further the decision to use preference ranks to measure preference rather than WTP, as 
reported in Chapter 7. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that individuals will better construct 
WTP as a result of deliberation (see Niemeyer and Spash, 2001). For an example of this in practice, 
see Schkade et al (2000). 
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there was a pattern in the shifts suggests there was a reason for this trend that should be 
detectable from the Q sorts. 6 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the interaction between subjective and preference 
transformation is a more complex one than can be portrayed using the undifferentiated 
set of Q statements. However, it is possible at this stage to get a sense of the role of 
subjective transformation in changing preferences. The simplest approach is to plot 
each jurors change in subjectivity against changes to preference; each expressed in terms 
of a correlation.7 Figure A8-13 shows the resulting plot where subjectivity and 
preference are plotted on the x and y axes respectively. Because I am interested in the 
level of change in subjectivity and preference, rather than similarity, the plot is inverted 
such that there is decreasing correlation along each of the axes, representing an increase 
in deliberative shift. 
It is clear from Figure A8-13 that there is a relationship between changes to 
subjectivity and the transformation of preferences during deliberation. The regression 
line and 95% confidence interval are as a dashed line and shaded area respectively. The 
correlation coefficient, r = 0.54 (p = 0.08), is not statistically significant, with such a 
small sample size, but still large enough to suggest that the role of subjective 
transformation is worthy of further exploration. 
6 In Chapter 5 jurors stated reasons for changing their preferences. Not least of these was the attribution 
of changes to information they received during the deliberative processes transforming their pre 
deliberative attitudes and beliefs. 
7 A more precise measure of difference between ranks is that of Spearman distance. However, where the 
number of options for ranking vary between measures, Spearman distances are not directly comparable. 
The standardised measure of Spearman distance is Speannan correlation, which I will use here. 
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Figure AS-13. Plot of correlation of pre and post-deliberative subjectivity 
and preference 
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It is also possible from Figure A8-13 to observe the relative strength of 
subjective-preference transformation of each of the jurors. Adventure's transformation 
is the smallest among the jurors, but not insignificant, as we saw in Chapter 7. (It will 
also be observed in a later section that her subjective transformation was also 
significant.) 
Janine and Julie both occupy the other end of the spectrum, the farmer's 
preference shift being the greatest. It will emerge during the course of this chapter that 
Julie is the only juror whose subjective-preference transformation cannot easily be 
accounted for; that the observed changes are due to a high level of random variation, at 
least at the pre-deliberative stage.8 Janine, however, will emerge during the course of 
this chapter as a particularly interesting case of subjective-preference transformation. 
8 Of all the jurors, Julie had by far the most difficulty in performing the Q sort. English is Julie's 
second language and it was evident that she had difficulty in organising the cards. By the end of 
deliberation, Julie's Q-sorting had improved substantially, having become more familiar with both the 
process and the statements. 
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There are also a number of outliers in Figure A8-l 3, of which there are two 
types. Keith (and, to a lesser extent, Boat) represent the first type, or 'inelastic' 
preference. Each has experienced a comparatively large shift in subjectivity in contrast 
to a small shift in preference. Snoopy on the other hand has demonstrated particularly 
'elastic' preferences, where a small subjective shift has yielded by far the biggest shift in 
preference. 
It is possible that these 'anomalies' are due to measurement error. It may 
simply be that there is no rational explanation; they are simply due to random variation, 
as has been anticipated as case for Julie. Another possibility is that these outliers can be 
explained by preference construction. However, because preference construction would 
only account for large preference shifts relative to subjectivity, this would only 
conceivably apply to Snoopy. Unlike Julie, there is no (qualitative) evidence so far to 
suggest that his pre-deliberative preferences were any less constructed that other jury 
members. 
Alternatively Keith' s conservatism might be accounted for by cognitive 
consistency. However, Keith also managed to explicate reasons for voting the way that 
he did, his arguments being embodied in the jurors' report in Chapter 5. A more 
interesting possibility is that the theoretical framework that has been use to describe 
preference formation so far is inadequate for describing at least certain kinds of 
preference shift. 
(a) Trend in Attitude-Subjective Shifts 
So far it appears to have been an increase in intersubjective consensus and 
subjective shifts among most jurors that have been accompanied by comparable shifts in 
preference. As yet there is have been no indication concerning where all these changes 
are headed to, or coming from. 
The observed trend among preference shifts in Chapter 7 toward a dominant 
(Restrictive Access) preference position has already been noted above. A trend 
subjective dynamics was also observed in Chapter 6. Optimism has declined 
substantially during deliberation, and Symbolism disappeared altogether. If there is 
indeed a relationship between changes to subjectivity and preference, if they are strong 
enough, it should be possible to observe a consistent relationship between these trends. 
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This will particularly be the case if there was at least some level of intersubjective 
construe ti on. 
One approach to examining the relationship between these trends in subjective 
and preference shifts involves the use of each jurors ' pre-deliberative subjective-
preference position as benchmarks against which to correlate the rest of the jury. This is 
done for each juror (j) using the equations: 
. j •-I 
r.1 = - ~r(a(J) a''') where i" j SUBJ n _ } 4i • ' 
for subjectivity, and 
- j 1 -~ (j) (i J . . 
r,Ru = -L, r(x ,x ), where l" J 
n-1 ;. 1 
for preferences. Where, in the case of subjectivity a and x are pre deliberative 
Q-sorts and preference ranks respectively, and i represents each of the remaining jurors. 
Each point ( r}~;; · ip,, ! , r;~~~·•,,,. J) represents the level of agreement with juror j's subjective 
and preference positions respectively. Where U/u81,T)REF) = (1 , 1) there is perfect 
consensus among all jurors. 
The resulting average correlation to that juror's position indicates the level to 
which the remainder of the jury holds a similar subjective and preference position. I will 
use this process for both pre and post-deliberative preferences, but keeping the 
benchmark position against which the remaining jurors are compared constant at pre 
deliberation. In this way it is hoped to detect if there is any consistency among jurors in 
terms of pre-deliberative positions that the jury may have migrated to or from. 
Beginning with the pre-deliberative jury, the resulting plot of subjective-
preference trend is shown in Figure A8-l 4 as stars, with subjective position plotted 
along the x-axis and preference on the y-axis. 
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Figure A8-14. Trend in Subjective and Preference Shifts 
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It can be seen that there is no singularly strong pre-deliberative subjective-
preference position. However, if instead pre-deliberative jurors are individually 
compared with the post-deliberative jury - such that each point represents the extent 
to which there post-deliberative jury agrees with that pre-deliberative juror9 - then a 
clear picture emerges, as shown by the dots in Figure A8-14. 
The results show that there has been a shift toward Adventure (and Matilda's) 
pre-deliberative subjective-preference position and away from those of Janine and 
Snoopy. This suggests that, although there does not appear too much order with the 
pre-deliberative subjective-preference landscape, there are clearly certain types of 
9 Where post-deliberative subjectivity b(iJ and preferences / 1 are substituted for i'J and x (ii . In this case, 
each point cr;~;;·',.. 1.r;;;/""' 1) represents the extent to which the jury (in this case including juror J) 
have moved to or from j's pre deliberative position. 
-439-
A ~n::Hx 8: Combired Arnlysis of SubjectMty arrl Prefererxe 
subjective-preference positions, which the jury as a whole migrated from and others 
have gravitated toward. 
Moreover, there is an association between these subjective positions and 
preferences that feature at feature at each end of Figure A8-14 to the extent that the 
individuals are most strongly associated with respective subjective (and preference) 
positions. 
Adventure, who represents the subjective-preference position to which jurors 
gravitated, began the deliberative process as the most dominant in her loadings on 
Preservation and Restrictive Access. By contrast, Janine and Snoopy, the two jurors 
from whose pre-deliberative positions the rest of the jury migrate, were strong pre-
deliberative Propitiatists and Optimists respectively (the former being strongly loaded 
on both factors). Additionally, Snoopy's pre-deliberative preference rank is the reverse 
of Adventure's with {BIT, UPG, STA, MAI, CLO}, which I label Maximise Access 
(MA). It is thus plausible that there may be an antithetical relationship between 
Preservation and Optimism in terms of preference construction - which will become 
clearer in the next section. 
However, Optimism- Maximise Access was not the only subjective-preference 
position that the jury migrated from during deliberation. The other position, 
represented by Janine, the most strongly loaded pre-deliberative Symbolist, is 
associated with a preference position that is associated neither with Restrictive or 
Maximise Access. 10 That Janine's apparently Symbolic preference is close to RA than 
is MA is reflected in Figure A8-14 so far as her pre-deliberative preference is higher up 
the y-axis. It also suggests that the relationship between Symbolism and Preservation, in 
terms of preference construction is different to that of Optimism.11 
From the above discussion there is also evidence that the remaining factors may 
also be associated with particular preference positions. In the next section, these 
associations and changes thereto will be explored with a view to refining the 
observations made so far regarding subjective-preference dynamics. 
10 With a Spearman correlation (r) of -0.60 and - 0.10 with Restrictive and Maximise Access 
respectively. 
11 That there is something 'differeot' about the way Propitiatism has been constructed into preference is 
alluded to in Appendix 7. It was found that it does not conform to the dominant "Level of Access" 
preference issue dimension along which most pre deliberative jurors had constructed preferences. 
Section: A.8.2 Preferen:e Transformation: Detailed Aralysis of Causes 
A.8.2.2. Testing The Preference Construction Hypothesis 
In section 8.3.2 of Chapter 8 it was suggested that perhaps much of the 
preference shift observed during deliberation might be due to preference construction. 
Using the undifferentiated suite of Q data this indeed appeared to be the case. However, 
there is far more pre-deliberative intersubjective agreement between how the Bloomfield 
Track issue is viewed and what policy means should be selected than these results 
suggest. If instead of analysing preference construction across the undifferentiated suite 
of subjectivity data, we look at them though the lens of the four subjective factors, then 
a dramatically difference picture emerges. 
The correlation of preference and subjectivity was analysed by calculating 
standardised preference output that is associated with a particular subjective factor. 
Thus, preference and subjectivity can be compared using the correlation of individual 
jurors to a subjective factor to their correlation to the corresponding preference output. 
For the remainder of the analysis, the resulting correlation will be referred to as Factor-
Preference Construction (FPC). 
The results of the analysis of FPC for the four subjective factors are shown m 
Table A8-21 for pre and post deliberation construction on each of the four subjective 
factors. 
Table AS-21. Instersubjective Cocrelation between Factor Loading and 
Preference 
Preservation Pragmatism Optimism Symbolism 
Pre-deliberation 0.43 0.40 0.45 0.50 
Post-deliberation 0.80 0.29 0.05 0.30 
The results in Table A8-21 suggest that there was a higher level of pre-
deliberative Instersubjective consensus than is revealed using the undifferentiated data. 
In other words, it appears that jurors did not simply 'make up' their pre-deliberative 
preferences. Rather, there was some level of preference construction along the lines of 
the subjective factors that were extracted in Chapter 6. 
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A.8.3. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF PRAGMATISM 
In order investigate the role of Pragmatism in pre and post-deliberative 
preferences we need to first establish benchmark against which to compare deliberator 
preferences. Unlike Preservation, we do not have a strongly intersubjectively 
constructed factor preference rank about which we can be sure represents its 'true' 
preference output. We do have the pre-deliberative FPRPres of {STA, MAI, UPG, BIT, 
CLO} as a starting point. We could use this rank as a benchmark on the assumption 
that, because it was constructed prior to the emergence of Preservation as the strongest 
factor upon which preferences were constructed, it best represents the Pragmatist 
position. However, if we were to think about how a truly conservative Pragmatist 
might rank the five policy preferences, one might expect that the actual preference rank 
would switch Stabilisation and Status Quo such that the FPR is {MAI, STA, UPG, 
BIT, and CLO}. For similar reasons of convenience in the use of the term Restrictive 
Access, I shall label this preference ordering 'Cautious Minimalist' (CM) to reflect 
sequence of options from 'least activity' in terms of policy intervention to 'most 
activity'. 
Using CM as benchmark I will now turn to individual deliberators to assess how 
Pragmatism interacted with other subjective factors, beginning with Keith. Keith is the 
most straightforward case of Pragmatism, it being the only factor on which he is pre-
deliberative loaded; he is also the most strongly loaded deliberator on it. Consequently, 
it is not surprising that his pre-deliberative preference rank corresponds with Restrictive 
Access. 
Once again leaving Julie aside, the next most strongly loaded pre-deliberative 
Pragmatist is Boat. Boat's pre-deliberative preference rank is very similar to the 
Preservationist preference position of Restrictive Access, with the exception of a 
reversed preference of Closure and Bituminise. It is possible that this is due to random 
error.12 However, assuming that Boat carefully constructed all his preferences in an 
12 In most cases among the jury, this appears to have been the case. So far I have been able to account all 
preference ranks. Furthermore, during deliberation deliberators explicated reasons for each and every 
rank, although this applies only to post-deliberative preference. However, there is evidence that as 
individuals move down the list of options there is increased random error associated with each rank. 
For discussion see Morrison (2001). 
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intersubjectively shared way, there is a logical explanation for this switch. In addition to 
Pragmatism, Boat is also strongly pre-deliberatively loaded on Preservation. It is 
possible that, although he did not fully activate his Preservationism at the moment of 
preference construction, it may have played a role at the point of choosing between 
Bituminise and Closure for his final preference such that the former was instead 
relegated. In terms of preference dynamics, the 'activation of Preservation' hypothesis 
also appears work in this case. Following deliberation, his subjectivity has increasingly 
shifted form Preservation to Pragmatism. Yet, his preferences have shifted in the 
direction of Restrictive Access. This could be due to a similar, non-linear, interaction 
between these two subjective factors to that attributed to Optimism above. 
A similar dynamic to Boat can be observed in the case of Aswad, except that the 
influences on her preference appear to be spread among all four factors. At first blush 
the strongest pre-deliberative influences on her preferences appear to be a combination 
Pragmatism and Optimism. It turns out that Aswad's pre-deliberative preference rank 
is the same as the intersubjectively determined factor preference rank for Optimism, or 
{STA, MAI, UPG, BIT, CL0}.13 It is plausible that her Optimism, which is much 
more strongly associated with development, led her to choose Stabilisation, which is a 
slightly more ' active' option than the Status Quo. However, I have already precluded a 
strong interaction between these factors in constructing preferences. It is, therefore, 
more plausible that her Propitiatism led her to favour that option in the belief that it 
would reduce sediment run-off that she believed to be affecting the onshore reefs. 
Further supporting the activation hypothesis, as in the case of Boat, it appears that 
Aswad's Preservationism was activated during deliberation, with a resultant shift 
toward the Restrictive Access position, though still retaining some measure of 
Pragmatism by ran.king the Status Quo first. 
The same dynamic can again be observed in the case of Pearl, although with a 
much stronger shift. With the same pre-deliberative as Cautious Minimalist, Pearl, 
appears to be a straightforward Pragmatist. However, by the end of deliberation, Pearl 
is a thoroughgoing Preservationist, clearly constructing preferences on this subjective 
factor. 
13 See section A.8.1 in Appendix 8 
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From the discussion it appears that main role of Pragmatism in the construction 
of preferences has been to act as a conservative brake, steering preferences in a more 
conservative direction than they might. It also appears that there has been a degree of 
'switching away' from Pragmatism during deliberation such that it has been constructed 
into preferences to a lesser degree relative to Preservation. 
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there was a pattern in the shifts suggests there was a reason for this trend that should be 
detectable from the Q sorts.6 
As discussed in Chapter 8, the interaction between subjective and preference 
transformation is a more complex one than can be portrayed using the undifferentiated 
set of Q statements. However, it is possible at this stage to get a sense of the role of 
subjective transformation in changing preferences. The simplest approach is to plot 
each jurors change in subjectivity against changes to preference; each expressed in terms 
of a correlation.7 Figure A8-13 shows the resulting plot where subjectivity and 
preference are plotted on the x and y axes respectively. Because I am interested in the 
level of change in subjectivity and preference, rather than similarity, the plot is inverted 
such that there is decreasing correlation along each of the axes, representing an increase 
in deliberative shift. 
It is clear from Figure A8- l 3 that there is a relationship between changes to 
subjectivity and the transformation of preferences during deliberation. The regression 
line and 95% confidence interval are as a dashed line and shaded area respectively. The 
correlation coefficient, r = 0.54 (p = 0.08), is not statistically significant, with such a 
small sample size, but still large enough to suggest that the role of subjective 
transformation is worthy of further exploration. 
6 In Chapter 5 jurors stated reasons for changing their preferences. Not least of these was the attribution 
of changes to infonnation they received during the deliberative processes transforming their pre 
deliberative attitudes and beliefs. 
7 A more precise measure of difference between ranks is that of Spearman distance. However, where the 
number of options for ranking vary between measures, Spearman distances are not directly comparable. 
The standardised measure of Spearman distance is Spearman correlation, which I will use here. 
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Figure AS-13. Plot of correlation of pre and post-deliberative subjectivity 
and preference 
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It is also possible from Figure A8- I 3 to observe the relative strength of 
subjective-preference transformation of each of the jurors. Adventure's transformation 
is the smallest among the jurors, but not insignificant, as we saw in Chapter 7. (It will 
also be observed in a later section that her subjective transformation was also 
significant.) 
Janine and Julie both occupy the other end of the spectrum, the farmer's 
preference shift being the greatest. It will emerge during the course of this chapter that 
Julie is the only juror whose subjective-preference transformation cannot easily be 
accounted for; that the observed changes are due to a high level of random variation, at 
least at the pre-deliberative stage.8 Janine, however, will emerge during the course of 
this chapter as a particularly interesting case of subjective-preference transformation. 
8 Of all the jurors, Julie had by far the most difficulty in performing the Q sort. English is Julie's 
second language and it was evident that she had difficulty in organising the cards. By the end of 
deliberation, Julie's Q-sorting had improved substantially, having become more familiar with both the 
process and the statements. 
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There are also a number of outliers in Figure A8-13, of which there are two 
types. Keith (and, to a lesser extent, Boat) represent the first type, or 'inelastic' 
preference. Each has experienced a comparatively large shift in subjectivity in contrast 
to a small shift in preference. Snoopy on the other hand has demonstrated particularly 
'elastic' preferences, where a small subjective shift has yielded by far the biggest shift in 
preference. 
It is possible that these 'anomalies' are due to measurement error. It may 
simply be that there is no rational explanation; they are simply due to random variation, 
as has been anticipated as case for Julie. Another possibility is that these outliers can be 
explained by preference construction. However, because preference construction would 
only account for large preference shifts relative to subjectivity, this would only 
conceivably apply to Snoopy. Unlike Julie, there is no (qualitative) evidence so far to 
suggest that his pre-deliberative preferences were any less constructed that other jury 
members. 
Alternatively Keith's conservatism might be accounted for by cognitive 
consistency. However, Keith also managed to explicate reasons for voting the way that 
he did, his arguments being embodied in the jurors' report in Chapter 5. A more 
interesting possibility is that the theoretical framework that has been use to describe 
preference formation so far is inadequate for describing at least certain kinds of 
preference shift. 
(a) Trend in Attitude-Subjective Shifts 
So far it appears to have been an increase in intersubjective consensus and 
subjective shifts among most jurors that have been accompanied by comparable shifts in 
preference. As yet there is have been no indication concerning where all these changes 
are headed to, or coming from. 
The observed trend among preference shifts in Chapter 7 toward a dominant 
(Restrictive Access) preference position has already been noted above. A trend 
subjective dynamics was also observed in Chapter 6. Optimism has declined 
substantially during deliberation, and Symbolism disappeared altogether. If there is 
indeed a relationship between changes to subjectivity and preference, if they are strong 
enough, it should be possible to observe a consistent relationship between these trends. 
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This will particularly be the case if there was at least some level of intersubjective 
construction. 
One approach to examining the relationship between these trends in subjective 
and preference shifts involves the use of each jurors' pre-deliberative subjective-
preference position as benchmarks against which to correlate the rest of the jury. This is 
done for each juror (j) using the equations: 
for subjectivity, and 
] n-1 
pi = - ~r(xUI x<n) where i,., j 
PREF n _ J -f.?i 1 1 
for preferences. Where, in the case of subjectivity a and x are pre deliberative 
Q-sorts and preference ranks respectively, and i represents each of the remaining jurors. 
Each point (fs1~;/"'' i,r;;;/P" 1 ) represents the level of agreement with juror j's subjective 
and preference positions respectively. Where ('fs~B1 ,r)REF ) = (1, 1) there is perfect 
consensus among all jurors. 
The resulting average correlation to that juror's position indicates the level to 
which the remainder of the jury holds a similar subjective and preference position. I will 
use this process for both pre and post-deliberative preferences, but keeping the 
benchmark position against which the remaining jurors are compared constant at pre 
deliberation. In this way it is hoped to detect if there is any consistency among jurors in 
terms of pre-deliberative positions that the jury may have migrated to or from. 
Beginning with the pre-deliberative jury, the resulting p lot of subjective-
preference trend is shown in Figure A8-l 4 as stars, with subjective position plotted 
along the x-axis and preference on the y-axis. 
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Figure AS-14. Trend in Subjective and Preference Shifts 
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It can be seen that there is no singularly strong pre-deliberative subjective-
preference position. However, if instead pre-deliberative jurors are individually 
compared with the post-deliberative jury - such that each point represents the extent 
to which there post-deliberative jury agrees with that pre-deliberative juror9 - then a 
clear picture emerges, as shown by the dots in Figure A8-14. 
The results show that there has been a shift toward Adventure (and Matilda's) 
pre-deliberative subjective-preference position and away from those of Janine and 
Snoopy. This suggests that, although there does not appear too much order with the 
pre-deliberative subjective-preference landscape, there are clearly certain types of 
9 Where post-deliberative subjectivity bm and preferences JJJ are substituted for a('J and x(i). In this case, 
each point Ci}b;; .1,..i,r~~'i~.;,., i) represents the extent to which the jury (in this case including juror j ) 
have moved to or fromj's pre deliberative position. 
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subjective-preference positions, which the jury as a whole migrated from and others 
have gravitated toward. 
Moreover, there is an association between these subjective positions and 
preferences that feature at feature at each end of Figure A8- l 4 to the extent that the 
individuals are most strongly associated with respective subjective (and preference) 
positions. 
Adventure, who represents the subjective-preference position to which jurors 
gravitated, began the deliberative process as the most dominant in her loadings on 
Preservation and Restrictive Access. By contrast, Janine and Snoopy, the two jurors 
from whose pre-deliberative positions the rest of the jury migrate, were strong pre-
deliberative Propitiatists and Optimists respectively (the former being strongly loaded 
on both factors). Additionally, Snoopy's pre-deliberative preference rank is the reverse 
of Adventure's with {BIT, UPG, STA, MAI, CLO}, which I label Maximise Access 
(MA). It is thus plausible that there may be an antithetical relationship between 
Preservation and Optimism in terms of preference construction - which will become 
clearer in the next section. 
However, Optimism-Maximise Access was not the only subjective-preference 
position that the jury migrated from during deliberation. The other position, 
represented by Janine, the most strongly loaded pre-deliberative Symbolist, is 
associated with a preference position that is associated neither with Restrictive or 
Maximise Access. 10 That Janine' s apparently Symbolic preference is close to RA than 
is MA is reflected in Figure A8- l 4 so far as her pre-deliberative preference is higher up 
the y-axis. It also suggests that the relationship between Symbolism and Preservation, in 
terms of preference construction is different to that of Optimism. 11 
From the above discussion there is also evidence that the remaining factors may 
also be associated with particular preference positions. In the next section, these 
associations and changes thereto will be explored with a view to refining the 
observations made so far regarding subjective-preference dynamics. 
10 With a Spearman correlation (r) of -0.60 and -0.10 with Restrictive and Maximise Access 
respectively. 
11 That there is something 'different' about the way Propitiatism has been constructed into preference is 
alluded to in Appendix 7. It was found that it does not conform to the dominant "Level of Access" 
preference issue dimension along which most pre deliberative jurors had constructed preferences. 
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A.8.2.2. Testing The Preference Construction Hypothesis 
In section 8.3.2 of Chapter 8 it was suggested that perhaps much of the 
preference shift observed during deliberation might be due to preference construction. 
Using the undifferentiated suite of Q data this indeed appeared to be the case. However, 
there is far more pre-deliberative intersubjective agreement between how the Bloomfield 
Track issue is viewed and what policy means should be selected than these results 
suggest. If instead of analysing preference construction across the undifferentiated suite 
of subjectivity data, we look at them though the lens of the four subjective factors, then 
a dramatically difference picture emerges. 
The correlation of preference and subjectivity was analysed by calculating 
standardised preference output that is associated with a particular subjective factor. 
Thus, preference and subjectivity can be compared using the correlation of individual 
jurors to a subjective factor to their correlation to the corresponding preference output. 
For the remainder of the analysis, the resulting correlation will be referred to as Factor-
Preference Construction (FPC). 
The results of the analysis of FPC for the four subjective factors are shown in 
Table A8-21 for pre and post deliberation construction on each of the four subjective 
factors. 
Table AS-21. lnstersubjective Correlation between Factor Loading and 
Preference 
Preservation Pragmatism Optimism Symbolism 
Pre-deliberarion 0.43 0.40 0.45 0.50 
Post-deliberation 0.80 0.29 0.05 0.30 
The results in Table A8-21 suggest that there was a higher level of pre-
deliberative Instersubj ective consensus than is revealed using the undifferentiated data. 
In other words, it appears that jurors did not simply 'make up' their pre-deliberative 
preferences. Rather, there was some level of preference construction along the lines of 
the subjective factors that were extracted in Chapter 6. 
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A.8.3. ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF PRAGMATISM 
In order investigate the role of Pragmatism in pre and post-deliberative 
preferences we need to first establish benchmark against which to compare deliberator 
preferences. Unlike Preservation, we do not have a strongly intersubjectively 
constructed factor preference rank about which we can be sure represents its 'true' 
preference output. We do have the pre-deliberative FPRPres of {ST A, MAI, UPG, BIT, 
CLO} as a starting point. We could use this rank as a benchmark on the assumption 
that, because it was constructed prior to the emergence of Preservation as the strongest 
factor upon which preferences were constructed, it best represents the Pragmatist 
position. However, if we were to think about how a truly conservative Pragmatist 
might rank the five policy preferences, one might expect that the actual preference rank 
would switch Stabilisation and Status Quo such that the FPR is {MAI, STA, UPG, 
BIT, and CLO}. For similar reasons of convenience in the use of the term Restrictive 
Access, I shall label this preference ordering 'Cautious Minimalist' (CM) to reflect 
sequence of options from 'least activity' in terms of policy intervention to 'most 
activity'. 
Using CM as benchmark I will now tum to individual deliberators to assess how 
Pragmatism interacted with other subjective factors, beginning with Keith. Keith is the 
most straightforward case of Pragmatism, it being the only factor on which he is pre-
deliberative loaded; he is also the most strongly loaded deliberator on it. Consequently, 
it is not surprising that his pre-deliberative preference rank corresponds with Restrictive 
Access. 
Once again leaving Julie aside, the next most strongly loaded pre-deliberative 
Pragmatist is Boat. Boat's pre-deliberative preference rank is very similar to the 
Preservationist preference position of Restrictive Access, with the exception of a 
reversed preference of Closure and Bituminise. It is possible that this is due to random 
error. 12 However, assuming that Boat carefully constructed all his preferences in an 
12 In most cases among the jury, this appears to have been the case. So far I have been able to account all 
preference ranks. Furthermore, during deliberation deliberators explicated reasons for each and every 
rank, although this applies only to post-deliberative preference. However, there is evidence that as 
individuals move down the list of options there is increased random error associated with each rank. 
For discussion see Morrison (2001 ). 
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intersubjectively shared way, there is a logical explanation for this switch. In addition to 
Pragmatism, Boat is also strongly pre-deliberatively loaded on Preservation. It is 
possible that, although he did not fully activate his Preservationism at the moment of 
preference construction, it may have played a role at the point of choosing between 
Bituminise and Closure for his final preference such that the former was instead 
relegated. In terms of preference dynamics, the 'activation of Preservation' hypothesis 
also appears work in this case. Following deliberation, his subjectivity has increasingly 
shifted form Preservation to Pragmatism. Yet, his preferences have shifted in the 
direction of Restrictive Access. This could be due to a similar, non-linear, interaction 
between these two subjective factors to that attributed to Optimism above. 
A similar dynamic to Boat can be observed in the case of Aswad, except that the 
influences on her preference appear to be spread among all four factors. At first blush 
the strongest pre-deliberative influences on her preferences appear to be a combination 
Pragmatism and Optimism. lt turns out that Aswad's pre-deliberative preference rank 
is the same as the intersubjectively determined factor preference rank for Optimism, or 
{STA, MAI, UPG, BIT, CL0}.13 It is plausible that her Optimism, which is much 
more strongly associated with development, led her to choose Stabilisation, which is a 
slightly more 'active' option than the Status Quo. However, 1 have already precluded a 
strong interaction between these factors in constructing preferences. It is, therefore, 
more plausible that her Propitiatism led her to favour that option in the belief that it 
would reduce sediment run-off that she believed to be affecting the onshore reefs. 
Further supporting the activation hypothesis, as in the case of Boat, it appears that 
Aswad's Preservationism was activated during deliberation, with a resultant shift 
toward the Restrictive Access position, though still retaining some measure of 
Pragmatism by ranking the Status Quo first. 
The same dynamic can again be observed in the case of Pearl, although with a 
much stronger shift. With the same pre-deliberative as Cautious Minimalist, Pearl, 
appears to be a straightforward Pragmatist. However, by the end of deliberation, Pearl 
is a thoroughgoing Preservationist, clearly constructing preferences on this subjective 
factor. 
13 See section A.8.1 in Appendix 8 
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From the discussion it appears that main role of Pragmatism in the construction 
of preferences has been to act as a conservative brake, steering preferences in a more 
conservative direction than they might. It also appears that there has been a degree of 
'switching away' from Pragmatism during deliberation such that it has been constructed 
into preferences to a lesser degree relative to Preservation. 
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